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Abstract 
A pro-poor approach to upgrade agri-food value chains 
in Tanintharyi region of Myanmar 
by 
Jared Berends 
Following decades of isolation, Myanmar’s continuing transition to democracy, peace-building, and 
economic liberalisation has resulted in sustained economic growth and subsequent reductions in 
poverty. Although Myanmar’s economy is underpinned by its agricultural sector, agricultural 
productivity and profitability are among the lowest in Asia, leading to higher rates of poverty in rural 
areas. With almost 70% of Myanmar’s population engaged in agriculture, small-scale farms are 
critical leverage points for improving the livelihoods of farm and non-farm households. 
In 2017, the New Zealand government approved a five-year project to upgrade agri-food value chains 
to strengthen rural livelihoods in the Tanintharyi Region of Myanmar. Embedded within this 
livelihoods project, this research incorporated action research methods to select upgrading 
interventions that target small-scale farmers in the pork value chain. Small-scale farmers in the 
project’s target villages face multiple production, processing, and marketing constraints and system 
shocks that result in poor quality products that are not viable for higher value markets. Traditional 
pro-poor upgrading approaches primarily rely on qualitative and descriptive data collected through a 
one-time “snapshot” of the value chain. However, the search for interventions to upgrade 
smallholder agri-food value chains needs tools that consider the dynamic and complex nature of the 
chain while allowing for trade-off analysis to strengthen pro-poor decision-making. 
This research used participatory spatial group model building tools to engage a diverse group of 
stakeholders to identify and describe the dynamic processes in the pork value chain system. A 
quantitative system dynamics model of the pork value chain was constructed to account for critical 
feedback loops, structures, and relationships in the system. The model integrated modules of animal 
production, marketing, investment, finance, knowledge, credit, and collective action. The latter two 
modules represent new innovations in agri-food systems modeling. Once validated, the model was 
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used to conduct a comprehensive ex-ante impact evaluation of potential pro-poor upgrading 
interventions, including trade-off analysis across diverse performance indicators, value chain actors, 
and temporal horizons.   
Results showed that technical upgrading activities implemented along with novel producer group 
arrangements brought sustained financial benefits to target communities and outperformed the 
short-term gains generated by these activities in the absence of collective action. A distinct rank 
order of individual technical interventions emerged: (1) establishing animal health workers, (2) 
microcredit, (3) technical training, and (4) artificial insemination. The model showed that a well-
sequenced, multipronged approach with these technical activities enabled a larger number of poor 
households to benefit from pig livelihoods while also reducing risks from environmental and 
economic shocks. The model’s results determined the upgrading strategy of the project: establishing 
producer groups whose members are empowered to produce hybrid pig breeds for the burgeoning 
domestic premium pork market. The institutional arrangements underpinning the producer groups 
must be investor-friendly to encourage investment in value-adding assets and continued patronage 
by members. 
The study demonstrated how a systems dynamics model can engage the complexity within agri-food 
value chains using spatial group model building tools to identify critical problems and relationships in 
the system. Moreover, it demonstrated the merit of integrating such models into rural development 
projects that require ex-ante information about value chain interventions that best sustain growth in 
smallholder incomes. 
 
Keywords: agricultural value chains, inclusive, pro-poor, Myanmar, system dynamics, spatial group 
model building, poverty alleviation  
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Chapter one provides context to this thesis by outlining the challenges facing small-scale farmers in 
Myanmar and the development project and theoretical frameworks that inform this research. It then 
identifies the research problem and objectives, concluding with an outline of the relevance of the 
research and the structure of the thesis.  
1.1 Background 
A country of rich political and cultural history, Myanmar is attempting a triple transition: nation 
building, from 60 years of civil conflict to sustainable peace; state building, from an authoritarian 
military system to democratic governance;1 and economic liberalisation, from a closed centrally-
planned economy to an open, integrated, and transparent market-based economic system (United 
Nations Development Programme [UNDP], 2016). Since the installation of a quasi-civilian 
government signalled the start of this transition in 2011, Myanmar’s economy has made rapid 
progress. The country’s GDP has more than doubled since 2008 and economic growth rates remain 
strong, reaching over 6% per year from 2017 to 2019 (Asian Development Bank [ADB], 2021). 
Myanmar’s poverty rate also declined by one-third over the last decade (World Bank, 2017). While 
headlining as one of the fastest growing economies in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN), Myanmar, remains one of the poorest nations in the region (World Bank, 2014). Myanmar’s 
poverty rate is 32.1% and a further one-third of the population falls within 50% of the poverty line 
(World Bank, 2017). Poverty is much higher in Myanmar’s farms and rural villages, sitting at 38.8% 
(13.8 million poor), compared with 14.5% in towns and cities (1.7 million poor) (World Bank, 2017). 
With almost 70% of Myanmar households (HHs) engaged in agriculture, poverty is strongly 
associated with small-scale farming and correlated with low agricultural incomes and lack of access 
to productive assets (Boughton et al., 2018; World Bank, 2017).  
Taking advantage of Myanmar’s highly favourable climatic conditions for diverse agricultural 
production, approximately two-thirds of the population engage in agriculture, forestry, and fisheries 
for their livelihoods (Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, and Irrigation [MoALI], 2018; Zorya, 2016). As 
a result, the agricultural sector underpins Myanmar’s economy, accounting for nearly 30% of GDP, 
25% of export earnings, and 56% of employment, as well as ensuring food security for the rural poor 
 
1 The work contained in this thesis was completed prior to the military coup that took place in Myanmar on 
February 1, 2021 and, therefore, does not take into consideration the changes in circumstances that resulted.   
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(MoALI, 2018). While there is rich agricultural potential in Myanmar (Raitzer et al., 2015), agricultural 
productivity across all sectors and performance measurements is among the lowest in Asia (World 
Bank, 2016). Low agricultural productivity and profitability are caused by multiple factors including 
insecure land tenure; lack of access to quality seeds, fertiliser, and pesticides; low technology usage; 
poor access to technical extension services; and limited access to affordable credit (MoALI, 2018; 
World Bank, 2018). Commercialisation in the agricultural sector is further inhibited by limited 
knowledge and skills in value addition that meets market demand, crude post-harvest processing and 
storage facilities, and poor access to modern value-adding equipment (MoALI, 2018; World Bank, 
2016). The government has historically underinvested in the sector, leading to weak rural and export 
infrastructure, and poor-quality research and extension services (MoALI, 2018). As a result, small-
scale farms are labour intensive, largely devoid of productive assets, and struggle to profitably 
engage with quality differentiated local, domestic, and international agri-food value chains (VCs) 
(HARP-F & MIMU [Myanmar Information Management Unit], 2018; World Bank, 2016).  
Given that 87% of Myanmar’s poor live in rural areas, small-scale farms are critical development 
leverage points as they are a highly important source of rural incomes for both farm and non-farm 
households (Boughton et al., 2018). Empirical studies have shown that a rise in agricultural 
productivity and commercialisation in developing economies leads to investments and growth in 
non-agricultural sectors and off-farm employment, which in turn diversifies and grows the entire 
economy (International Fund for Agricultural Development [IFAD], 2016; Southgate et al., 2011). 
Recognizing the vital importance of upgrading small-scale farmers, the Government of Myanmar’s 
Agriculture Development Strategy 2018-2023 has prioritized “linking associated smallholder farmers 
to agri-food enterprises within organized value chains” (MoALI, 2018, p.12). Donor agencies in 
Myanmar have also focused their efforts on supporting small-scale farmers to “step-up” into 
commercially successful enterprises (Livelihoods and Food Security Fund [LIFT], 2014). 
In 2017, the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) approved a five-year project 
to upgrade agri-food VCs to strengthen rural livelihoods in the Tanintharyi Region of Myanmar. The 
project is implemented through a quadripartite partnership: World Vision (WV), an international 
non-government organisation (INGO), to implement in-country; VisionFund, a microfinance 
institution (MFI), to provide financial services; and Lincoln University (LU) and the International 
Livestock Research Institute (ILRI) to provide research-informed technical assistance. The Tanintharyi 
Region Rural Income and Livelihood Development (TRRILD) project has three key outputs: (i) 
Producer groups and organisations are established and equipped to engage in markets; (ii) Producers 
are introduced to economic and market engagement opportunities through selected VCs; and (iii) 
Producer groups, organisations, and households are provided access to pro-poor financial services. 
This PhD research was embedded within Output Two of the TRRILD project in that it employed 
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action-research methods to guide the selection of pro-poor upgrading interventions for targeted 
agri-food VCs. Another LU PhD student focused on Output One of the TRRILD project, prescribing and 
implementing novel institutional and governance mechanisms to establish functional producer 
groups (PGs) and producer organisations (POs) to undertake the transactional and value adding 
interventions within the selected agri-food VCs. These two pieces of PhD research were designed to 
be complementary: PGs and POs were to be established in a manner that best enables small-scale 
farmers to capture value-added in the upgraded chains. 
The scope of this research was determined by the TRRILD project’s focus on agri-food VCs in Myeik 
and Palaw Townships of Myanmar’s Tanintharyi Region. Tanintharyi is the southern-most region in 
Myanmar, bordering Thailand to the east and south, and the Andaman sea to the west (Figure 1). 
Located in the coastal agro-zone, the region’s poverty headcount (43.9%) is well above the national 
average (World Bank, 2017). A participatory VC assessment was undertaken by the TRRILD project 
from March to October 2018, selecting pork and rice as target VCs for the project. While this PhD 
research guided the selection of the TRRILD project’s pro-poor upgrading interventions for both the 
pork and rice VCs, this thesis focuses primarily on the pork VC. The research targeted small-scale pig 
producers from 32 rural villages (home to around 9,000 households [HHs]) in Myeik and Palaw along 
with associated VC actors (Figure 2). Research relating to the rice VC is drawn upon in the thesis to 
support findings and insights regarding the methodology used to select pro-poor upgrading 
interventions.  
 
Figure 1: Map of Myanmar 
Source: MIMU (2018) 
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Figure 2: Map of the TRRILD project’s target townships in Myanmar’s Tanintharyi region 
Source: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2014) 
The TRRILD project’s baseline survey (Lyne & Snoxell, 2018) reveals critical insights into the 
livelihoods of small-scale farmers in the target location with selected results presented in Table 1. 
Though livelihoods are diversified, small-scale farming was the primary livelihood strategy for 
targeted rural HHs. More than half of rural HHs earned most of their cash incomes from small-scale 
farming. Moreover, for non-farm HHs, one-half of their business enterprises involve processing and 
trading locally produced food, while 22% depended on small-scale farms for daily wages. The survey 
also indicates high-levels of poverty in the target villages. On average, HHs were earning less than a 
dollar a day per person and over 40% of HHs experienced food shortages during the year, with non-
farm HHs faring worse than farm HHs.  
The research applies a VC framework to strengthen the livelihoods of targeted small-scale farmers in 
the TRRILD project. A VC describes the full range of activities that bring a product or service through 
the different nodes of production to delivery to final consumers (Kaplinsky & Morris, 2000). In agri-
food terms, the VC covers the journey of a product from “farm to fork”. VC approaches were 
originally developed to determine a firm’s competitive advantage (Porter, 1985) and then later 
applied to understand the uneven economic benefits accruing to developing economies as they 
integrated into global production networks (Gereffi, 1994). A key theme that emerged was the role 
of “lead” firms that dictated where value is added among the chain actors (Gereffi et al., 2005). This 
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led to an emphasis on the governance of VCs, driven by transaction costs, in determining how 
producers in developing economies could capture added value and the resultant economic benefits 
(Humphrey & Schmitz, 2002). This research applies these VC concepts of nodal segments, 
governance, transaction costs, and added value to analyse the pork VC in the target region.   
Table 1: Results from TRRILD project baseline survey 
Characteristics  All rural HHs Non-farm 
HHs 
Farm HHs 
Female-headed HHs (%) 32 33 32 
HHs in minority ethnic groups (%) 26 11 39 
HH size 5.20 5.23 5.18 
HHs earning income from farming activities (%) 54 2 96 
HHs earning income from wage work on farms (%) 18 22 15 
HHs earning income from non-farm wage work (%) 50 67 36 
HHs earning income from own business enterprises (%) 24 30 16 
HHs earning income from processing or trading locally produced 
food (%) 
19 15 23 
HH income in 2017, excluding petty wages (US$) 1,310 900 1,654 
Source: Lyne & Snoxell (2018) 
The research adopts a pro-poor approach to upgrade the pork VC in Myeik and Palaw. A pro-poor 
orientation aims to counteract the exclusion of small-scale farmers from value adding chains and 
persistent poverty in farm and non-farm HHs (Seville et al., 2011). This approach extends the scope 
of VC analysis by paying specific attention to the constraints that small-scale farmers face in 
accessing markets, in deficiencies in their resources, physical infrastructure, and operating 
environment, and in the institutional voids that characterise many developing economies 
(Trienekens, 2011). Additionally, a pro-poor approach analyses the distribution of benefits among VC 
actors to prioritize upgrading activities that increase the share of value added (and income) captured 
by small-scale farmers (M4P, 2008). A pro-poor approach evaluates these upgrading activities 
through a wider lens than solely economic impacts. This includes considering poverty, gender, risks, 
labour, and environmental factors, not only for small-scale farmers but also for non-farm households 
(Bolwig et al., 2010). A pro-poor approach seeks pragmatic, “win-win” solutions by identifying 
partnerships that consider the asset and risk profiles of small-scale farmers, power and information 
asymmetries, and the socio-political climate (Bolwig et al., 2010). Proponents of the pro-poor 
approach advocate for action-research methodologies, including ex-ante impact evaluations to select 
appropriate pro-poor upgrading strategies, that are then adjusted iteratively based on the 
monitoring of results (Riisgard, et al., 2010).     
1.2 Research problem  
Small-scale farmers in Myeik and Palaw face significant constraints to entering into and adding value 
within agri-food VCs. The TRRILD project baseline survey reveals small-scale farmers have severe 
restrictions to accessing affordable credit (Lyne & Snoxell, 2018). Combined with irregular cash flows, 
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this creates liquidity problems, meaning farmers are unable to invest in productive assets and apply 
quality inputs to improve farm productivity. Furthermore, inadequate extension services and 
traditional farm practices result in poor quality agri-food products which are not viable for higher 
value markets. These low-quality agri-food products are typically sold at the farm gate or in the 
nearby village to buyers and traders at cash-market prices. While a common set of farm enterprises 
(betel nut, paddy, pigs, cashew, and rubber) are practised across the target villages, there is scarce 
evidence of collective action among farmers. The constraints present in Myeik and Palaw, echo 
conditions small-scale farmers face across Myanmar and other developing economies and lend 
themselves to a pro-poor VC approach (Trienekens, 2011). Arising from these constraints is the 
research’s central problem: how can small-scale farmers and surrounding communities in Myeik and 
Palaw substantively engage in, and meaningfully benefit from, value-adding agri-food value chains?   
To address the central research problem and achieve Output Two of the TRRILD project, a 
methodology is required that accommodates both the dynamic and complex nature of agri-food VCs 
and the need to understand the socio-economic impacts of upgrading strategies. Agri-food VCs, 
particularly livestock ones, are characterised by biophysical delays, cyclical behaviours, and dynamic 
interactions between nodes in the VC (Rich et al., 2011). Traditional pro-poor VC methodologies 
primarily rely on qualitative and descriptive data, are often collected through a one-time “snapshot” 
of the VC and tend to cluster information at the macro- or meso-level (Rich et al., 2011). These 
approaches are therefore limited in their ability to quantify, ex-ante, the impacts of upgrading 
strategies as they do take into consideration the dynamic nature of the VC and the complexity of the 
connections and interdependencies in the VC system (Rich et al. 2011). Traditional approaches also 
struggle to consider the wider consequences and trade-offs (intended or unintended) of upgrading 
activities within or beyond the immediate VC system. This includes understanding how the impacts 
of upgrading interventions are experienced differently by the full range of small-scale farmers, non-
farm households, and other VC actors, along with bringing to light environmental, gender, and social 
concerns (Stoian et al., 2011). Action research has been suggested as an appropriate methodology 
for pro-poor VC interventions (Riisgard et al., 2010). Within a research-informed development 
intervention, tools are required that not only accommodate the dynamic nature of VCs and include 
trade-off analysis based on the project’s finite time, resource, and financial constraints, but also 
allow for wider stakeholder participation that builds ownership of the project’s activities and 
encourages partnerships. Linked to the central research problem is therefore a second question of 
process: what tools appropriately support the selection and implementation of upgrading strategies 
within a pro-poor agri-food VC project? 
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1.3 Research objectives 
The research’s primary purpose is to identify and describe interventions to upgrade pro-poor, agri-
food VCs in the Tanintharyi Region of Myanmar. Operating in an action research paradigm, the 
second and related purpose of the research is to recommend pro-poor upgrading interventions for 
implementation within the TRRILD project.  
These dual purposes are accomplished through the following key objectives: 
i. Identify and describe the dynamic processes and relationships within selected agri-food 
value chains in Myanmar’s Tanintharyi region. 
ii. Analyse the ex-ante impacts of pro-poor interventions to upgrade selected agri-food value 
chains in Myanmar’s Tanintharyi region. 
iii. Describe the pro-poor upgrading interventions recommended for the TRRILD project, 
highlighting initial implementation efforts and short-term outcomes.  
The thesis focuses on the pork VC in Myeik and Palaw as the principal case study to address these 
three research objectives. Systems thinking and system dynamics (SD) tools are utilised as the 
primary analytical framework to achieve Objectives One, Two, and Three. SD principles and tools are 
uniquely placed to capture the dynamic and complex nature of agri-food VCs, and encourage system 
learning that leads to behaviour change among VC stakeholders (Rich et al., 2011; Stroh, 2015). The 
research uses spatial group model building (SGMB) tools to develop richer, spatially contextualised 
qualitative and quantitative SD models of the pork VC in Myeik and Palaw using SD language to 
describe the dynamic elements and sub-modules of the pig VC, highlighting key feedback loops, 
delays, stocks, and parameters (Objective One). The quantitative SD VC model is used to conduct an 
ex-ante impact evaluation of potential pro-poor upgrading interventions, with these interventions 
determined by stakeholders within the SGMB process and TRRILD project (Objective Two). The ex-
ante scenario testing quantifies the impacts and costs of upgrading strategies across VC actors, with a 
focus on small-scale pig producers (Objective Two). The results of scenario testing are then analysed 
to select a concentrated number of upgrading interventions that have multiplier effects across the 
chain and are appropriate for the TRRILD project’s timeframe, resource limitations, and operating 
environment (Objectives Two and Three). Findings from the SD VC models also contribute to the 
TRRILD project’s first output as they help identify PGs and the institutional arrangements needed to 
graduate them to POs that can invest in value-adding assets and joint ventures with strategic 
partners.  
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The choice of SGMB tools to select and support the implementation of upgrading strategies within a 
pro-poor agri-food VC project addresses the second research problem and forms the fourth research 
objective: 
iv. Explore the effectiveness of SGMB tools to engage stakeholders in agri-food value chain 
analysis and upgrading.  
This thesis achieves this final objective by outlining factors that influenced the effectiveness of SGMB 
tools for engaging TRRILD stakeholders in VC analysis, along with highlighting critical lessons learned. 
The study also investigates how SGMB participant understandings of the target VCs evolved through 
the SGMB process. While Objectives One, Two, and Three focus only on the pork VC, Objective Four 
draws on material from SGMB process undertaken to upgrade both the pork and rice VCs in the 
TRRILD project.  
1.4 Relevance of the research 
Primarily, the study provides technical contributions to determine the pro-poor upgrading strategies 
for implementation within the MFAT-funded TRRILD project. Secondarily, the research contributes an 
agri-food case study in rural Myanmar to the wider field of pro-poor VC literature. This case study 
demonstrates the applicability of SGMB tools and quantitative SD models to determine high-impact 
pro-poor VC upgrading strategies. While quantitative SD models have been previously developed to 
analyse agri-food VCs, this research contributes a first-time application of a SGMB process to the 
wider participatory GMB literature. Past examples of SD models of agri-food VCs did not move 
beyond theoretical policy recommendations. However, this research is embedded in a development 
initiative and documents the selection of pro-poor upgrading interventions based on the model’s 
findings and the project’s operational boundaries. This thesis therefore demonstrates an innovative 
methodology for agri-food VC projects: the use of participatory SD tools to identify, ex-ante, high-
impact pro-poor interventions that guide project implementation. Arising from the application of SD 
tools in this case study are two new VC modules (credit and collective action) that can be applied to 
future agri-food system models. Further extending the knowledge base, the model’s 
recommendations and the initial results of selected upgrading strategies are explored in this thesis to 
generate conclusions applicable to VC interventions in Myanmar and other developing economies. 
1.5 Structure of the thesis 
Chapter 1 introduced the research, covering small-scale farming in Myanmar, the TRRILD project, and 
the relevant literature that informs the research’s problems, overall purpose, and specific objectives. 
Chapter 2 begins with a review of small-scale farming’s role in development and VC theories. It then 
traces the characteristics of modern agri-food VCs, considers the problems they create for small-
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scale farmers in developing economies, outlines the pro-poor VC approach, and summarises common 
pro-poor upgrading entry points, including those uniquely emphasised within the TRRILD project. 
Chapter 2 ends with a review of system dynamics and its recent application to pro-poor agri-food 
VCs. Chapter 3 explains the research methodology, building on action research and case study 
principles and tools. Included in Chapter 3 is an overview of two agri-food SD modules, created as 
part of this research for contextualisation to the pig VC SD model. Chapter 4 presents a description of 
the pork VC model, followed by an analysis of the results of the ex-ante scenario testing of pro-poor 
upgrading interventions in Chapter 5. In Chapter 6 the pro-poor upgrading recommendations 
provided to the TRRILD project are discussed along with the effectiveness of SGMB tools and 
subsequent learning. The thesis concludes with Chapter 7 which summarises the research’s key 
findings, theoretical and policy contributions, and challenges as well as offering recommendations 





This chapter provides an overview of VC literature, drawing attention to VC theories relevant to 
small-scale farmers in developing economies. It highlights the characteristics of modern agri-food 
VCs, considers the barriers they create for small-scale farmers, and outlines the pro-poor VC 
approach, including the TRRILD project’s pro-poor upgrading strategy. The chapter ends with a 
review of system dynamics and its recent application to agri-food VCs. 
2.1 The role of small-scale farms in poverty reduction 
On a global-scale, poverty rates are declining. However, over 750 million people still live in extreme 
poverty, of which two-thirds live in rural areas (Food and Agricultural Organisation of the United 
Nations [FAO], 2017). Small-scale farms dominate rural livelihoods, generating 80% of the world’s 
food in Africa and Asia and supporting the livelihoods of around 2.6 billion people (FAO, 2017; IFAD, 
2016). These small-scale farms provide significant opportunities for rural poverty reduction given 
their role in both food security and on- and off-farm income generation (FAO, 2017; Hendriks & Lyne, 
2003; IFAD, 2016). Empirical evidence shows that investments in agriculture produce three to four 
times greater poverty reduction outcomes than investments in other sectors (FAO, 2016; IFAD, 
2016). In developing economies, investments in agriculture produce long-term structural benefits to 
the economy through a virtuous cycle: improved agricultural productivity and commercialisation lead 
to investments and growth in non-agricultural sectors and off-farm employment which diversify the 
economy and result in savings and export earnings which furthers productivity investments (IFAD, 
2016; Southgate et al., 2007). In response to these opportunities, a pro-poor approach is strongly 
supported by the development community to upgrade small-scale farmers within agri-food VC 
(Mitchel & Coles, 2011). 
2.2 Value chains 
A VC describes “the full range of activities which are required to bring a product or service from 
conception through the different phases of production, to delivery to final consumers and then 
disposal after its use” (Kaplinsky & Morris, 2000, p.4). Put simply in agri-food terms, the VC 
documents the journey of products from “farm to fork”. There are two main theoretical foundations 
in the VC literature: (i) Porter’s (1985) focus on the VC and value system to improve the competitive 
advantage of firms; and (ii) the Global VC (GVC) approach used to understand the increasing wealth 
gaps within and between countries because of trade globalisation (Gereffi, 1994; Kaplinsky & Morris, 
2000). 
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Porter (1985, p. 36) conceptualised an individual firm’s VC as the “collection of activities that are 
performed to design, produce, market and deliver, and support its product”. According to Porter 
(1985), firms should concentrate on understanding the breakdown of its VC activities to determine 
the firms’ sources of competitive advantage. The VC’s activities consist of two broad types: primary 
and secondary. Primary activities are directly related to the creation of products and services and are 
further divided into five categories: inbound logistics, operations, outbound logistics, marketing and 
sales, and service. Secondary activities are support services required across the VC, such as human 
resource management, planning, procurement, and technology. Importantly, Porter (1985) contested 
that VCs are systems of interdependent activities rather than stand-alone functions. As a result, a 
change in one activity can have a positive or negative impact on another. Competitive advantage is 
therefore found not only in improving individual activities, but also through optimising and 
coordinating linkages between activities in the VC.  
In Porter’s (1985) framework an individual firm resides in a value system. Porter’s (1985) value 
system is essentially an expanding VC, whereby the firm can link vertically to the VC of suppliers 
(upstream) and buyers (downstream) that are all part of delivering a final product or service. 
Competitive advantage, therefore, also arises from optimising and coordinating linkages between 
individual firms, referred to as “inter-link linkages” (Kaplinsky & Morris, 2000, p.7). Though Porter’s 
terminology was later subsumed (value systems became VCs) and his focus was on strategic decision-
making in firms, the concepts of value systems and inter-link optimisation and coordination are 
foundational to agri-food VC approaches.   
Global VC (GVC) analysis came to prominence in the 1990s out of the growing concern that the 
globalisation of trade was contributing to rising inequalities within and between countries (Kaplinsky 
& Morris, 2000). Gereffi (1994) noted the rise of powerful transnational firms and the integration of 
trade as VCs became fragmented across national boundaries. Observing the links to commodity chain 
approaches, Gereffi (1994) pointed to “lead” firms that controlled and coordinated the VC. Power 
and information asymmetries across the chain resulted in the lead firms (typically from developed 
countries) largely determining value addition and its benefits among chain actors. Building on 
Porter’s definitions, GVC analysis focuses on the dynamic inter-linkages across a productive sector 
(groups of interconnected firms rather than the individual firm) to understand how poor countries 
are integrated into global markets and to determine how economic rent is distributed among VC 
actors (Kaplinsky & Morris, 2000). GVC analysis sought to understand which activities are kept within 
a firm, which are outsourced to other firms, and where the various activities are located (Gereffi et 
al., 2005, p. 79). This analysis would then help identify leverage points for firms in developing 
economies to capture increased value from the chain and prevent a race to the bottom as low-value 
commodity exporters (Kaplinsky & Morris, 2000). 
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2.2.1 Global value chain upgrading 
The upgrading of VCs to enable emerging economies to benefit from integration into the global 
economy is a key concern within the GVC literature (Gereffi & Kaplinsky, 2001). GVC upgrading refers 
to the ability of firms to innovate and increase the value added of their products and processes 
(Giuliani et al., 2005; Humphrey & Schmitz, 2002). Four GVC upgrading strategies are commonly 
described in the literature (Humphrey & Schmitz, 2002; Kaplinsky & Morris, 2000). In the first 
strategy, the efficiency of internal processes is improved, both within and between links in the VC. 
Increases in efficiency can arise from new technologies or the reorganisation of processes. Second is 
product upgrading, which encompasses the introduction of new products within individual links 
within the chain or in the inter-chain relationships. The third strategy, functional upgrading, 
rearranges (or adds to) the mix of activities undertaken by individual firms or moving core functions 
(manufacturing, marketing, etc.) between different links in the VC. The final strategy is inter-chain 
upgrading, whereby an entire new product or service is developed across the VC. GVC theories 
expanded the domestic clustering literature, highlighting the importance of a firm’s external linkages 
across international boundaries, rather than a sole focus on domestic partnerships (Humphrey & 
Schmitz, 2002).   
Industry and contextual forces shape the upgrading strategies available to firms in developing 
economies (Gereffi & Fernandez-Stark, 2016). There is some evidence that upgrading strategies are 
hierarchical with sequential progression possible, as shown in the horticultural and garment 
manufacturing industries (Gereffi, 1999; Gereffi & Fernandez-Stark, 2016). However, Trienekens 
(2011) noted that product and process upgrading strategies are most pursued in developing 
countries, with an associated lower accrual of benefits. Accordingly, Gereffi and Fernandez-Stark 
(2016) asserted that many of the highest value capture activities are in pre- and post-production 
manufacturing services, such as research, design, marketing, and services, which remain in 
developed countries. A key issue, therefore, is for developing economies to capture the added 
benefits of functional upgrading instead of remaining a commodity producer. Evidence shows that 
the inter-related dimensions of power and information asymmetries, lead firms, and chain 
governance largely determine which upgrading strategies are adopted by chain actors and the 
related distributional benefits (Gereffi, 1999; Humphrey & Schmitz, 2002; Kaplinsky & Morris, 2000). 
2.2.2 Value chain governance and transaction costs 
The governance of VCs underpins upgrading decisions and the distribution of benefits accrued by 
chain members (Kaplinsky & Morris, 2001). Gereffi (1994, p.97) defined governance as “authority and 
power relationships that determine how financial, material and human resources are allocated and 
flow within a chain.” VCs are characterised by repeated interaction between nodes, with governance 
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describing the nature of these interactions (Humphrey & Schmitz, 2002). Governance encompasses 
the coordination of VC nodes related to position, logistics, quality standards, and monitoring. Due to 
asymmetric power relationships, VCs are often governed by one or more lead firms that play the 
dominant role in the chain, coordinating and controlling product flows and therefore the accrual of 
economic rent (Gereffi, 1999).  Drawing from case studies, Gereffi (1999) distinguished between 
buyer-driven and producer-driven chains based on the position of the lead firm. In buyer-driven 
chains, buyers play the lead governing role and establish production networks that provide goods 
based on the design and manufacturing specifications of lead firms (Dolan & Humphrey, 2004). In 
producer-driven chains, large manufacturers play the lead role in coordinating backwards and 
forward linkages. These chains are characterized by technology- and capital-intensive manufacturing 
industries. 
Building on the work of Sturgeon and Lee (2001) and Humphrey and Schmitz (2002), Gereffi et al. 
(2005, 2016) conceptualised a typology of governance within GVCs. The five basic VC governance 
types are outlined below: 
i. Market-based relationships or “spot-markets”. Transactions are simple and require limited 
exchanges between actors in the chains. Information about the product’s attributes is easily 
understood and the cost of switching to new partners is low for both parties. 
ii. Modular value chains. Information about the complex transactions is easy to codify. 
Suppliers are contracted to provide products to specifications and take full ownership of the 
supply process typically using generic machinery. Switching costs are low due to low asset 
specificity.  
iii. Relational value chains. Advantageous when actors rely on each other for complex 
information that is not easily learned or transmitted. The interactions between buyer and 
seller are increasingly frequent and complex, involving mutual dependence and higher 
investment in asset-specific production resources (i.e., machinery, people, technology). A key 
requirement is trust built through repeated interactions and social and spatial bonds.  
iv. Captive value chains. Suppliers are dependent on large buyers and face high costs for 
switching products and buyers because of transaction costs and asset specific investments. 
As such, suppliers are “captive” to buyers and subject to higher levels of control and 
monitoring by the lead buyers.  
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v. Hierarchy. Processes are vertically integrated into a single unit and governance takes the 
form of management control. Products and services are developed within the firm due to 
complexity or lack of a capable supplier. 
Bhattarai et al. (2013) postulate that within agri-food VCs, governance or marketing arrangements 
will move through this typology from spot markets to hierarchy as transaction costs between the 
parties involved increase. Transaction costs are defined as the costs of carrying out any exchange 
(Hobbs, 1996). Within the VC, transaction costs occur through the interactions within and between 
the various chain nodes. Ex-ante costs occur before contracting, are typically fixed, and are 
associated with searching for information and contract negotiation (Hobbs, 1996). Ex-post 
transaction costs happen after an arrangement is entered into and are incurred through monitoring 
and enforcement of agreements (Hobbs, 1996). According to transaction cost economics, companies 
select the governance form or vertical coordination that minimizes transaction costs, under 
conditions of bounded rationality and opportunism (Trienekens, 2011, p.58).  
Transaction costs are determined by uncertainty, asset specificity, frequency, and complexity 
(Poulton & Lyne, 2009; Williamson, 1979, 1991). Uncertainty refers to unanticipated changes in the 
circumstances involving a transaction (Bhattarai et al., 2013). Two common categorisations of 
uncertainty are environmental and behavioural (Jaffee, 1995). Environmental uncertainty is related 
to elements outside of a firm’s control, such as weather and global price volatility. Behavioural 
uncertainty arises from incomplete, imperfect, or asymmetrical information which can lead to 
adverse selection and moral hazards (Hobbs, 1996). When elements of the transaction are uncertain, 
VC actors will seek more control over downstream or upstream firms. For example, in agri-food VCs 
uncertainty because of price volatility, weather shocks, or a product’s credence attributes can shift 
governance arrangements from spot markets to relational contracts.  
Asset specificity occurs when one partner in an exchange makes resource investments which are 
specific to that exchange and have little or no value in redeployment (Hobbs, 1996, Williamson, 
1991). There is an increasing risk of hold-up problems as asset specificity increases (Klein, 1996). For 
example, when Firm A in an agri-food VC invests in product-specific machinery or technology, its 
trading partner may opportunistically offer less favourable trade terms knowing that the asset-
specific investment has locked Firm A into the exchange. In VCs, as firms increase their asset-specific 
investments, they seek to strengthen control to offset investments and hold-up risks. These result in 
higher transaction costs and tighter governance mechanisms as firms seek more information about 
partners, fuller contractual relationships, and face potential legal costs through contract 
enforcement.  
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The complexity of transactions also increases transaction costs and encourages a movement away 
from spot markets towards vertical integration (Gereffi et al., 2005). Within simple transactions, 
buyers can easily describe and price the desired product. This makes the costs associated with 
searching and contracting lower as products and quality markers are typically standardized. Asset-
specific investments are also less risky as standard products are manufactured and bought from a 
variety of firms. However, when products and service requirements become increasingly complex, 
coordination costs increase due to higher information needs and time sensitivities (Gereffi et al., 
2005). Complexity also increases asset specific investment which increases the risk of opportunistic 
behaviour.   
The frequency of transactions also influences transaction costs. Recurring transactions between the 
same partners can reduce transaction costs as trust is established and partners seek to protect their 
reputations and opportunity for repeat business (Hobbs, 1996). Meanwhile, the costs of frequently 
searching for partners and negotiating contracts increase transaction costs and can lead to more 
hierarchical governance structures (Bhattarai et al., 2013). 
2.2.3 Contextual drivers of modern agri-food value chains 
Agri-food VCs are shaped by contextual drivers related to inherent biological and environmental 
conditions, and the more recent rise of globalisation, consolidation of retail power, and quality 
differentiated competition (Boehlje et al., 2011; Lee et al., 2012). Inherently high volatility in both 
production and marketing conditions increase the uncertainty of the agri-food industry (Boehlje et 
al., 2011). Agriculture is directly impacted by local environment and biological conditions, such as 
pests, diseases, and extreme weather events, which increase the volatility of production and 
processing. The instability in output and efficiency is further influenced by large swings in agri-food 
commodity prices. The agri-food industry is also characterised by lengthy seasonal biological 
production cycles, which result in time delays to changing market and environmental conditions. 
Additionally, production is often fragmented across different locations and countries, leading to 
coordination problems, and resulting complexity (Boehlje et al., 2011). This provides challenges for 
downstream firms that require products that consistently meet quality, safety, and traceability 
standards.  
The effects of globalisation, liberalised trade conditions, foreign direct investment, and technological 
innovations, have resulted in increasing cross-border trade of agri-food products (Lee at al., 2012). 
The last three decades have seen a rise in transnational agri-food businesses that assimilate 
producers in developing economies into their sourcing networks. Global supply chain networks are 
now able to supply diversified products, year-round, at price points which appeal to mass consumer 
bases (Trienekens & Zuurbier, 2008). This continual supply, originally focused on processed foods, 
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though increasingly fresh produce is traded domestically and internationally for year-round sale in 
supermarkets and retail stores (Reardon et al., 2012).  
Power in global agri-food VCs has generally shifted towards larger buyers (Boehlje et al., 2011). 
Increasingly, consumers around the globe purchase processed food and fresh fruit and vegetables 
from retailers and supermarkets rather than traditional shops or wet-markets (Reardon et al., 2012). 
Since the 1990s, the rise in supermarket and food retail sales has spread to include Latin America, 
Central Europe, Central America, Asia, and Russia. As a result, supermarkets and retailers are 
emerging as the lead firms in domestic and international agri-food VCs (Lee et al., 2012). The change 
to consumer-purchasing decisions is driven by rising incomes, urbanisation, convenience of one-stop 
shopping, increasing role of women outside the home, and concerns over food safety standards 
(Reardon et al., 2012). Meanwhile on the supply side, investments from international and domestic 
retail firms are further supported by modernised procurement systems and government support 
(Reardon et al., 2012). With increased share of the consumer market, supermarkets and retailers 
require supply chains to meet their demands for lower prices, consistent quality, and stringent food 
quality and safety standards. Larger agri-businesses have proven better able to absorb the costs of 
these stringent standards while reducing the transaction costs for buyers, often at the expense of 
small-scale farmers who face significant upgrading constraints (Reardon et al., 2012).  
Ever more food retailers are using quality attributes to distinguish their products from competitors 
(Boehlje et al., 2011). The focus on quality differentiated products results in closer coordination and 
more vertically integrated VCs (Lee et al., 2012). Buyers have typically moved towards a smaller 
group of large-scale suppliers that can ensure their products meet the required food safety, quality, 
and traceability standards. Standards have arisen in response to government regulations, consumer 
concerns and preferences, technological improvements in measuring contaminants, and the risks 
involved in elongated transnational supply chains (Boehlje et al., 2011; Narrod et al., 2009; 
Trienekens & Zuurbier, 2008). Food quality standards cover intrinsic product characteristics and 
increasingly extrinsic characteristics (i.e., credence attributes) of the production process that cannot 
be immediately judged by the consumer (e.g., Fairtrade, environmental sustainability, organic). The 
reliance on credence attributes as a quality differentiator causes transaction costs to rise which leads 
to even tighter control and integration in the agri-food VC (Lee et al., 2012).  
The proliferation and complexity of food standards has mixed benefits for small-scale farmers in 
developing economies (Boehlje et al., 2011; Vorley et al., 2009). While developing economies have 
become more integrated into global food markets due to year-round demand for products, stringent 
standards have increased compliance costs that have excluded many small-scale farmers (Narrod et 
al., 2009; Trienekens & Zuurbier, 2008). Raised compliance costs for small-scale farmers relate to 
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information (how to produce safe food), reputation (how to be recognised as producing safe food), 
and cost (how to find cost-effective technologies for compliance and remain competitive with larger 
producers) (Narrod et al., 2009; Reardon & Berdegué, 2002). Collective action and innovative public-
private partnerships have emerged as key pathways for small-scale farmers to comply with standards 
and enter niche or high-value markets (Narrod et al., 2009). 
2.2.4 Constraints for small-scale farmers in developing economies 
Small-scale farmers in developing economies face numerous production constraints as well as 
considerable barriers to engage in higher-value VCs. While a large volume of literature covers this 
topic, this section briefly outlines the key constraints through the framework of (i) access and 
orientation to market; (ii) resources and physical infrastructure; and (iii) the institutional 
environment (Trienkens, 2011). 
Within developing economies, three general types of market channels exist: local, national, and 
international. These market channels increasingly attach greater importance to quality, safety, and 
traceability attributes through the typology from local to international and, as such, market 
intelligence becomes increasingly critical (Dolan & Humphrey, 2004; Trienekens, 2011). Small-scale 
farmers face challenges accessing market intelligence on product standards, volumes, and pricing 
and lack the social capital to engage with key actors within higher value market channels to 
overcome information asymmetries. This is further compounded by their difficulty in complying with 
standards, reputation for poor quality and reliability, and weak bargaining power (London et al., 
2010; Trienekens, 2011).  
Even once small-scale farmers gain requisite market intelligence, a lack of resources and physical 
infrastructure limits their ability to deliver agri-food products that meet higher value market 
standards. Porter’s (1990) broad definition of resources (i.e., physical, human, knowledge, 
technology, and infrastructure) is useful for framing these constraints. The right balance of physical 
resources is needed to meet agri-food market demands, including, inter alia, water access, energy, 
secure land tenure, suitable agro-ecological conditions, distance from markets, and physical inputs 
(Poulton, et al., 2006; Poulton & Lyne, 2009). Moreover, meeting quality standards for higher-value 
markets requires sustained access to affordable, quality inputs (e.g., seeds, fertilisers, pesticides), 
and efficient pre- and post-harvest services (London et al., 2010; Poulton et al., 2010). A lack of 
affordable credit and savings facilities further inhibits the ability of small-scale farmers to invest in 
quality seasonal inputs and fixed and moveable assets while still maintaining enough working capital 
to offset lumpy investments (London et al., 2010; Milder, 2008). Crop and health insurance, 
important means of reducing risks, are also typically absent (London et al., 2010). A lack of technical 
knowledge and skilled labour often limits the production efficiency of small farms and can prohibit 
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the uptake of new, appropriate farm technologies even when they are available at affordable prices 
(Trienekens, 2011). Infrastructure gaps, common in developing economies, contribute to higher 
transaction costs for small-scale farmers, hampering the flow of products to markets and upstream 
flow of market intelligence (Poulton et al., 2010; Trienekens, 2011). These include poor 
transportation conditions, and unreliable electricity, water, and communication services. 
Infrastructure deficits are amplified by weak healthcare systems, poor social safety nets, and an 
unsupportive regulatory environment (Poulton et al., 2010). 
The institutional environment of developing economies can further restrict small-scale farmers from 
VC upgrading (Trienekens, 2011; Vorley et al., 2009). Institutions are essentially “the rules of the 
game in a society, or more formally, are the human devised constraints that shape human 
interactions” (North, 1990, p. 3). Developing economies are often typified as having institutional 
voids, which occur when institutions that support markets are weak, absent, or negatively impact 
small-scale farmers (Mair & Marti, 2008). Government regulations and policies (regulative 
institutions) may constrain farmers through limited investment in agri-food research and innovation 
(Ruttan & Hayami, 1998), application of unfavourable taxes or policies (Poulton et al., 2006), and an 
inability to enforce contract law (Eaton & Shepherd, 2001). Business institutions can in turn favour 
existing powerful actors and relationships that prevent small-scale farmers from upgrading within 
VCs. Cognitive institutions or socio-cultural norms based on ethnic, gender, or religious lines may 
place limitations of movement, knowledge, innovation transfer, or labour necessary for 
improvements in farm production (Eaton & Shepherd, 2001; Trienekens, 2011).   
2.3 The pro-poor value chain approach 
The increasing realisation of the constraints facing small-scale farmers and the mixed results of 
traditional VC approaches on poverty reduction have given rise to the pro-poor VC approach (Seville 
et al., 2011; Stoian et al., 2012). Also referred to as “inclusive” VCs, the pro-poor VC approach is 
defined by the United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO) (2011, p. 7) as “a 
positive or desirable change in a VC to extend or improve productive operations and generate social 
benefits: poverty reduction, income and employment generation, economic growth, environmental 
performance, gender equity and other development goals.” A pro-poor approach, therefore, places 
small-scale farmers, and the communities in which they reside, at the centre of change. The 
emphasis is on “making VCs work better for the poor” through widening the total amount and value 
of agri-food products that small-scale farmers sell through the chain, while increasing the share of 
value added (or income) that small-scale farmers capture compared to others in the chain (M4P, 
2008). However, it is increasingly acknowledged that “win-win” relationships that strengthen the 
entire VC are necessary for sustainable impacts (Cooper et al., 2021; Stoian et al., 2012; Vorley et al., 
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2009). Thus, a pro-poor approach pays attention to both vertical links (i.e., how VCs integrate local 
livelihood systems of small-scale farmers to upstream and downstream networks) and wider 
horizontal elements and trade-offs. These horizontal elements and trade-offs include an analysis of 
the varying impacts of VC integration within local contexts of poverty, assets bases, risk tolerance, 
gender, labour, and the environment (Bolwig et al., 2010; Stoian et al., 2011). Table 2 provides a 
summary of key horizontal elements and their applications to agri-food VCs. The pro-poor approach 
is also multi-chain, considering local, domestic, and export VCs, with entry points determined by the 
target farmers’ asset bases, the resilience of their livelihoods, and the business case for inclusion 
(Stoian et al., 2012; Vorley et al., 2009).   
Table 2: Summary of key horizontal elements and their applications to agri-food value chains 
Horizontal elements Applications to agri-food value chains 
Participation - Who is participating in and who is excluded from agri-food VCs? 
- What other VCs are small-scale farmers participating in and why? 
Poverty - How does integration within a VC and upgrading impact poverty-levels of small-
scale farmers and the communities in which they live? 
- How do small-scale farmers balance livelihood strategies and how does upgrading 
affect household income, resources, risk, and benefit allocations? 
- What are the impacts of VC participation on a household’s income, non-cash assets, 
and well-being? 
- How do upgrading strategies reinforce or reduce access to key productive 
resources? 
Vulnerability and Risk - How do upgrading strategies increase the vulnerability of small-scale farmers to 
shocks in the agri-food industry? 
Inequality  - What inequalities persist among small-scale farmers and will VC upgrading 
exacerbate or ameliorate these? 
Gender - What are the gender dimensions within small-scale farmer households and how will 
upgrading strategies alter gender dynamics? 
Labour - How does VC restructuring alter the employment arrangements (job loss/creation, 
wage changes, conditions) of community members across the chain? 
Environment - How do VC upgrading strategies affect the environment through emissions and 
resource utilisation and interaction? 
Source: Bolwig et al., 2010; Riisgaard et al., 2010; Stoian et al., 2012.   
2.3.1 Common elements in the pro-poor value chain approach 
Across the various literature streams (theoretical, action research, case studies, toolkits), a common 
pro-poor VC approach has emerged, though terminology varies, and processes may be merged or 
lengthened. First, to ground the pro-poor approach, a contextual understanding of constraints facing 
small-scale farmers is required (Bolwig et al., 2010; Trienekens, 2011). Along with the general agri-
food VC constraints, Bolwig et al. (2010, p.178) argued that a pro-poor approach should seek to 
understand constraints and opportunities as outlined in Table 2. This stance shifts the framing of 
small-scale farmers in VCs away from a homogenous production unit to a diverse set of actors that 
will engage and benefit from VCs in multiple ways. Thus, a pro-poor approach recognises that the VC 
system is dynamic and interconnected, impacting small-scale farmers, and surrounding communities, 
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in different ways at different times, while also reinforcing broader VC constraints and behaviours 
(Stoian et al., 2012; Riisgaard et al., 2010). Additionally, Bolwig et al. (2010) stressed the importance 
of understanding local socio-cultural and political environments, to help identify the powerful actors 
that influence and control chain participation and the relationships which are key to leverage for 
upgrading. 
The second element of a pro-poor approach entails a value chain analysis (VCA) that investigates and 
describes the interactions between the different actors in the chain through a four-step process 
(M4P, 2008; Rich et al., 2011; Trienekens, 2011.). First, a VCA systematically maps out the actors that 
are involved in the chain, covering production, processers, wholesalers, traders, marketers, and 
retailers (M4P, 2008). In mapping the chain, a key distinction is made between vertical and horizontal 
networks (Trienekens, 2011). The vertical dimension describes the flow of goods and services from 
producer to consumer (i.e., farm to fork), while the horizontal dimension highlights relationships 
between actors in the same level of the chain, for example farmer associations. The second step in a 
pro-poor VCA is to draw attention to the role of governance and how it influences the position of 
small-scale farmers within the different chains. Analysing chain governance helps recognise lead 
firms and power asymmetries, which determine the location of functions, value addition, and 
benefits of each node (Trienekens, 2011). The transaction cost perspective also helps to identify 
governance mechanisms that can increase small-scale farmers’ bargaining power and lower 
transaction costs for purchasers of their goods (Bhattarai et al., 2013). Identifying value addition and 
the distribution of benefits among chain actors are the third and fourth strands of VC analysis. Value 
is added throughout the chain based upon quality, costs, innovations, etc., and reflected in the price 
of goods and product margins of each actor (M4P, 2008). Identifying how value is added across 
different chain nodes and actors helps determine which market channels and upgrading strategies 
are within reach of small-scale farmers considering context, governance mechanisms, asset bases, 
and resources available for upgrading (Bolwig et al., 2010) 
The final element of the pro-poor approach is the selection of appropriate VC upgrading strategies 
based on findings from the detailed VCA that was informed by context and constraints. Building on 
GVC literature, four broad pro-poor upgrading strategies for small-scale farmers within agri-food VCs 
are commonly identified (Bolwig et al., 2010; Kilelu et al., 2017; Trienekens, 2011): 
i. Improving process or product. These strategies cover improvements within the same node by 
utilising technology or management gains. Process upgrades improve productivity which 
increases the volume produced and/or decreases production costs. Product upgrades cover 
shifting to more sophisticated products or improving quality attributes of an existing product 
that increase unit prices. Product and process upgrades are market-driven and include 
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intrinsic (such as quality, composition, packaging) and extrinsic product attributes (such as 
food safety, traceability, ethical and environmental considerations).  
ii. Changing and/or adding functions. Small-scale farmers can take on new functions in the VCs, 
a process referred to as functional upgrading. The upgrading can take the form of 
downstream functions, small-scale farmers add value by processing, grading, branding, or 
marketing their products, or upstream functions, whereby they provide inputs or services to 
other chain actors.  
iii. Improving value chain coordination. Improving horizontal coordination often involves 
establishing collective marketing arrangements among small-scale farmers to reduce costs 
through bulk orders and to increase revenues and mitigate risks by joint marketing (Poulton 
et al., 2010; Trienekens, 2011). Collective action among small-scale farmers has been shown 
as a precondition for other upgrading strategies, as it strengthens bargaining power and 
reduces transaction costs and risks for upstream actors (Markelova, et al., 2009). Vertical 
coordination improves relationships between two actors at different nodes. For small-scale 
farmers this means “getting a better deal through closer and longer-term business ties with 
buyers” (Bolwig et al., 2011, p.36). Improving coordination involves upgrading governance 
structures in the VC. Increased vertical coordination can come through contract farming, 
relational contracts, or strategic partnerships and can bring benefits to small-scale farmers, 
such as relevant market information, input and service provision, financial services, price 
guarantees, and price premiums. Downstream actors also benefit through access to reliable 
supply of products that meet quality and safety requirements (Eaton & Shepherd, 2001).     
iv. Improving the institutional environment. VCs sit within institutional environments that can 
help support or exclude small-scale farmers from upgrading (London et al., 2009; Trienekens, 
2011). Given the wide-range of institutional voids, a targeted approach needs to consider the 
political will, resources available, and the time horizons required to bring about change 
(Bolwig et al., 2010; Kilelu et al., 2017; Mitchell et al., 2009). 
2.3.2 Selection of pro-poor upgrading strategies  
These four general pro-poor upgrading strategies are mutually reinforcing, and several strategies can 
be selected to multiply the effects (Trienekens, 2011). Bolwig et al. (2010, p.34) suggested that 
upgrading strategies should ideally be evaluated considering horizontal elements, and “action points” 
selected where political pressure or strategic action is feasible in relation to powerful downstream 
actors in the chain. Rather than operating in isolation, a “whole-of-chain” or “win-win” approach to 
upgrading is suggested by increasing the stake of powerful chain actors in the integration and 
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upgrading of small-scale farmers (Riisgard et al., 2010; Stoian et al., 2011). The selection of upgrading 
strategies also depends upon the incentives, resources, capacity, and power of organisations 
facilitating the upgrading, whether they are buyers, small-scale farmers, traders, non-government 
organisations (NGOs), donors, or government entities (Bolwig et al., 2010; Vorley et al., 2009).  
Ex-ante impact evaluations to help select appropriate pro-poor upgrading strategies and iterative 
monitoring to change approaches based on learning and contextual changes are recommended 
(Riisgard et al., 2010). However, there is scarce reference in the pro-poor literature on specific tools 
and methodologies that best support such a research-led approach. This includes tools and 
methodologies that can: (i) factor in the dynamic and complex nature of agri-food VC systems, (ii) 
measure economic and horizontal impacts in the chain, and (iii) build consensus among chain 
stakeholders around “whole-of-chain” approaches. A number of oft-selected “action points” for 
upgrading small-scale farmers have emerged that cut across the four broad upgrading strategies 
outlined above. These are summarised in Table 3. While case-studies on these action points abound, 
there is limited research using more systematic trade-off analysis to help development agencies 
select and allocate limited resources to high-impact action points.    
Table 3: Summary of common pro-poor upgrading action points 
Action point Key elements 
Collective 
action 
- Farmer controlled marketing organisations provide an opportunity for small-scale farmers to 
actively coordinate nodal functions 
- Allows access to higher value markets through (i) pooling of capital to invest in value-adding 
assets and technologies; (ii) strengthening of bargaining power; (iii) enlarging economies of 
scale for inputs (goods and services) and outputs that decrease transaction, production, 
processing, and marketing costs; (iv) lowering the cost and increasing the sharing of market 
information and technologies; and (v) coordinating small-scale farmers’ production and 
harvesting to meet buyer demands for quality, timing, and volume.  
- Common cooperative problems (e.g., free rider, horizon, portfolio, control, and influence 
problems) are tackled through innovative institutional arrangements  
(Esnard, et al., 2017; Lyne & Collins, 2008; Markelova et al., 2009; Narrod et al., 2009; Poulton 




- Small-scale farmers access appropriate technologies that improve yield, quality, and decrease 
production costs. 
-  The appropriateness of technology is determined by the relative price of inputs, i.e., land-
saving when labour is abundant and labour-saving when land is abundant. 
- Improved technology and innovation can flow to small-scale farmers through tighter vertical 
coordination in the VC to meet market demands 
- The public sector, NGOs, and private sector have roles in technology dissemination, but the 
up-take is driven by profit incentives.  










Table 3: Summary of common pro-poor upgrading action points (continued) 




- Provision of credit to small-scale farmers can come from sources internal and external to 
the VC. 
- Internal to the VC: Within contractual and relational governance mechanisms, credit is 
provided to small-scale farmers to purchase quality inputs and productive assets to meet 
contractual obligations around quality and volume. 
- External to the VC: Banks, microfinance, and financial institutions provide credit by 
substituting collateral for business plans, supply contracts, and repayment ability. 
International banks can encourage local banks to lend to rural farmers through loan 
guarantee arrangements. 
- Blended finance models use donor funds as leverage for private capital by decreasing the 
risk profile of investments. 
- Term loans provided through graduated or deferred repayments can assist in alleviating 
cash flow problems associated with investments in productive farm assets. 
(Finnemore et al., 2004; Milder, 2008; Sutton & Jenkins, 2007) 
Contract 
farming 
- Contract farming decreases the investment risks to small-scale farmers and buyers as they 
undertake VC upgrading strategies.  
- Contract farming seeks a “win-win” arrangement based on profitability. Buyers “win” 
through access to agri-food products at the quality, volume, price, and time required by 
downstream actors. Small-scale farmers “win” through a guaranteed market and price and 
access to quality inputs and services, new technology and training, and knowledge which can 
be applied to other farm enterprises.   
- Small-scale farmers tend to prefer written contracts that allow for variable price options 
related to quality.  




- Public-private partnerships connect small-scale farmers to inputs, services, and collection 
centres in “hubs” or “parks” that enable their integration in quality-differentiated retail 
markets. 
- Increasing uptake of Inclusive Business Models (IBMs), where multiple stakeholders work 
together to integrate the poor into agri-food VCs and provide strategic finance and business 
assets.  
- Private sector is incentivised by positive image, profit-making ability, and market position. 
(Narrod et al, 2009; Stoian et al., 2012; Sutton & Jenkins, 2007) 
Alternative 
value chains 
- Niche, quality, safety, environmental, and ethical differentiated VCs are developed through 
improved consumer knowledge on production and processing practices. Examples include 
Fairtrade, organic, and transnational alternative agri-food networks. 
- Importance is increasingly placed on credence attributes of safety and ethical elements 
resulting in relational contractual arrangements between small-scale farmers and 
downstream actors. 
- Consumers depend on third-party certification, labelling, reputation, and participatory 
guarantee systems as an assurance that products meet quality, safety, environmental, and 
ethical requirements.  
(Hatanaka, 2009; Nelson et al., 2016; Ruben & Fort., 2012) 
 
2.3.3 TRRILD project’s pro-poor approach 
The TRRILD project, which forms the context for this research, was designed to address upgrading 
constraints faced by small-scale farmers in Myanmar. Two pro-poor upgrading “action points” 
underpinned the project’s strategy and led to the selection of consortium partners: first, the 
provision of VC financing, undertaken in large part by the TRRILD project’s partner MFI; and second, 
the establishment of producer groups (PGs) for small-scale farmers that can readily transition to 
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producer organisations (POs) capable of investing in value-adding assets. This second strategy was 
supported by LU’s other PhD Researcher within Output One of the project. Although briefly covered 
in Table 3, the literature surrounding these two interventions are reviewed in more detail in this 
section, providing background to the credit and collective action modules newly created within the 
research’s SD model of the pork VC.  
2.3.3.1 Value chain finance 
Accessing credit is a significant barrier for small-scale farmers in upgrading their enterprises in 
developing economies (Miller & Jones, 2010). While farm liquidity can come from multiple sources, 
the timing of cash incomes from farms and low levels of household savings typically mean small-scale 
farmers must rely on credit to upgrade their enterprises. Credit allows small-scale farmers to finance 
seasonal inputs and invest in fixed or moveable assets that improve productivity and profitability 
(Khandker et al., 2016). This credit typically comes from three main sources: (i) informal lenders such 
as moneylenders, friends, relatives, and local loan associations; (ii) VC actors who make loans or 
purchases on credit available to farmers to promote integration; and (iii) formal financial institutions 
like commercial banks, MFIs, and NGOs (Shakhovskoy et al., 2019).  
Unfortunately, access to credit for rural small-scale farmers is tightly constrained in most developing 
economies  (Miller et al., 2018). Globally, there is an estimated US$240 billion demand for 
smallholder finance, of which only US$70 billion, or 30%, is currently met (Shakhovskoy et al., 2019). 
The gap of US$170 billion is concentrated in long-term agricultural investment financing, where 98% 
(US$86 billion) of the demand remains unmet, compared to seasonal agricultural loans in which 67% 
(US$66 billion) of the demand is unmet. There are several well-documented reasons for these 
financial gaps. Because small-scale farmers are typically spread across a large geographic area, often 
with poor infrastructure services, formal providers face information challenges in lending, making the 
assessment, provision, and monitoring of loans highly costly (Kloeppinger-Todd & Sharma, 2010). 
Additionally, small-scale farmers may lack loan collateral, such as land titles, furthering the belief that 
the agricultural sector is high-risk given climate variations and there is insufficient scale to generate 
sufficient returns when compared with urban ventures (Milder, 2008; Pica-Ciamarra et al., 2010).  
Lending from MFIs has rapidly increased since its introduction in the 1970s, now reaching around 140 
million clients a year providing a variety of services beyond small loans, such as savings, remittances, 
and insurance (Convergences, 2019). While initially viewed as a potential development panacea, 
microfinance has been criticised for delivering modest pro-poor outcomes, potentially causing over-
indebtedness, and delivering a mixed performance in the SME sector (Banerjee & Duflo, 2011; 
Buckley, 1997; Cull, 2015; Morduch, 2000). Moreover, the increasing commercialisation of the sector 
has lowered the appetite of MFIs towards more risky borrowers, like small-scale farmers, because of 
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the high-transaction costs involved in accessing farmers and targeting loan offerings to different 
agricultural products (Cull, 2015; Khandker et al., 2016; Milder, 2008; Morduch, 2000). Authors have 
also brought attention to the unsuitability of many MFI loan products to the agriculture sector, citing 
short loan terms that do not synchronise well with farm production cycles and regular repayment 
schedules that preclude borrowers from undertaking investments in lumpy assets (Pellegrina, 2011). 
This mismatch can lead small-scale farmers to favour higher interest loans from informal sources or 
commercial banks over MFIs that offer lower interest rates (Pellegrina, 2011).    
The finance gap facing rural farmers seeking to commercialise their enterprises has been termed “the 
missing middle” by Milder (2008). Farmers seeking to upgrade their enterprises frequently require 
meso loan sizes beyond the amounts of standard MFIs (i.e., greater than US$500) but below the level 
of capital and collateral that necessitates the interest of commercial banks. Meso loans are required 
for bulk purchasing inputs, or for making investments in value-adding assets, such as a rice mill or a 
slaughtering facility. Milder (2008) and Miller and Jones (2010) have documented various options for 
finance from both within and external to the VC that can address the “missing middle;” these 
include, inter alia, financing from the lead firm, loan guarantees, input supplier credit, warehouse 
receipts, and leasing. While case studies have retrospectively highlighted the pitfalls and successes of 
these types of VC finance (Doran et al., 2009; Milder, 2008; Miller & Jones, 2010), an ex-ante impact 
evaluation of the different finance options available to small-scale farmers and producer associations 
is notably, uncommon. This type of evaluation could bring to light the impacts of different financial 
products (e.g., term loans, seasonal loans, leasing, etc.) provided to the various VC nodes (i.e., input 
supplier, individual farmers, cooperatives) allowing for trade-off analysis between the different 
financial products on offer and other possible pro-poor upgrading options. 
Small-scale farmers in Myanmar face severe restrictions in accessing credit. In the last decade, access 
to formal finance in Myanmar has improved from 10% of the general population in 2011 to 48% in 
2018 (Duflos et al., 2013; Jefferies et al., 2018). However, 30% of the general population still cannot 
access any financial services, while 21% rely solely on informal providers that routinely charge high 
interest rates. While the state-owned Myanmar Agricultural Development Bank (MADB) provides 
low-interest loans for seasonal inputs for paddy production, credit facilities for agriculture or VC 
lending outside of this sector remain extremely low (Jefferies et al., 2018). Moreover, the needs of 
commercially orientated farmers are not adequately met because of the small loan sizes and 
shortened loan terms from MADB, commercial banks, and MFIs. As a result of the extremely limited 
outreach of commercial banks and MFIs in rural Myanmar, small-scale farmers generally turn to 
informal lenders for VC financing (Hein et al., 2016; Jefferies et al., 2018). Even though their interest 
rates can range from 5% to 20% per month, there is still a strong demand for informal lending, 
showcasing the importance of credit for small-scale farmers (Hein et al., 2016).   
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The TRRILD baseline survey conducted in 2018 showed small-scale farmers in the project’s target 
villages have severe restrictions to accessing affordable credit (Lyne & Snoxell, 2018). Only 12% of 
farmers borrowed from formal providers, while 48% borrowed from informal moneylenders and 
family, though demand was much higher for formal lenders. Combined with irregular cash flows, this 
finance gap creates liquidity problems, meaning farmers in the target region were unable to invest in 
productive assets and apply quality inputs to improve farm productivity or meet standards 
demanded by higher value markets (Snoxell & Lyne, 2019). With the slow development of the 
commercial banking sector, the TRRILD project’s MFI partner would remain a key provider of formal 
credit in the pork and paddy VCs. Decisions about this MFI’s level of investment and how to 
contextualise current product offerings to promote pro-poor upgrading lend themselves to a 
quantitative analysis that can consider risks and shocks in the system as well as the impacts of 
providing credit to different VC nodes and small-scale farmers with diverse risk and asset profiles. A 
quantitative analysis could prove helpful in shifting the TRRILD’s partner MFI funding towards the 
“missing middle,” by detailing horizontal and temporal impacts of lending to individuals and groups 
for value-adding investments, compared with the MFI’s existing practices of small, short cycle loans 
to individuals.          
2.3.3.2 Producer groups and producer organisations 
As outlined in Table 3, collective marketing, through the formation of PGs and POs, is promoted as a 
pro-poor form of horizontal coordination that can help small-scale farmers to access higher value 
markets (Markelova et al., 2009). While often used interchangeably, a clear distinction between PGs 
and POs is emerging in the literature. PGs are typically less formal with their main function being 
“transactional,” in that they provide training to members, enable bulk purchasing of inputs, and 
collectively market produce. Mwambi et al. (2020) suggest that PGs are more inclusive because they 
require less capital and investment from members. In contrast, POs focus on integration within the 
VC as a means of delivering economic benefits to members (Bijman, 2016). This integration can take 
place either downstream, through the PO providing value-adding services to allow access to high-
value markets, or upstream, where value is captured through the manufacture and supply of inputs. 
The emphasis on marketing or value-adding strategies means POs require larger capital investments 
and improved management capabilities than PGs (Bijman, 2016). New Institutional Economic theory 
has shown that institutional arrangements adopted by POs are critical to incentivise capital 
investments in value-adding assets while also encouraging member patronage to maintain marketing 
and supply contracts (Esnard et al., 2017). The TRRILD project aimed to first establish PGs that would 
later become POs by extending their transactional activities to include value adding strategies. This 
sequence would entail constituting PGs with institutional arrangements that support this transition 
and enable POs to source capital for value adding investments.  
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Traditional cooperatives are susceptible to governance and capital problems when they invest in 
value-adding strategies that require a consistent supply of quality products from members. The 
literature identifies these as free rider, horizon, portfolio, control, and influence problems which 
have led to the evolution of non-traditional and hybrid cooperative structures (Chaddad & Cook, 
2004). In traditional cooperatives members are rewarded for their patronage rather than their level 
of investment. This discourages members from investing in shared assets as benefits accrue to larger 
patrons who have not necessarily contributed capital in proportion to their patronage (Chaddad & 
Cook, 2004). A New Generation Cooperative (NGC) seeks to address this free-rider problem by 
issuing delivery rights to members to ensure  that they invest capital in proportion to their 
patronage. Tradeable delivery rights are a contractual right and obligation of a member to deliver a 
certain volume of product to the PO at a premium price (Moore & Noel, 1995). In the horizon 
problem, members are reluctant to make investments in durable assets because they may not realise 
benefits beyond their membership in the PO. As a result, members give preference to favourable 
prices rather than leaving profits in the PO for further investment. The issuing of non-redeemable 
delivery rights that members can trade among themselves can overcome both the free-rider and 
horizon problems. Tradeable delivery rights can be sold or granted to PO members and traded 
between them, allowing members to capture appreciation on their capital as well as manage their 
farm risk. Appreciable delivery rights also encourage contractual compliance (Moore & Noel, 1995). 
To invest in value-adding assets smallholder POs often require capital beyond the level raised by 
selling tradeable delivery rights to members. POs can raise further capital by issuing a second class of 
shares to members and external investors that are both tradeable and appreciable (Chaddad & Cook, 
2004).   
A recent advancement in the evolution of POs is the emphasis on inclusive business models (IBMs) 
that involve the use of blended finance (Organisation for Economic Co-operations and Development 
[OECD], 2017; Sutton & Jenkins, 2007;). An IBM is defined as a business partnership that promotes 
the integration of small-scale farmers into markets while enabling mutual benefits for both poor 
farmers and other business partners. Kelly et al. (2015) suggest that including existing VC actors and 
more committed and capable small-scale farmers increases the effectiveness of these partnerships. 
Stakeholders in the partnership collaborate with one another to achieve their own objectives, with 
each bringing unique value into the arrangement. One concern in IBMs is the liquidity constraints 
that would prevent POs from fully capturing value-add if investments in assets are largely owned and 
controlled by other partners. To mitigate this risk, POs should adopt institutional arrangements that 
attract external investment while still enabling POs to have majority or meaningful control. Blended 
finance can support IBMs by using cheap capital from donors and public agencies to leverage debt 
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and equity capital from private investors by improving the risk-return profiles of investment that 
enhances pro-poor outcomes (OECD, 2017).  
Consequent to these concerns, the TRRILD project made several provisions to incentivise equity-
sharing arrangements with strategic partners within an IBM. A large portion of the project’s budget 
was set aside to establish two MFI branches that will service the target villages. These funds will 
provide subsidised micro- and meso-loans to PG and PO members to finance on-farm investments 
needed to meet the quality standards of premium markets. The MFI has further provisions to supply 
group meso-loans to POs for investments in value-adding assets. TRRILD project funds are also 
available for increasing the equity contribution of members in PO-owned assets. The project’s equity 
contribution could reduce the risks for potential strategic partners, incentivising their investment, 
while increasing the share of the added value accruing to PO members. Having a private sector 
enterprise partner with a PO in a shared equity arrangement not only leverages financial capital but 
also brings intangible assets and additional technical and management expertise into the PO. This 
arrangement would, in theory, enhance the ability of the PO to access term loans from commercial 
banks to further scale-up investments.  
While the TRRILD project was designed to establish PGs that transition to POs, further quantitative 
analysis could provide insights into the types of specific institutional arrangements that promote 
both inclusiveness and long-term economic viability. Of particular interest is the mix of technical 
interventions and PO institutional arrangements that best promotes the inclusion of poorer 
producers, while also ensuring the PO remains financially viable. The development literature is 
replete with case studies of cooperative failure following the exit of project support or subsidies. As 
such, a pro-poor ex-ante evaluation should investigate the long-term sustainability of PGs and POs, 
while factoring in future price shocks, production risks (e.g., disease, drought, etc.), and capital 
constraints. With tight capital markets in Myanmar, the TRRILD project would further benefit from 
understanding the trade-off between retained earnings and price premiums/rebates in PGs and POs 
that would deliver both technical services to members and investments in value-adding assets. The 
use of an SD model could also provide insights into how and where the TRRILD project should 
allocate its cheap capital to incentivise investments from strategic partners. This decision would 
incorporate the level of pro-poor and financial impacts in the system generated from different MFI 
loan products, and the potential returns to a strategic partner’s equity investment in a shared value-
adding asset. 
2.3.4 Knowledge gaps in the pro-poor value chain approach 
Pro-poor VC approaches remain at the forefront of poverty reduction strategies; however, gaps 
regarding the effectiveness of commonly used pro-poor tools and their contribution to poverty 
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reduction exist (Stoian et al., 2012). Traditional pro-poor VCA tools are primarily qualitative and 
descriptive, lacking rich quantitative data that captures the dynamic nature of agri-food VC systems 
(Rich et al., 2011). When present, quantitative data analysis generally covers profits and margins 
within segments and channels and is therefore insufficient to support robust decision making and 
consider critical horizontal elements (Bolwig et al., 2010; Rich et al., 2011). Stoian et al. (2012) 
further notes the tendency for pro-poor VCA tools to deduce household-level economic impacts from 
enterprise level outcomes and the failure to take into consideration external factors in the 
institutional environment or market context and the interconnectedness of VCs. This oversight into 
the interconnectedness of VCs, communities, and household systems, means traditional pro-poor 
approaches often fail to account for changes in livelihood assets (i.e., human, social, natural, physical, 
and financial) in their analysis, leading to positive (and negative) feedback loops being largely absent 
from decisions on high-impact upgrading strategies (Stoian et al., 2012).    
Further, Riisgaard et al. (2010) assert that action research methods should be employed to diagnose 
problems, find and quantify solutions, and implement pro-poor VC upgrading activities, listing ex-
ante impact evaluations as a tool to select a “best-bet” strategy. Rich et al. (2011) support this 
pragmatic shift, arguing that given the multi-functionality, complexity, and pro-poor relevance of 
agri-food VCs, the focus should move from tools that diagnose problems towards tools that quantify 
the impact of potential solutions. However, traditional descriptive VCA are limited in their ability to 
quantify, ex-ante, the impacts of potential upgrading strategies as they do not sufficiently consider 
the wider consequences and trade-offs (intended, or unintended) of upgrading strategies both within 
the VC system (i.e., impact on other nodes and actors) but also on small-scale farmers and the wider 
community (Rich et al., 2011; Stoian et al., 2011). Traditional approaches are essentially aspatial and 
temporal snapshots of a dynamic system, thereby allowing only static analysis at the enterprise or 
meso-level rather than a focus on household or farm-level livelihoods (Mitchel & Coles, 2011; Rich et 
al., 2011; Stoian et al., 2012) These gaps have led Rich et el. (2011) to propose quantitative system 
dynamics (SD) tools to capture the dynamic, interconnected nature of agri-food VCs and to model ex-
ante impacts across multiple dimensions, various stakeholders, and time horizons. The use of 
multiple evaluation indicators (economic and non-economic impacts across different stakeholders 
across multiple time horizons) enables a comprehensive trade-off analysis, which in turn allows 
decision-makers to select a more targeted and effective strategy for VC upgrading that leads to 
poverty reduction (Stoian et al., 2012, p.57).   
Humphrey and Navas-Alemán (2010) suggest there is a general lack of evidence as to the 
effectiveness of VC approaches on poverty reduction. The lack of ex-post impact evidence is related 
to a general absence of project monitoring data but also the narrow lens of research. Changes to 
employment and income at the farm level are typically measured, rather than the wider household 
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impacts (e.g., poverty, assets and savings, livelihoods, environment, gender) or the impacts on non-
farm households as they engage in production and non-production chain nodes (i.e., processing, 
provision of services or goods). The lack of evidence extends into rural Myanmar, where pro-poor VC 
initiatives are prioritised by the government (MoALI, 2018) and the donor community (LIFT, 2014), 
yet their effectiveness on poverty reduction is largely undocumented and lessons for future 
application are scarce.   
While pro-poor VC action research is presented as a participatory, empowering methodology, 
evidence suggests that decisions on upgrading strategies are typically derived from expert-orientated 
processes (Mitchel et al., 2009). Group Model Building (GMB), a participatory SD modelling tool, has 
recently been applied to increase the involvement of small-scale farmers within pro-poor VCA and 
quantitative model building (Lie et al., 2017). Only a small number of GMB processes within the VC 
context have been documented and there are currently no examples of action research using GMB 
tools to select pro-poor upgrading strategies for implementation within a development project in 
either Myanmar or in other developing economies. The next section of the literature review will 
cover SD and participatory GMB tools and their current and potential application to the pro-poor VC 
approach. 
2.4 System dynamics 
2.4.1 Overview of system dynamics 
System Dynamics (SD) is an analytical paradigm for modelling the structure and behaviour of 
complex systems, a field pioneered by Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) Professor Jay 
Forrester in the 1950s. It was initially applied to understand problems in industrial systems 
(Forrester, 1961), and then further developed to provide quantitative insights into urban (Forrester, 
1970), and world systems (Forrester, 1971). Central to this paradigm is the premise that the 
behaviour of a system is primarily determined by its structure and that systems are complex and 
interconnected (Sterman, 2010). Understanding the components, relationships and boundaries of a 
system is foundational for addressing complex problems, and as Lewis Thomas (1979, p.90) noted “If 
you want to fix something you are first obliged to understand…the whole system.” Though complex, 
systems can be modelled to increase our understanding by only including components and 
relationships which influence system behaviours.  
SD is interdisciplinary, grounded in theories of nonlinear dynamics and feedback control from 
mathematics, physics, and engineering. The relationships in these complex systems are governed by 
nonlinear differential equations, which are expressed through graphical interfaces within an SD 
model, easing model conceptualisation, and sharing across disciplines (Sterman, 2010). Through 
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qualitative and quantitative modelling, SD tools are used in multi-disciplinary settings to solve messy 
problems and support decision-making in complex environments. This includes diverse fields such as 
agriculture, healthcare, environmental science, social housing, defence, and management (Stroh, 
2015; Vennix, 1999). 
SD is commonly applied to solve complex, messy problems where policies (or interventions) are 
contested or have met with previous failures or resistance. Sterman (2001) believed that this “policy 
resistance” occurs when interventions or policies create unanticipated side effects and unforeseen 
reactions from within the system, which then negatively impact on the intervention’s original 
purpose. Humans tend to address urgent, surface-level symptoms rather than underlying causes of 
problems (Stroh, 2015). These quick fixes may bring short-term success; however, when root causes 
are not resolved, the surface-level interventions can lead to unintended problems which further 
compound the original problem (Braun, 2002). Due to time delays in systems, there is a common 
disconnect between our action and the systems reaction, leading us to believe reoccurring problems 
are beyond our influence and our actions had no negative impacts on the system (Stroh, 2015). 
These failures are underpinned by the inability of mental models to cope with the dynamic 
complexity of the systems in which our interventions operate (Sterman, 2000). Humans have limited 
neural ability to process large amounts of information. We typically use simple mental models which 
struggle to consider feedback loops and consequently employ biases and heuristics based on 
previous experiences and our environment when making decisions (Kahneman, 2011; Vennix, 1999). 
By contrast, systems often produce counterintuitive results because of the changing interactions of 
multiple agents over time (Sterman, 2000). This dynamic complexity may arise from various causes, 
but the most challenging for our mental models are feedbacks, accumulations, time delays, and 
nonlinearities in the system (Sterman, 2001).  
Complexity within systems arise from feedback (or interactions) among the components of the 
systems, rather than the complexity of the components themselves (Sterman, 2002). Feedback 
occurs when a change in one part of the system affects other parts of the system, which in turn 
impacts the original component. Given the closed-chain nature of systems, feedback “loops” are 
circular causalities that govern the behaviour of systems through delayed circular causal relationships 
between system components (Hamza, 2014; Ford, 2010). There are only two types of feedback loops 
which affect all SD models: (i) Positive (or reinforcing) and (ii) Negative (or balancing) (Sherwood, 
2002). Positive loops are self-reinforcing, strengthening the original direction of the change and 
therefore amplifying behaviour in the system. As a result, these reinforcing (R) feedback loops bring 
either exponential growth or decay to the system. Negative or balancing (B) feedback loops are self-
adjusting, counteracting and opposing change. Balancing feedback loops therefore seek to balance 
the system towards some level of stasis or equilibrium (Sterman, 2001). A simple example of a 
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reinforcing and balancing feedback loop is shown in Figure 3, using a common SD tool, the Causal 
Loop Diagram (CLD). In Figure 3, pig births lead to a higher pig population which in turn lead to even 
more pig births and an increasing pig population, a reinforcing (R) feedback loop. This is counteracted 
by the balancing (B) feedback loop shown in Figure 3: when more pigs are born into the population 
and it grows, there are more deaths, which reduces the pig population and subsequent number of 
births. 
 
Figure 3: CLD of a simple pig population illustrating reinforcing and balancing feedback loops 
Note: In CLDs the + sign indicates movement in the same direction as the origin of the change (i.e., when the 
pig population increases the birth rate increases and when the pig population decreases the birth rate 
decreases) and the - sign indicates movement in the opposite direction to the origin of change (i.e., when pig 
death rates increase the pig population decreases and when the pig death rates decrease the pig population 
increases). 
Accumulation and dispersal of goods or services are central to the dynamic complexity of systems 
(Sterman, 2001, p.14). In SD language, the term “stock” represents the accumulation of goods or 
services (or simply “things”) at any given time in the system (Ford, 2010). Stocks describe the state of 
critical system elements and can be either tangible, such as household income, or intangible, such as 
the technical knowledge of a farmer, provided that stocks of intangible goods can be measured 
through some sort of quantitative proxy (in the knowledge example, for instance, by use of a scored 
examination). A “flow” represents the actions that change the state of stocks over time (Ford, 2010). 
In other words, flows provide the entry and exit points for goods and services into or out of a stock. 
Continuing the livestock example, a pig population is considered a stock, which increases by the flow 
of births and decreases by the flow of deaths. In SD models, parameters (also called converters) are 
used to determine the rate of flows over time or to affect other parameters. For example, there are 
many factors which would influence births (in flow) in a pig population (stock), such as birth rate, 
number of sows, litter size, etc., as well as deaths (out flow) in a pig population (stock), including 
disease outbreaks, pig breed, etc. These influencing factors are considered parameters and comprise 
nonlinear differential equations and / or graphs over time in an SD model and change the rate of 
flows into and out of stocks. SD models are commonly represented by stock-and-flow diagrams 
(SFDs) with boxes representing stocks, pipes representing inflows and outflows, and parameters 
represented by circles. The earlier pig population example is expanded upon in Figure 4 to showcase 
a simple SFD.     
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Figure 4: SFD diagram of a simple pig population model 
Time delays between an action and its effects on another part of the system are another cause of 
dynamic complexity. When these occur in feedback loops, actors can fail to account for time delays 
in the design of policies and misjudge an intervention’s outcome (Sterman, 2001). Delayed feedback 
can cause actors to continue to intervene and overcompensate, which leads to oscillations and 
instability in a system (Sterman, 2001). Our inability to recognize time delays in systems can result in 
assigning a false positive to a policy or failing to notice a delayed negative (or positive) consequence 
that arose from a specific action (Braun, 2002). 
Within the field of SD, two primary tools are employed to support collective understanding and 
decision-making: qualitative CLDs and quantitative simulation modelling. CLDs are a qualitative tool 
that visually represents the most critical parts of any system (i.e., a closed boundary) and capture 
dynamic complexity through documenting the polarity of relationships between stocks, flows and 
converters and the identification of feedback loops and time delays (Sterman, 2010). Some SD 
practitioners, however, represent CLDs without delineating the system with stock-and-flow 
terminology, preferring to use a simple generic structure (as illustrated previously in Figure 3) to 
enhance learning (Sherwood, 2002). Within CLDs, common patterns of feedback processes that 
underpin complex problems are often present, known as system archetypes (Braun, 2002). System 
archetypes provide insights into reoccurring patterns of behaviour and are transferable across 
different system contexts to aid in the diagnosis and understanding of problems (Stroh, 2015). 
Proponents of CLDs argue that they increase the basic understandings of systems as mental models 
are shared and expanded, helped by the SD terminology providing a common language platform for 
stakeholders to converse with one another (Sherwood, 2002; Vennix, 1996). Moreover, simple CLDs 
help draw attention to the specific feedback loops that have a strong influence on system behaviour 
and outcomes, thus focusing discussions on interventions (Vennix, 1999). However, Sterman (2001) 
counters that given the complexity of feedback loops, delays, and stocks and flows within systems, 
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beyond a system containing only a few simple feedback loops, it is virtually impossible to fully 
understand the dynamics of a system without the use of a quantitative computer-simulated model. 
Computer simulation-based SD modelling (often referred to simply as SD modelling) uses computer 
software to run scenarios of a complex system, represented by stocks, flows, feedback loops, and 
parameters (Sterman, 2001). Mathematical equations are developed to represent relationships 
between the system’s elements and variables assigned to each of the parameters. These non-linear 
differential equations are simulated over time to ascertain patterns of dynamic phenomenon rather 
than to forecast a particular equilibrium point (Rich, et al., 2016). The advantage of SD modelling 
over macro-economic optimisation models, such as partial equilibrium and general equilibrium, is 
that it allows the users to run various intervention (or policy) scenarios within complex dynamic 
systems over time (Sterman, 2001). The short-, medium- and long-term effects of interventions on 
the system can then be compared to a baseline (no intervention) and the outcome of other possible 
intervention scenarios. This type of simulation is particularly powerful in the modelling of biological 
systems, such as agri-food VCs, which are characterized by biophysical delays and cyclical behaviour 
(Rich et al., 2011).  
Computer simulation SD modelling can build on participatory qualitative modelling processes. When 
system elements are developed through multi-stakeholder collaborative processes, computer SD 
simulations can further expand the mental models of participants by enabling them to visualise how 
their choices affect the system and impacts on others (Stroh, 2015). This expanded picture can foster 
consensus building on root causes of problems and leverage points as well as promote ownership 
over change initiatives (Stroh, 2015). 
The nature of the problem under study and the purpose of the model should be clearly understood 
before SD approaches are selected as other system modeling options are potentially more 
appropriate (Millington et al., 2017; Vennix, 1996). SD modeling techniques are suited to 
understanding dynamic complex problems caused by endogenous feedback loops. Compared with 
other system modeling options, SD is particularly powerful when interactions between multiple 
system components (such as biophysical, institutional, and economic) determine dynamic 
behaviours, and a holistic picture of impacts are required to determine trade-offs among system 
actors (Millington et al., 2017; Rich et al., 2011). SD models also support participatory processes as 
they can accommodate perspectives and data from a wide range of stakeholders and can be updated 
iteratively within a stakeholder workshop setting. Rather than focusing on optimisation of one part of 
the system as within a general/partial equilibrium model, SD models allow the comparison of the 
impacts of interventions across diverse system elements. Thus, as opposed to situations that require 
precise economic forecasting instruments, SD models lend themselves to processes that need 
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decision-support tools (Vennix, 1996). Multi-agent-based computer simulation models, however, can 
provide a more detailed picture of impacts than SD models as they accommodate a wider range of 
individual farm or household decisions (Ding et al., 2018). Meanwhile, partial/general equilibrium 
models are suited to macro-level economic analyses when a large body of quantitative data is 
available and region- or country-wide impacts of market policies and prices are sought. SD modelling 
is unique in that it can provide aggregation at the system level and multiple feedback pathways from 
macro- and micro-system elements (Ding et al., 2018). 
2.4.2 Group model building 
Group Model Building (GMB), as a field within SD, was developed to specifically involve a wider 
group of participants in the model building process (Richardson & Andersen, 1995; Vennix, 1996). 
Early SD model building exercises have been criticised by practitioners as expert-oriented processes 
that led to a narrow problem definition, subsequent difficulties in the communication of results, and 
low buy-in of recommendations by decision-makers and the public (Hovmand, 2014). The focus of 
GMB is on participatory processes, where group members exchange their ideas and perceptions and 
explore questions together on the nature and origin of the problem and possible solutions, rather 
than solely focusing on model accuracy (Vennix, 1996). GMB is particularly suited to development 
challenges which can be characterized as “messy problems,” i.e., problems in which there are large 
differences in opinions across diverse stakeholders (Antunes et al., 2006). Vennix (1996, pp. 4-6) put 
forward three purposes for GMB when tackling “messy problems.” First, GMB creates an 
environment in which participants can learn from one another, where an individual’s mental models 
are shared and transformed through interactions. These interactions create a shared understanding 
of the context and problem. Second, consensus among team members on the nature of the problem 
and potential solutions is sought only after sharing of viewpoints and deliberation. Finally, the GMB 
process should foster commitment to the resulting decision and buy-in to follow-up interventions. 
Applying these three principles lends itself to an interactive and iterative SD modelling process 
(Sterman, 2001). 
Common steps have emerged to facilitate a GMB process (Cavana & Maani, 2000; Hovmand, 2014; 
Sterman, 2010; Vennix, 1996). The first step is for the group to clearly identify and define the 
problem and the purpose of the model.  A focused problem is critical as SD models are useful in 
simplifying complex systems, seeking to create an understandable representation of relevant parts of 
a system, rather than the entire system (Sterman, 2002). This is built on an understanding that all 
models are inherently wrong and, therefore, models are only representations of a sub-system 
(Sterman, 2002). Next, the system is conceptualised to understand the nature and cause of the 
problems – a dynamic hypothesis. GMB processes facilitate stakeholders to discuss and define the 
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system and its relationships using CLDs, SFDs, and model boundary diagrams. Depending on the 
nature of the problem and the background of participants, a basic preliminary model can be shared 
with participants for modification, rather than a blank-slate approach (Vennix, 1996).  The output of 
this step is an agreed concept model of the problem, including root causes, feedback loops, and 
dynamic relationships. At this stage of the GMB process, the model can remain qualitative for the 
purpose of increasing understanding, or it can progress towards a quantitative model that is used to 
test solutions to the initial problems.  
Formulating a quantitative simulation model is the next step in the GMB process. This involves 
quantifying the model’s parameters by specifying mathematical equations for each of the 
relationships in the system and initial conditions (Vennix, 1996). Data for the parameters can come 
from a variety of sources, often starting with participants in the GMB process and then extending to 
key informants and secondary sources. Next the model is tested and validated to build confidence in 
the soundness and usefulness of the model (Forrester & Senge, 1980). Validation and testing are 
built on a number of premises, namely: i) there are no absolutely valid models and as such the model 
is built to generate insights for a specific problem; ii) tension between the validity and utility of the 
model should be resolved; and iii) exact validity can never be determined, hence validity is 
determined by the confidence of the end users of the model (Sterman, 2002; Vennix, 1999). 
Common tests focus on the structure and behaviour of the model with results routinely shared with 
key stakeholders to continue to refine the structure and its parameters (Vennix, 1996). Once the 
requisite confidence is built, the model is then used to design and test solutions to the group’s 
selected problems, the stage often referred to as “policy analysis” or “scenario testing” (Vennix, 
1996; Sterman, 2000). At this point, intervention scenarios are simulated through the computerized 
SD model to determine their effect on the behaviour of the system, measured by a variety of 
indicators. Considering the results of this “scenario testing,” policies are then analysed and 
prioritised for implementation by the group.  
The logical next step in a GMB process is the implementation of policies that were identified through 
the GMB process, though this conclusionary step remains contentious (Vennix, 1996). Sterman’s 
(2001) five-stage GMB process leaves out this step and it did not take place in previous GMB 
processes that developed SD models of agri-food VCs (Lie, et al., 2018; McRoberts, et al., 2013). 
While Vennix (1996) included “model use or implementation” as part of the final stage, “modelling as 
learning” is highlighted as the key approach. In this approach, the critical insights from GMB 
processes are conceptual, i.e., improved understanding of the problem, rather than instrumental, 
i.e., actionable outcomes. While enhanced learning and mutual understanding are valuable 
outcomes of GMB, this should be balanced with the original intent of SD tools – providing pragmatic 
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and considered decisions to real-world problems, such as those facing small-scale farmers in 
developing economies (Rich et al., 2011). 
A representative group of stakeholders is selected to participate in the GMB sessions, striving to find 
a balance between local insights, expert knowledge, and participants with the authority to 
implement decisions and motivate others (Hovmand, 2014). Tensions typically exist in participant 
selection between smaller group numbers that encourage participation and harmony and larger 
groups that increase diversity, potential for conflict, and commitment to a decision (Vennix, 1996). 
Vennix (1996) suggested that it is better to have one group member too many than one too few, and 
that groups larger than twelve will require special attention to mitigate negative side effects. For VC 
research, GMB participants would include producers, processors, traders, and retailers as well as 
those from the enabling environment, such as government representatives, and those who will 
implement selected interventions, such as project staff and producer associations (Lie et al., 2017). 
Inherent to participatory processes, special attention needs to be paid to power dynamics among 
participants, definitions of community, the level of participation in group sessions as well as the 
inclusion of female and minority stakeholders (Cook & Kothari, 2001; Gaventa & Cornwall, 2008; 
Guijt & Shah, 1998).    
Facilitation is one of the most crucial elements in a GMB process, with a particular focus on the 
facilitation team’s attitudes, skills, and teamwork (Vennix, 1996). The use of a facilitation team is 
strongly encouraged; the common roles include a lead facilitator, a modeler, a process coach, a 
recorder, and a gate keeper (Hovmand, 2014). To aid in the facilitation of GMB processes, the use of 
scripts is advised (Andersen & Richardson, 1997). Scripts are developed in planning sessions by the 
facilitation team and aim to provide a roadmap for each GMB session, guiding the facilitation team in 
the process, team roles and behaviours, time available, and desired outputs (Hovmand et al., 2012; 
Luna-Reyes et al., 2006).    
GMB was originally conceptualized as a participatory process for engaging clients in SD modelling 
exercises. As Vennix (1996, p.4) stated, “in group model-building the model is created in close 
interactions with a group of policy makers or managers.” Mediated Modelling (MM) extended GMB 
participants beyond “clients,” to include stakeholders in industry, government, academia and the 
public (Antunes et al., 2006), while Community Based Systems Dynamics (CBSD) emerged within the 
GMB discourse in response to the limited number of GMB cases involving community stakeholders 
(Hovmand, 2014). CBSD focuses on engaging communities in the modelling process as a key 
stakeholder, assisting communities to co-create models to problems which affect them and 
empowering and mobilizing communities to advocate for and implement identified change 
interventions (Hovmand, 2014, p.6). While definitions of community are contestable, for the 
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purposes of pro-poor VC upgrading, community participation in a VC GMB process would entail 
representatives of small-scale farmers and other VC actors as active participants in building SD 
model, scenario testing, and selecting upgrading interventions.   
A further evolution of GMB has been the recent addition of spatial group model building (SGMB). 
SGMB builds upon CBSD and GMB principles to include participatory GIS tools to explicitly address 
the spatial aspects and drivers of agri-food systems (Rich et al., 2018). One of the limitations of a 
traditional GMB approach to agri-food VCA is that concerns around space and association with place 
do not inform the analysis. However, Rich et al. (2018) postulate that in agriculture or VC systems, 
prospective interventions will likely have a spatial element, such that nodes in the VC are impacted 
differently according to their geographic location, and patterns of trade and land use co-evolve with 
policies and have corresponding feedback loops. The addition of participatory GIS tools helps 
stakeholders visualize system phenomena, thus improving the quality and pace of information 
collected. It also facilitates greater participation in GMB sessions by accounting for the spatial 
elements that influence the participatory process itself as well as the resulting SD model (Rich et al., 
2018).  
Spatial information can be collected using participatory GIS platforms such as “Layerstack,” a physical 
facilitation tool that uses a series of transparent plastic acetates over a local map. Each of the plastic 
acetates equates to a different data collection layer (similar to a computer-based GIS) that enables 
spatial representation to the system (Mumba, et al., 2017). Layer definitions can include patterns of 
trade, resource use, socio-economic characteristics, and disease outbreaks. Various consumables are 
used to label spatial characteristics by participants, and reference modes and running legends are 
directly drawn on the edges of the map to illustrate trends in spatial elements. Mumba et al., (2017) 
noted that SGMB methods increased participation and motivation among stakeholders with the 
visualisation tools contributing to the quality of data collected. This supports earlier findings that 
visualised SD presentations of complex information aid strategic decision making (Fisher, et al., 
2003). Rich et al. (2018) suggested that further research is needed to test, validate, and codify the 
SGMB process in terms of informing agricultural assessments and the development of SD models.  
2.4.3 Application of system dynamics to the pro-poor value chain approach 
Various toolkits and methodologies to support the pro-poor VC approach have been developed by 
INGOs and development donors. These include the ValueLinks 2.0 Manual on Sustainable VC 
Development (Springer-Heinze, 2018), Market Systems Development (WV, 2019), and M4P: Making 
VCs work better for the Poor (M4P, 2008). Rich et al. (2011) identified limitations to these 
methodologies (see Section 2.3.4) and proposed the use of SD modelling within agri-food VCs to 
simulate and conduct ex-ante impact evaluations of potential interventions.   
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The characteristics of agri-food VCs are well aligned to a systems dynamic approach, as Boehlje et al. 
(2011, p.54) noted, “one should view the decision process in the food and agricultural industry as a 
complex adaptive process…characterised by nonlinear processes…that require broader and more 
powerful analytical frameworks.” SD models can take into consideration the complexity of agri-food 
systems that include, biophysical delays, cyclical behaviour, consumer preference changes, climatic 
changes, land use, institutional effects as well as the resulting dynamic interactions within the VC 
nodes (Fisher et al., 2000; Rich et al., 2011). This includes the ability to model interactions across the 
three parts of a market system, stylised within the Market System Development approach: 
supporting functions, core supply and demand nodes, and the formal and informal rules that shape 
behaviour (WV, 2018). Additionally, exogenous shocks which characterize agri-food VCs, such as 
weather and price volatility can be included in intervention scenarios (Rich et al., 2011). Traditional 
VCA typically maps and diagnoses the VC at one point in time – a static snapshot –, while in contrast 
SD models can address evolving dynamics. Additionally, SD modelling enables quantitative analysis 
and comparisons of intervention scenarios targeting different components of the VC system. For 
example, micro-level interventions targeting a small-scale farmer’s production, such as improving 
access to quality inputs, could be compared to meso-level interventions, such as regional 
infrastructure development, or macro-level policy strategies, such as decreasing tariffs on fertilisers. 
Fisher et al. (2000, p. 282) aptly termed SD models “flight simulators,” as they enable agribusiness 
decision-makers to reflect and experiment with strategic changes that would take years or even 
decades to bear results given time lags and uncertainty in the agribusiness environment. Importantly, 
SD models can analyse the impact of potential interventions on the performance of the entire chain 
and the distributional effects among the VC actors (Lie et al., 2018). This enables ex-ante analysis of 
intervention scenarios on small-scale farmers and other poor households involved in the chain, as 
well as the communities they live in, to ensure upgrading strategies have a pro-poor orientation. 
Within projects with limited funding and discrete timelines, SD models can therefore consider the 
costs and benefits of upgrading interventions to identify leverage points or catalytic action points. 
This trade-off analysis would enable decision-makers to select interventions that have a multiplying 
effect across the VC, to help ensure “win-win” scenarios, that specifically deliver sustained, positive 
impacts to small-scale farmers and surrounding communities. 
Over the last decade, a body of research has demonstrated the utility of SD models to analyse agri-
food VCs and conduct ex-ante analysis of policy interventions. This includes applications covering (i) 
the impacts of disease outbreaks and policy options on livestock systems (Naziri et al., 2015; Dizyee 
et al., 2017; Ouma et al., 2018); and (ii) policy and intervention options for agricultural VCs, including 
beef (Rich et al., 2009; Dahlanuddin et al., 2017), goats (McRoberts et al., 2013; Hamza et al., 2014), 
amaranth (Dizyee et al., 2020), and dairy (Lie et al., 2018). These case studies comprise theoretical 
 40 
studies (in which policy interventions were recommended at the systems or macro- level) and 
applied studies (where micro-level interventions were recommended for operationalization within a 
geographically defined agri-food VC or development project).  
This research extends the methodology used within the applied case studies that generally use a 
standard format. First, once problem statements are agreed upon, an SD model of the VC is 
constructed, typically starting with a qualitative CLD. From the CLD, modules are agreed upon that 
correlate to key constraints and these form the basis of the quantitative, computer-simulated model. 
When the SD model structure is agreed upon by stakeholders, it is parametrized using data from 
GMB sessions, key stakeholders, and secondary sources, and the baseline is simulated to test and 
validate the model. VC upgrading interventions are then simulated to test their impacts on the VC, a 
stage known as scenario testing. These scenarios are aptly described by Lie et al. (2017) as “what if 
scenarios,” for example “what if the quality of livestock feed improves?” The results of the what-if 
scenarios are then analysed against key performance metrics and analysed to derive policy 
recommendations.  
Dizyee et al. (2017) developed a conceptual framework for SD models of agri-food VCs. More recent 
applications have modelled fewer nodes in the VC and / or restricted the model’s boundary to a 
smaller geographic location (Ouma et al., 2018; Lie et al., 2018; Reinker & Gralla, 2018). Building on 
Dizyee et al.’s (2017) conceptual framework, Figure 5 presents an overview of the modules that 
typically constitute a VC SD model.  
 
Figure 5: Overview of the common modules within agri-food value chain models 
Source: Developed by the Author based on Dizyee et al.’s (2017) conceptual framework 
 41 
The production module covers the biological lifecycle of the agri-food product at the farm-level. This 
can include distinct farm enterprises within production systems that supply inputs to one-another; 
for example, wean-to-finish and farrow-to-finish pig systems (Rich et al., 2018; Lie et al., 2018). The 
environment module covers factors that impact production systems, such as climate variability 
(rainfall patterns, seasonal temperature variations); resource management (allocation of land and 
water), biology (pests, disease), and the provision of critical inputs and services (such as the quality 
of seeds, fertiliser, feed, and production equipment). After the production module, agri-food 
products flow into a marketing module that covers the various post-farm segments, such as 
processors, wholesalers, retailers, and consumers. In the marketing module, prices for products are 
calculated along the different VC nodes, typically starting with the farm-gate price. These prices are 
either exogenous variables or computed endogenously. Sterman’s inventory pricing method is a 
common approach for developing endogenous farm-gate prices for products (2010). Costs and 
revenues derived from the production and marketing modules input into the financial performance 
module that calculates the profitability of producers and other VC actors. Typically, expected 
profitability is the main driver of VC actor behaviour. This includes changes in production, processing, 
wholesaling, retailing, and consumption behaviours as well as changes within the coordination 
among VC actors. For farmers, expected profitability alters farm management practices in the 
environment module. The institutional module effects the production, market, and environment 
module through changes to policy, rules, and regulations. These can include changes to price 
controls, input subsidies, extension services, and import/export restrictions.  
SD models generally include structure to model shocks that affect the VC system. While these shocks 
can operate on any part of the system, typically environmental shocks (drought, floods) or price 
shocks (rapid change in demand or supply) are simulated. Additional modules beyond those 
represented in Figure 5 are routinely added to SD models to represent potential policy or 
intervention scenarios. For example, Dizyee et al. (2017), included a module covering improved 
disease control and partial easing of the monopsony of the Botswana Meat Commission. Likewise, Lie 
et al. (2018) developed a knowledge module to simulate the impacts of training farmers, while 
Reinker and Gralla (2018) developed an agricultural input dealer module to simulate the effects of 
various options for providing quality seeds to farmers. 
2.4.4 Gaps in the application of system dynamics to pro-poor agri-food value 
chains 
SD modelling techniques have been used to test ex-ante, “what-if” scenarios across a range of agri-
food VCs, demonstrating the applicability of SD techniques to VCA and their ability to analyse, 
prioritise, and recommend upgrading strategies. The recent introduction of participatory modelling 
techniques has also been shown to increase stakeholder understanding of the dynamic and complex 
 42 
nature of VCs (Mumba et al., 2017; Kopainsky et al., 2017; Lie et al., 2018). SGMB has recently 
evolved as a promising technique to incorporate critical spatial elements and participatory 
facilitation techniques. However, it has only been applied in a handful of cases, and therefore further 
research is required to test its applicability more generally to agri-food VCs in developing economies 
and to begin to codify processes.  
Previous studies using SD modelling have been largely theoretical operating outside of an existing VC 
project and therefore did not follow pro-poor action-research principles as recommended by Riisgard 
et al. (2010). Apart from recent work by Cooper et al. (2021), there has been little emphasis on a 
cost-benefit analysis of recommendations (Lie et al., 2017), trade-offs across different impact 
measurements, VC actors and time horizons, or the capacity and willingness of stakeholders to 
implement interventions (Stoian et al., 2012). Moreover, while these case studies analysed the 
impacts at the small-scale farmer level, they did not incorporate pro-poor principles to extend the 
analysis to horizontal elements identified by Bolwig et al. (2010), such as employment, risk profiles, 
gender, the environment, and the intersection of other livelihoods. Hence, research has not yet fully 
documented the use of SD modelling to select pro-poor, agri-food VC upgrading interventions for 
implementation in a project and then used the model’s findings to continue to guide the project’s 
activities.    
While there are various additional modules that can be built on the core SD model structure outlined 
in Figure 5, there are two notable gaps in the literature. Firstly, the impacts of credit are largely 
absent from agri-food VC SD models, even though credit is a common pro-poor upgrading action 
point (London et al., 2010; Milder, 2008). Reinker and Gralla (2018) noted that importance of credit 
to help farmers purchase quality inputs but omitted this from their model, while Dizyee et al. (2017) 
suggest including credit providers to extend VC models. Second, while the different types of 
collective action are widely discussed in the development literature, a collective action module that 
model’s member behaviour and different institutional arrangements has yet to be developed. A 
simple collective action module was constructed by McRoberts et al. (2013). However, this did not 
capture the decisions that small-scale farmers make regarding patronising the producer association 
or the ability of the produce association to alter the level of retained earnings and price rebates 





This chapter presents the research’s methodology, beginning with the research rationale in Section 
3.1 and strategy in Section 3.2. The research methods are discussed in Section 3.3, including the key 
steps in developing the SD model and other data gathering techniques. Section 3.4 describes the 
research’s ethical considerations. Finally, Section 3.5 outlines the creation of two new SD modules, 
which covers the provision of credit and collective action.  
3.1 Research rationale 
The purpose of this research is to identify, describe, and quantify the impact of pro-poor 
interventions to upgrade the pork VC in the Tanintharyi region of Myanmar. The research is 
grounded in the interpretative social science paradigm as it seeks to understand and describe 
complex human and social interactions with biological phenomena (Neuman, 2011). Further 
following interpretivist principles, the Researcher interacted closely with the phenomenon under 
study, using participatory and qualitative tools to develop quantitative models of agri-food VCs. 
Rather than maintaining a distance from the research subject to avoid bias, the Researcher was fully 
engaged in the process of upgrading VCs with a partiality for pro-poor interventions that benefited 
the project’s target population (Neuman, 2011; Riisgard et al., 2010).  
In the research’s model-building phase the ontological position is interpretivist: agri-food VCs are 
represented by system dynamics (SD) models, following their interpretation and reconstruction by 
the Researcher and model builders (Flood, 2010; Pruyt, 2006). Within the research, system concepts 
are employed in the process of constructing reality, which reflects an assumption that the world is 
systematic (Flood, 2010, p. 276). This position is aligned with Sterman’s assertion that as a 
representation of reality, “all models are wrong” and therefore the focus is on creating “useful 
models” (2000, p.251), and Flood’s (2010, p.276) view that models act as “a pair of spectacles 
through which we can look at and interpret reality.” From a pragmatist position, the research’s logic 
is both inductive and deductive (Pruyt, 2006). Real-world observations, facts, and previous findings 
are induced to construct a “useful” or “least wrong” structural micro-theory, the quantitative SD 
model, which is then deduced to evaluate, ex-ante, the impact of upgrading interventions (Pruyt, 
2006, p. 22).  
The research is both descriptive and explanatory. A rich description of the pork VC (Objective One), 
the ex-ante results of upgrading interventions (Objective Two), and the recommended pro-poor 
upgrading interventions (Objectives Two and Three) are built through mixed methods. Operating 
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within an SD framework, the research highlights critical feedback loops, time delays, and stocks to 
explain the dynamic and complex behaviour of the VCs (Objective One). The research explains the 
rationale for recommending specific upgrading interventions (Objective Two and Three) and 
highlights initial implementation efforts (Objective Three), explaining challenges as well as enabling 
factors that draw conclusions transferable to the wider pro-poor VC literature. Finally, the research 
describes and reflects on the SGMB process, explaining its effectiveness on engaging participants and 
drawing lessons for future application (Objective Four). 
3.2 Research strategy 
This study employed action research for its principal strategy as recommended by pro-poor VC 
literature (Riisgard et al., 2010). According to Reason and Bradbury (2008, p.1), “Action research is a 
participatory, democratic process concerned with developing practical knowing in the pursuit of 
worthwhile human purposes, grounded in a participatory worldview.” Integrated within a 
development project, this research fulfils the action research mandate of identifying effective 
solutions to real-world problems: using participatory processes to select high-impact interventions to 
upgrade a pro-poor VC in Tanintharyi region of Myanmar (Stringer, 2007). With a focus on action, the 
Researcher was actively involved in bringing about change, rather than investigating and 
documenting a change process from the outside (Piggot-Irvine, 2009). This change process was 
grounded in systems thinking, i.e., SD tools were used to construct meaning that represents people’s 
experiences within VC systems (Flood, 2010, p.282). In terms of positionality, the action research 
aimed for reciprocal collaboration (insider-outsider teams) with TRRILD project partners and VC 
actors, striving for equitable power relations where knowledge is jointly developed and owned (Herr 
& Anderson, 2015).     
Four distinctive features of action research underpinned the research strategy. Firstly, action 
research fosters participatory and collaborative partnerships (McNiff, 2016). The research used 
participatory processes that engaged small-scale farmers, VC actors, TRRILD staff, and government 
officials. Moving beyond subjects of the research, these actors collaborated with the Researcher and 
one another to develop the VC SD models and implement upgrading interventions. Relationships and 
knowledge fostered by the model-building process (i.e., the research) extended into non-research 
spaces as VC actors begin to partner and collaborate with each other to improve their enterprises. 
The research’s results were also shared with actors outside of the SGMB process, as powerful actors 
beyond the immediate VC are often required to implement successful upgrading activities (Riisgard 
et al., 2010). This resulted in preliminary discussions with a national supermarket chain to supply 
them with premium pork products. 
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Secondly, a “research in action, rather than a research about action”, approach was taken (Coghlan & 
Brannick, 2014, p.6). The goal of action research is practical knowledge that makes an action more 
effective, while simultaneously extending the scientific body of knowledge (Stringer, 2007). 
Embedded in a development “action,” the research was shaped by the TRRILD project’s boundaries, 
such as resources, budget, and timeline, and its requirement for practical, easy-to-implement 
solutions. Beyond the local and practical, the research broadened the understanding of participatory 
SD modelling techniques and pro-poor VC interventions in developing economies, which benefited 
the wider body of scientific knowledge.  
Thirdly, the research sought to practise transformation towards human flourishing, defined as 
positive and sustainable change to actors, relationships, systems, and the environment (Reason & 
Bradbury, 2008; Coghlan & Brannick, 2014). This included expanding participant mental models of 
the VC system, facilitating positive working relationships among chain stakeholders, encouraging 
wider participation in determining upgrading strategies, and ultimately improving the lives of small-
scale farmers. To answer the call for sustainable change, the research measured impact across short-, 
medium-, and long-term time horizons as well as based on a typology of farmers and other key actors 
in the chain. 
Lastly, a systematic approach to problem solving defined the research (Coghlan & Brannick, 2014; 
Reason & Bradbury, 2008). Lewin’s cyclical understanding of action research was followed, which as 
he describes (1948, p.206), “proceeds in a spiral of steps, each of which is composed of a circle of 
planning, action and fact-finding about the results of the action.” The research drew on common 
cyclical approaches to follow four steps of (i) observation and evaluation, (ii) reflection, (iii) planning, 
and (iv) action which leads to further observation and evaluation (Reason & Bradbury, 2008; Stringer, 
2007). While explained as steps, the research was iterative rather than linear and functioned as a 
continuing spiral of working through the four steps, a practise echoed within GMB literature (Rich et 
al., 2015; Vennix, 1996).  
Two main action research cycles took place and are outlined in Figure 6. The first cycle developed the 
SD model and selected upgrading interventions, starting in July 2018, and finishing in August 2019. 
The second cycle that followed started in September 2019 and finished in December 2020. This cycle 
monitored the TRRILD project and contextual changes in order to revise the SD model and steer 
subsequent upgrading actions. Within the four steps, further action research micro-cycles occurred 
as described by Cardno (2003). For example, after each workshop, an open reflection session was 
held with the SGMB team, which led to updates to future scripts and workshop practices. 
Additionally, as social science research, the study systematically documented the methods used to 
collect data, build models, and to select and implement interventions. To support this, an action 
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research journal recorded the Researcher’s reflections and insights along with any notable incidents 
as recommended by Bartlett & Piggot-Irvine (2008). 
The research strategy incorporated a longitudinal case study, an approach strongly associated with 
action research (Neuman, 2011). According to Yin (2009, p.18), a case study is an empirical inquiry 
used to understand a real-life phenomenon in depth, particularly when the boundaries between the 
phenomena and the context are not clear. In this research, the real-life phenomena of agri-food VCs 
are deeply embedded within context, i.e., location, time, culture, and project. Rather than divorcing 
the phenomenon under study from its context, a case study approach draws out critical features and 
highlights key relationships and influences. Yin (2009, p.19) further adds that a case study approach 
relies on multiple sources of evidence and triangulation to cope with a situation in which there will 
be many more variables of interest than data points. To manage such data complexity, only variables 
which had a strong influence on system behaviour were included in the SD models, hence, defining 
the boundary of the system under study. Newman (2011) recommends triangulating data to improve 
research validity. In the SGMB process, model data was triangulated by involving multiple actors in 
each SGMB workshop, rechecking critical information over time, and having a reference group serve 
as a technical backstop to the process. Outside of the SGMB process, triangulation was also achieved 
through key informant interviews (KIIs), focus group discussions (FGDs), observations, and the use of 
comparable secondary data. 
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Figure 6: Overview of the action research process 
Source: Developed by the Researcher 
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3.3 Research methods 
The research employed mixed methods to achieve its objectives. The chosen methodology was, to a 
large extent, determined by the action research orientation and the subsequent requirement to 
integrate within the TRRILD project’s logical framework, deliverables, and timelines (Neuman, 2011). 
The research used qualitative tools and processes to build an SD model which generated quantitative 
results, enabling the TRRILD project to select pro-poor upgrading interventions. For clarity, this 
section presents the research methods in a series of linear steps; however, in practice these steps 
often overlapped and oscillated. 
3.3.1 Research scope 
The TRRILD project’s approved design and contractual obligations to MFAT provided clear boundaries 
for the research’s scope: 
• Coverage to include 32 peri-urban and rural villages in Myeik and Palaw Townships of 
Tanintharyi Region, Myanmar. 
• Establish agri-food VCs that have wide smallholder participation, commercialisation 
potential, are inclusive (of gender and ethnic minorities), and are environmentally 
sustainable. 
• Develop interventions which have a demonstrable pro-poor impact (as defined by the 
project’s Results Measurement Table) on small-scale farmers within the project’s lifetime 
(2017 to 2022). 
• Include interventions that fit within the project’s activity and budget categories. 
The selection of pork and rice VCs as a focus of the TRRILD project was undertaken by the TRRILD’s 
project advisory committee (PAC2) prior to the commencement of the research’s field work. A three-
step selection process was used between March to October 2018. First, participatory processes 
narrowed down the wide scope of potential VCs to a shorter, “long-list” of candidate chains. 
Economic, environmental, social, and institutional criteria were then used to judge and rank 
candidate chains as per the guidelines developed by Schneemann & Vredeveld (2015). This ranking 
process selected paddy rice, rubber, dried prawns, pigs, fish paste, cashew nuts, chicken, dried fish, 
and gourds as potential agri-food chains. Second, a rapid assessment of these VCs was conducted. 
For each VC, approximately ten key informants were interviewed to collect quantitative information 
 
2 The TRRILD’s PAC consisted of representatives from each of the partner organisations and provided 
management oversight to the project. 
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of VC processes; constraints and solutions; rankings based on economic, environmental, social, and 
institutional criteria; and qualitative information on chain governance. Secondary data was also 
collected and analysed to triangulate information from these interviews. Finally, rapid assessment 
data were analysed and discussed in plenary during a three-day workshop with TRRILD project 
partners. From this workshop, two products were prioritised, paddy and pigs, and subsequently 
approved by MFAT in November 2018, from which the pork VC forms the focus for this thesis.  
3.3.2 Development of system dynamics models 
The research combined tools and techniques from GMB, CBSD, and SGMB to develop qualitative 
SFDs that were extended into quantitative SD models of the pork VC. Figure 7 provides a high-level 
map of the key steps to develop the SD model and provide upgrading recommendations to the 
TRRILD project. In Figure 7, non-shaded objects represent activities conducted in Myanmar that 
support the model-building process, light grey shapes highlight SGMB and reference group (RG) 
sessions and their outputs, while objects shaded in dark grey represent remote modelling work 
conducted in New Zealand. Model-building workshops were held between January and March 2019 
in Myanmar. The preliminary SD model and upgrading recommendations for the pork chain were 
provided to the TRRILD team in August 2019.  
 
Figure 7: High-level map of the model building process 
Source: Developed by the Researcher based on GMB process outlined by Lie et al. (2017) 
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3.3.2.1 Participants  
The model-building process was centred around two core platforms, SGMB workshops and RG 
sessions. Most model-building outputs originated from SGMB workshops, which represented actors 
directly involved in the VCs. RG sessions helped refine SGMB outputs and provided an additional 
layer of technical analysis and information triangulation. The division into two separate model-
building groups followed the methodology of Lie et al. (2017) and was considered crucial to reducing 
power dynamics among participants to allow more open and robust discussions. Further tools and 
techniques were used within workshops to mitigate power imbalances amongst SGMB and RG 
participants, these included small group work, a balance of small group, plenary, and individual tasks, 
and the training of the MBT in participatory group facilitation techniques (Hovmand, 2014; Lie et al., 
2017).  
The selection of participants for the SGMB workshops and RG sessions was undertaken by the TRRILD 
staff with support from the Researcher. To ensure SGMB and RG participants represented the pig 
industry in Myeik and Palaw the initial participant selection criteria was developed by the Researcher 
by drawing on both secondary data (Ebata et al., 2018; Soe, 2018) and a recent VCA conducted by 
the TRRILD team in December 2018 and January 2019 (ACCESS, 2019). These sources revealed 
distinct sub-categories of pig producers in Myanmar, common nodes in the value chain, and key 
power brokers that should be included in SGMB workshops and RG sessions. Most of the TRRILD staff 
had previously worked in the target area and used their local knowledge and connections to select 
participants which fulfilled the criteria provided by the Researcher, including actors representing 
critical nodes in the VCs as well as a diversity of age, gender, ethnicity, and wealth rankings. After the 
Researcher and MBT visited farms and value chain actors prior to the first SGMB workshop, there 
were a small number of adjustments to SGMB and RG participants to improve representation of the 
target area. Two World Vision Myanmar staff acted as the primary gatekeepers for workshops, both 
of whom held over five years of experience working in livelihoods projects within the partner INGO. 
They provided access to key VC actors and helped motivate their attendance at formal sessions and 
facilitate meetings for the Researcher outside of the workshop settings. Purposive sampling was used 
by gatekeepers to identify and invite workshop participants that matched the selection criteria. 
Importantly, gatekeepers maintained a close link with local government authorities, drawing in 
senior technical officers to the RG sessions whose attendance brought credence to the process, and 
helped the Researcher to gain the necessary approvals to visit remote field locations.  
Two concurrent SGMB processes were held: workshops in Myeik focusing on the pork VC and 
workshops in Palaw focusing on the rice VC. Fifteen people representing different nodes in the VC 
were invited to participate across five SGMB workshops in each location. While this number is at the 
upper end of recommended group size, a larger number helped ensure broader representation of VC 
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nodes and allowed for dropouts as suggested by Vennix (1996). An average of 13 VC actors attended 
the Myeik SGMB workshops, including five small-, two medium-, and two large-scale pig producers, 
one broker, three slaughterhouse managers, and two slaughterhouse licence holders whose 
businesses operated across brokering, slaughtering, and wholesale functions. Of these SGMB 
participants, 53% were female, and all but one were of Burmese ethnicity.3 
The RG sessions involved technical experts covering both VCs and had a more fluid membership as 
participants attended sessions aligned with their expertise. An average of eight people attended 
from a pool of 12, with 25% female representation. Participants were technical specialists from 
INGOs, technical officers representing the Township or Regional Livestock Veterinary and Breeding 
Department (LBVD) and Agricultural Departments, and experienced farmers. In addition to providing 
specific technical inputs on paddy or pig production, RG members also brought to light differences 
between the contexts (and variables used in the model) in Myeik and Palaw. This allowed for further 
generalisation of results, important to the project which would implement upgrading interventions 
across both townships. 
Out of the twelve weeks of field research, approximately two-thirds of the time was dedicated to 
preparing and running SGMB and RG sessions and to the refining of workshop materials. This left 
sufficient time for the Researcher to use KIIs, FGDs, and observations to triangulate and expand the 
knowledge base of the model and the research. 
3.3.2.2 Model building team 
A six-person model building team (MBT) was established to facilitate SGMB and RG sessions. Discrete 
roles and responsibilities were assigned to each team member and training provided with additional 
focus on attitudes, skills, and teamwork. The roles and responsibilities of team members are detailed 
in Table 4. The Researcher took on the Team Leader role, which covered facilitator, process coach, 
and modelling, a common practise in participatory research (Voinov & Bousquet, 2010). As all 
workshops and interviews were conducted in the Burmese language, a translator supported the 
Researcher in all interactions and translated notes from other MBT members into English. While 
sessions were steered by a Lead Facilitator, Assistant Facilitators enabled workshops to flow, by 
guiding small-group sessions, helping struggling participants to understand (translating from 
Burmese to Karen) and write, and taking care of physical functions, like posting notes to whiteboards 
and collating data. Importantly, Assistant Facilitators were able to raise points to the attention of the 
Lead Facilitator which they had missed or had gone unnoticed during robust group discussions. A 
 
3 An average of 13 participants attended the paddy SGMB workshops, including seven paddy farmers, three rice 
millers, two paddy traders/brokers, and a rice wholesaler. Participants came from the both the two main ethnic 
groups, Burmese (10) and Karen (3), and 25% of participants were female (one farmer and two traders). 
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Notetaker documented the workshops by taking a written and visual record of key discussion points 
and materials. 
Table 4: Roles and responsibilities of the MBT 




Team Leader PhD 
Researcher 
- Lead MBT 
- Prepare agendas and scripts for each model building session 
- Lead reflection exercises 
- Support Lead Facilitator to lead and direct each model building session 
- Finalise CLDs and SD model 
Lead Facilitator TRRILD 
Market 
Facilitator  
- Work with gatekeepers to identify RG and SGMB participants  
- Facilitate RG and SGMB sessions 






- Train MBT 
- Evaluate and provide feedback on first RGs and SGMB workshops 
- Advise on agendas and scripts for model-building sessions 







- Organise logistics for each session (location, inviting participants, 
transport, stationery, food/drinks, koha4) 
- Bring to the attention of Lead Facilitator any issues or concerns during 
sessions 
- Support Lead Facilitator to facilitate all sessions, i.e., small group 






- Support translation for Team Leader for workshops, KIIs, and FGDs 
- Bring to the attention of Team Leader any issues or concerns during 
sessions 





- Take notes of key processes/discussions during model building 
sessions 
- Record observations on participant’s behaviour during sessions 
- Photograph and store all workshop material 
Source: Developed by the Researcher 
With no previous background in SD modelling, apart from the Expert Modeler, training, agendas, 
scripts, and reflection exercises were applied to build the capacity of the MBT. The Researcher 
attended a five-day training workshop in India prior to field work in Myanmar. This training was led 
by the Expert Modeler and covered Layerstack, CLDs, SFDs, and quantitative systems modelling, 
including practise sessions with participants. Once the MBT was assembled in Myanmar, a two-day 
intensive training was delivered by the Expert Modeller in Myeik. This covered basic SD theory but 
focused on practical exercises which would form the core of upcoming workshops, like Layerstack, 
reference modes, cause-and-consequence maps, and CLDs. Detailed agendas, including GMB scripts, 
were prepared for each workshop and tools were rehearsed during the full-day planning sessions 
held before each workshop. The use of agendas and scripts helped the team, by articulating common 
steps for each exercise, and defining outputs and the associated roles, materials, and time 
allotments. A summary of the agendas for each SGMB workshop are found in Appendix A. The Plus-
 
4 The term “koha” is a Māori word that refers to a gift, present, offering or contribution.   
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Minus-Interesting (PMI) technique as outlined by Sharma & Priyamvada (2017) was used after each 
SGMB and RG session to critically reflect on the process and generate consensus for improvements in 
subsequent actions.  
3.3.2.3 Model development 
As illustrated in Figure 7, a total of five SGMB and RG workshops were held to build the SD model, 
which were structured around key steps of problem definition, causal loop modelling, developing a 
quantitative dynamic model, scenario testing, and implementation (Cavana & Maani, 2000). A brief 
overview of the steps in the model-building process follows, with Table A6 in Appendix A providing a 
detailed timeline, including timing, objectives, and participants involved in each step. The first four 
sessions were conducted over a seven-week block (January to March 2019) in Myanmar, resulting in 
the development of concept models of the VCs along with the interventions and indicators for 
scenario testing. This concept model consisted of interconnected CLDs that represented key modules 
and were replete with stocks, flows, and converters. This was translated into a quantitative SD model 
using the Stella Architect software package (http://www.iseesystems.com) by the Researcher in New 
Zealand over a four-month period. Following model validation, the Researcher undertook scenario 
testing and analysed the model’s results to determine the preliminary upgrading interventions. The 
SD model and preliminary results were then reviewed and validated during a fifth combined SGMB 
and RG session. Following minor adjustments to the model, results of the scenario testing and 
recommendations for upgrading interventions were then presented to the TRRILD’s PAC in August 
2019.  
A systematic participatory approach was taken to prepare and deliver each RG and SGMB workshop. 
Preparation began with the Researcher developing a draft agenda for each upcoming workshop. This 
was then discussed and modified with the MBT, resulting in a final agreed copy which was 
disseminated to all MBT members. A summary agenda was written in Burmese on a large sheet of 
paper and placed on the workshop wall for ease of access. During preparatory sessions, key tools and 
exercises, like Layerstack, were practised among MBT. These practise sessions enabled the MBT to 
trial Burmese equivalents of key English SD or VC words and phrases in order to agree on easy-to-
understand equivalents. Apart from the final SGMB and RG sessions, no PowerPoint slides or digital 
media were used. Instead, all concept models and variables were hand drawn and written on large 
posters in Burmese prior to the workshops. Tactile, low-tech materials were chosen so that materials 
were more accessible to participants, encouraging them to make physical changes to models through 
markers, pens, and post-it notes. Once written onto posters, the Burmese text was then 
crosschecked for understanding and accuracy by a member of the MBT verbally translating it back 
into English for the Researcher. Special attention was given to the organisation of the workshop 
spaces as suggested by Hovmand (2014). WV Myanmar offices were used for each of the model-
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building sessions after being cleared of any redundant furniture or posters, and desks were placed in 
a C shape to aid the ease of movement, communication, and concentration. Participants were 
registered on their arrival by the Notetaker and provided a name tag, complete with a coloured 
background that corresponded to their function in the VC; for example, farmers had a green 
background, and butchers had a grey background. This system helped the MBT to encourage 
participation across all VC nodes during group exercises and note any nuances related to VC function.  
The first workshop in the series was held with RG members and introduced the TRRILD project and 
SD concepts. An overview of the VCs was discussed, and critical problems prioritised by participants. 
This workshop afforded buy-in by key government officials that attended and allowed the MBT to 
have a practise run facilitating key scripts and tools and using SD terminology in the Burmese 
language. Following this initial workshop, RGs sessions followed a similar pattern of reviewing and 
revising CLDs and associated parameters.  
The goal of the first SGMB workshop was to prioritise problems in the VC. To start defining the 
model’s boundary, the TRRILD project’s scope was introduced to participants, stressing its focus on 
pro-poor VC interventions for the target population. The SGMB process and timelines were 
introduced, and participants were reminded of the need to attend all five sessions if possible. 
Following participant introductions, the “Hopes and Fears” script developed by Luna-Reyes et al. 
(2006) was used to identify expectations for the SGMB process and clarify any concerns or 
misunderstanding. The basic language of SDs was introduced in this first session and reviewed in 
each subsequent session to allow participants time to become familiar with new concepts. A 
modified version of the water glass script (“coke on a hot day”) introduced stocks, flows, converters, 
and behaviour-over-time graphs. Participants then gathered around the Layerstack tool and, after a 
demonstration by the MBT, proceeded to draw the VC layers with reference to spatial elements on 
the underlying geographical map. The recently introduced SD terminology was used by the facilitator 
to prompt discussions, with behaviour-over-time graphs of dynamic behaviours sketched alongside 
the VC layers.  
The VC discussions generated by Layerstack segued into identifying problems faced by VC actors. 
Problems were individually written on coloured cards and presented in plenary by participants which 
allowed for further refinement. Any spatial associations of problems were also identified by 
participants on the large maps of Myeik and Palaw which were positioned at the front on the room. 
Once grouped under common issues on the whiteboard, participants voted for their top three 
problems by placing sticker dots on their choices. A maximum of two stickers per person per problem 
was allowed. The top three problems were then further discussed in plenary to end the first session. 
In addition to the workshop, a baseline survey of participant knowledge regarding VCs was 
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completed at the start of the session, as was the completion of a consent form to comply with ethical 
research practices.  
In the second SGMB workshop, VC problems were further explored to determine key modules to 
develop into CLDs. Participants were divided into small groups, containing participants from each VC 
segment, to sketch reference modes for the prioritised VC problems. Reference modes took the form 
of behaviour-over-time graphs covering the last ten years and were drawn in the centre of a 
whiteboard. Participants then wrote the causes of the problem on individual coloured cards, that 
were placed on the left side of the reference mode. The facilitator grouped similar causes together 
and prompted a discussion on root causes by asking the question, “What causes this?”, to sketch the 
causal relationships of the problem. The process was repeated on the right side of the reference 
mode for the consequences of the problem through the question prompt, “And then what 
happens?” Relationships between consequences and causes were then identified and emerging 
feedback loops discussed, documenting the polarity between variables. Each small group’s work was 
then presented for plenary discussions and revision by consensus, which was the pattern for all 
small-group work in SGMB and RG workshops. The MBT facilitated plenary discussions on themes 
which emerged from the causes and consequences mapping to identify modules that were to be 
further developed into CLDs. Clearly identifying modules enabled the basic boundary of the model to 
be established at that point. To prepare for the next session, basic CLDs of production and finance 
modules that utilised SD structures were introduced to participants and adjusted based on plenary 
discussions. 
The third SGMB session concentrated on developing qualitative CLDs for each module. Small-group 
work was used to draw module structures on large paper sheets. These CLDs contained stocks, flows, 
converters with key causal relationships and feedback loops assigned positive or negative polarity. 
Small groups presented their CLDs to the wider audience, highlighting causal relationships, and the 
facilitator sought revision and adjustments through open discussion. Most discussions were solved 
through reaching a consensus, with lingering disagreements going with the majority while the 
minority views were recorded by the Notetaker. Differences between pig production systems were 
common and a lot of time was spent identifying production categories which would later become the 
arrays within the quantitative SD model. Once agreement on the structure was reached, key module 
structures were then parametrised in plenary, taking note of differences across production systems.  
Typically, SGMB workshops were separated by five days to allow refinement of workshop outputs, 
debriefing, preparation with the MBT, and KIIs with VC actors. The longest time gap occurred 
between the third and fourth workshop as two weeks was needed to refine and combine the CLD 
modules into a simple concept SD model, while undertaking individual follow-ups with SGMB and RG 
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members. This concept model used SD structures and each variable was parametrised. However, the 
two weeks was insufficient for the Researcher to present a working quantitative SD model for the 
fourth workshop, contrary to the original plan.   
In the fourth SGMB and RG workshops, the concept model was validated, and scenarios and 
indicators prioritised for later stages. The Researcher presented the concept model (which had 
earlier been drawn on multiple paper sheets and attached to the workshop walls) in plenary, 
highlighting feedback loops and relationships which led to the problems and behaviours identified in 
the second workshop. A particularly useful tool was requesting volunteers to present the concept 
model to the group, as it enabled the Researcher to identify and clarify any misunderstandings. 
Participants recorded any final changes to the structure on coloured cards and these were placed on 
the model if there was group consensus. Model data was validated in a similar manner. Following 
lunch, the Researcher explained how the concept model would be converted into a quantitative SD 
model using Stella Architect which would allow for scenario testing. Participants individually wrote 
on coloured cards their preferred intervention scenarios which were then grouped by themes on a 
white board. Again, participants prioritised intervention scenarios through voting with three stickers. 
This process was repeated to select indicators to use during the model to measure the impact of 
intervention scenarios on the VC. The fourth workshop finished by thanking participants and 
outlining the remaining tasks to finish the model, including a provisional date for the fifth workshop.  
Once back in New Zealand, the Researcher spent around four months to convert the concept model 
into a quantitative SD model of the pork VC. During this time, iterations of the model were shared 
with the Expert Modeler for advice. When data gaps emerged, the Researcher connected remotely to 
RG members or to SGMB members through the MBT who remained employed by the TRRILD project. 
When primary data were not available secondary data were used. Priority was given to sourcing 
secondary data from Myanmar, but when this was absent, data from similar contexts in Southeast 
Asia were applied to the model.  
3.3.2.4 Model validation and scenario testing 
Model validation was undertaken to establish confidence in the reliability and usefulness of the SD 
model (Forrester & Senge, 1980). Four commonly prescribed tests for model validity were performed 
throughout the model process, rather than as a single discrete step as recommended by Vennix 
(1996), Sterman(2000), and Ford (2010). The validation process is described in more detail in Section 
4.2.1.  
After the validation exercises established requisite confidence in the baseline model, preliminary 
scenario testing and the analysis of results were conducted in New Zealand. Scenarios and indicators 
derived from the SGMB and RG participants were added to by TRRILD project partners. The TRRILD’s 
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PAC then worked with the Researcher to narrow possible interventions to a short-list by considering 
their pro-poor orientation, environmental impact, and alignment to the TRRILD project’s logical 
framework, scope, budget, and technical capacity.  
Generating results and upgrading recommendations continued in New Zealand. The results of each 
upgrading scenario were compared to the model’s baseline and evaluated around the following 
questions: 
i. What are the short-, medium-, and long-term impacts of each intervention?  
ii. What are the costs (financial, human resources, etc.) of each intervention? 
iii. How are the costs and impacts (positive and negative, intended and unintended) distributed 
among the VC actors? 
iv. How are intervention impacts affected by shocks to the system? 
v. What combination and timing of interventions bring the highest impact? 
vi. How sensitive is the rank order of interventions to changes in uncertain parameters? 
3.3.2.5 Sharing results and model refinement 
The baseline SD model and findings from scenario testing were shared with RG and SGMB 
participants through a fifth and final workshop held in Myanmar in August 2019. Feedback from 
participants was provided on both the model’s structure and data, as well as the findings. This also 
provided an opportunity to double-check data for critical variables and determine uncertain variables 
in the model for sensitivity analysis. Once this feedback was incorporated into the SD model, it was 
considered a “final” draft and scenarios were re-run and a final package of findings and 
recommendations developed. 
The model’s findings and upgrading recommendations for the pork VC were provided to the TRRILD’s 
PAC in August 2019. Findings and recommendations were discussed in plenary, with the Researcher 
fielding questions on methodology and analysis. Following the PAC’s acceptance of upgrading 
recommendations, the Researcher assisted TRRILD staff to develop the project’s workplan to 
operationalise the upgrading interventions. A final field visit took place in January 2020 for 
monitoring the implementation of upgrading recommendations and collecting data for further model 
refinement.  
Originally, the Researcher had planned field trips for June 2020 and January 2021 to monitor the 
short-term outcomes of the project and to hold one last SGMB workshop (June 2020) to further 
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refine and update the SD model. As a result of the COVID-19 outbreak, however, the Researcher was 
unable to travel to Myanmar for the remainder of the PhD research. Regular contact through Skype 
was maintained with the MBT and TRRILD project staff to understand any contextual changes and 
project outcomes, and a decision was made in June 2020 to finalise the SD model for inclusion in this 
thesis. 
3.3.3 Spatial group model building questionnaire 
A written pre- and post-SGMB questionnaire was developed by the Researcher to investigate the 
effectiveness of SGMB in transforming participant understanding of the VC (Outcome four of the 
research). Pre- and post-questionnaires have been frequently used to evaluate the effectiveness of 
GMB processes (Lansu, et al. 2016; Rouwette et al., 2011, Vennix, et al., 1993). The pre- and post-
SGMB questionnaire, including Burmese (Myanmar) translations, are found in Appendix H, Table H1. 
The questionnaire was divided into three parts: Part A covered participant understanding of the VC; 
Part B centred on relationships between actors in the VC; and Part C looked at the effectiveness of 
the SGMB workshops in engaging participants in VCA and upgrading. A total of 33 questions were 
included. From these, 29 employed a five-point Likert scale, which is extensively used within social 
science and GMB research for measuring changes in attitudes and behaviours (Joshi et al., 2015; 
Lansu et. al, 2016). The remaining four questions were open-ended.   
The questionnaire was developed by the Researcher and shared with the MBT during the training 
workshop. First prepared in English, the questionnaire was translated into Myanmar by the MBT. 
Following translation, it was then tested for accuracy and understanding with other staff of the 
TRRILD project. Alterations were then made following the testing to simplify the language and finally 
the questionnaire was translated from Myanmar to English to verify that the original intent of 
questions was maintained.  
Parts A and B of the questionnaire were collected prior to the start of SGMB workshop one and then 
Parts A, B, and C of the questionnaire were undertaken at the end of SGMB workshop five. This 
resulted in five months between the pre- and post-SGMB questionnaires for the pork VC workshops 
and eleven months for the paddy VC workshops. To aid in understanding and mitigate the different 
literacy abilities among participants, questions were read aloud by a member of the MBT so that 
participants could request help if there were any misunderstandings. Two members of the MBT 
worked alongside Karen language speakers for additional help with translation.  
Questionnaire data was coded in New Zealand by the Researcher and analysed using SPSS (Statistical 
Package for Social Scientists). A paired sample t-test was undertaken to determine if there were 
statistically significant differences in responses between the pre- and post-SGMB questionnaires. 
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3.3.4 Key informant interviews 
KIIs were conducted in Myanmar throughout the field visits, acting as a tool to further explore, 
supplement, and/or triangulate data obtained during the model building sessions. Semi-structured 
interviews were selected because of their ability to yield “thick,” descriptive data and their 
compatibility to action research (Davidson & Tollich, 2003). Interviewees were selected through 
purposive and snowball sampling, with respondents often providing referrals or introductions to 
other prominent actors in the chain. KIIs were loosely structured around pre-prepared open-ended 
questions, with a conversational style employed. The relaxed, interactive nature of KIIs meant the 
interviewee was treated as the “expert” who told their story while the interviewer used questions to 
probe and guide. As found by Sarantakos (2005), the informality and flexibility of KIIs helped reveal 
new information and fresh perspectives on the VCs under study.  
KIIs were held in Yangon, Myeik, and Palaw. In Yangon, a total of ten KIIs were undertaken over the 
three visits with individuals from pig feed companies, government departments, livestock 
federations, pork wholesalers and retailers, and supermarkets. KIIs in Myeik and Palaw took place 
during each field visit. The KIIs undertaken before SGMB and RG sessions helped to lay the 
knowledge foundations needed in order to facilitate participatory processes and to develop question 
probes used within the workshops. Meanwhile, KIIs conducted after the SGMB and RG process 
assisted in the monitoring of project outcomes and led to micro updates to the model. A total of 24 
interviews were held in Myeik and Palaw, covering institutions and actors in the VCs. This included 
farmers, brokers, slaughterhouse workers and owners, input supply shops, government officials, 
wholesalers, retailers, restaurant owners, and hotel owners. KIIs not only added to the richness of 
research data, leading to a more robust model, but also strengthened project outcomes by 
establishing networks and connections which helped the TRRILD project to successfully implement 
upgrading activities. 
Members of the MBT acted as translators during the KIIs. While the Researcher had previously lived 
and worked in Myanmar for two-and-a-half-years, his Burmese language ability was minimal. The 
PhD Researcher’s basic understanding of Myanmar’s history, culture, and socio-economic structures 
helped facilitate these exchanges; however, translators and TRRILD staff were encouraged to openly 
share any cultural or contextual nuances to build the Researcher’s understanding. Written notes 
were taken by the Researcher during the interviews. These were discussed with the translator and 
any other staff or Researchers present after the interview to ensure key points were accurately 
recorded. 
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3.3.5 Focus group discussions 
Alongside the group discussions in the formal SGMB and RG sessions, a small number of FGDs were 
held. FGDs are used to gather data from a group of people who share in a common situation or are 
impacted by a similar phenomenon (Collis & Hussey, 2014). In the research, five FGDs were held with 
PGs established within the TRRILD project to discuss their engagement in the VC and the impact of 
selected upgrading interventions. In three of these, PG leaders had been participants in the SGMB 
workshops.  
3.3.6 Observations 
Observations of actors, inputs, products, and physical infrastructure in the VCs added to the data set. 
The Researcher spent many hours meeting with actors in the VC, which afforded the opportunity to 
observe and record their day-to-day operations, such as the conditions of pig farms and 
slaughterhouses, the use of pig feed, the type of pork products available in restaurants, etc. 
Observations helped to layer real-life examples onto information elicited through workshop settings 
and allowed the Researcher to probe and focus discussions through his experiences to workshop 
settings, e.g., “When I saw pig farms in Pyi Gyi village, I experienced…. Is that typical?” Even though 
this technique enriched discussions, a frequent critique of observational techniques in research is the 
effect of the Researcher’s subjective judgements and the validity and reliability of observations 
(Brockington & Sullivan, 2003, Collis & Hussey, 2014). To help mitigate this, observations were 
recorded in the Researcher’s notebook and triangulated through KIIs, FGDs, and the SGMB and RG 
workshops. 
3.4 Research ethics 
The basic ethical principles of research as described by Davidson and Tollich (2003) were followed 
throughout the research: do no harm; voluntary participation; anonymity and confidentiality; 
avoidance of deceit; and the faithful analysis and reporting of data. Moreover, following the action 
research principles, this study sought not only to protect participants but to improve their situation 
and “to do good” (Scheyvens et al., 2003). Corbridge (1998) states that development research has a 
moral and ethical obligation to not only interact and extract, but to inform development practise. 
Answering this call, the research’s results and learning were disseminated to participants, TRRILD 
staff, Myanmar stakeholders, and the development community through presentations and articles.   
In this research, information was obtained from participants working within the TRRILD project. As 
the implementing partner, WV Myanmar facilitated and sponsored the research, obtaining all 
necessary permissions and approvals within Myanmar (primarily from the Department of Social 
Welfare). WV Myanmar has an INGO operating licence in Myanmar and permission from the national 
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and regional governments to implement the TRRILD project, which cover all the field work activities 
for the research. Both WV Myanmar and the government of Myanmar’s Department of Social 
Welfare applied their standards to monitor ethical considerations in the research. In this research, 
information was obtained from VC actors in their professional capacity as they chose to participate in 
the TRRILD project. As such, no application was required or made for human ethics clearance from 
the Lincoln University Human Ethics Committee. However, ethical considerations were addressed in 
all aspects of the process.   
Prior to participating in data collection activities, written and verbal consent was sought. Participants 
were informed of the research’s background, objectives, voluntary nature, and expectations through 
an information sheet in both English and Burmese. Written consent was obtained, when appropriate, 
prior to data collection and participants were informed of their rights to voluntarily withdraw from 
interviews and workshops at any time. The contact information of the lead PhD supervisor, 
Researcher, and TRRILD staff were made available to participants to follow up on any concerns they 
may have. Due to cultural dynamics and literacy levels, many participants did not care for the 
formality of the information sheets and consent forms. In this situation, a thorough verbal 
explanation was offered, and any questions answered as they arose.  
The research did not employ any deceit or pressure on participants at any time. Given the context 
and history of Myanmar, the Researcher was careful to avoid any political discussions or sensitive 
issues. As per protocols for official foreigner visits within Myanmar, a government representative 
should, in principle, have accompanied the Researcher during data collection. However, as the 
research did not touch on any sensitive political topics, the presence of government officials at 
workshops and field visits typically occurred less than 20% of the time. To lessen any risk, all 
information was treated with confidence and anonymity preserved for all participants.  
Workshops and meetings were organised in public or private spaces, such as the WV office or the 
village community hall, and permission sought from relevant authorities. Most of the KIIs, FGDs, and 
observations took place within individual homes, farms, or businesses, with permission always 
sought prior to entering and engaging participants. As SGMB and RG sessions took more than half a 
day, the research provided lunch and refreshments for participants. Transport arrangements were 
made by the TRRILD project to ensure participants did not incur any financial penalties for their 
attendance at workshops. At the end of the SGMB and RG process, participants were provided with a 
participation certification and a modest koha, such as a bag or bath towel, which is standard practice 
within the TRRILD project. Prior to the commencement of workshops and interviews, permission was 
sought for the Researcher or Notetaker to record the workshop (through notes or a voice recorder) 
and to use all materials, diagrams, charts, etc., that were created by participants. Data were treated 
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confidentially, with a data management plan employed to preserve and protect information as per 
LU protocols. This included password protecting all digital data and storing data electronically in 
three places: (i) on the hard drive of the Researcher’s computer, (ii) on cloud storage, and (iii) on a 
portable hard drive.  
3.5 Creation of new credit and collective action modules 
The SD model developed by the Researcher for the ex-ante impact evaluation of the pork VC built 
upon modules used within previous SD models of agri-food VCs as highlighted in Figure 5. This 
research’s model starts with a production module that covers the biological processes of pig 
production and changes in farming systems within target villages. Pig volumes from the production 
module combine with the region’s total pig supply within a marketing module to calculate the price 
of live pigs. A financial performance module calculates aggregate costs, revenues, savings, cashflow, 
and profit margins of different pig producers and other value chain actors. On-farm decisions take 
place in an environmental module and are influenced by expected profits from the financial 
performance module. The structure of this research’s pork VC SD model is described in more detail in 
Section 4.3, with a copy of the final Stella Architect-designed SD model found in Appendix B and 
associated data located in Appendix C. The exception, however, was the structure for the credit and 
PG/PO collective action modules. These modules have not previously been included within any 
previous SD models, beyond the collective action cashflow structure modelled by McRoberts et al. 
(2013) within a case study of a dairy VC in Mexico and deserve additional exposition. The basic SFD of 
the finance and collective action modules will be highlighted in this section to allow for further 
application to agri-food VC SD models beyond the pork VC. This section will also outline potential 
adaptations of these two modules, drawing on variations used within the paddy SD model developed 
by the Researcher for the TRRILD project. 
3.5.1 Credit module 
The purpose of the credit module is to model the impacts of different financing options for small-
scale farmers in the VC. In the simplest form, shown by SFD in Figure 8, there are two providers of 
credit to small-scale farmers: (i) formal lenders, representing MFIs and commercial banks; and (ii) 
informal lenders, representing moneylenders, pawn brokers, friends, and relatives. Formal lenders 
have a limited amount of credit available to small-scale farmers which is represented by the stock, 
formal lender: available loan capital5 (US$). Informal lenders meet any additional credit 
requirements from small-scale farmers, but at a higher interest rate.      
 
5 Through the thesis, structures from CLDs and SFDs are italicised to aid the reader in linking text to 
corresponding figures.  
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The module contains two types of loan products for small-scale farmers: (i) seasonal production 
loans that cover key farm inputs, like seeds, fertiliser, and pig feed; and (ii) upgrading loans that are 
used by farmers to invest in assets, such as tractors, harvesters, hybrid sows, and hygienic livestock 
shelters. 
In the module shown in Figure 8, upgrading loans are prioritised by the formal lender with the 
converters, formal lender interest rate (percentage/week), and formal lender loan term (weeks), 
determining loan characteristics and the initial value of the stock, formal lender: available loan 
capital, the total volume of credit available for upgrading loans. Any remaining capital in the stock, 
formal lender available loan capital, is then made available to small-scale farmers for seasonal 
production loans. Some formal lenders, such as MFIs, have mandatory savings requirements 
(percentage loan/week) for borrowers, and this increases farmer stocks of savings, lowering the 
production loan capital required. 
Farmer decisions to invest in upgrading assets are driven by the expected profitability of upgrading. 
This variable forecasts the annual profitability of the farm given the expected farm revenue with the 
new upgrading investments and the expected farm costs with upgrading costs and upgrading cost 
savings applied. For example, investments in productive assets like a tractor bring increased revenue 
through higher yields and from hiring out of the tractor but also alter farm costs because of loan 
repayments and lower costs for field preparation. 
Loan repayment costs for upgrading investments are determined by the upgrading interest rate and 
upgrading loan term and are calculated based on the type of the loan, i.e., amortised, balloon, etc. 
These two variables are system variables such that they are computed as the weighted averages of 
the interest rates and loan terms applied by both formal and informal lenders. As the number of 
farmers upgrading increases, the stock of upgrading loan capital in the system rises. At the same 
time, farmers upgrading draw down the stock, formal lender: available loan capital which increase 
flows into the stock, formal lender: loan capital in use. The ratio of the two stocks, formal lender: 
loan capital in use and upgrading loan capital in the system determines the upgrading loan term and 
upgrading interest rate. When the stock of formal lender: available loan capital is exhausted, the 
proportion of loans covered by formal lenders decreases, causing both the upgrading loan term and 
upgrading interest rate to rise. This sequence of events raises upgrading costs which dampens the  
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Figure 8: SFD of the credit module 
Source: Developed by the Researcher 
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expected profitability of upgrading. In a similar vein, the proportion of production loans covered by 
the formal lender determines the production loan interest rate.  
Small-scale farmers default on loans when their newly upgraded enterprises remain unprofitable 
over a sustained period. When the variable, expected profitability of upgrading declines, loan capital 
exits from the stock of formal lender: loan capital in use through the flow, defaulting on upgrading 
loan. The rate of this flow is determined by both expected profitability and the volume of 
outstanding upgrading loans from the formal lender with the latter calculated by multiplying the 
proportion of loans covered by the formal lender by the stock of upgrading loan capital in the system. 
In a similar manner, defaulting on production loans draws down the stock, formal lender: available 
loan capital. The magnitude of this flow is determined by multiplying the production loan capital 
required by the proportion of production loans covered by formal lenders along with the expected 
profitability of upgrading. Small-scale farmers without upgrading loans but with production loans 
from the formal lender can also exit from farming and this causes further losses to the stock of loan 
capital through defaults on production loans.  
The module described in Figure 8 provides a basic credit module, allowing for further adaptations to 
assist in scenario testing or to accommodate for further complexity in the system. Firstly, key 
exogenous variables can be altered to compare different financial products, including the initial 
amount of loan capital available from the formal lender and the corresponding interest rates and 
loan terms. In the basic credit module, upgrading loans are prioritised over production loans, but this 
can easily be changed to a fixed proportionality by restricting the flow of capital from the stock 
Formal lender: available loan capital. The addition of arrays covering different types of small-scale 
farmers and upgrading investments can further layer complexity into the module. For example, in the 
paddy VC SD model, four long-term investment opportunities were modelled: harvesters, tractors, 
land-levelling, and paddy storage facilities, while the pork VC SD model contained six sub-types of 
small-scale pig producers. In the basic credit module presented, there is a sole formal lender; 
however, additional providers can also be added into the system either through arrays or the 
addition of further stocks. For instance, the paddy SD model developed by the Researcher included a 
stock of production loan capital from MADB and a stock of loan capital for hire purchase loans for 
tractors and harvesters provided by retailers with loan guarantees from commercial banks. While 
Figure 8 only contains loans for small-scale farmers, this structure can also be applied to other VC 
actors. For example, in the pork VC model meso loans were provided to the PO for investing in a 
hygienic slaughterhouse, while in the paddy model developed by the Researcher, meso loans were 
provided to rice millers. Finally, structure can be added to the basic credit module to allow small-
scale farmers and PGs/POs to allocate their savings and loan capital across various investment 
options based on profitability, investment time horizons, and discounted rate of returns. These 
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options were included in the paddy SD model which will be published in a forthcoming academic 
paper.      
3.5.2 Collective action module 
The purpose of the collective action module is to understand the financial and pro-poor performance 
of different PG and PO institutional structures and their impacts on the wider VC system. The basic 
collective action module developed is bipartite, reflecting the TRRILD project’s strategy of 
establishing PGs that would later become POs by extending their transactional activities to include 
value adding strategies. The PG elements of the collective action module are presented in Figure 9, 
with Figure 10 highlighting the additional PO structure.  
PG membership can take two forms in the module, represented by the stocks, active PG members 
and non-active PG members. These stocks can be further arrayed to represent distinct farming 
systems available to members. Active PG members become non-active PG members when it is more 
profitable for them to stop patronising the PG and side-sell their products. When side selling 
becomes less profitable than patronising the PG, they start re-engaging in the PG (PG 
producers/week) and increase the stock of active PG members. When profits (PG member and non-
member) are consistently negative, active PG members and non-active PG members leave farming all 
together, while less substantial shifts in profits cause PG members to change their farming system 
(upgrade/downgrade), resulting in movement between arrays in the stock of active PG members.   
The cashflow portion of the PG module extends the work of McRoberts et al. (2013) with additional 
stocks representing PG capital (US$) for providing services and PG rebates (US$) for paying rebates to 
members. The stock of PG cashflow increases through premiums obtained for PG member products 
that meet the requirements of premium buyers (e.g., quality, volume, timing, etc.). If the stock of PG 
cashflow becomes negative, PG capital is diverted into the flow of PG revenue and the price paid for 
PG member products is reduced. The PG has three outflows for its revenue. Taking priority are PG 
costs that are incurred as operational costs (e.g., management, training of members, etc.) and 
depend on the number of active PG members and the price paid for PG member products. If the PG 
has sufficient cash on hand, determined by the maximum flexible cash variable (see McRoberts et al., 
2013), it then allocates cash through the flow of retained earnings to the stock of PG capital. Any 
remaining cash on hand increases the stock of PG rebates that are paid to members according to the 





Figure 9: SFD of the PG portion of the collective action module 




Figure 10: SFD of the PG and PO portions of the collective action module  
Source:  Developed by the Researcher
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The stock of PG capital is used for investing in PG services when there are capacity gaps. The stock of 
PG services represents the transactional services that PGs provide to members, such as bulk 
purchasing, collective marketing, and training and are modelled through a simple capacity stock and 
flow structure as described by Sterman (2010). The level of PG services determines the volume of 
quality products that members can deliver through the PG as well as PG member profits. Capacity 
gaps occur when the number of active PG members outweighs the capacity of PG services to cover all 
PG members. If the stock of PG capital is insufficient to cover any capacity gaps, then the PG savings 
rate (proportion/week) increases. The stock and flow structure also allows project investment into 
the stock of PG services and declining capacity from those services over time. For example, if the PG 
is providing animal health services, an initial project investment could be the training of animal 
health workers, while a certain proportion of these animal health workers leave the profession every 
year.  
The extension of the collective action module, representing the evolution from PG to PO status,6 is 
shown in Figure 10. The additional structure captures the ability of the PO to invest in value-adding 
assets, such as a pig slaughterhouse or rice mill, to allow access to premium markets. The cashflow of 
this new venture is represented by the stock, PO value-adding asset cashflow (US$), which increases 
by revenue inflows from orders for premium product and decreases via costs from operational 
expenditure and loan repayments for external debt capital. If the maximum flexible cash of this 
venture is sufficient to cover operating costs, a dividend payment to the PO’s owners takes place. If 
the value-adding venture falls into negative cashflows any shortfalls are covered by drawing down 
the stock of PO capital through the flow, cashflow shortfall.  
The PO makes investments in the stock, value-adding asset capacity, from the stock of PO capital. 
Growth in the value-adding asset capacity gaps increase the stock of PO capital allocated to investing 
in the value-adding assets, with the rate of investment driven by the profitability of the PO value-
adding asset. Further capacity gaps and increases in the profitability of the PO value-adding asset 
increases the PO savings rate. Value-adding asset capacity can also increase through the investment 
of a strategic partner that provides the initial capital investment or through external debt capital. 
When the expected order rate for the premium product increases the gap between PO production 
levels and expected demand, the PO responds by recruiting more members to join the PO. There is a 
delay in this action, however, to allow active PO members to upgrade their farming systems or 
increase individual production in response to rises in PO member profits.  
 
6 This transition from a PG to a PO is a discrete process in the pork VC model as premium markets expand; 




The collective action modules illustrated in Figures 9 and 10 provide a basic SFD that can be modified 
for scenario testing or to accommodate further contextual dynamics. In terms of institutional 
arrangements, savings and rebate functions can be adjusted to mimic various options available. For 
example, reducing PG savings rates and allocating further PG cashflow to members as rebates would 
orientate the PG towards a more traditional cooperative. Meanwhile the additional PO structure, 
complete with investment from a strategic partner that leverages external debt capital closely 
resembles the arrangement of an investor-share cooperative (ISC) with NGC features. 
The optimisation functionality of Stella Architect could be applied to the module to investigate the 
institutional arrangements that best enables POs to acquire sufficient production and processing 
capacity to meet volume and quality standards of premium markets while ensuring the PO remains 
inclusive of poorer members. In the basic form, shown in Figures 9 and 10, PGs provide generic 
services to members and the PO invests in a single value-added venture. By adding arrays or 
additional stock-and-flow structure to the module, further services and value-added ventures can be 
modelled. Furthermore, investments from the stock of PO capital can be allocated across services 
and value-added ventures dependent on their relative profitability. For example, in the paddy VC 
model developed by the Researcher, the PO distributes savings and investment capital across paddy 
milling, dehulling, and paddy drying assets. 
The credit and collective action modules were created to link into existing agri-food VC modules as 
illustrated in Figure 11 that expands Figure 5 from Section 2.4.3. The credit module interacts with the 
financial performance module by providing capital for purchasing seasonal inputs and for 
investments in upgrading, while receiving loan repayments to maintain financial providers’ capital 
stocks. The institutional module provides information that determines loan parameters as per 
government financial regulations. The PG component within the collective action module links to the 
financial performance and environment module by providing transactional services to members, 
such as bulk purchase discounts, training, and collective marketing. The PO component strengthens 
linkages to the environment module through investments in input and service operations while also 
extending linkages to the marketing module given the PO’s strategy to invest in value-adding assets 
for accessing premium markets. The production module links to the collective action module through 
the provision of products that meet quality standards for collective marketing or as part of member 
tradeable delivery rights for accessing premium buyers. The collective action module is also 
influenced by the institutional module given changes to government cooperative policies. 
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Figure 11: Overview of credit and collective action module linkages within agri-food VC models 




Description of the pork value chain 
The foundations for a multi-layered understanding of the dynamic nature of the pork VC in Myeik 
and Palaw were built through SGMB and RG workshops and supplemented by additional interviews 
with VC actors. During the first SGMB workshop, the Layerstack tool was used to explore changes 
and problems in the pork VC and orient findings vis-à-vis temporal and spatial domains. Six 
Layerstack acetates were used to discuss: (i) livelihood zones and pig farm locations by type; (ii) 
production inputs and services; (iii) flows between pig farms and slaughterhouses; (iv) flows from 
slaughterhouse to end consumers; (v) investments and costs occurring along the VC; and (vi) the 
participation of women/men/ethnic groups and the poorest. Building upon the Layerstack findings, 
SGMB participants then identified the priority problems within the chain and their causal dynamics.  
Section 4.1 presents the context of the pork VC, highlighting spatial and temporal dynamics. Next, 
Section 4.2 discusses the three prioritised problems, illustrated by problem reference modes and 
cause-and-consequence maps. The  chapter concludes with Section 4.3, which provides an overview 
of the SD model of the pork VC, highlighting key structures and feedback loops. Combined, these 
findings provided the basis for a comprehensive VC description, both from the standpoint of VC 
structure and as a platform for the quantitative analysis based on this structure that is discussed in 
Chapter 5.  
4.1 Context and dynamics of the pork value chain 
During the last decade, there has been steady growth in the consumption of pork in Myeik and Palaw 
Townships. While there are no official data available at the township-level, workshop participants 
indicated that pork sales had increased by 5%-10% per annum for the last decade. At the time of the 
research, between 80 and 120 pigs were slaughtered daily in Myeik, and 15 to 20 per day in Palaw. 
The resulting pork products serviced local markets, apart from a small volume of pork sausages made 
in Palaw (equivalent of one to two live pigs per day) which were exported to restaurants outside of 
the region. This level of consumption growth reflects patterns in other urban centres across 
Myanmar where official data are collected, such as Yangon, Mandalay, and Nya Pi Taw (Charoen 
Pokphand [CP], 2019) and trends in neighbouring countries of the Greater Mekong Region (Ebata et 
al., 2018).  
The rise in demand for pork products was attributed to three key factors. First, there had been an 
overall growth in population —Myanmar’s annual population growth rate has averaged 0.72% per 
annum from 2008 to 2018 (World Bank, 2020) with Myeik slightly higher than the national trend 
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(Ministry of Immigration and Population [MoIP], 2015). Second, rising household income levels and 
urbanisation had shifted protein consumption patterns towards animal proteins and, within that, a 
shift towards pork (Huynh et al., 2007). Accordingly, Myanmar’s pig population has risen from 10.3 
million heads in 2010 to 17.6 million heads in 2016 (Soe, 2018), pork imports have increased from 
four tonnes in 2010 to 2,373 tonnes in 2017 (FAO, 2020), and per capita pork consumption has 
doubled between 2010 and 2018 (CP, 2018; Soe, 2018). Lastly, the tourism industry has expanded 
rapidly in Myeik. In Myanmar, the number of international tourists increased by 400% between 2008 
and 2018 with the Ministry of Hotels and Tourism (MoHT) reporting that available hotel beds rose 
from 65 to 538 over this time in Myeik township (2009, 2019). While no further data are available, 
given Myeik’s pristine beaches, its proximity to Thailand, and the addition of domestic tourist 
numbers, growth is likely much higher, resulting in increased pork sales in restaurants and hotels.  
Resulting from the growing consumption of pork, pig production has increased in importance as a 
livelihood activity, augmenting the region’s traditional rural livelihoods of rubber, paddy, betel leaf, 
and areca nut production. Figure 12 highlights the spatial orientation and changes in importance of 
livelihood strategies in Myeik. Simple behaviour-over-time graphs drawn by participants in SGMB 
workshops showed that farmer investment in paddy had decreased, while rubber had increased but 
plateaued in the last three years due to stalling prices. Meanwhile, there was a general trend to 
replace local pigs with hybrid pigs. For farmers with access to arable farmland, pig production 
provided a secondary or supporting livelihood. Pig farming diversifies household incomes that are 
often primarily dependent on either paddy, rubber, or betelnut, thus lowering vulnerability to 
economic and climate shocks. For the poor, pigs were often treated as a form of savings, a “livestock 
bank” to alleviate temporary cashflow problems and to finance inputs for subsistence crops and non-
farm enterprises. This finding is reinforced by the TRRILD baseline survey which showed pig farming 
had the lowest revenue per grower and smallest level of asset investment out of the region’s five 
main livelihoods (Lyne & Snoxell, 2018). However, the introduction of more profitable hybrid 
varieties had raised the importance of pig farming as a household livelihood strategy. This was 
especially significant for poorer community members, typically characterised by small or non-
existent landholdings, as hybrid varieties increased the potential for higher incomes within existing 
natural resource constraints (Ebata et al. 2018). 
The pork VC is differentiated by two pig breeds, broadly categorised as local and hybrid (hybrid is 
also referred to locally as “high quality”). The smaller, hairy, local Myanmar variety of pig is 
considered more robust and produces pork with a higher fat content than hybrid varieties. Hybrid 
varieties are a cross between Duroc, Yorkshire, and Landrace breeds. Local breed pig farmers source 
breeder sows and boars from nearby villages, but hybrid pig farmers focus more on quality, 
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occasionally going outside of the Tanintharyi region to source from commercial farms in Mawlymine, 
Yangon, or Thailand.  
 
Figure 12: Spatial overview of the livelihood dynamics in Myeik 
Source: Developed by SGMB participants 
Hybrid fatteners are heavier than the local breed (average of 88 kgs [55 viss7] compared with 56 kgs 
[35 viss]) and receive around a 60% higher price per kg. In the year before the field research (2018), 
hybrid live pig prices had ranged from 1.88 to 2.17 US$/kg (equivalent to 4,500 to 5,200 Myanmar 
kyats [MMK8]/viss) and local pigs fetched between 1.17 and 1.46 US$/kg (equivalent to 2,800 and 
3,500 MMK/viss). Research participants noted that consumer demand was slowly shifting towards 
the less fatty pork produced through the combination of hybrid breeds and commercial feed. 
Increasing consumer preferences, favourable prices, and weight differences helped cause the steady 
 
7 Viss is the standard weight measurement used in Myanmar pig production and equates to 1.6 kg. 
8 The Myanmar Kyat (MMK) is the unit of currency in Myanmar. At the time of the field research, one New 
Zealand dollar (NZD) equated to approximately 1,000 MMK, and one United States dollar (US$) equated to 
approximately 1,500 MMK.  
 75 
shift from local to hybrid pig production. The Layerstack maps, highlighted in Figure 13, show a clear 
spatial dimension to this shift: the proportion of hybrid pig farmers declined in relation to the 
distance from downstream actors and service providers which were principally located in Myeik 
municipality. Workshop participants estimated that hybrid varieties made up 50% of Myeik’s total pig 
production. However, this number dropped to around 20 to 30% in the TRRILD’s target area owing to 
the project’s focus on rural communities. Participants noted the dynamic nature of hybrid pig 
farming. In recent times, rising live pig prices prompted farmers to transition from local to hybrid 
pigs. However, widespread pig mortalities following a recent disease outbreak had halted this 
transition for many. These mortalities were linked to low vaccination rates and poor access to 
veterinary services.  
Pig farmers were broadly categorised into three farming systems:9 small, medium, and large, across 
the two predominate breeds. These three sub-systems along with changes in their market share are 
illustrated in Figure 13 and described below: 
I. Large-scale pig farms focus exclusively on hybrid varieties and farm within the government-
established “pig farming zone” located within the Myeik municipal boundary. Production 
units range from ten to 30 breeding sows with the capacity to produce up to 500 fatteners 
annually. Pigs are fed commercial rations mixed with locally available products (broken rice, 
rice bran, and fish meal). These farms have well-constructed housing including concrete 
floors, wet areas, piped watering systems, and drainage systems, and follow simple bio-
security practises such as regular cleaning with disinfectant and footbaths. Farmers typically 
deal directly with slaughterhouses to negotiate delivery times and prices. Due to the falling 
pig prices after 2017 (described in Section 4.2.1), the number of large-scale farms had 
declined from 50 to less than ten. Large-scale farms accounted for around 20% of pig 
production in Myeik, having dropped from 50% just a few years earlier. 
II. Medium-scale pig farms have between three to ten predominantly hybrid sows and produce 
piglets for sale to nearby villages while also retaining some piglets for fattening and replacing 
of breeding sows. These farmers are typically located in peri-urban areas of Myeik or Palaw, 
with production units situated alongside household dwellings. Pig-housing conditions and 
animal husbandry practises closely mirror those of large-scale farms, though fewer durable 
materials are used, and bio-security measures are generally absent. Medium-scale pig farms 
usually work through a broker to negotiate sales prices. The production capacity of medium-
 
9 The categorisation of small, medium, large and local/hybrid is used by other authors but with differing 
definitions in other locations across Myanmar, see Ebata et al. (2018) and Soe (2018).    
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scale farmers has remained steady, accounting for around 30% of total pig production in 
both townships.   
III. Small-scale farms dominate the pig systems located in the project’s target villages, 
generating 50% of local production in Myeik and 70% in Palaw. These farms are 
predominately located in rural villages and can be categorised into two sub-systems. The first 
system, named Farrow-to-Finish (FF), has one to three sows and produces piglets for sale to 
nearby households while retaining a portion for fattening and sow replacement. The second 
system, called Wean-to-Finish (WF), purchases one to two piglets per year from FF farms for 
fattening and sale. About 70% of small-scale farmers use local breeds as they are considered 
more resistant to disease and heat stress, though, as noted previously, a number of farms 
were transitioning to hybrid pigs. FF farmers use a mixture of commercial and local feed, 
while WF farmers typically feed food waste and rice by-products. Housing is basic, with larger 
farms investing in bamboo pens and concrete floors, while smaller farms use simple bamboo 
or wood pens to house pigs when they are not roaming free through the village. Around two-
thirds of pig-farming households in TRRILD target villages practise the WF system. 
A system of brokers connects peri-urban and rural pig farmers to slaughterhouses. Brokers typically 
use personal client networks to search for live pigs to fulfil slaughterhouse orders. A typical broker 
sources between eight to 15 pigs per week and is paid either a flat search fee or commission by 
slaughterhouses. Along with searching and aggregating, brokers negotiate prices, and occasionally 
store pigs on behalf of slaughterhouses. The negotiating power of brokers is stronger in more remote 
areas, where pig farmers have less direct interactions with downstream VC actors, such as 
slaughterhouses and wholesale markets, and less horizontal coordination with other farmers from 
whom they can gauge recent prices. Brokers estimate pig weights and subjectively assess pig quality 
with no agreed standards on which to base negotiations. Overweight and diseased pigs, or older 
sows are purchased at a discounted rate even though they can be sold in the wholesale market 
without a means to differentiate the meat from healthy animals.   
The government licensing system has enabled pig slaughterhouses to take on a role akin to “lead” 
actors (Gereffi, 1999) within the pork VC. The local government authority (known as the Township 
Development Committee [TDC]) operates a licensing system for pig slaughtering. Licences are 
auctioned annually, granting holders the legal right to slaughter a fixed number of live pigs per year. 
Slaughtering by non-license holders is illegal but tolerated by the TDC in small volumes at the village-
level for household consumption. In Myeik, two licenses are granted, each costing US$86,666 per 
year, for the rights to slaughter up to 60 live pigs per week. Given this significant financial 
investment, these licenses are further sub-divided. In Myeik, one license is divided into two sub-
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licenses and the other is divided into ten sub-licenses for a total of twelve license holders. A similar 
system operates in Palaw, but with smaller volumes; one main license is split evenly among four 
slaughterhouses granting each the right to slaughter four live pigs per day. Slaughterhouses also 
operated as meat wholesalers in the Townships’ wet markets. The licencing system creates 
significant power asymmetries in the chain as pig producers have limited alternatives for their 
products (Woods, 2004). Slaughterhouses and their networks of brokers and wholesalers are 
therefore able to exert some oligopsony power over producers and oligopoly power over consumers.  
 
Figure 13: Spatial overview of production, service, and market flow in the pork VC in Myeik 
Source: Developed by SGMB workshop participants 
Slaughtering facilities operate at very low standards of food safety. Slaughterhouse owners have little 
incentive to invest in a hygienic, food-safe slaughtering facility because of a cap imposed on 
wholesale pork prices by Myeik’s TDC, weak demand for differentiated pork products, and the 
absence of TDC inspections. Moreover, the annual licensing system creates uncertainty, as 
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investments in fixed improvements and equipment cannot be recovered within the twelve-month 
license period.  Accordingly, all slaughtering takes place in either the government-allocated 
slaughtering area next to the wet market, or at slaughtering facilities attached to residential houses. 
Pigs are slaughtered in the open on basic concrete slabs, with unsterilized implements and no 
biosecurity or waste management measures, as shown in Figure 14. Basic hygiene practices are not 
followed, meat is neither chilled nor frozen, and waste is typically disposed of into open sewers or 
nearby lakes and rubbish dumps. None of the slaughterhouses observed by the Researcher met even 
basic food safety standards as outlined by FAO (1991).  
 
Figure 14: Government-allocated slaughtering facility in Myeik 
Source: Picture taken by the Researcher in January 2019 
The majority of live pigs supplied to slaughterhouses come from outside Tanintharyi Region, further 
increasing competition for local producers and the slaughterhouse’s oligopsony. According to SGMB 
and RG participants, approximately 70% of all pigs purchased by slaughterhouses are transported 
from Mawlymine and Thailand. The volume of Thailand live pig imports has been in decline since 
2010 to now sit below 5%; however, imports from Mawlymine have been gradually increasing. 
Located 570 kilometres north, Mawlymine is a twelve-hour truck drive from Myeik and a key trading 
hub connecting Myanmar to Thailand and Southern Myanmar to Yangon and Northern Myanmar. 
Myeik and Palaw slaughterhouses have stronger coordination with large-scale pig farms and traders 
in Mawlymine due to repeated exchanges. Orders of up to 50 pigs can be filled within 24 hours, often 
through a transaction with a single farmer or trader. The landed price of live pigs from Mawlymine 
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ranged between 2 to 2.09 US$/kg including transport charges. Slaughterhouses in Myeik and Palaw 
favoured ordering from Mawlymine because of the lower transaction costs. It takes only one or two 
phone calls to order higher volumes at a consistent quality with a price point comparable to 
purchasing from medium and small-scale pig farmers scattered throughout Myeik and Palaw. 
The pork VC in Myeik and Palaw is dominated by one product: undifferentiated wholesale pork sold 
in each town’s wet market by slaughterhouses. Pork from local and hybrid varieties are sold without 
distinction in wet markets, though consumers have a growing preference for lean cuts that originate 
from hybrid carcasses. In 2016, the Myeik TDC imposed a ceiling on retail pork prices when live pig 
prices increased suddenly following a shortage caused by disease outbreaks. After pig production 
and supply stabilised, the price ceiling remained in place. The TDC- imposed ceiling prices operate 
across a range of pork products, for example, 3.33 US$/kg for three-layer meat,10 3.75 US$/kg for 
two-layer meat, and 2.08 US$/kg for ribs. As a result, there was little opportunity for price premiums 
associated with quality, safety, or hygiene attributes within the wholesale market.  
As wholesalers, slaughterhouses sold undifferentiated products directly to households (50% of their 
market), restaurants (30%), hotels (10%), and retailers (10%). In recent years, there has been a small 
increase in demand from restaurants and hotels for direct delivery of pork to their business. These 
customers were starting to select premium pork cuts. This attracted a small premium (5% to 10% 
above wet market prices) and appeared to avoid the price ceiling as pork to this channel did not pass 
through the wet market. Otherwise, retailers purchased in bulk from the wet market and packaged 
pork into smaller volumes (i.e., 0.5 to 5 kgs) for sale in urban suburbs and rural communities. A 
premium of 10% to 20% is charged for this service. Due to concerns about quality and hygiene 
standards in farms and slaughterhouses, it was reported that a small number of high-end restaurants 
in Myeik had started importing frozen pork cuts, such as cutlets and ribs, directly from Thailand. 
Meeting with key informants in Yangon revealed an accelerating demand for premium pork products 
in the capital city. A number of wholesalers in Yangon were importing from abroad the equivalent of 
one tonne of premium cuts per week and looking to vertically integrate with Myanmar producers 
and slaughterhouses to protect their supply chains against any import restrictions. At the time of this 
study, VC actors in Myeik and Palaw were not connected to buyers in Yangon.  
Owing to the low levels of vertical and horizontal coordination among actors, the pork chain 
governance fits within the “informal market” category as defined by Bhattarai et al. (2013). 
Workshop participants were unaware of any active pig producer groups, which is consistent with 
findings from the TRRILD project’s baseline survey (Lyne & Snoxell, 2018). In the project’s target 
region, small-scale farmers sell live pigs in villages at spot rates negotiated with brokers or 
 
10 Three-layer meat refers to pork belly, which consists of skin, fat, and pork meat. 
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slaughterhouses. There is little or no information exchange prior to sale; instead, brokers arrive at 
the village and commence canvassing pig producers to find those willing to make an immediate sale. 
This practise enhances information asymmetries and mitigates against collective selling. Small-scale 
farmers are unable to access current market information or organise themselves to negotiate higher 
prices based on bulk sales. Moreover, there are no consistent quality standards used across brokers 
and producers to guide negotiations, with even the weighing of pigs not common. Given the 
infrequency of broker visits, lack of information, and limited alternative markets, small-scale 
producers face hold-up problems as they are unsure of alternative opportunities and prices (Klein, 
1996). Small-scale producers had to weigh up low spot-rates from brokers against ongoing 
production costs, such as feed, and an unknown future price for their pigs. This hold-up problem is 
further exacerbated by pressure to repay loans taken at high interest from informal moneylenders. 
The lack of coordination also extends to support services within the chain. The Livestock Breeding 
and Veterinary Department (LBVD) has the primary responsibility to maintain the regulatory 
environment of the pork industry. According to workshop participants, limited resources result in 
LBVD restricting activities to training and veterinarian support to urban and peri-urban producers. 
Furthermore, LBVD is not able to maintain slaughterhouse pre- and post-mortem inspections or 
enforce importation bans. Figure 13 above highlights the spatial distribution of veterinarian services 
and input supply shops, which are both clustered around township centres. The supply of piglets for 
WF farms and boar services for FF farms also suffer from coordination problems. The more remote 
pig farms experience more shortages of piglets and sows, higher costs for boar services, and a lower 
quality of products and services.       
The pork VC is impacted by regular and irregular demand and supply shocks. Local festivals and 
celebrations by ethnic and religious groups cause small demand spikes which have little effect on live 
pig prices as increased pig numbers can be sourced from the large market in Mawlymine. Chinese 
New Year celebrations occur across all of Myanmar as well as in Thailand, and this routinely increases 
live pig prices as local, regional, and national demand increases. Small- and medium-scale producers 
generally sell the bulk of their fattened pigs between April and June because of concerns over 
disease outbreaks during the wet season and to finance inputs for paddy production. This leads to 
excess local supply which results in a reduction in live pig prices during this period. Disease outbreaks 
cause the most significant shocks to the system. While small and isolated disease outbreaks (e.g., 
blue ear) were frequent, there are also less frequent – but significantly larger outbreaks – that affect 
most villages, such as the Hog Cholera outbreak in 2015/2016.  Disease outbreaks result in panic 
selling by pig producers, who must accept the lower prices offered by brokers. Once the public 
becomes aware of the disease outbreak, demand falls sharply due to customer fears around 
purchasing diseased meat as there is no traceability or safety standards in the VC. Weak demand 
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combined with the oversupply of pigs results in falling live pig prices. Significant disease outbreaks 
can also bring regulatory action. The Hog Cholera outbreak of 2015/2016 prompted the LBVD to 
impose an import ban on live pigs from Mawlymine and to set ceilings on wholesale prices.  
Gender differences are evident across the different nodes in the VC. Within the production node, 
small and medium-scale farms are typically managed by women, with men supporting more labour 
intensive and off-farm activities, such as building pig pens and purchasing pig feed. SGMB 
participants linked the requirements of travel and the physical demands of transporting live pigs to 
the predominantly male brokers. The physical nature of slaughtering also means that most 
slaughterhouse employees are men, though half of slaughterhouses are owned and managed by 
women. Most employees of the wholesale and retail markets are female. 
4.2 Identification and prioritisation of problems within the pork value chain 
The first SGMB and RG workshops introduced the project’s goal of selecting pro-poor upgrading 
interventions as well as the project’s geographic area: 32 predominantly rural villages in Myeik and 
Palaw. Participants appreciated that the goal of the SGMB process would be to improve the 
profitability of small- and medium-scale pig farms in peri-urban and rural villages in the project’s 
target area. After the Layerstack exercise, participants individually identified key problems to 
achieving this goal. Table 5 lists the ten problems identified. These problems were discussed in 
plenary, and then prioritised through individual voting. Listed in order of priority, the top three 
problems were: (i) the unstable price of live pigs, (ii) insufficient capital for successful pig farming, 
and (iii) the high cost of quality pig feed. These problems were also noted in Ebata et al.’s (2018) 
research into governance and biosecurity along the pig VC in Yangon. A more detailed description of 
the problems follows, drawing on problem reference modes and cause-and-consequence maps 
created by SGMB workshop participants. 
Table 5: Problems identified within the pork value chain 
Rank order of pork VC problems  
Unstable price of live pigs 
Insufficient capital for successful pig farming  
High cost of quality pig feed 
Lack of support from LBVD 
Low knowledge on systemic hybrid pig farming 
Unable to easily purchase high-quality hybrid pigs 
TDC-mandated slaughterhouse license system limits competition 
Lack of technical support from government  
Fixed wholesale pork price 
Price of piglets is expensive, and it is difficult to find high-quality piglets 
Source: Developed by SGMB participants 
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4.2.1 Problem one: Unstable price of live pigs 
The unstable price of live pigs was identified as the foremost problem to profitable pig farming. Two 
related reference modes were developed by SGMB and RG participants. The first, illustrated by 
Figure 15, shows the estimated farmgate price of live pigs between 2010 and 2019, and the second, 
presented in Figure 16, highlights the monthly price oscillations of live pigs across the most recent 
calendar year.  
 
Figure 15: Reference mode of farmgate price of live pigs in Myeik 
Source: Developed by SGMB and RG participants 
 
Figure 16: Reference mode of annual fluctuations of live pig price in Myeik 
Source: Developed by SGMB and RG participants 
Workshop participants reached a consensus on historical events that led to the price fluctuations 
shown in Figure 15. Prior to 2012/2013, slaughterhouses in Myeik sourced pigs from surrounding 
villages; however, the short supply resulted in rapidly rising farmgate prices which caused 
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slaughterhouses to start purchasing live pigs from outside the region, mainly from Mawlymine and 
Thailand. The rapidly increasing imports stabilised, and then lowered, live pig prices until 2015/2016 
when there was a significant disease outbreak. In response to this, panic selling ensued along with 
lower consumer demand. The TDC also banned the importation of live pigs from outside Myeik as a 
biosecurity measure. The lack of imports from Mawlymine and Thailand and low numbers of local 
pigs resulted in rapid live pig price increases in 2017/2018, reaching highs of 2.25 US$/kg. These 
record-high prices encouraged rapid expansion in Myeik-based pig enterprises, particularly among 
larger farms with access to financial capital. In pig production cycles, returns on production 
investment are delayed by at least six months. Due to this production time-lag and high local prices, 
slaughterhouses in Myeik circumvented the TDC ban on importing pigs from outside of Myeik. The 
TDC was unable to enforce the importation ban, nor trace the origin of live pigs ready for slaughter, 
which further encouraged slaughterhouses to quickly reinstate imports. The combination of restoring 
pig imports from Mawlymine and subsequent increases in local pig production resulted in a large 
increase in the inventory of pigs ready for slaughtering. This glut of supply drove prices down in 
2018/2019 and resulted in many large-scale pig farms ceasing operations, as they could not repay 
investment loans, while medium-scale farmers were forced to scale down production. 
According to SGMB and RG participants, the annual fluctuations of live pig prices followed a regular 
pattern as shown in Figure 16. The annual January/February price increase was linked to increased 
consumer demand over Chinese New Year. Meanwhile, the June/July trough was related to the 
oversupply of pigs as small-scale farmers sold fatteners to cover paddy input costs and because of 
concerns over monsoonal disease outbreaks. 
Workshop participants developed the related cause-and-consequence map, shown in Figure 17,11 
identifying two feedback loops: “underinvestment” and “debt spiral”. In the underinvestment loop, 
unstable prices cause uncertainty and lower profits for pig farmers who are then unwilling or unable 
to make investments in their businesses. Low levels of on-farm investment in animal health, quality 
feed, and technical expertise reduce pig supply and pig quality in Myeik. This encourages 
slaughterhouses to purchase pigs from Mawlymine rather than Myeik, which in turn affects farmgate 
pig prices. The uncertainty around profit also discourages farmers from investing in collective action, 
which reduces opportunities to address information asymmetries, making farmers susceptible to low 
spot-rate offers at the farmgate. In the debt spiral loop, low and uncertain profits for pig farmers 
reduce their ability to pay back seasonal production and asset loans. To continue farming, farmers 
with no other credit options take additional loans from informal moneylenders at high interest rates 
 
11 The cause-and-consequence maps shown in this section reflect the specific discussions held in the SGMB and 
RG workshops and as a result they do not include the polarity of relationships. The SFDs which were developed 
from these cause-and-consequence maps are found in Section 4.3 and include relationship polarity.  
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(5 to 10% per month). The rising debt from high-interest loans increases pressure on farmers to sell 
pigs at lower-than-expected spot rates. 
 
Figure 17: Cause-and-consequence map of unstable price of live pigs 
Source: Developed by SGMB and RG participants 
4.2.2 Problem two: Insufficient capital for successful pig farming 
The next most significant problem identified was insufficient financial capital for successful pig 
farming, which was also a root cause of the other two priority problems. As shown earlier in Figure 
13, access to credit in the pork VC in Myeik and Palaw is spatially related, which is widely noted in the 
literature (Milder, 2008). Large-scale and medium-scale farms, being located closer to Myeik had 
access to a wider range of credit options, such as MADB, commercial banks, MFIs, moneylenders, 
and pawn shops. As distance from Myeik increases, credit options for medium- and small-scale 
farmers diminish and, in some cases, reduce to a choice between moneylenders and the informal 
lending of animals. This supports the findings of Jefferies et al. (2018), who found that large- and 
medium-scale farmers in Myanmar are twice as likely to engage with formal institutions and to use 
multiple sources of credit than small-scale farmers.  
The problem reference mode illustrated in Figure 18 shows that while the number of formal financial 
institutions (banks and MFIs) has grown, credit access for pig farmers is lagging. As noted by Jefferies 
at al. (2018), the expansion of formal credit in Myanmar has focused on paddy farmers through the 
MADB, with limited expansion in other agricultural sectors. Workshop participants reported that 
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over 80% of small- and medium-scale pig farms relied solely on informal loans from moneylenders 
and friends to operate their businesses. This large proportion support findings of the ACCESS 
Advisory VC report commissioned in 2018 by the TRRILD project and the TRRILD project’s baseline 
report that reported 80% of farming households requiring credit borrowed from moneylenders (Lyne 
& Snoxell, 2018).  
 
Figure 18: Reference mode of provision of formal credit in Myeik and Palaw 
Source: Developed by SGMB and RG participants 
As shown by the problem’s cause-and-consequence map in Figure 19, the inability to access formal 
credit on reasonable terms forces pig farmers to take high interest loans from informal 
moneylenders which reduces their ability to expand production, invest in quality inputs, and make 
upgrades to their businesses (such as purchasing of hybrid breeds).  The “debt spiral” loop is again 
present as mounting pressure to pay back high-interest loans, combined with information 
asymmetries, make small-scale farmers susceptible to accepting low spot-market rates for their 
products. The cause-and-consequence map also highlights significant barriers for pig farmers to 
access services from formal institutions, termed the “rural credit gap” by SGMB participants. SGMB 
participants reported that banks and MFIs operating in Myanmar frequently require loan collateral 
(such as land, savings, and assets) and onerous documentation (such as applications, guarantees, and 
land titles). As reported by Duflos et al. (2013), these requirements exclude many small- and 
medium-scale pig farmers from applying for formal loans. Furthermore, loans for pig farming are not 
a priority for these institutions as they are considered high-risk due to the fluctuating live pig prices 
and recent history of low profitability. The terms of loan products on offer were also reported as 
unsuitable for pig farming. Short loan lengths (less than one year), low initial loan amounts (less than 
US$300), and fixed monthly repayment schedules did not match the realities of pig farming, which 
include production delays and high investment costs (feed and piglet/sow purchasing). 
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Figure 19: Cause-and-consequence map of insufficient capital for successful pig farming 
Source: Developed by SGMB and RG participants 
4.2.3 Problem three: High cost of quality pig feed 
The high price of quality pig feed in relation to live pig prices was identified as the third most 
significant problem in the VC. Participants distinguished between two types of pig feeding systems: 
high- and low-quality. The high-quality system uses commercial feed as either a concentrate mixed 
with quality local ingredients (rice brain, broken rice, and fish meal) or as a complete feed package. A 
low-quality feeding system was defined as using only locally available ingredients at little or no cost 
to farmers, such as rice bran, broken rice, and kitchen/food scraps. The reference mode drawn by 
SGMB and RG participants in Figure 20 shows a slow transition of feeding systems from low- to high-
quality. Workshop participants linked the increasing use of high-quality feed systems to investments 
made in hybrid pigs on large- and medium-sized farms. The plateauing of high-quality feed usage was 
attributed to the recent downturn in large-scale pig farms as described previously. The reference 
mode also demonstrates changes in pig feed costs, with the high-quality system showing gradual 
increases and the low-quality system showing a gradual decline. 
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Figure 20: Reference mode of costs and use of pig feed systems 
Source: Developed by SGMB and RG participants 
This problem’s corresponding cause-and-consequence map, shown in Figure 21, includes 
underinvestment and debt spiral feedback loops (like those discerned in Problem one), and an 
additional feedback loop, termed “scales of economy.” The underinvestment loop in Figure 21 adds 
upgrading to hybrid pigs and investing in quality pig feed to the farmer’s investment options. The 
high cost of commercial pig feed causes farmers to either mix in more local ingredients with 
commercial concentrates or to forgo commercial feeds altogether. This behaviour delays the 
fattening process and reduces the overall quality of the pig, which lowers farmgate prices. When 
farmer profits are lower than expected, farmers delay investments in hybrid breeds and commercial 
feed systems. Participants contended that the weak demand for commercial feed had delayed the 
construction of a commercial feed plant in Tanintharyi.12 With no local supply, commercial feed must 
be sourced from Yangon or Thailand incurring significant transport costs that raise commercial feeds 
costs, referred to as the “scales of economy” loop by workshop participants. 
 
 
12 RG members reported that discussions had been held with several investors and donors to establish a pig 
feed company in Myeik to capitalise on the by-products of the large fishing industry in the area. However, this 
did not eventuate during the research period.  
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Figure 21: Cause-and-consequence map of the high price of pig feed 
Source: Developed by SGMB and RG participants 
4.3 Overview of the system dynamics model of the pork value chain 
The next step in developing the system dynamics (SD) model was to identify critical sub-systems, or 
“modules,” that represent relationships and variables that determine dynamic behaviour within the 
VC. By the end of the second SGMB session, participants had drawn on cause-and-consequence maps 
to select three modules to develop further: pig production, farmer investments, and farmer finance. 
During the construction of the pig production module, it became clear that the model needed to 
consider market forces beyond the farmgate. As a result, the module “pig system pricing and 
marketing” was added. The third and fourth SGMB and RG workshops involved participants working 
in small groups to develop modules into simple SFDs, containing key variables and feedback loops. 
Modules were discussed in plenary and subsequent changes to the module structure and parameters 
made through consensus. In the initial stages, causal relationships within and between modules were 
simplified to positive (+) and negative (-) effect. As modules were refined, causal signs (+ and -) were 
replaced by equations and graphical functions. A further three modules were developed by the 
Researcher upon returning to New Zealand: farmer knowledge, credit, and collective action 
(containing both PG and PO structure). The structure and parameters of these modules were 
reviewed by RG members through online platforms and discussed in-person during the fifth SGMB 
workshop. Figure 22 shows a high-level map of the model’s structure, highlighting the information 
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(black arrows) and material (dashed arrows) flows between the component modules along with each 
module’s core functionality.  
This section presents simplified SFDs of the modules, highlighting the key stocks, flows, variables, 
causal relationships, and feedback loops13 that determine the dynamic nature of the system. The 
complete structure of the SD model (developed in Stella Architect) appears in Appendix B, while 
related parameters and equations are found in Appendix C. 
 
Figure 22: High-level map of the pork VC SD model 
Source: Developed by the Researcher 
 
13 Sherwood (2011, p.132) advises against “…[using] terms such as ‘increase in’ or ‘decrease in’”, when 
describing causal relationships, instead recommending terms such as “…’increase or decrease’…’pressure 
on’…’change in’.” However, to aid readability and in the pattern of journal articles on similar topics (Lie et al., 
2016; Lie et al., 2018), relationships and feedback loops are presented in language which describes the typical 
behaviour of the loop, such as “increase” or “decrease.” Related diagrams in the text present the polarity of 
causal relationships for ease of reference, so that the reader can understand the variable will either increase or 
decrease depending on the behaviour of related variables. 
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4.3.1 Pig system pricing and marketing module 
The pig system pricing and marketing module, shown in Figure 23, calculates the base price at which 
slaughterhouses in Myeik will buy live pigs from local pig producers. This variable, slaughterhouse 
price of live pigs from Myeik,14 is used by the farm finance module to generate the farmgate price of 
live pigs. Previous pig production and inventory pricing models developed by Meadows (1970), 
Sterman (2010), Ford (2015), and Hamza and Rich (2015) form the basis for the module’s equations 
and structure. The module contains a central stock, inventory of live pigs ready for slaughter, to 
represent all fattened pigs available for purchasing by Myeik slaughterhouses. This stock has three 
inflows representing sources of fattened pigs: Myeik producers (pigs in production Myeik), TRRILD 
project producers (inventory of live pigs in TRRILD project area), and Mawlymine (Mawlymine live 
pigs available for export). 
In the model, slaughterhouses have two options for purchasing: from Mawlymine or from Myeik, 
with the decision on purchase origin determined by price differences associated with quality and 
lower transaction costs. This decision is represented by the variable, effect of price difference on 
ordering from Mawlymine, a graphical function which favours Mawlymine pigs when no price 
difference exists due to the lower transaction costs and higher quality. The price of live pigs from 
Mawlymine and Myeik are both calculated through an inventory pricing model: as the inventory of 
pigs changes relative to slaughterhouse orders the price moves in the opposite direction. In the 
model, the Mawlymine price of live pigs is less responsive to changes in pig inventory than in Myeik 
(Mawlymine sensitivity of price to inventory coverage is -0.05 compared to -0.1 for Myeik), 
representing the larger and more stable supply from Mawlymine. The supply of pigs from 
Mawlymine grows at 6 % per annum as reported by RG members. However, unlike Myeik pig 
production, Mawlymine’s production capacity is delinked from the price of live pigs in Mawlymine. 
This is related to Mawlymine’s position as a regional trading hub for Yangon, with sales to Myeik 
accounting for only a small fraction of its overall market. 
In the baseline model, a significant15 disease outbreak occurs every four years and lasts for 26 weeks, 
with a death rate of 15% of pigs per week as proposed by RG and SGMB participants. Panic selling by 
producers quickly ensues resulting in initially higher numbers of pigs for sale; however, disease 
outbreaks eventually reduce all three pig flows, decreasing the inventory of live pigs ready for 
slaughtering. The more prolonged a disease outbreak, the greater the chance that there will be an 
importation ban imposed by the Myeik TDC that reduces the stock of Mawlymine live pigs available 
for export. This delayed reduction in available pig imports, reduces overall inventory and causes 
 
14 The names of model variables have been italicised to assist in linking descriptive narrative to module figures. 
15 Regular but isolated disease outbreaks occur every year. This function models a significant region-wide swine 
disease outbreak, such as the hog cholera event of 2015/2016 that affected most pig producers.  
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prices to rise; however, price changes are initially offset by the reduction in demand as consumers 
become aware of the pig disease and change their purchasing patterns. 
 
Figure 23: Pig system pricing and marketing module 
Note: Grey variables indicate structure from a different module. 
Source: Developed by SGMB and RG participants and the Researcher 
Slaughterhouse ordering of live pigs is determined by the stock, Myeik slaughterhouse total live pig 
demand. Quantity demanded by slaughterhouses is driven by exogenous variables owing to the local 
government’s price on wholesale pork, which is fixed per regulations at 3.54 US$/kg in the baseline 
model and rises by 7% every seven years (as observed and reported by RG members who noted one 
price rise since the TDC fixed wholesale pork prices). Baseline demand for wholesale pork starts at 
the equivalent of 700 pigs/week and is regulated by the change in demand due to population and 




















































Myiek pigs dying+ Order rate from
Mawlymine

































































of live pigs from Myeik>
-


























Inventory of live pigs




Chinese New Year celebrations and decreases by 30% during disease outbreaks with a four-week 
time lag to account for delays for disease information to reach consumers. These demand dynamics 
were widely discussed and confirmed within SGMB and RG workshops.  
The module also calculates the profits of slaughterhouses and brokers based in Myeik. As shown in 
Figure 23, slaughterhouse profits are constrained by the Government-fixed pork price ceiling, which 
limits the maximum prices they pay Myeik producers even in times of scarcity. While demand for 
premium pork products within and outside of Myeik rises, slaughterhouses have yet to access these 
markets, which would increase their price per kg of pork.  
The module contains two notable balancing feedback loops which produce the fluctuations in prices 
described during SGMB workshops. The first, B1, is a capacity utilisation loop, the essential part of 
the module’s price-setting structure adapted from Sterman’s commodity model (2010). In the 
capacity utilisation loop, rising live pig prices results in higher profits for Myeik pig producers which 
causes them to increase their production capacity by either purchasing more piglets/sows or 
allocating more gilts as breeding stock. The model uses the graphical function, indicated capacity 
utilisation, to determine the effect of profitability on pig production capacity. There is a significant 
delay between price shifts and higher numbers of fatteners becoming ready for sale: a 26-week delay 
for producers to respond to price signals by changing production levels, and a further 26-week delay 
to account for biological processes of breeding and fattening. Completing the loop, the higher 
volume of fatteners increases the inventory of live pigs ready for slaughtering in Myeik, which results 
in a lowering of slaughterhouse pig prices.  
The second feedback loop, B2, is a product substitution loop (Sterman, 2010) for Myeik pigs, that 
further balances the slaughterhouse price of live pigs from Myeik and causes price oscillations. When 
the slaughterhouse price of live pigs from Myeik increases, the price difference between Mawlymine 
and Myeik pigs falls, which causes slaughterhouses to increase orders from Mawlymine. This results 
in increases in the inventory of live pigs ready for slaughtering in Myeik which lowers the 
slaughterhouse price of live pigs from Myeik. There are no material delays in this feedback loop, and 
as such it dominates the price setting process system unless there is a significant disease shock. 
When a disease outbreak coupled with an importation ban occur, the usually steady stock of 
Mawlymine live pigs available for export is extinguished and loop B2 ceases to function. This causes 
B1 to dominate the system, with falling inventory causing rapid increases in pig prices and pig 
producers in Myeik responding by investments in production capacity. When the disease outbreak 
ceases or the importation ban is circumvented by slaughterhouses, flows of live pigs from 
Mawlymine quickly enter the inventory of live pigs ready for slaughtering in Myeik due to the large 
price difference, which causes prices in Myeik to fall. The timing of reinstating the B2 loop (once a 
 93 
disease outbreak ends) combined with biological delays in the B1 loop can result in large oscillations 
of pig prices. For example, if the reopening of the importation channel occurs in conjunction with 
Myeik pig producers’ capacity investments entering the market, a large volume of fatteners will flow 
into the inventory of live pigs ready for slaughter in Myeik, which will rapidly decrease the 
slaughterhouse price for live pigs from Myeik.  
4.3.2 Pig production module 
The Pig Production Module, presented in Figure 24, covers the biological processes of pig production 
and changes in farming systems applied by the 1280 pig farmers located in the project’s 32 target 
villages. The biological stocks and flows follow a similar structure to that applied in other pig 
production models (Sterman, 2010; Hamza and Rich, 2015; and Ouma et al., 2018), but with 
contextual modifications made through the SGMB process. The production section of the module 
contains five stocks to represent the life cycle of pig production: gestation, piglets, growers, breeding 
sows, and inventory of live pigs from TRRILD project area (which are “fatteners” ready for sale). An 
additional stock, purchased piglets, represents hybrid and local piglets purchased by WF farmers. 
Biological delays conditioned on pig breed determine flow rates between these stocks. Hybrid and 
local pigs have the same period for gestation (114 days) and piglet weaning (45 days); however, 
average fattening time is less for hybrid pigs (135 days) than for local breeds (255 days). Pig losses 
occur at each stage of production due to common illnesses (10% during gestation, 13% for piglets, 
10% for growers). These mortality rates are affected by significant disease outbreaks (an additional 
loss of 15% per week for 26 weeks), type of breed (local pigs are 30% more resilient to diseases), and 
level of good animal husbandry practices (GAHP). Pig biological and production data was discussed at 
length within SGMB and RG workshops in order to reach a consensus for inclusion in the SD model.  
Two key determinants of GAHP are used in the model: number of Animal Health Workers (AHWs), 
and application of biosecurity and hygiene measures (with full coverage of GAHP reducing death 
rates by 80%). Sales of piglets and fatteners are driven by exogenous variables: FF farms sell 50% of 
their piglets to WF farmers, and all fatteners not set aside for breeding purposes are sold to brokers 
and slaughterhouses when they reach their target weight (88 kgs for hybrid and  56kgs for local 
breeds). When a significant disease outbreak occurs, SGMB and RG participants reported that 
farmers panic sell 5% of piglets, fatteners, and breeding stock at reduced weights (40% of optimal) 
and prices each week for a ten-week period.  
A reinforcing feedback loop, R1, regulates pig production capacity in this module. Pig farmers select 
gilts from the stock of growers for breeding purposes. Increases in breeding sow numbers grow the 
number of pregnancies, piglets, and growers which in turn enlarges the number of sows available for  
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Figure 24: Pig production module 
Note: Grey variables indicate structure from a different module. 
Source: Developed by SGMB and RG participants and the Researcher 
breeding. The pace and magnitude of change in the R1 loop are greater for hybrid pig production due 
to fertility and fattening practices. Hybrid sows produce 24 piglets per year (two litters of 12 piglets) 
while local breed sows typically produce eight piglets from a single litter per year. Additionally, 
hybrid pig farmers generally take half as long to complete a production cycle (26 weeks for hybrid 














































































































































































seasonal production patterns; for example, 60% of FF farmers sell their fatteners in the two months 
preceding the monsoon, while breeding stock is culled after two years due to declining fertility.  
The combination and timing of farmer profits and disease outbreaks determine whether the R1 loop 
is virtuous or vicious in nature. When a significant disease outbreak strikes the target population, the 
number of pigs in the system reduces through deaths and panic selling. These losses decrease the 
number of gilts available for breeding as well as current breeding stock, which brings further 
reduction in pregnancies, piglets, and growers and the R1 loop works to decrease pig numbers. Farm 
profitability also affects this loop. As farm profits rise, the R1 loop operates in a virtuous manner, and 
farmers increase breeding stock numbers to raise production capacity to deliver more fatteners for 
market. This increases the numbers of gilts available for further breeding and production increases, 
which raises farm profits. When disease outbreaks reduce overall inventory and live pig prices 
eventually rise as a result, the R1 feedback loop can magnify biological delays. Pig farmers who have 
lower stock levels due to livestock deaths or panic selling are unable to rapidly increase their 
breeding stock due to the low numbers of gilts. As a result, pig producers without capital reserves or 
networks to buy in new breeding stock or piglets are unable to take advantage of the high live pig 
prices and move production quickly towards the virtuous side of this reinforcing loop.  
The R1 loop also has an impact on WF farmers. The majority of WF farmers source piglets from local 
villages; hence, a reduction in breeding stock also decreases their availability of piglets. Although WF 
farmers can source piglets from outside of their local villages, this brings further costs and is not 
always possible if disease outbreaks are system wide. Thus, WF farms have a similar dynamic to FF in 
that they are unable to take advantage of rising live pig prices due to delays in accessing piglet supply 
and the high price of piglets.  
The pig production module further governs farmer evolution across different production systems. A 
central stock, pig producers in each farming system, categorises pig producers into six different 
farming enterprises, with inflow and outflows allowing producers to transfer between these systems. 
This, and other stocks in this module, use a three-by-two array to cover six producer categories: (i) 
pig producers farming local breeds within the FF system; (ii) pig producers farming local breeds 
within the WF system; (iii) pig producers farming hybrid breeds within the FF system; (iv) pig 
producers farming hybrid breeds within the WF system; (v) PG/PO members farming hybrid breeds 
within the FF system; and (vi) PG/PO members farming hybrid breeds within the WF system.16 Pig 
producers move to different production systems based on the expected medium-term profitability of 
each system. A farmer’s technical knowledge also influences the decision to upgrade a production 
 
16 The last two categories are not used for the baseline model but are included to allow for scenario-testing.  
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system and links this module to the knowledge module through the variable – effect of knowledge on 
upgrading decisions.  
A simple upgrading pathway between the pig systems that was developed by SGMB participants is 
used in the module. This pathway is illustrated in Figure 25, showing that farmers typically move 
from WF to FF systems and from local to hybrid pig breeds. The module also enables pig producers to 
leave and then re-engage with pig farming based on short-term profits. When re-entering pig farming 
producers start pig production at one-level down the upgrading hierarchy outlined in Figure 25. 
 
Figure 25: Upgrading pathways for pig producers in pig production module 
Source: Developed by SGMB participants and the Researcher 
4.3.3 Farmer finance, credit, and investment modules 
The farmer finance, credit, and investment modules are intricately linked by feedback loops and are 
therefore explained in combination and represented together in Figure 26. The farmer finance 
module calculates pig farmer profits for each of the six farm enterprises. Farm costs are attributed to 
two sources: farm production costs, which change proportionally to the number of pigs in each 
production system, and loan costs, which are incurred by producers to finance pig production costs 
or investments to upgrade production systems. 
The main farm production costs come from boar servicing, applying GAHP, purchasing piglets, and 
providing feed. Across all six pig systems, pig feed consumes the majority of production costs. Feed 
costs are greater in hybrid systems compared with local breeds, and higher in FF compared with WF 
systems. In the baseline model, around 80% of FF farmer production costs and 50% of WF farmer 
production costs relate to pig feed. For WF farmers, piglet purchase costs are the other significant 





positively correlated with the slaughterhouse prices of live pigs in Myeik; thus, piglet prices rise as the 
inventory of live pigs in Myeik falls. 
 
Figure 26: Farmer finance, credit, and investment modules 
Note: Grey variables indicate structure from a different module. 
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SGMB exercises noted that pig producers rely heavily on loans, primarily from informal 
moneylenders, to cover ongoing production costs. In the module, growth in farm production costs 
brings increases in the productive loan capital required to maintain cash flow. The model assumes 
that as profits increase, farmers save a greater portion of their profits for reinvestment, lowering the 
amount of productive loan capital required. The portion of profits saved is determined by the 
graphical function, savings rate. This graph models a sigmoid curve to represent the behaviour of 
farmers using profits to first cover basic HH or primary livelihood requirements (such as paddy 
inputs) before reinvesting in pig farms. This was developed in conjunction with SGMB participants 
who explained that farm reinvestments increased after HHs used profits to cover HH essentials but 
then tapered off as profits were also invested in other livelihood sources.  The cost of capital is 
dependent on the productive loan interest rate and is added into the total farm costs. The debt cycle 
loop described by SGMB participants is represented by the reinforcing feedback loop, R2: rising loan 
costs lower pig farmer profits which reduces the savings rate and requires producers to source 
further productive loan capital from informal moneylenders to remain in pig farming.  
Farm revenue in the module is driven by the number and type of pigs sold as well as the farmgate 
price of live pigs in target villages. Derived from the production module, revenue comes from three 
categories of pigs: fatteners sold to slaughterhouses; piglets sold to WF farmers; and the culling of 
breeding stock. The farmgate price of live pigs in the target villages obtains its base value from the 
system pricing and marketing module and is conditioned by three variables represented by graphical 
functions. First, pig quality positively influences farmgate prices, with pig quality dependent upon 
feed quality and farmer technical knowledge. Investments in higher quality commercial feed enhance 
the physical condition of pigs and decrease fattening time. Second, the amount of outstanding loan 
costs creates pressure on producers to take lower prices from brokers to reduce debt that is accruing 
interest weekly, a phenomenon termed “debt pressure” by SGMB participants. As the amount of loan 
costs increase, debt pressure increases, which in turn lowers farmgate prices as producers have few 
alternative options to sell their fatteners. Lastly, the volume of fatteners ready for sale in the villages 
impacts on transaction costs incurred by brokers, especially search costs. As the Inventory of live pigs 
in the TRRILD project area increases, transaction costs decrease, which will in turn raise farmgate 
prices.  
The pig farmer investment options elicited by the SGMB process and illustrated in Figure 26 are all 
reinforcing loops, “engines of growth or decline.” In the module, all investment decisions are 
determined by expected profits which incur delays as producers take time to decipher market 
signals, following Lie et al. (2018). In R3 and R4, changes in short-term (26 weeks) profits cause 
producers to adjust production levels, by either increasing or decreasing the number of gilts 
allocated as breeding sows (R3) or altering the number of piglets purchased (R4). The resulting 
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change in the number of pigs sold and transaction costs impacts pig farmer profits. If short-term 
profits fall to levels where pig farming is unsustainable, pig farmers cease to engage in the livelihood, 
lowering the number of pigs in villages, which lowers farmgate prices through increased transaction 
costs for brokers, depicted by the R5 reinforcing loop. Given pig farming’s role in household savings, 
the graphical function governing the R5 loop, effects of short-term profits on engaging in pig farming, 
has a lower threshold for action than other profit related variables. Short-term profit margins also 
drive decisions around investments in pig feeding systems, shown by the reinforcing loop, R6. As 
profits increase, farmers have further savings to invest in production inputs, of which feed is the 
most significant. As described above, further investments in feed quality raise farmgate prices which 
increase farmer revenues.  
Pig farmers can also upgrade their farming system, represented by the R7 feedback loop. Farmer 
decisions to upgrade are driven by technical knowledge and medium-term (52 weeks) profitability, 
which considers the expected profits of the upgrades and also the once-off upgrading costs. 
Upgrading costs include asset and animal purchases, such as piglets, sows, improved shelter, and 
equipment. The ongoing costs to service a loan to cover animal or asset purchases also determine 
the medium-term profitability of upgrading. Upgrading pig systems either increases the number or 
value of pigs in the village, which causes revenue to rise, driving further upgrading decisions.  
The investment feedback loops also have reciprocal balancing loops, designated by B3 in Figure 26. 
While investments increase total farm revenue, they also raise farm production costs, which reduces 
farmer profits and balances investments. The R2 – debt loop – further curbs investment, as any 
increases in farm production costs further raise the amount of loan capital required. The B1 and B2 
feedback loops from the system pricing and marketing module act as a further brake on producer 
investments, especially given the long production delays which prolong returns on investment 
strategies.    
Two sources of credit are available to producers in the model: from informal moneylenders and from 
formal financial providers, such as MFIs and banks. The moneylender interest rate is set at 5% per 
month and 2.46%17 per month from formal sources as reported by SGMB and RG participants and 
recent literature (Jefferies et al., 2018; Hein et al., 2016). Moneylenders are assumed to have an 
unlimited source of credit; however, loan capital from formal providers is limited by the initial value 
of the stock, formal lender: available loan capital. Two types of formal loans are available to farmers; 
loans to finance assets or animals needed for upgrading pig systems and loans to cover ongoing 
production costs, such as pig feed. The module prioritises loans for upgrading when it allocates the 
stock of formal lender: available loan capital. The remaining loan capital from formal lenders is made 
 
17 This is the interest rate of the TRRILD project’s partner MFI. 
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available for production loans. The cost of loan capital is computed as weighted average of the 
interest rates charged by formal and informal lenders. As the proportion of loans from formal lenders 
increases, interest rates across the module move closer towards the floor level of 2.46% per month. 
The loan term for upgrading loans is computed in a similar manner, with formal lenders providing 
shorter term loans (52 weeks) compared to informal moneylenders (66 weeks).  
The credit module also covers defaults by pig farmers. Recently upgraded pig producers default on 
loans when their new enterprises are unprofitable over a 52 week period. When the variable, 
medium-term expected profitability of pig system declines, the number of new entrants leaving rises 
and loan capital exits from the stock of formal lender: loan capital in use through the flow: defaulting 
on upgrading loan. Pig producers without upgrading loans but with production loans from the formal 
lender also exit from farming when short-term profits fall, and this causes reductions in the stock of 
formal lender: available loan capital.  
Two main feedback loops are present in the credit module. Firstly, a balancing feedback loop, B4, 
exists given the finite nature of credit. When profits rise and pig producers make upgrades, they start 
to exhaust formal credit supplies. This increases the overall interest rate which in turn increases loan 
costs, thus lowering farming profits. Also acting to reduce loan capital, in R8, lower farmer profits 
cause higher default rates as farmers leave pig farming and are unable to meet their repayment 
obligations. This reduces the overall loan capital available, which raises system interest rates and 
negatively impacts farmer profits. 
4.3.4 Farmer knowledge module 
The farmer knowledge module determines changes to the stock of farmer technical knowledge and is 
illustrated in Figure 27. The stock of technical knowledge covers good GAHP like feed preparation, 
animal health, biosecurity, and appropriate shelter. The module assumes that, ceteris paribus, any 
increases in technical knowledge convert to improvements in farm practices. The technical 
knowledge of farmers has a positive relationship towards overall pig quality and increases the 
confidence of producers to upgrade their pig enterprises (as shown in Figures 26 and 27). The stock 
of farmer technical knowledge has an inflow, acquiring knowledge, and an outflow, forgetting, which 
is assumed as a fixed rate of 5% of capacity per annum. There are two pathways for acquiring 
knowledge in the module: through training events (based on the module structure presented by Lie 
et al., 2018) and peer-to-peer learning (based on the relationships identified by Reinker and Gralla, 
2018). 
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Training structures represent training events18 delivered by the TRRILD project, and LBVD and other 
civil society actors. For the baseline, SGMB participants estimated that 5% of the target population’s 
farmers would participate in a training every year. The percentage of farmers acquiring knowledge 
from training positively influences the learning rate among farmers. The learning rate is also 
determined by the rate at which farmers absorb and apply knowledge, shown by the variable 
knowledge absorption rate (assumed at 50 % based on discussion with RG participants), as well as 
their knowledge gap. Farmer knowledge gap is the difference between the maximum knowledge a 
farmer can be expected to attain (i.e., a master or expert farmer) and their current level of 
knowledge. Herein lies the balancing feedback loop, B5; changes to the stock of farmer technical 
knowledge alters the knowledge gap, which determines the learning rate. As a balancing feedback 
loop, additional training events in the module produce diminishing rates of returns to the stock of 
farmer technical knowledge. 
Farmers also increase their technical knowledge through regular interactions with peers, represented 
by the variable, proportion of farmers educated by peers. As the stock of farmer technical knowledge 
rises there is increasing likelihood that farmers will encounter technically competent farmers when 
meeting with peers. Not all interactions between farmers result in education transfer and in the 
module, it is assumed that the proportion of contacts resulting in education is 50% as per advice from 
RG members. A reinforcing feedback loop, R9, operates within the peer-to-peer learning process. As 
farmers gain technical knowledge, the likelihood of learning from a technically competent farmer 
increases, which further increases the stock of knowledge among pig farmers. The peer-to-peer loop 
could, therefore, build on knowledge gains from a training event by multiplying it across the target 
village and offsetting the forgetting of technical knowledge. However, the strength of this multiplier 
effect depends upon the number of contacts with peer farmers and the proportion of contacts 
resulting in education. The number of contacts with peer farmers is positively influenced by the 
number of PG/PO members in the collective action module.  
Learning curve principles adapted from the improvement process literature (Sterman, 2010; 
McGarvey & Hannon, 2004) determine the effect of knowledge changes on farmer upgrading 
decisions and pig quality. The learning rate is assumed at -0.05 for upgrading and -0.02 for quality 
following discussions with SGMB and RG participants. The module uses a learning rate formula 
(Sherman, p. 338, 2010) to calculate the effect of changes in knowledge. For example, the variable, 
effect of knowledge on upgrading decisions, is calculated in Stella Architect using the equation: 
(farmer technical knowledge/Initial knowledge level) ^ (LN (1-Learning rate – upgrading)/LN(2)). 
 
18 This includes events such as classroom training, learning from a mobile application, farmer field schools, and 
on-farm interactions with livestock extension workers.  
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When applying this calculation, the effect of knowledge on upgrading decisions increases by 5% every 
time farmer technical knowledge doubles compared with initial knowledge levels. 
 
Figure 27: Farmer knowledge module 
Note: Grey variables indicate structure from a different module. 
Source: Adapted from Lie et al. (2019) by the Researcher 
4.3.5 Collective action module 
The collective action module in the pork VC SD model is based on the generic SFD developed in 
Section 3.5.2. In the pork VC, there is little to no collective action; hence, the collective action module 
operates as a potential intervention for scenario testing. The collective action module consists of two 
parts: (i) the PG module, shown in Figure 28; and (ii) the PO module, presented in Figure 29. In the 
pork VC SD model, pig PGs are established to transition to pig POs, hence the PG module structure is 
fully absorbed into the PO module. This is because PGs operate primarily at a transactional level in 
the model and POs extend their operations by investing in value-adding assets to capture a larger 
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encourage investment and discourage side-selling, including tradable delivery rights and class B 
shares (Chaddad & Cook, 2004).   
The PG module tracks membership in pig PGs, the financial position of pig PGs, and investments in 
pig PG services, as shown in Figure 28. The structure and equations used in this module are based on 
the cooperative decision and cashflow module developed by McRoberts et al. (2013), but with 
additional functionality around PG membership, institutional arrangements, and capacity 
investments. In this module, pig PG members are represented by two stocks, active PG members and 
non-active PG members, with two arrays to cover WF and FF farmers. Flows between the two stocks 
allow members to alter their engagement within the pig PG depending on circumstances. When 
working individually is more profitable than working through the PG, members stop patronising the 
PG, and when circumstances are reversed, they re-engage with the PG. This functionality represents 
the well-documented phenomenon of side-selling that negatively impacts collective action (Cook, 
1995). Mirroring structure from other modules, pig PG members can leave pig farming permanently 
if profits fall sharply, and upgrade from WF to FF farms based on medium-term profitability.  
The financial state of the PG is represented by the stock, PG cashflow, which has a revenue inflow, 
and outflows for savings (i.e., retained earnings to increase PG capital), costs, and price rebates. In 
the module, PGs establish a relationship with slaughterhouses to collectively market their pigs, with 
revenues collected from these sales increasing PG cashflow. PGs negotiate a modest premium 
(baseline value of 5% above farmgate prices was agreed by SGMB and RG members and confirmed 
during KIIs with slaughterhouse owners) to supply a consistent volume of high-quality hybrid pigs 
based on relational or formal contracts. On delivering pigs to the PG, members are paid the 
equivalent farmgate price which depletes PG cashflow. Covering the pig PG’s operating costs also 
draws down PG cashflow; these costs include management fees (i.e., payments to Directors or PG 
Managers), technical fees (costs of technical training on hybrid pig production), and any ongoing 
costs to maintain the PG’s capacity to provide services to its members. The level of cash reserves the 
pig PG needs to cover these regular costs is represented by the variable, minimum desired balance. 
The minimum desired balance is determined by multiplying PG costs by a desired time coverage, 
which is set for two weeks in the baseline model based on discussions with RG and TRRILD project 
staff. The maximum flexible cash that the PG has available to allocate for retained earnings or price 





Figure 28: PG portion of the collective action module 
Note: Grey variables indicate structure from a different module. 









































































































































































































Figure 29: PO portion of the collective action module 
Note: Grey variables indicate structure from a different module. 
Source: Developed by the Researcher drawing on McRoberts et al. (2013) 
The pig PG allocates cashflow to the stock of PG savings if there is sufficient cash to maintain the 
minimum desired balance and until the maximum PG savings level is attained (US$50,000 in the 
baseline). PG savings are used for investing in PG capacity to provide services to pig PG members. In 
the SD model, basic services include training for members, bulk purchasing of inputs (decreasing 
standard farm production costs), and collective marketing of products. Additionally, the pig PG 







































































































































































































































































































Insemination (AI). The level of pig PG capacity determines the volume of high-quality fatteners that 
PG members can supply to the PG to meet orders. The module assumes that pig PGs aim to provide 
services to all members’ pig enterprises, rather than limiting services to cover only the pigs required 
to meet contract orders. The pig PGs’ capacity deficit (i.e., gap in AHW coverage and gap in AI 
capacity) is determined by the share of its members’ pigs not serviced by the PG services. If savings 
allow, the PG continues to invest in the additional capacity needed to provide these services to its 
members. In the event of liquidity stress, the stock of PG savings is redirected to revenue inflows and 
PG payments to members for pigs are reduced to maintain positive cash flows in the PG.  
The PG module contains multiple feedback loops, of which only the most significant will be 
explained. The success of the PG as an institution rests on its ability to maintain financial viability. In 
the reinforcing feedback loop, R10, revenue generated from meeting orders increases PG savings 
and investments in the capacity of the pig PG to service its members. Growth in services increases 
the volume and quality of members’ pigs, which enables the PG to maintain and grow its orders for 
high-quality pigs. This revenue generating loop is counterbalanced by the B6 loop. In this balancing 
loop, PG investments in capacity to deliver services to members incur ongoing costs. These costs 
combine with payments to PG members in the form of immediate farmgate payments for pigs and 
delayed price rebates, decreasing PG cashflow, and its ability to save and make future investments in 
capacity.  
The success of the PG also rests on its ability to maintain membership numbers that allow the PG to 
meet the orders for PG high-quality pigs and achieve economies of scale for its services. This 
feedback loop, R11, requires a critical mass of pig producers to join the PG to determine whether it 
operates in a state of growth or decline. In a state of growth, increases in profits earned by PG 
members relative to non-members encourages more pig farmers to join the PG, to re-engage with 
the PG, or to change their farming system from WF to FF, all of which grow the volume of high-
quality fatteners produced by PG members. This grows PG member revenue as they can supply more 
high-quality fatteners at a premium to meet slaughterhouse orders, and fatteners sold outside of PG 
contracts also bring higher farmgate prices because of their improved quality. Both these revenue 
streams increase PG member profits, thus helping to maintain PG membership and attract new 
members when required. The balancing loop, B7, acts as a counter to the R11 loop, influencing 
whether the loop is in growth or decline. The B7 loops focuses on the costs associated with 
producing a quality product. If the costs of producing a quality product outweigh the price rebates 
that members receive over and above the farmgate price, then PG member profits decline relative to 
non-member profits and PG members begin to disengage from the PG and side-sell their products.  
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The institutional and PG member feedback loops in the PG module are interconnected and thus 
reinforce patterns of growth or decline. For example, in the B6 balancing loop, if the PG overinvests 
in its capacity, costs increase, decreasing its ability to pay price rebates to members. This causes a fall 
in PG member profits, which negatively affects both PG membership numbers and overall PG 
profitability (negatively effecting the R1, R2, R3, and R7 production and investment loops) and results 
in the R10 moving towards a state of decline. PG revenue is then decreased, limiting investments in 
capacity. If PG capacity drops to a point where it cannot supply the volume or quality determined by 
orders for high-quality pigs, then the R11 re-enforcing loop also moves into a state of decline, which 
lowers PG revenue and further decreases capacity and the ability to pay price rebates to members.  
The PO module, shown in Figure 29, accommodates the scenario in which PGs convert to POs that 
invest in value-adding assets. In the pork VC SD model, POs invest in a hygienic slaughterhouse that 
produces premium pork products. Any remaining slaughterhouse capacity is allocated to producing a 
high-quality wholesale product for the wet market. The PO module replicates PG cashflow structure 
with a few notable exceptions. Firstly, investments by the POs in slaughterhouse capacity are 
determined by the gap between production capacity and orders as well as the long-term profitability 
of the slaughterhouse. As shown in Figure 29, changes to long-term profitability of the 
slaughterhouse determine both PO savings rates and the rate of investment in the PO’s 
slaughterhouse. Additionally, the slaughterhouse capacity stock and flow structures provide the 
opportunity for a strategic partner to inject an initial capital investment in the slaughterhouse. As a 
result, dividends paid out from the slaughterhouse through to the POs are determined by the 
variable, Proportion of slaughterhouse investment from PO. As the slaughterhouse’s profitability 





Results of the ex-ante impact evaluations of pro-poor interventions 
to upgrade the pork value chain 
This chapter presents and analyses the results of the ex-ante impact evaluation of pro-poor 
interventions to upgrade the pork VC. First, the process to validate the model is outlined in Section 
5.1 followed by an overview of the indicators used to analyse the results of scenario-testing in 
Section 5.2. Findings from the baseline model of the pork VC are then described in Section 5.3. Next, 
Section 5.4 provides an overview of the institutional scenarios and technical upgrading activities used 
for scenario-testing. Sections 5.5 and 5.6 present and analyse the results from the ex-ante evaluation 
of these pro-poor upgrading scenarios. The chapter concludes with the sensitivity analysis of the pork 
VC model’s findings in Section 5.7, including alternative scenarios and a multi-variate parameter 
analysis.    
5.1 Model validation 
Model validation outlined by Forrester and Senge (1980) and Sterman (2010) was undertaken to 
establish confidence in the SD model and its ability to guide decision-making in the TRRILD project. 
During the fifth SGMB session, the quantitative SD model was shared with the original SGMB and RG 
participants and the evolution of the concept model’s structure was examined and verified by them. 
This sharing served as a structure-verification test, helping to ensure that only structure that had real 
world meaning was included in the model (Sterman, 2010). Throughout the model-building process, 
the Researcher performed intuitive sensitivity analyses to verify the accuracy of critical parameters. 
This was particularly important for parameters that could not be triangulated with secondary data 
and for the graphical functions that drive the model’s dynamic behaviour (Sterman, 2010). Extreme 
condition testing was applied to the model to analyse and confirm its ability to respond plausibly 
when using extreme ranges of parameters. Critical parameters and graphical functions were also 
selected for more intensive sensitivity analysis. The results of these analyses are reported in Section 
5.7. 
The model was also validated by checking its ability to replicate historical behaviour (Forrester & 
Senge, 1980; Sterman, 2010). Owing to the lack of historical secondary data, the model’s behaviour 
was compared to historical trends described in reference modes established by SGMB and RG 
participants. The baseline model was able to recreate notable historical trends and patterns including 
(i) live pig prices which oscillate seasonally, continue to rise, and have peaks and troughs following 
disease shocks; (ii) the migration of pig producers to FF systems; (iii) disease outbreaks; and (iv) the 
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growth in importation of pigs from outside the region. These behaviour reproduction tests were 
reviewed and confirmed by SGMB and RG participants in workshop five to further build confidence in 
the model’s results.  
5.2 Model indicators 
Indicators were identified to analyse the results of scenario testing and to guide the selection of 
upgrading strategies for the TRRILD project. Originally suggested by workshop participants in SGMB 
and RG four, indicators were iteratively modified by TRRILD project partners as further information 
to guide project decision-making was required. Given the large number of indicators and scenarios 
for testing,19 two were chosen as outcome-level indicators: (i) the aggregate profits of all pig 
producers in the project’s target villages was selected to assess the size of the project’s economic 
impact; and (ii) the number of pig producers in highly profitable systems was selected to assess the 
project’s pro-poor impacts by examining the distribution of economic benefits across producers. 
These two aggregate indicators were chosen to understand both the project’s economic and pro-
poor impacts within the system under enquiry – pig producers in the 32 target villages. To further 
strengthen the project’s pro-poor impacts, the focus of the remaining indicators was weighted 
towards small- and medium-scale producers in the target area, with per capita indicators used to 
understand differences in timelines and between farming systems. However, several meso-level 
indicators were also included to measure the impacts of upgrading on other key chain actors, such as 
slaughterhouses and brokers. Where possible each indicator was delineated by pig breed (local or 
hybrid); farming system (FF or WF); and participation in a farmer organisation (individual or PG/PO 
member). The final set of seventeen indicators is presented in Table 6. The model produced data 
using a time step of weeks; typically, indicators were compared across short- (260 weeks), medium- 
(520 weeks), and long-term (780 weeks) horizons.   
Table 6: Indicators for the pork VC model 
Indicator Unit Indicator definition 
Slaughterhouse price of live pigs US$/kg Price of live pigs purchased by slaughterhouses in Myeik 
and Palaw 
Proportion of pigs slaughtered in Myeik 
and Palaw originating in Myeik and 
Palaw 
Percent The proportion of all pigs slaughtered in Myeik and Palaw 
slaughterhouses that were produced by farmers in Myeik 
and Palaw 
Cumulative profits for slaughterhouses  US$ Total profits for slaughterhouses in Myeik and Palaw 
servicing the 32 villages targeted by the project 
Cumulative profits for brokers US$ Total profits for all brokers servicing the 32 villages 





19 Analysing seventeen indicators over three different time horizons across the baseline and three scenarios 
containing five upgrading activities equated to 1,020 unique data points for comparison.    
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Table 6: Indicators for the pork VC model (continued) 
Indicator Unit Indicator definition 
Number of weeks 
worked in pig-related 
off-farm activities  
Weeks The number of weeks worked by people employed as animal 
health workers (AHWs), artificial insemination (AI) workers, 
brokers, and slaughterhouse labourers that are directly 
attributable to the supply of live pigs from target villages  
Number of pig producers 
in each farming system 
Pig producers The number of pig producers active in each of the six farming 
systems: (i) individual local breed FF; (ii) individual local breed 
WF; (iii) individual hybrid breed FF; (iv) individual hybrid breed 
WF; (v) PG member hybrid breed FF; and (vi) PG member 
hybrid breed WF  
Number of pig producers 
in highly profitable 
systems 
Pig producers The number of pig producers that earn more than US$153a 
per year from pig sales. 
Weekly cashflow for 
individual producers in 
each farming system 
US$/week Weekly cashflow for an individual producer in each of the six 
types of farming systems 
Aggregate profitsb for 
individual producers in 
each farming system 
US$/producer Total profits for an individual producer in each of the six types 
of farming systems 
Annual profits for 
individual producers in 
each farming system 
US$/producer/year Annual profits for an individual producer in each of the six 
types of farming systems 
Aggregate profits of all 
pig producers in target 
villages 
US$ Total profits from pig farming for all pig producers in all 32 
target villages 
Cumulative number of 
fatteners sold 
Fatteners Cumulative number of fatteners sold at full weight by each of 
the six type of farming systems 
Number of active PG 
members  
PG members Number of farmers who belong to a PG and are actively 
working through the PG to sell their fatteners 
PG cashflow US$/week Weekly cash balance of the PG 
PO slaughterhouse 
cashflow 
US$/week Weekly cash balance of the PO’s upgraded slaughterhouse   
Aggregate profits for 
slaughterhouse strategic 
partner 
US$ Total profits of the strategic partner from their investment in 
the PO slaughterhouse 
Note: a  The figure of US$153 is selected as this is approximately 50% more than the average (MMK153,000) 
revenue of sales from livestock recorded in the TRRILD’s baseline survey (Lyne & Snoxell. 2018). b Profit refers 
to economic returns to a pig producer’s labour, management, and land used in pig production. 
Source: Developed by SGMB and RG participants, TRRILD project partners, and the Researcher 
5.3 Model baseline 
5.3.1 Baseline description 
The baseline model represented the farming enterprises of 1,280 pig producers in the TRRILD 
project’s target area of 32 villages in Myeik and Palaw and established a benchmark against which to 
compare the results of pro-poor upgrading scenarios. The model was parameterised with data 
provided by SGMB and RG workshop participants and, when appropriate, secondary sources. The 
complete list of baseline parameters and their sources are presented in Appendix C. The TRRILD 
project’s PG survey of December 2019 provided baseline information about the initial distribution of 
pig producers across farm enterprises: 15% individual local breed FF farmers; 60% individual local 
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breed WF farmers; 12.5% individual hybrid breed FF farmers, and 12.5% individual hybrid breed WF 
farmers.  
The baseline scenario included a significant disease outbreak every four years that lasts for 26 weeks. 
This represented another covariate risk to the target population over and above the typical losses 
from disease which are embedded in the model (10% during gestation, 13% for piglets, and 10% for 
growers as reported by RG members). The significant disease shock was assumed to cause mortality 
rates of 15% per week across all pigs (pregnant sows, breeding sows, piglets, and fatteners) and 
induced panic selling, represented by increasing the selling rate of under-weight (40% of optimal 
weight) fatteners by 5% per week for ten weeks. Four weeks after disease is detected, consumer 
demand for pork falls by 30% and returns to pre-disease level after 26 weeks. The disease outbreak 
parameters in the baseline reflect historical events as described by SGMB and RG participants, such 
as the hog cholera epidemic in 2015/16 and the porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome 
(PRRS) outbreak of 2011. 
5.3.2 Baseline results 
In the model’s baseline, the nominal slaughterhouse price of live pigs in Myeik and Palaw rose 
steadily, albeit with regular price oscillations. Smaller annual price fluctuations of up to 4% reflect 
increased demand during the Chinese New Year festival and increased local supply when producers 
sell prior to the monsoon season. As shown in Figure 30, significant outbreaks of swine disease 
caused more substantial price fluctuations. At the initial stages of a disease outbreak, live pig prices 
fell for thirteen weeks due to panic selling by pig producers and reduced consumption owing to food-
safety concerns following widespread pig deaths. Prices then rebounded sharply, peaking 18 weeks 
after the disease outbreak finishes. Price peaks were 10% higher than pre-disease prices because of 
the fall in overall pig supplies and consumer demand returning near to pre-disease levels. These large 
spikes in price induced small-scale pig producers to increase production capacity or to upgrade their 
pig enterprises. Once farmer investments in production capacity were realised, higher volumes of 
fatteners became available, and prices fell steadily over a twelve-month period to slightly higher than 
pre-disease levels. The baseline model showed that these price reductions grew in magnitude over 
time. As a result, price troughs caused by disease and oversupply reached levels later in the model 
that caused recently upgraded pig farmers, particularly those that used debt capital for investment 
purchases, to operate at losses. 
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Figure 30: Slaughterhouse price of live pigs in baseline model 
Note: The letter “D” denotes disease events occurring at weeks 72, 280, 488, and 696. 
Source: Pork VC model simulation 
In the baseline model, FF farming systems were much more profitable than WF farming systems, 
with hybrid breeds more profitable than local breeds. As Table 7 shows, WF pig systems generated 
minimal cash profits; for example, over the long-term local breed WF farmers earned a cash income 
of US$2 per year that increased to US$13 per year for Hybrid WF farmers. This supports SGMB 
findings and the literature (Ebata et al., 2018; Smith et al., 2019) which suggest that small-scale 
producers in Myanmar and other Southeast Asian countries raise pigs primarily as a “livestock bank” 
used for household savings. For villages without access to formal banking and with limited space and 
capital, pig farming enables poorer households to use available resources – such as kitchen scraps, 
rice by-products, and household land – to maintain an asset that is easy to sell when cash is required. 
This is aligned with the findings of Jefferies et al. (2018) that in Myanmar livestock is the second 
highest non-cash form of savings. By contrast, hybrid FF farmers earned US$907 annually, compared 
to US$209 for local breed FF farmers. This is a more than four-fold increase in profits and provided a 
strong incentive for farmers to upgrade from local to hybrid breeds as well as from WF to FF systems; 
this also tracked with reference modes developed during SGMB workshops. When comparing the 
model’s annual earnings with the TRRILD’s baseline study (which showed an average household gross 
income of US$950 from farming) there is evidence that hybrid pig farming could become a primary 




Table 7: Annual profits for individual producers in each farming system in the baseline model 
Farming System Short-term Medium-term Long-term 
 US$ US$ US$ 
Individual local breed FF 194 204 209 
Individual local breed WF 1 2 2 
Individual hybrid breed FF 800 867 907 
Individual hybrid breed WF 7 9 13 
Source: Pork VC model simulation 
The baseline model showed that the profitability gains of hybrid breeds and FF farming systems were 
offset by the higher risks inherent within these systems. As illustrated in a Figure 31, FF farming 
systems experienced more significant periods of negative cashflow during disease outbreaks than WF 
farmers. These negative cashflows were a result of pig mortality and panic selling at lower prices as 
well as the obligation to continue making repayments on loans taken to finance upgrading 
investments and regular production costs. Hybrid pig farming was associated with greater risks given 
the higher susceptibility of hybrid breeds to disease and the substantial loan payments to 
moneylenders. These higher loans occur from one-off upgrading costs (in the model upgrading costs 
for hybrid FF are US$1,000 compared with US$240 for local breed FF as confirmed by SGMB and RG 
participants) and ongoing production costs, particularly feeding practices (RG and SGMB members 
reported that hybrid feed costs are twice as high as that of local breeds). The model projected that FF 
farmers experience negative cashflow for 18 weeks following a disease outbreak. Debt totalled 
US$182 per hybrid FF farmer compared with US$19 per local breed WF farmer. These negative 
cashflows make upgrading from WF to FF and from local breeds to hybrid pigs a risky endeavour 
unless farmers have significant cash reserves or lines of credit to cope with these liquidity problems. 
The number of pig producers in highly profitable systems showed a small increase of 2.1% per annum 
in the baseline model. As Table 8 below illustrates, pig farmers upgraded steadily from local breed 
WF to local breed FF farming systems but were unable to upgrade at a similar rate to the hybrid FF 
system. The prolonged periods of negative cashflow and high entry costs combined with high interest 
rates from moneylenders prohibited upgrading to the highly profitable hybrid FF system. Though less 
risky than hybrid FF systems, the baseline model forecasted that just over a third of farmers who 
upgraded to the local breed FF system would drop out at some point because of disease shocks and 
return to the less risky local WF system. This contributed to the overall dropout rate from pig farming 
of 9.3% predicted by the model which suggests a moderately stable livelihood over the long-term. In 
the baseline model, only 14 producers successfully upgraded to hybrid FF systems; hence, the 
dropout rates of this system remain low. This inability of a large portion of producers in the baseline 
model to upgrade to hybrid and local breed FF farming combined with the growing demand for pork 
in Myeik led to a decline in the proportion of locally produced pigs purchased by slaughterhouses. 




Figure 31: Weekly profits for individual farmers in each farming system in the baseline model (up 
to week 260) 
Note: The letter “D” denotes disease events occurring at weeks 72. 
Source: Pork VC model simulation 
Table 8: Number of pig producers in each farming system in the baseline model 
Farming system Model start Short-term Medium-term Long-term 
Local FF 192 220 280 290 
Local WF 768 727 656 550 
Hybrid FF 160 160 161 174 
Hybrid WF 160 157 154 147 
Total number of pig farmers 1,280 1,264 1,251 1,161 
Number of pig farmers in highly 
profitable systems 
352 380 441 464 
Source: Pork VC model simulation 
The baseline model shed light on the skewed distribution of profits amongst small-scale pig 
producers towards hybrid and FF systems across all time horizons. Accounting for only 15% of pig 
farmers in the baseline model, hybrid FF producers recorded 68% of the total producer profits in the 
system. This is followed by local FF producers who accounted for 25% of pig farmers and 31% of the 
producer profits in the target villages.      
The baseline model showed that slaughterhouses generated the largest profits among VC actors 
upstream of the retail market. Of the total profits generated over fifteen years, slaughterhouses 
received 56% (US$4,481,533), pig producers 38% (US$3,043,266), and brokers 5% (US$393,564). The 
portion of profits to local producers slowly decreased over the model’s timeline as the proportion of 
pigs sourced from Myeik and Palaw continued to decrease. Pig farming also generated off-farm 
DD 
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employment (AHWs, artificial insemination workers, brokers, and slaughterhouse labourers) 
equating to US$499,137 in wages over fifteen years20. 
5.4 Pro-poor upgrading scenarios  
Three institutional scenarios were developed for testing and comparison with the baseline scenario 
of no project interventions. In addition, five technical upgrading activities were tested within each of 
these institutional scenarios. The scenarios and activities were originally developed in the SGMB and 
RG workshops and then shared with TRRILD partners for refinement to ensure that they aligned with 
the project’s donor-approved design document, workplan, and budget. This section outlines each of 
the scenarios and activities.    
5.4.1 Institutional upgrading scenarios  
Scenario one (S1): Individual pig farmers  
In S1, the TRRILD project implements five technical activities across all 1,280 pig producers in the 32 
target villages. These activities include introducing microcredit, training for pig farmers on GAHP, 
establishing and training animal health workers (AHWs), setting up artificial insemination (AI) units, 
and a combination of all technical activities. The scale and scope of these activities align with the 
TRRILD project’s workplan and budget and are further described in Section 5.4.2.  
Scenario two (S2): Producer groups 
In S2, the TRRILD project establishes a producer group (PG) in each of the 32 target villages with 20 
members per PG (i.e., half of all pig farmers join PGs for a total of 640 members). The technical 
activities in S2 are the same scale and scope as for S1; however, they focus solely on the 640 PG 
members. The model assumes that PGs are established in the first year of the model and that it takes 
52 weeks for all members to join. PGs focus on hybrid pig production and draw new members from 
each of the four pig enterprises. Village pig producers become PG members at a ratio of one hybrid 
FF farmer to six hybrid WF farmers21 and then upgrade from WF to FF systems based on expected 
profitability.  
The PG’s adopt institutional arrangements similar to those that characterise a new generation 
cooperative (Chaddad & Cook, 2004). These arrangements discourage members from side-selling 
their pigs and from extracting all PG profits as short-term price rebates, allowing the PGs to retain 
 
20 On-farm and off-farm employment SD model structure is found in Appendix B with related data in Appendix 
C. The model used US$5 per day as the off-farm wage as reported by SGMB and RG participants and VC studies 
in the target region (ACCESS Advisory, 2019; Rich, 2018).    
21 This ratio is based on an FF producer with two sows producing around 48 piglets per year. If 50% of piglets 
are kept for fattening, then the remaining 24 piglets can be purchased by six WF farmers to ensure they have 
two piglets for fattening at a time.    
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and accumulate profits to finance long-term investments in PG capacity. Price rebates are paid to 
members every 26 weeks in proportion to patronage, and only after the PG’s savings and investment 
goals are achieved. The PG incurs operational expenses, including management, technical support, 
and training costs, and engages in collective purchasing of pig feed to receive a 5% bulk purchasing 
discount for members (as proposed by input suppliers during KIIs). Savings from the PGs are first 
used to cover any cashflow shortfalls after which they finance increases in AHW and AI capacity. 
These operational and capacity costs are covered by the TRRILD project for the first three years and, 
following the project’s exit, are fully funded by the PG. The model restricts PG membership changes 
for the first three years, after which the PG recruits new members to meet capacity shortfalls. PG 
members can exit or reduce their delivery obligations to the PG, based on comparisons of 
profitability with non-members. 
PGs enter into a contract with a local slaughterhouse to supply high-quality fatteners for the 
wholesale market in Myeik and Palaw. As a contract condition, PGs receive a 5% premium above the 
farmgate price of live pigs. Slaughterhouses sell this high-quality pork to local restaurants and other 
customers for a 10% premium over current wholesale prices. These premiums for high-quality 
fatteners were derived from KIIs with restaurants and slaughterhouse owners. On delivery PG 
members are paid the equivalent farmgate price for their high-quality live pigs, with the 5% premium 
retained to cover PG operational costs and capacity investments. Once capacity needs are meet, PG 
profits are paid out as price rebates every six months to members proportional to their supply of 
high-quality fatteners. The demand for high-quality fatteners in the wholesale market starts at 511 
kgs per week (i.e., 1% of all pork sold in the target area) and grows by 2%22 per year, which reflects 
market patterns as informed by SGMB and RG participants. PG members’ pigs that are surplus to the 
orders for high-quality fatteners are sold at farmgate prices. All members’ pigs, however, are covered 
by PG services, such as training, AHWs, and AI.  
Scenario three (S3): Producer organisations 
In S3, after three years of operations, the PGs upgrade into POs that co-invest in a modern, hygienic 
slaughterhouse with the capacity to produce premium pork cuts that meet the quality standards 
required by domestic supermarkets, restaurants, and premium wholesalers. The initial capital for the 
slaughterhouse comes from a strategic partner who invests US$25,02523 to establish a facility with 
the capacity to slaughter and butcher 35 pigs/week. Subsequent investments in slaughterhouse 
capacity come from PO savings, equivalent to US$750 per additional carcass of capacity per week. 
The strategic partner is paid a six-monthly dividend from slaughterhouse profits proportional to their 
 
22 This is equivalent to demand of nine high-quality fatteners per week in year one growing to 30 in year fifteen 
of the model. 
23 This is based on costings by Handlos (2015) on the feasibility of upgrading slaughterhouses in Uganda.  
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original investment, with the remaining profits flowing into the PO’s revenue to cover operational 
costs, future investments in slaughterhouse capacity, and PO management and technical costs. Once 
operational and capacity needs are met, any remaining profits are paid to PO members proportional 
to the number of high-quality fatteners they supplied to the PO.  
The establishment of a modern slaughterhouse enables the PO to sell pork through four market 
channels. The priority channel is the premium pork market in Yangon which covers premium 
wholesalers that supply high-quality restaurants and hotels, and domestic supermarkets. KIIs in 
Yangon revealed a strong demand for locally produced premium pork cuts, suggesting a conservative 
value of 1000 kgs per week of premium cuts24 which would increase by 6% per year. Preparing a 
premium product for the Yangon market incurs additional costs for marketing, butchering, 
packaging, and transport through a cold chain, but also attracts a 35% premium (confirmed by KIIs in 
Yangon) over the Myeik wholesale market price. The modern slaughterhouse also provides premium 
pork cuts to restaurants in Myeik based on the assumption that quality is equivalent to products 
currently sourced from Thailand. According to RG feedback, the demand for premium pork cuts in 
Myeik is 255 kgs per week (i.e., 0.5% of total pork demand), and this is expected to increase by 2% 
per year. The slaughterhouse also provides pork from high-quality fatteners for the Myeik wholesale 
market as in S2, with the remaining slaughterhouse capacity used to supply the undifferentiated 
wholesale pork market. The POs continue to invest in slaughterhouse capacity based on profitability 
and when there is sufficient supply from members. When the supply of high-quality fatteners falls 
below the production capacity of the slaughterhouse, the PO actively recruits members to fill supply 
gaps.  
5.4.2 Technical upgrading activities 
Unlike the upgrading institutional scenarios which implement macro-level initiatives, technical 
upgrading activities affect change at the individual farm level.  
Upgrading activity one (A1): Microcredit  
In A1, an initial stock of microcredit amounting to US$150,00025 is made available to targeted 
individual pig producers for the life of the model.26 The microcredit products modelled are standard 
amortised loans27 which charge interest at 2.46% per month and have a loan term of 12 months. As 
per the partner MFI’s policies, microcredit clients are required to save 5% of the loan amount. In the 
 
24 According to KIIs, 30% of a pig carcass is suitable for premium cuts demanded in Yangon.    
25 The figure of US$150,000 was selected as this was the approximate amount of VC funding in use by the 
TRRILD project at the time of conducting scenario tests.   
26 The microfinance partner’s strategy is to retain a presence in the target area following the project’s exit. 
27 The partner MFI loan terms reflect the Government of Myanmar’s microfinance laws and regulations. The 
standard amortised loan charges equal monthly repayments across the loan term with the interest calculated 
on the outstanding loan balance.  
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model, the stock of available microcredit is first prioritised for upgrading costs (e.g., purchasing of 
shelters, equipment, and breeding sows) that enable pig producers to move up through the hierarchy 
of pig enterprises as outlined in Figure 25. The remaining loan capital is made available for seasonal 
production loans for inputs, such as feed and piglets. Any shortfalls in formal credit are filled by loans 
taken from informal moneylenders at an interest rate of 5% per month with a loan term of 1.25 
years. As per the model’s structure, the stock of microcredit reduces permanently when producers 
default on loans following farm failure. 
A second microcredit upgrading activity (referred to as A1.2) that increased the stock of available 
microcredit to US$300,000 was also considered. This was included to better understand the impact 
of microcredit on the pork VC and to guide the project’s allocation of budget between VC lending and 
other lending opportunities in the target area. Further exploration of the impacts of loan terms and 
product types on the profitability of pig producers is reported in Section 5.7.1: Alternative scenarios. 
Upgrading activity two (A2): Training 
Upgrading activity two (A2) covered technical training provided by the project to pig producers. 
Training workshops increased the technical knowledge of pig farmers, leading to improvements in 
biosecurity and hygiene measures, increased confidence to upgrade, and improvements in overall pig 
quality. Training is conducted for three years by the TRRILD project, which has the capacity to 
educate 650 farmers per year. In S1, training opportunities are provided to all pig producers but in S2 
and S3 they are limited to PG and PO members. In S2 and S3, the PGs/POs employ a technical officer 
who provides training to members to ensure that PG/PO fatteners consistently meet minimum 
quality standards for premium pork markets. Technical knowledge also increases through peer-to-
peer contacts in which learning takes place.  
Upgrading activity three (A3): Animal health workers 
Within A3, one AHW per village is trained and equipped by the project to service the target 
population. RG members reported that an AHW had the capacity to cover 140 pigs (including piglets, 
breeding sows, and fatteners) and this reduces the disease mortality rate by up to 60%28 through the 
provision of vaccinations, advice, and basic veterinary services. The effectiveness of AHW on 
mortality rates depends on the proportion of pigs in the target area covered by AHWs and the AHW’s 
technical knowledge. Changes to the AHWs technical knowledge is modelled using the same 
structure as per farmer technical knowledge, outlined in Section 4.3.4. In S2 and S3, PGs/POs hire a 
 
28 In A2, mortality from disease is reduced by up to 20% simulating the effects of GAHP, as such the total 
mortality reduction possible (A2 and A3) is 80%. 
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technical officer to provide refresher trainings to AHWs and the PGs/POs continue to recruit and 
train AHWs with the goal that all their members’ pigs are covered by their services.  
Upgrading activity four (A4): Artificial insemination 
In A4, an AI unit is established to service the target population. From the RG and TRRILD project 
staff’s experience, an AI unit costs US$3,000 to establish (including equipment and boars to produce 
semen to service 20 sows per week) and depreciates over thirty years. The AI unit is subsidised by 
the TRRILD project for three years to keep its service fee below the standard hybrid boar charges of 
US$30 per service. Following the project’s exit, the AI unit’s service fee is determined by covering its 
costs and adding a 20% profit margin (as per guidance from TRRILD staff). Costs include maintenance 
fees, veterinary services, boar feed, transport, labour, and boar replacement costs. In S2 and S3, the 
PGs/PO continue to invest in AI capacity to cover fertilisation of member sows to ensure high-quality 
piglets.  
Upgrading activity five (A5): Combination of microcredit, training, AHWs, and AI   
In A5, all four interventions are implemented jointly across the target populations. 
5.5 Results of ex-ante evaluation of technical upgrading activities. 
The five upgrading activities were simulated within each of the three institutional scenarios, with 
results analysed across the pork VC indicators outlined in Table 6. Preliminary results were shared 
with TRRILD partners at roundtable discussions in Yangon and Christchurch. During this time, a 
decision was made to emphasise two outcome indicators from the model and include non-model 
indicators to compare and prioritise upgrading institutional scenarios and technical activities. This 
narrowing of indicators was undertaken to help simplify results and ease decision-making 
considering the large volume of numerical data generated by the model. The final categories 
incorporate quantitative measures from the pork VC model on financial impact (represented by the 
outcome indicator: aggregate profits of all pig producers), pro-poor orientation (represented by 
outcome indicator: number of pig producers in highly profitable systems) and benefit-to-cost 
analysis29 (comparing each activity’s financial impact with its costs30). Alongside model-derived 
information, qualitative judgements on risks and the implementing INGO’s experience levels in each 
of the technical activities were also included to guide decision-making and recommendations. 
Following these discussions, the upgrading activities were given a priority score (high, medium, low) 
across the selected categories to establish a clear rank order. The rationale behind allocating priority 
 
29 Benefit-to-cost analysis used a discount rate of 5% as recommended by Sequeros et al. (2020) in a study on 
agricultural impacts and returns in Myanmar.  
30 Costs for the activities were obtained from the TRRILD project’s budget and information from the TRRILD 
project team.  
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scores was to provide a clear ranking of interventions in relation to each other, leading to improved 
decision-making. The rank order of the individual technical upgrading activities is presented in Table 
9. The results of each technical upgrading activity and the combination of activities are analysed and 
discussed in this section. 
Table 9: Rank order of technical upgrading activities 










A3. Animal Health 
Workers 
 
High Medium High 
 
Medium Medium High 
A1. Microcredit 
 
Medium High Low/ 
Medium 
High High High 
       
A2. Training 
 
Medium Medium Medium 
 
Low High Medium 
A4. Artificial  
Insemination 
Low Low Low High Low Low 
Source: Pork VC model simulation and TRRILD project partners 
5.5.1 Animal health workers: High priority 
The establishment of AHWs in target villages ranked as the highest priority activity, with the financial 
and pro-poor impact greater in S2 (PGs) and S3 (POs) than S1 (individuals). In the model, the key 
benefit of establishing an AHW network was a decreased pig mortality rate which protected farmers 
from sustained periods of negative cashflow and defaulting on loans. This had strong positive flow-on 
effects to farm profitability, allowing for further farm investment and the activation of the feedback 
loops R2: production capacity; R3: purchasing piglets; and R7: upgrading. As shown in Table 10, the 
AHW activity (A3) ranked first or second for raising aggregate profits of all pig producers across 
almost all upgrading scenarios and timeframes. Across the three scenarios, establishing AHWs 
consistently delivered the highest profit gains across the six different farming systems. WF producers 
had the highest proportional gains because the loss of one or two fatteners from disease can 
completely nullify yearly earnings. For example, in S1(individual producers), WF aggregate profits 
rose by 22% (local) and 47% (hybrid) compared with FF producer gains of 8.7% (local) and 11% 
(hybrid). However, in terms of overall cash income, the larger FF farmers benefited substantially 
more than smaller WF farmers. For example, in S3(POs), establishing a healthy AHW network drew in 
additional cumulative income of US$1,631 for PG hybrid FF farmers and US$135 for PG hybrid WF 
farmers compared to the next highest upgrading activity.   
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Table 10: Results from scenario testing on aggregate profits of all pig producers 
Scenario Short-term Medium-term Long-term 
 US$ Change 
(%a) 
Rankb US$ Change 
(%) 
Rank US$ Change 
(%) 
Rank 
Baseline 842,295   1,866,956   3,043,266   
Scenario One: Individual 
Producers 
         
S1.A1: Microcredit $150K 1,087,576 +29 1 2,380,011 +27 1 3,940,949 +29 1 
S1.A1.2: Microcredit $300K 1,261,361 +50 (1)c 2,877,423 +54 (1) 4,897,681 +61 (1) 
S1.A2: Training 945,149 +12 3 2,089,817 +12 3 3,452,985 +13 2 
S1.A3: AHWs 975,574 +16 2 2,139,809 +15 2 3,420,022 +12 3 
S1.A4: AI 919,824 +9 4 2,027,026 +9 4 3,353,877 +10 4 
S1.A5: Combinationd 1,382,303 +64 1 3,214,879 +72 2 5,441,792 +79 3 
Scenario Two: Producer 
groups 
         
S2.A1: Microcredit $150K 830,903 -1 1 2,171,795 +16 2 4,021,996 +32 3 
S2.A1.2: Microcredit $300K 917,148 +9 (1) 2,475,852 +33 (1) 4,692,074 +54 (1) 
S2.A2: Training 800,067 -5 3 2,141,964 +15 3 4,062,055 +33 2 
S2.A3: AHWs 819,634 -3 2 2,210,552 +18 1 4,103,582 +35 1 
S2.A4: AI 769,025 -9 4 2,044,762 +10 4 3,812,834 +25 4 
S2.A5: Combination 1,022,314 +21 3 3,199,340 +71 3 7,063,532 +132 2 
Scenario Three: Producer 
organisations 
         
S3.A1: Microcredit $150K 835,051 -1 1 2,754,206 +48 2 6,835,205 +125 4 
S3.A1.2: Microcredit $300K 921,469 +9 (1) 3,145,440 +68 (1) 7,730,822 +154 (2) 
S3.A2: Training 804,249 -5 3 2,754,454 +48 3 7,153,488 +135 2 
S3.A3: AHWs 823,966 -2 2 2,955,368 +58 1 8,166,828 +168 1 
S3.A4: AI 773,044 -8 4 2,658,302 +42 4 6,890,234 +126 3 
S3.A5: Combination 1,026,296 +22 2 4,033,651 +116 1 11,205,559 +268 1 
Note: a Percentage change from the baseline. b Rank for the combined activities compares S1, S2, and S3.            
c Value in parentheses denotes that ranking of the sub activity A1.2. d Combination refers to A1 + A2 + A3 + A4, 
where A1 is microcredit capped at $150K.    
Source: Pork VC model simulation 
The introduction of AHWs decreased the length and depth of negative cashflow experienced during 
disease outbreak, as shown by the example of hybrid FF farmer cashflow across the baseline, 
S1(individuals), and S2(PGs) in Figure 32. The ability to maintain higher pig stocks during disease 
outbreaks not only reduced financial losses from pig mortality and panic selling but also enabled pig 
producers to rapidly scale-up production to take advantage of favourable post-disease prices. With 
fewer pig losses, the introduction of AHWs resulted in the number of FF farmers dropping out of pig 
farming reducing by over 50% in comparison with the next highest activity.   
There are two underlying reasons for the higher financial impacts of AHWs in S2(PGs) and S3(POs) 
compared with S1(individuals). Firstly, the structure of PGs/POs allowed them to maintain 
investments in AHWs after the project exited to work towards covering the entire pig population of 
members with AHW services. By contrast, once the project exited in S1(individuals), AHWs services 
slowly depleted as the government and civil society were unable to maintain the project’s 
investment. After fifteen years, 22.1% of the pig population was covered by AHW services in 
S1(individuals) compared with 96.8% in S2(PGs) and 97.6% in S3(POs). This is further illustrated in 
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Figure 32, that shows negative cashflows for hybrid FF farmers in S1(individuals) returned after five 
years and approached baseline values by the end of the model.  
 
Figure 32: Comparison of weekly profits of hybrid FF producers in baseline, S1, and S2 
Source: Pork VC model simulation 
Secondly, in S2 and S3, PGs/POs made increased on-farm investments, such as improved shelter, bio-
security measures, and commercial feed, to produce a high-quality hybrid fattener. When these 
substantial upfront investments and associated higher-value loans are combined with the premiums 
lost from a high-quality fattener’s death or discounted panic sale, the consequences of pig mortality 
and morbidity were more significant in S2(PGs) and S3(POs). AHWs, therefore, helped offset the 
higher risks of producing a premium product by enabling PGs/POs to maintain livestock numbers to 
consistently meet the orders from Yangon and Myeik. PGs/POs also sold fatteners that were surplus 
to orders from premium buyers in Yangon and Myeik and could therefore take advantage of the price 
rises in the local wholesale market that invariably follow a disease outbreak.   
At the macro-level, as shown in Table 11, the AHW activity had little impact on the number of pig 
producers in highly profitable systems in S1(individuals) and S2(PGs), in contrast to S3(POs) where it 
had the largest impact out of all activities. Analysis at the farm enterprise level shows that AHWs 
enabled PG and PO members to continually transition to the highly profitable FF system; however, 
this scale of upgrading did not take place in S1(individuals). By the end of the model simulation 
 123 
period, there were 292 (S2[PGs]) and 633 (S3[POs]) hybrid FF farmers compared with 173 in 
S1(individuals). The greater number of farmers in FF systems and the higher price of PG and PO high-
quality fatteners is an important reason why AHWs had a larger impact on overall system profitability 
compared to microcredit in S2(PGs) and S3(POs) but had a smaller impact in S1(individuals). In the 
model, microcredit had a larger impact in enabling farmers to quickly upgrade while AHWs reduced 
the risks of the high-quality pig enterprise, allowing producers to extract more value from these 
systems and continue farming during disease and price shocks.   
Table 11: Results from scenario testing on the number of pig producers in highly profitable systems 
Scenario Short-term Medium-term Long-term 
 Number Change 
(%)a 
Rankb Number Change 
(%) 
Rank Number Change 
(%) 
Rank 
Baseline 379   441   464   
Scenario 1: Individual producers          
S1.A1: Microcredit $150K 420 +11 1 539 +22 1 550 +18 1 
S1.A1.2: Microcredit $300K 477 +26 (1)c 635 +44 (1) 636 +37 (1) 
S1.A2: Training 399 +5 2 495 +12 2 522 +12 2 
S1.A3: AHWs 389 +3 3 457 +3 3 507 +9 3 
S1.A4: AI 380 +0 4 449 +2 4 483 +4 4 
S1.A5: Combinationd 480 +26 1 639 +45 2 710 +53 2 
Scenario 2: Producer groups          
S2.A1: Microcredit $150K                            343 -10 2 394 -11 2 453 -2 2 
S2.A1.2: Microcredit $300K 363 -4 (1) 435 -2 (1) 512 +10 (1) 
S2.A2: Training 343 -10 1 498 -10 1 474 +2 1 
S2.A3: AHWs 343 -10 2 378 -14 4 449 -3 4 
S2.A4: AI 343 -10 2 387 -12 3 451 -3 3 
S2.A5: Combination 397 +5 3 542 +23 3 704 +52 3 
Scenario 3: Producer 
organisations 
         
S3.A1: Microcredit $150K                                           343 -10 1 534 +21 4 699 +51 4 
S3.A1.2: Microcredit $300K 363 -4 (1) 575 +30 (1) 853 +84 (2) 
S3.A2: Training 343 -10 1 550 +25 2 751 +62 2 
S3.A3: AHWs 343 -10 1 556 +26 1 882 +90 1 
S3.A4: AI 343 -10 1 540 +22 3 722 +55 3 
S3.A5: Combination 399 +5 2 684 +55 1 877 +89 1 
Note: a Percentage change from the baseline. b Rank for the combined activities compares S1, S2, and S3.            
c Value in parentheses denotes that ranking of the sub activity A1.2. d Combination refers to A1 + A2 + A3 + A4, 
where A1 is microcredit capped at $150K. 
Source: Pork VC model simulation 
The ability of AHWs to help individual farmers and PG/PO members maintain pig stocks in the region 
resulted in positive flow-on effects across other chain actors. The introduction of AHWs was the most 
effective measure for improving off-farm employment (by a factor of eight compared with other 
activities) and strengthening the supply of locally produced pigs for brokers, slaughterhouses, and 
consumers. This continuous supply led to increased local slaughterhouse profits as they had multiple 
supply channels to choose from, thereby reducing the price of live pigs they purchased. Moreover, 
while not directly modelled, non-PG members and nearby villages would likely access AHW services, 
thus increasing overall pig health in both target and non-target villages in all three scenarios.  
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There are some risks involved with establishing AWHs which were not accounted for completely in 
the model but will affect the implementation and impact of this activity. Firstly, AHW dropout rates 
of 10% per annum (as reported within previous WV Myanmar projects) were used in the SD model, 
but this could vary based on the relative profitability of this livelihood compared with other semi-
skilled occupations. Secondly, there is a risk that AHWs will not always be able to provide quality, 
low-cost services given periodic shortages of vaccinations and medicines and the occasional 
monopolisations of vaccines by the local LBVD department who then charge a premium for access.  
Despite these risks, the AHW activity had the highest BCR out of all the interventions. In the medium-
term, the BCRs were S1(individuals), 1.65; S2(PGs), 1.63; and S3(POs), 5.39. These continued to rise in 
the long-term with S2(PGs).A3: AHWs posting an equivalent BCR to S2(PGs).A5: Combination of 
activities (4.54 versus 4.72) and the BCR for S3(POs).A3: AHWs (21.77) over twice as strong as 
S3(POs).A5: Combination of activities (9.36). This provides a strong rationale for the project to invest 
its resources in mitigation strategies to prevent AHW service failure, such as providing ongoing fees-
free training for AHWs, gifting start-up vaccination kits to AHWs, and importing vaccines and 
medicines from outside of Myeik when required to ensure a consistent supply for AHWs before PGs 
have sufficient capacity to take on this role.  
5.5.2 Microcredit: High priority 
The provision of microcredit loans to pig farmers is another high priority intervention. Across all 
three institutional scenarios, providing microcredit with a total capital stock of US$150,000 
significantly improved the aggregate profitability of all pig producers in the target villages, as shown 
in Table 10. However, given the risks of potential negative impacts for poorer producers, it ranks 
below establishing and training AHWs. Microcredit consistently ranked first or second for overall 
financial and pro-poor impacts in the short- and medium-term. Because the majority of PG and PO 
members upgraded to highly profitable systems in the short- and medium-term, the financial and 
pro-poor impact of microcredit lessened in the long-term in S2(PGs) and S3(POs). However, when the 
larger capital stock of US$300,000 was modelled (A1.2) in S2(PGs) and S3(POs), microcredit retained 
first or second priority because it covered larger portions of pig producers’ regular production loans 
(for example, in S2(PGs).A1, US$150,000 of loan capital covered 35% of production loans, while in 
S2(PGs).A1.2, US$300,000 covered 64%). Having a larger amount of loan capital available reduced 
producers’ interest payments and enabled further savings, which in turn encouraged smaller loan 
sizes and enabled more PG members to access the lower interest microcredit loans.  
A key impact of microcredit was the reduction in entry costs for upgrading, allowing more farmers to 
migrate to highly profitable pig systems, as shown in Table 11. The model showed that compared to 
other project activities, microcredit enabled more producers to upgrade to the most profitable 
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system – hybrid FF – rather than only upgrading to the local breed FF system. For example, in 
S1(individual).A1 the number of farmers practicing local and hybrid FF enterprises increased by 26% 
and 22%, respectively, almost twice the change of the next highest activity.  
As a stand-alone intervention, introducing microcredit resulted in higher numbers of farmers exiting 
FF pig farming as it exacerbated the negative consequences of disease shocks. In the model, 
microcredit alone was unable to materially decrease the length or depth of negative cashflows 
during times of disease. In the baseline model, an average of 8 farmers exited FF systems annually. 
When microcredit was made available to producers, annual dropout numbers increased to an 
average of 16 farmers in S1(individuals).A1, 14 farmers in S2(PGs).A1, and 20 farmers in S3(POs).A1. 
Doubling the stock of microcredit available (A1.2) increased dropout rates in S1(individuals) and 
S2(PGs) but decreased dropout numbers in S3(POs) because cheaper production loans helped offset 
negative cashflow during disease. Without other activities to support recently upgraded FF farmers, 
the risks of upgrading were not sufficiently reduced, leading to negative impacts for some farmers. If 
the TRRILD project pursued a singular focus on microcredit, poorer farmers, in particular, could face 
difficulty servicing their loans because of disease and price shocks and may need to liquidate farm 
and other household assets to pay back the lending MFI. In the model, loan defaults resulted in a 
steady reduction in the stock of microfinance capital in the system. For example, in S3(POs).A1, 
microfinance capital declined from US$150,000 to US$77,377 over fifteen years. This large fall 
explains the declining influence of microcredit on producer profits in S3(POs) and shows that the 
medium- to long-term sustainability of the partner MFI’s operations could be threatened by a 
singular focus on delivering microcredit to pig farmers.  
When pro-rating MFI and TRRILD project costs across the loan capital of US$150,000 the BCRs over 
the medium-term were 1.43 for S1(individual).A1, 0.66 for S2(PGs).A1, and 2.04 for S3(POs).A1. 
When the larger capital amount of US$300,000 was modelled In A1.2, the BCR remained steady for 
S1(individuals), rose for S2(PGs) to 1.05, and dropped for S3(POs). This is related to the increased 
volatility that higher stocks of microcredit bring to the system. While A1.2 increased dropout 
numbers in S1(individuals) and S2(PGs), it also encouraged more farmers to transition to hybrid FF 
systems and experience profit gains, albeit for a short period of time. This resulted in higher profits in 
A1.2 compared to A1 and a stronger BCR.  
5.5.3 Training: Medium priority 
Training delivered moderate to high impacts on overall farmer profits and the number of farmers in 
highly profitable enterprises. In comparison to high-priority activities, training delivered around two-
thirds the gains on both outcome indicators. As highlighted in Table 11, short-term training did not 
enable farmers to upgrade in large numbers to more profitable systems. Rather, training helped 
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farmers extract further profits from current enterprises through improved farm practices that lessen 
the impact of seasonal diseases and produce a higher quality fattener. As a result, apart from AHWs, 
training had the highest impact on increasing individual farmer profit. However, with limited impact 
on upgrading farm enterprises, the effect of training on overall profitability remained low compared 
with microcredit. When the transition to hybrid pig farming takes place within a PG/PO, the impact of 
training on overall profits were negative in the short-term (see Table 10) because gains in sale prices 
did not overcome the repayment costs of high-interest loans from informal moneylenders. This was 
reflected in training BCRs which were less than one in the short-term for S2(PGs) and S3(POs) but 
were greater than one in the medium-term: S1(individual).A2, 1.27; S1(PGs).A2, 1.18; and 
S3(POs).A2, 4.19. Because of the low-cost of training, BCRs were higher in S2(PGs) and S3(POs) than a 
higher impact activity like microcredit. The model further suggested that training had the highest 
potential for negative impacts on slaughterhouses, as it equipped producers with further knowledge 
on the quality of their product, reducing the gap between the slaughterhouse price and the farmgate 
sale price, and thus reducing slaughterhouse profit margins.  
5.5.4 Artificial insemination: Low priority 
AI was the lowest priority for the project because of its relatively small financial and pro-poor 
impacts and the high risks involved. AI is a new technology in Myanmar and practised only by the 
larger, internationally backed pig farms near Yangon. In the model, AI reduced costs for the 
fertilisation of hybrid sows, from US$30 to around US$6.67. While this was a large cost reduction, it 
is only a small percentage (<4%) of the overall costs of producing a hybrid fattener, and therefore did 
not bring material gains to the system. In S2(PGs).A4 and S3(POs).A4, the introduction of an AI unit at 
early stages resulted in the largest negative financial impacts to farmers. This is because the small 
reduction in production costs were unable to offset the large upgrading costs of PG/PO members and 
the burdens of disease shocks. Additionally, AI only benefited FF systems – that made up a small 
portion of farmers at early stages of the intervention. However, as the number of FF farmers grow in 
S2(PGs).A4 and S3(POs).A4, the cost of insemination services reduced, and the impacts of AI were 
experienced to a wider degree and by more farmers.  
Project partners noted the high risks involved with introducing a new technology into the target 
locations. While the training and maintenance service for AI could be contracted to a third-party, this 
would also increase the costs by a factor of two to three according to RG members. The idea of 
PGs/POs managing the AI unit was also considered, as the model shows this enterprise grows in 
profitability given the large volume of insemination events required once the PGs are well 
established. However, local capacity to manage an AI unit from among PG/PO members was 
considered weak and basic infrastructure requirements to ensure a cold chain would require 
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substantial capital investments from the project team and later PG/PO members. The risks of AI are 
further exacerbated by the low BCR in the medium-term: S1(individual).A4, 0.74; S2(PGs).A4, 0.53; 
and S3(POs).A4, 2.95. Across all time horizons, these BCRs are among the lowest ratios out of the five 
technical upgrading activities.  
5.5.5 Combination of technical activities: Highest priority 
Combining the four upgrading activities (A1, A2, A3, and A4) resulted in a healthy interaction effect 
that provides strong evidence that multiple interventions are a strategic priority for the TRRILD 
project. As Figure 33 and Table 10 illustrate, combining interventions delivered between two to three 
times more aggregate profits for all pig producers than the highest single intervention over the long-
term. This combinatorial impact was particularly important in the early stage of S2(PGs).A5 and 
S3(POs).A5 to prevent the negative financial returns of solo activities and allow mutually reinforcing 
feedback loops to deliver strongly positive short-term financial benefits compared to the baseline. As 
shown in Table 10, in S3(POs), adding percentage effects from isolated activities in the short-term 
showed a combined change of -18% from the baseline in terms of producer profits, but a well-
sequenced combination of upgrading activities ensured short-term positive outcomes (i.e., 
S3.A1+A2+A3+A4 = +21%). Standalone interventions reduced the number of highly profitable pig 
producers in the short- and medium-term in S2(PGs) and short-run in S3(POs). However, as 
illustrated in Table 11, combining technical activities reversed this trend; for example, in S3(POs), 
isolated upgrading activities resulted in ten fewer producers in highly profitable systems which 
shifted to five more producers in S3(POs).A5.  
Jointly implementing technical activities also discouraged PGs/POs from dissipating in the early 
stages when revenue is low due to small production rates, and costs are high because of repayments 
for upgrading loans. Combining activities also helped ensure that the project’s impacts were further 
spread among community members. Compared to the highest single activity, the interaction effect 
brought in an extra 160 farmers in S1(individuals).A5 and 194 farmers in S2(PGs).A5 into highly 
profitable systems. In S3 the interaction effect worked strongest in the short- and medium-term, but 
after fifteen years the establishment of an AHW network and the combination of activities had 
similar impacts on the number of pig producers in highly profitable systems (882 in A3 and 877 in 
A5). However, when activities were combined in S3(POs), 95% of PO members remained in the most 
profitable hybrid FF system by the end of the model simulation period, compared with only 86% 
when AHWs were solely introduced. 
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Figure 33: Comparison of technical upgrading activities on aggregate profits of all pig producers in 
S2(PGs) 
Source: Pork VC model simulation  
Model results showed that implementing isolated interventions within S2(PGs) and S3(POs) could 
bring significant risks to the project. Stand-alone activities that promote rapid upgrading did not fully 
overcome liquidity problems of PG/PO members and therefore could lead to a failure of collective 
action. In contrast, a strategy of multiple activities prevented PGs/POs from dissipating early on 
when member profits and PG/PO rebates and services were low (due to biological production delays 
and loan repayments) and continued to provide ongoing protection from negative cashflows and 
subsequent dropouts. This allowed PG/PO members to rapidly transition from moderately profitable 
WF to highly profitable FF systems and prevented farmers leaving the industry during disease 
outbreaks. This is highlighted in Figure 34 that shows a steady increase in the number of PO hybrid FF 
farmers in S3.A5: Combination, compared to fluctuations in S3.A1: Microcredit which delivered the 
next highest financial returns. Moreover, with a combination of activities, PG/PO FF members 
generated 16% (S2.A5) and 18% (S3.A5) more income and WF members 26% (S2.A5) and 102% 
(S3.A5) more income than the next highest intervention. 
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Figure 34: Number of PO members engaged in hybrid FF systems in S3.A1 and S3.A5 
Source: Pork VC model simulation 
Implementing activities in tandem unlocked the reinforcing feedback loops in the pork VC system, 
particularly in S3(POs). Increases in the number and profitability of PO hybrid FF farmers improved 
the efficiencies of investments in AI and AHWs. This enabled POs to invest more heavily in 
slaughterhouse capacity, delivering increased revenue to POs, and allowing further investments that 
lowered the risks of price and disease shocks and increased rebates to PO members. The number of 
PO dropouts also fell from 8.6 farmers per annum in the S3.A1: Microcredit to zero in S3.A5: 
Combination. This had a positive effect on keeping MFI loan capital in the system and resulted in 
retaining 99% of total loan capital in S3.A5 compared to 52% when microcredit was a stand-alone 
intervention (S3.A1). This additional MFI loan capital helped lower the cost of transitioning to FF 
systems and increased pig production rates. Ensuring a multipronged approach to support pig 
farmers rather than relying purely on microcredit, therefore, protects the project’s partner MFI’s 
long-term sustainability and profits because its operation costs can be further covered by the interest 
earned on the larger loan portfolio. 
Implementing all four activities in tandem generated the highest BCR across all timeframes in 
S1(individuals) and S2(PGs) and remained strongly positive in S3(POs). This means that as well as the 
highest overall gains for producers, combining activities also generated cost efficiencies for the 
TRRILD project. In the medium term, a project strategy of combined activities delivered BCRs of 2.06 
(S1[individuals].A5), 1.84 (S2[PGs].A5), and 2.94 (S3[POs].A5) for financial gains for small-scale 
producers. BCRs for S2(PGs).A5 and S3(POs).A5, more than doubled in the long-term; however, they 
remained below 1 in the short-term. This suggested that measures of the project’s cost effectiveness 
would remain negative over the project’s lifetime of five years if the project’s strategy focused on 
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establishing PGs and POs in the short-run. As such, further consideration should be given to 
understanding the relative strength of institutional arrangements in the project’s evaluation as these 
will underpin the medium- and long-term measurements of value for money in the project.  
Different combinations of technical upgrading activities were also run to determine their relative 
contributions to outcome level changes. Given the low priority of A4: AI, combinations of A1: 
Microcredit $150K, A2: Training, and A3: AHWs were simulated, with the results provided in Tables 
13 and 14. In S2(PGs) and S3(POs), the results show that A3: AHWs provided the greatest 
contributions to financial and pro-poor outcomes. Combining A3: AHWs with A1: Microcredit $150K, 
had the strongest short- and medium-term impacts, generating around 50% of the effects of the full 
combination of technical activities in S2(PGs).A5 and S3(POs).A5. However, combining A3: AHWs and 
A2: Training was preferrable in the long-term, capturing 52% (S2) and 77% (S3) of the financial 
impacts and 70% (S2) and 100% (S3) of the pro-poor impacts of all the technical activities combined. 
In contrast, in S1, A1: Microcredit $150K had the largest contribution to financial and pro-poor 
impacts. When combining A1: Microcredit $150K and A3: AHWs, one-half to two-thirds of the effects 
of the full combination of technical interventions were generated in S1(individuals).  
The results in Tables 13 and 14 further highlight the strong interaction effect between the technical 
activities, particularly in the early stages of S2(PGs) and S3(POs). The highest performing combination 
of two technical interventions (A1: Microcredit $150K and A3: AHWs), raises short-term profits by 9% 
(S2[PGs]) and 10% (S3[POs]) above the baseline, respectively; however, adding one further technical 
activity (A2: Training) close on doubles the financial impacts of the project to 18% gains. A similar 
pattern follows in relation to the number of pig producers in highly profitable systems: combining 
two technical interventions still results in negative project impacts, while implementing three 
technical interventions shows little change from the baseline value. While the interaction effect 
reduces over time, the results show there are still substantial financial gains to be found by reducing 
pig production costs through means other than establishing an AI unit. On average, introducing an AI 
unit reduced input costs by less than 4%, but Table 12 shows that even this small reduction could 
increase income from pig farming in the target villages by an additional 22% (US$917,236) in S2(PGs) 
and 10% in S3(POs) (US$850,841), compared with jointly implementing three technical activities. 
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Table 12: Results of different technical activity combinations on aggregate profits of all pig producers 
Scenario Short-term Medium-term Long-term 










of A5 (%) 






Baseline 842,965   1,866,956   3,043,266   
Scenario 1: Individual producers          
S1.A5: Combinationc 1,382,303 +64 +100 3,214,879 +72 +100 5,441,792 +79 +100 
S1.A1+A2: Microcredit + Training 1,169,143 +39 +60 2,650,862 +42 +58 4,476,380 +47 +60 
S1.A1+A3: Microcredit + AHWs 1,218,094 +45 +70 2,679,858 +44 +60 4,385,983 +44 +56 
S1.A2+A3: Training + AHWs 1,094,007 +30 +47 2,411,612 +29 +40 3,901,729 +28 +36 
S1.A1+A2+A3: Microcredit + 
Training + AHWs 
1,317,033 +56 +88 2,995,532 +60 +84 4,994,627 +64 +81 
Scenario 2: Producer groups          
S2.A5: Combination 1,022,314 +21 +100 3,199,340 +71 +100 7,063,532 +132 +100 
S2.A1+A2: Microcredit + Training 890,179 +6 +26 2,443,168 +31 +43 4,727,772 +55 +42 
S2.A1+A3: Microcredit + AHWs 922,794 +9 +45 2,516,805 +35 +49 4,877,684 +60 +46 
S2.A2+A3: Training + AHWs 897,333 +6 +30 2,525,335 +35 +49 5,148,729 +69 +52 
S2.A1+A2+A3: Microcredit + 
Training + AHWs 
90,628 +18 +82 2,940,691 +58 +81 6,164,296 +103 +78 
Scenario 3: Producer organisations          
S3.A5: Combination 1,026,296 +21 +100 4,033,651 +116 +100 11,205,559 +268 +100 
S3.A1+A2: Microcredit + Training 894,510 +6 +28 3,083,050 +65 +56 7,762,565 +155 +58 
S3.A1+A3: Microcredit + AHWs 926,321 +10 +45 3,242,479 +74 +63 8,807,806 +189 +71 
S3.A2+A3: Training + AHWs 900,805 +7 +32 3,254,083 +74 +64 9,351,578 +207 +77 
S3.A1+A2+A3: Microcredit + 
Training + AHWs 
994,389 +18 +83 3,760,327 +101 +87 10,354,718 +240 +90 
Note: a Percentage change from the baseline. b Column represents the proportion of the change from the baseline value of A.5: Combination captured by the various technical 
activity combinations. For example, 60% indicates that this combination captures 60% of the impacts of implementing all technical activities jointly (A5). c Combination refers to A1 
+ A2 + A3 + A4, where A1 is microcredit capped at $150K. 
Source: Pork VC model simulation 
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Table 13: Results of different technical activity combinations on number of pig producers in highly profitable systems 
Scenario Short-term Medium-term Long-term 










of A5 (%) 






Baseline 379   441   464   
Scenario 1: Individual producers          
S1.A5: Combinationc 480 +26 +100 639 +45 +100 710 +53 +100 
S1.A1+A2: Microcredit + Training 453 +19 +73 597 +35 +79 612 +32 +60 
S1.A1+A3: Microcredit + AHWs 433 +14 +53 561 +27 +61 626 +35 +66 
S1.A2+A3: Training + AHWs 415 +9 +35 519 +18 +39 584 +26 +49 
S1.A1+A2+A3: Microcredit + 
Training + AHWs 
470 +24 +90 626 +42 +94 700 +51 +96 
Scenario 2: Producer groups          
S2.A5: Combination 397 +5 +100 542 23 +100 704 +52 +100 
S2.A1+A2: Microcredit + Training 360 -5 n.a 436 -1 n.a 527 +13 +26 
S2.A1+A3: Microcredit + AHWs 352 -7 n.a 417 -6 n.a 516 +11 +22 
S2.A2+A3: Training + AHWs 354 -7 n.a 433 -2 n.a 568 +22 +43 
S2.A1+A2+A3: Microcredit + 
Training + AHWs 
378 -1 n.a 459 4 +18 633 +36 +70 
Scenario 3: Producer organisations          
S3.A5: Combination 399 +5 +100 684 +55 +100 877 +89 +100 
S3.A1+A2: Microcredit + Training 360 -5 n.a 585 +32 +59 858 +85 +95 
S3.A1+A3: Microcredit + AHWs 353 -7 n.a 577 +31 +56 880 +90 +100 
S3.A2+A3: Training + AHWs 355 -6 n.a 607 +37 +68 880 +90 +100 
S3.A1+A2+A3: Microcredit + 
Training + AHWs 
379 0 n.a 640 +45 +82 878 +89 +100 
Note: a Percentage change from the baseline. b Column represents the proportion of the change from the baseline value of A.5: Combination captured by the various technical 
activity combinations. For example, 60% indicates that this combination captures 60% of the impacts of implementing all technical activities jointly (A5). c Combination refers to A1 
+ A2 + A3 + A4, where A1 is microcredit capped at $150K. 




5.6 Results of ex-ante evaluation of institutional upgrading scenarios 
A comparison of the three institutional upgrading scenarios (with all technical upgrading activities 
jointly implemented, i.e., A5: Combination) showed differences in impact and trade-offs across 
temporal horizons and between pig producers and VC actors. As Table 10 and Figure 35 
demonstrate, S1(individuals) delivered the highest short-term aggregate profits for all pig producers, 
delivering triple the financial impact of S2(PGs) and S3(POs) (+64% change from baseline for S1.A5 
compared with +21% for S2.A5 and +22% for S3.A5). However, financial impacts in S1 from broadly 
targeting 1,280 individual farmers plateaued after the project exited, registering a +72% change from 
the baseline in the medium-term and +79% change in the long-term. This contrasts with S2 and S3’s 
focused investments in 640 PG and PO members that produced accelerating financial gains that 
outperform S1(individual) in the medium- to long-term. While investing in PGs (S2) yields similar 
financial impact as targeting individual producers (S1) after ten years, PGs delivered close to twice 
the economic benefits by year 15. Further investments in institutions like POs (S3) that manage 
value-adding assets, such as the slaughterhouse, had by a large measure the highest impact in the 
system. The model showed that over fifteen years, S3(POs).A5 increased incomes in target villages by 
three times that of S1(individuals).A5 and twice that of S2(PGs).A5. This meant S3(POs) delivered an 
additional US$818,772 in the medium-term and US$4,412,027 in the long-term to target village 
members compared with the next highest institutional scenario.  
 
Figure 35: Comparison of aggregate profits of all producers in baseline, S1, S2, and S3 
Source: Pork VC model simulation 
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All three institutional scenarios markedly increased the number of farmers engaged in highly 
profitable systems compared with the baseline. As highlighted in Table 11, the short-run number of 
highly profitable farmers was higher in S1(individuals).A5 (480) than S2(PGs).A5 (397) and S3(POs).A5 
(399). This is because in S1(individuals) project activities were applied across all 1280 producers, 
causing most farmers (59%) to upgrade to local breed FF systems and thereby missing out on the 
substantially larger financial gains from hybrid FF farming. In S2 and S3, PGs/POs concentrated on 
hybrid pig production. This led to an initially lower number of farmers transitioning to highly 
profitable systems because of the high entry costs surrounding a hybrid FF system that aims to 
produce pork for a premium market. In S2, PGs were unable to capture a significant portion of the 
value added for their fatteners as they received premiums for only a small portion (19.4%) of their 
stock that supplied Myeik restaurants. This meant that price rebates from the PGs in S2 are less than 
POs in S3, slowing down further investment and transitions to the FF system. As a result, S2(PGs) and 
S1(individuals) had a similar number of producers engaged in highly profitable systems by the end of 
the model. By contrast, PO farmers in S3 had access to a larger market for high-quality pork and 
received higher premiums, which encouraged members to scale-up production and quickly upgrade 
to FF systems. By the model’s midpoint, S3(POs) had the highest pro-poor impact and by the end of 
the model S3(POs) had 24% more farmers in highly profitable systems than S1(individuals) and 
S2(PGs) as highlighted in Table 11. Importantly, as illustrated in Table 14, in S2(PGs) and S3(POs) the 
number of hybrid FF farmers was considerably larger, reaching 548 and 693 farmers, respectively, by 
the end of the model compared with 298 in S1(individuals). 
Table 14: Results from scenario testing on the number of hybrid pig producers 
Scenario Short-term Medium-term Long-term 
 Number Change 
(%)a 
Rank Number Change 
(%) 
Rank Number Change 
(%) 
Rank 
Number of hybrid FF pig 
producers 
         
Baseline 160   161   174   
S1(Individual).A5: Combination 195 +22 3 242 +51 3 298 +86 3 
S2(PGs).A5: Combination 242 +51 2 385 +141 2 548 +243 2 
S3(POs).A5: Combination 243 +52 1 528 +230 1 693 +333 1 
Number of hybrid WF pig 
producers 
         
Baseline 157   154   147   
S1(Individual).A5: Combination 146 -7 3 135 -14 3 120 -24 3 
S2(PGs).A5: Combination 558 +255 1 413 +163 1 250 +59 1 
S3(POs).A5: Combination  556 +254 2 270 +72 2 104 -34 2 
Note: a Percentage change from the baseline. 
Source: Pork VC model simulation 
S2(PGs) and S3(POs) created a third pro-poor option for generating substantial income from pig 
farming: the hybrid WF system. In S1(individuals), though hybrid WF incomes increased by over 200% 
compared with the baseline, they were still low averaging around US$49 per year. With a focus on 
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quality hybrid pigs and access to market channels that pay premiums, PG/PO hybrid WF members 
had substantial income gains compared with non-PG counterparts. As presented in Figure 36, in 
S2(PGs).A5 and S3(POs).A5, PG/PO members with hybrid WF farms had annual incomes reaching 
US$103 and US$411 in the long-term. In S3(POs), incomes were considerably larger because of the 
rebates afforded by investments in the slaughterhouse. The profits from PO hybrid WF pig farming in 
S3 compared favourably to local breed FF farms (US$252 per annum) albeit with a significantly lower 
environmental cost31 and resource (financial, physical, and human) requirements. S3(POs), and to a 
lesser extent S2(PGs), therefore, created a pathway through hybrid WF farming for pig producers 
with less capital and risk tolerance to engage in a moderately profitable livelihood. These hybrid WF 
pig farmers could remain in the WF system if their circumstances require or readily upgrade to the 
more profitable hybrid FF systems with the advantage of the technical experience and capital gained. 
Model data revealed that after paying off upgrading loan costs, it would take on average five years 
for PG/PO hybrid WF pig farmers to upgrade to the FF system without needing to take on any 
additional external debt. 
 
Figure 36: Comparison of annual profits for hybrid WF producers in baseline, S1, S2, and S3 
Source: Pork VC model simulation 
All three scenarios increased the incomes of hybrid FF farmers compared with the baseline as shown 
in Figure 37. Annual incomes by the end of the model were US$2,573 in S3(POs).A5, US$1,810 in 
S2.(PGs)A5, and US$1,040 in S1(individuals).A5. This level of income would enable pig farming to 
become a primary livelihood that brings cash income above the average household levels of US$950 
in the target region (Snoxell & Lyne, 2019) without diverting substantial amounts of land, capital, and 
 
31 For example, a local breed FF farmer raised three to four times more fatteners than a hybrid WF farmer in S3. 
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human resources from other enterprises. The large upfront upgrading costs and the requirements for 
PG/POs to withhold rebates to initially invest in PG/POs capacity meant short-term profits are lower 
for PG/PO members compared with existing hybrid FF farmers. Once members and the PG/POs were 
well established by the midpoint of the model, there was little difference in the annual incomes of 
hybrid FF farmers between the three scenarios. Moreover, in the long-term PG and PO member 
annual profits exceeded non-members by 75% and 147%, respectively. By contrast, in 
S1(individual).A5, the difference in hybrid FF producer profits from the baseline slowly decreased 
because project interventions brought short-lived production efficiencies and protection against 
disease shocks; however, essentially the market channel and price for live pigs remained unchanged.  
 
Figure 37: Comparison of annual profits for hybrid FF producers in baseline, S1, S2, and S3 
Source: Pork VC model simulation 
The model’s results pointed towards two areas of concern regarding liquidity problems for farmers in 
the more profitable hybrid FF and PG/PO WF enterprises. First, as shown in Figure 32, in 
S1(individuals), soon after the project exits, hybrid FF farmers faced periods of negative cashflow 
following disease outbreaks. This increased risk to recently upgraded farmers who had taken out 
loans for investments and seasonal production costs. In S2 and S3, PG/PO members did not 
experience similar liquidity problems once loans were repaid, as they were able to maintain 
investments in biosecurity and AHWs. The second area of concern was the prolonged period of 
negative cashflow experienced by PG/PO members in S2 and S3 when they take on microfinance 
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loans to upgrade farms to hybrid FF or WF systems. These negative cashflows are shown in Figures 
36 and 37. In S2.A5 and S3.A5, it took PG/PO members around 90 weeks for their enterprises to 
break even, with debt peaking at US$1,951 for FF farmers and US$134 for WF farmers. The model 
assumed that PG members brought no existing capital or assets into their high-quality hybrid FF/WF 
farming enterprise and that microcredit loans operated on an amortised payment schedule. While 
these assumptions presented a worst-case scenario, it draws attention to the need for the TRRILD 
project to design institutional arrangements and loan products that enable poorer households to 
upgrade their farming systems while reducing risks from prolonged liquidity problems and disease 
outbreaks. Further analysis on the impact of microcredit loan terms and types is conducted in Section 
5.7.1: Alternative scenarios. 
S3 provided the largest pro-poor impacts by enabling PO members to further capture value from 
high-quality fatteners through the addition of a hygienic, safe slaughtering facility. The unlocking of 
market channels for high-quality pork enabled the PO to increase the number of FF members by 24% 
compared with S2(PGs). The PO delivered substantially higher returns for members from additional 
price rebates, resulting in a 28% increase in total profits for FF members and a 164% increase for WF 
members compared with S2(PGs). Along with individual financial returns in S3, PO members invested 
on average US$292 each in the expansion of the slaughterhouse. The model suggested that the 
slaughterhouse is a sound investment for a strategic partner. The initial cash investment of a partner 
of US$25,000 delivered annualised returns of around 53%. The start-up investment established a 35 
fattener/week slaughtering facility which expanded to 262 fatteners/week by the end of the model. 
PO cashflows remained positive throughout S3, even when a standard two-year MFI loan was taken 
to finance slaughterhouse investments in the absence of a strategic partner. These findings suggest 
that if a strategic partner is not forthcoming, the project should consider providing start-up capital 
through either a grant or loan facility to unlock the gains from a hygienic slaughtering facility.   
Each institutional scenario had a different impact on downstream actors in the pork VC as shown in 
Table 14. S1(individuals) magnified the current system because it introduced higher volumes of low-
quality hybrid and local breed pigs. The higher volumes led to annual profit increases for brokers 
(92%) and slaughterhouses (41%) as well as increases in off-farm employment (117%) by the end of 
the model. In S2 and S3, PGs and POs establish a collective supply agreement with a slaughterhouse, 
causing annual profits for brokers to fall by 57% in the long-term. In S2, the ongoing relationship 
between PGs and an existing slaughterhouse delivered a small (6%) annual decrease in total 
slaughterhouse profits. While purchasing high-quality fatteners for a premium wholesale market is 
profitable for local slaughterhouses, the model revealed that slaughterhouse profit margins were 
slightly lower than when purchasing low-quality fatteners for the standard wholesale market. This 
finding shows that it may prove difficult to engage with established slaughterhouses to switch part of 
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their system to focus on high-quality wholesale pork, given the strong financial incentive to continue 
in a high volume, low-quality system. S3(POs) decreased slaughterhouse annual profits by a more 
significant margin (34%), as local slaughterhouses needed to substitute fatteners previously supplied 
by PO members with higher priced fatteners from Mawlymine. All three institutional scenarios 
substantially increased off-farm employment by 95% to 154% in the short-run. After five years, 
employment gains in S2 and S3 outpaced S1(individuals) as PG and POs became debt-free and 
invested in farm and organisational capacity that brought additional employment to the VC. S3’s 
further investments in value-adding assets brought the highest employment gains. By the end of the 
model, these were equivalent to an additional US$174,462 in yearly wages to the local community 
compared with US$109,437 from S2(PGs) and US$37,327 from S1(individuals). As highlighted in Table 
15, increases in off-farm wages in S2(PGs) and S3(POs) offset any losses in the system experienced by 
brokers and slaughterhouses by the model’s midpoint. 
Table 15: Financial impacts of scenario tests on downstream actors in the pork value chain  
Downstream Actors Short-term Medium-term Long-term 
 US$ Change 
(%)a 
Rank US$ Change 
(%) 
Rank US$ Change 
(%) 
Rank 
Broker annual profits          
Baseline 27,163   24,178   25,065   
S1.A5: Combination 37,976 +40 1 42,738 +43 1 48,220 +92 1 
S2.A5: Combination 13,301 -51 2 11,137 -31 2 10833 -57 2 
S3.A5: Combination 13,407 -51 3 10,950 -31 3 10,389 -57 3 
Slaughterhouse annual 
profits 
         
Baseline 255,570   294,657   327,663   
S1.A5: Combination 296,506 +16 1 402,055 +36 1 460,712 +41 1 
S2.A5: Combination 203,382 -20 2 235,470 -20 2 307,652 -6 2 
S3.A5: Combination  188,478 -26 3 237,229 -19 3 215,597 -34 3 
Off-farm employment (wages 
earned annually) 
         
Baseline 34,338   31,155   31,791   
S1.A5: Combination 87,202 +154 1 75,064 +141 3 69,118 +117 3 
S2.A5: Combination 66,892 +95 3 97,212 +212 2 141,228 +344 2 
S3.A5: Combination  70,856 +106 2 138,437 +344 1 206,253 +549 1 
Total earnings for 
downstream actors 
         
Baseline 317,071   349,990   384,519   
S1.A5: Combination 421,684 +33 1 519,857 +49 1 578,050 +50 1 
S2.A5: Combination 283,575 -11 2 343,819 -2 2 459,713 +20 2 
S3.A5: Combination  272,741 -14 3 386,616 +10 3 432,239 +12 3 
Note: a Percentage change from the baseline. 
Source: Pork VC model simulation 
All institutional scenarios resulted in changes in the share of overall revenues generated among pork 
VC actors, as shown in Figure 38. S1(individuals) brought the smallest movement, with brokers 
retaining 8% of total revenue but slaughterhouse and producer proportions switching ranking 
compared to the baseline. In S2(PGs) and S3(POs), broker proportions fell to small amounts (1% to 
2%) and producers gradually gained three-quarters or more of the revenues from pig production in 
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the target villages. The model overestimated these gains as it did not take into consideration pig 
producers from outside of the target villages, from whom local slaughterhouses could purchase live 
pigs from at discounted rates. There were sufficient declines in the revenues of the current lead VC 
actors, slaughterhouses, suggesting that power shifts along the chain will be noted and potentially 
resisted by this group.  
 
Figure 38: Share of revenue captured by pork value chain actors 
Source: Pork VC model simulation 
Of the total pork consumed in the region, producers in the target area provided on average 7.4% 
(S1[individuals]), 9.9% (S2[PGs]), and 10.4% (S3[POs]), respectively. While these values are higher 
than the baseline of 5.6%, the increases were insufficient to significantly alter the live pig price in 
Myeik and Palaw. As shown in Figure 39, impacts on pricing equated to an average movement of 
between -1% (S1.A5) to -1.7% (S3.A5). Pricing shifts were the highest in S3(POs) because it produced 
the highest number of fatteners (103% increase from the baseline) of which between 70% to 85% 
entered the local wholesale pork market. Even with the highest number of additional fatteners, 
S3(POs) was still not able to reverse the baseline trend of increasing importations of live pigs from 
outside Myeik.   
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Figure 39: Comparison of slaughterhouse price of live pigs across baseline, S1, S2, and S3 
Source: Pork VC model simulation 
5.7 Sensitivity analysis  
The process of developing the pork VC SD model involved critical assumptions around structures, 
behaviours, and parameters. This is not unique to this research given that all models are 
approximations of reality and SD modellers strive for the “least wrong” or “most useful” model 
(Sterman, 2000). In this research, sensitivity analysis (SA) was performed to test whether conclusions 
from the model remained valid when assumptions were altered over a plausible range of uncertainty 
(Sterman, 2010, p.883). This section outlines the SA undertaken by altering both model structure, 
and parameters and then comparing results to the findings from the original scenario tests (i.e., the 
findings described in Sections 5.5 and 5.6).  
5.7.1 Alternative scenarios 
Based on assumption choices and discussions with project team members, alternative scenarios were 
created to examine the sensitivity of the model’s results to plausible alternative scenarios. Beyond 
building confidence in the model’s results, alternative scenarios also served to further shape pro-
poor upgrading recommendations for the TRRILD project team.  
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5.7.1.1 Alternative disease scenarios 
Two alternative disease scenarios were developed for SA. In the first alternative scenario, there is no 
significant disease outbreak and in the second, the government imposes and successfully enforces a 
ban on pigs imported from outside Myeik and Palaw following a significant disease outbreak. The 
second alternative disease scenario is based on SGMB and RG participants recollections of two 
importation bans in the past decade, instigated by the government to control wholesale pork prices, 
and reduce the spread of disease between regions and townships within Tanintharyi. In this 
alternative scenario, the importation ban took place four weeks after the disease outbreak, and 
slaughterhouses were only able to source locally grown fatteners. These two alternative disease 
scenarios were selected because using them helped strengthen the TRRILD project team’s ability to 
select interventions that deliver on short-term contractual obligations32 under three plausible 
external short-term circumstances: no disease, significant disease (i.e., the model baseline), and 
significant disease with an importation ban.  
The negative impacts of disease outbreaks on the target villages are clear when comparing the two 
alternative disease scenarios and the standard model baseline.33 As shown in Table 16 and Table 17, 
compared with a scenario where no disease outbreaks occur, a disease outbreak (i.e., the model 
baseline) reduced the aggregate profits of all pig producers by 14% and resulted in 14 fewer 
producers entering highly profitable systems. Pig producers in Myeik and Palaw benefited positively 
from the enforcement of an importation ban as it encouraged slaughterhouses to purchase locally 
resulting in the highest profits for pig producers (19% above the baseline), and an extra 57 producers 
in highly profitable systems. The model showed that impacts of disease particularly affected smaller 
(and typically less wealthy) WF pig producers whose profits fell by 109% (hybrid) and 209% (local 
breed) compared to the alternative scenario of no disease outbreaks. Meanwhile, FF farmer profits 
fell by 18% (local breed) and 15% (hybrid) when there is a significant disease outbreak. Among VC 
actors only slaughterhouses fared worse (3% decrease in aggregate profits) during an importation 
ban because they were unable to access the Mawlymine market and were forced to purchase locally 
to maintain production. This increased the price of locally produced pigs, increasing operating costs 
and reducing profit margins in slaughterhouses. 
The two alternative disease scenarios had opposite impacts on the slaughterhouse price of live pigs 
in the region, as illustrated in Figure 40. When there are no significant disease outbreaks the price of 
live pigs stabilises with only small annual oscillations associated with Chinese New Year (demand) 
 
32 The TRRILD project had three years to implement upgrading interventions following the model’s 
recommendations.  
33 The standard model baseline refers to the baseline of the pork SD model outlined in Section 4.3 and 5.3. In 
graphs and tables this is referred to as “Baseline: Disease.” 
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and pre-monsoon (supply) shocks. Meanwhile, the introduction of an importation ban caused 
steeper and larger price rises of between 32% and 43% above panic selling lows. These large price 
fluctuations cause significantly more investment in production capacity and upgrades to higher value 
pig enterprises. Once the importation ban is lifted, prices then drop to below pre-disease levels for a 
period of 70 weeks, which causes more farmers to exit from pig farming.   
Table 16: Comparison of alternative disease scenarios and standard model baseline on aggregate 
profits of all pig producers 
Scenario Short-term Medium-term Long-term 
 US$ Change 
(%)a 
Rank US$ Change 
(%) 
Rank US$ Change 
(%) 
Rank 
Baseline: Disease 842,965  3 1,866,956  3 3,043,266  3 
Alternative scenario: No 
Disease 
916,551 +9 1 2,085,929 +12 2 3,481,062 +14 2 
Alternative scenario: Disease 
and Importation Ban 
911,040 +8 2 2,089,426 +12 1 3,624,170 +19 1 
Note: a Percentage change from the baseline. 
Source: Pork VC model simulation 
Table 17: Comparison of alternative disease scenarios and standard model baseline on number of 
pig producers in highly profitable systems 
Scenario Short-term Medium-term Long-term 
 Number Change 
(%)a 
Rank Number Change 
(%) 
Rank Number Change 
(%) 
Rank 
Baseline: Disease 379  1 441  2 464  3 
Alternative scenario: No 
Disease 
353 -7 2 401 -9 3 488 +5 2 
Alternative scenario: Disease 
and Importation Ban 
375 +6 3 443 +10 1 521 +7 1 
Note: a Percentage change from the baseline. 
Source: Pork VC model simulation 
The institutional scenarios and technical upgrading activities were simulated using these two 
alternative disease scenarios and compared with the model’s original results. These comparisons on 
pro-poor and financial indicators are found in Appendix D, Tables D.1, D.2, D.3, and D.4. When 
running the model with no disease outbreaks there was a minor rank order change in the impact of 
project interventions on aggregate profits of pig producers: S2(PGs).A5 surpassed S1(individuals).A5 
in the medium-term. There was also a minor change in the rank order when considering pro-poor 
impacts: S1(individuals).A5 consistently outperformed S2(PGs).A5 in increasing the number of pig 
producers in highly profitable systems. Investing in POs (S3.A5), however, still delivered the highest 
pro-poor benefits in the medium- and long-term. In the baseline model, live pig price fluctuations 
reduced the number of producers who can weather disease and economic shocks and remain in the 
recently upgraded systems. When these fluctuations are minimised by prolonged periods without 
disease shocks, the project’s activities had less impact on reducing risk below an acceptable level for 
upgrading. As a result, in the no disease alternative scenario, increasing the number of farmers which 
engage in the project (i.e., S1[individuals]) enabled more farmers to upgrade into profitable systems. 
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Because S3(POs) brings increased value to hybrid WF farmers, S3 still outperformed S1(individuals) in 
pro-poor impacts even when these risks are reduced. In terms of the rank order of technical 
activities, without disease shocks A2: Microcredit strengthened its position to consistently have the 
highest financial and pro-poor impacts in S1(individuals) and in the short- and medium-term for 
S2(PGs) and S3(POs). As expected, this resulted in a reduced impact for A3: AHWs which dropped to 
the third priority activity, above A4: AI but below A2: Training. The exception, however, was S3 (and 
the long-term for S2), in which A3: AHWs still had the highest impact on aggregate pig producer 
profits and the number of highly profitable pig producers because the premium pork market 
afforded considerable extra value to fatteners. This confirmed the value of AHWs in S3 even when 
their impacts are scaled down to limiting pig mortality from regular seasonal diseases.    
   
Figure 40: Slaughterhouse price of live pigs in Myeik and Palaw in alternative baselines and 
standard model baseline 
Note: The letter “D” denotes disease events occurring at weeks 72, 280, 488, and 696. 
Source: Pork VC model simulation 
The alternative scenario: disease and importation ban resulted in larger oscillations of the live pig 
price in Myeik, as highlighted in Figure 40. This works to the overall advantage of local producers 
who are protected from competing with imported pigs and can take advantage of higher live pig 
prices following disease outbreaks. In this alternative scenario, slaughterhouse income was reduced 
because of the loss of their alternative supply channels and bargaining power with small-scale 
farmers. The high live pig prices post-disease created further advantage for those producers who 
could safely bring fatteners and sows through periods of disease. Fatteners could be sold for peak 






high prices due to piglet scarcity. As a result, in the disease and importation ban scenario, the A3: 
AHW improves its ranking to become the highest priority across S2(PGs) and S3(POs) for financial and 
pro-poor outcomes, and consistently second highest priority for S1(individuals) in terms of financial 
benefits for producers. The increased impact of AHWs and the ability of PGs to continue to invest in 
services for their members propelled S2(PGs).A5 above S1.(individuals)A5 in the medium-term for 
financial impact and increased the impacts of the TRRILD project. For example, in S2(PGs).A5 the 
changes in long-term incomes for all pig producers shifted from +132% in the standard model run to 
+169% in this alternative scenario.  
5.7.1.2 Temporal changes to disease outbreaks 
The standard model (i.e., baseline: disease) consisted of a regular disease outbreak (every four years 
and starting at week 72 to coincide with start of the monsoon season) with a static length (26 
weeks). To understand the impacts of temporal changes to disease outbreaks on the system, the 
standard model was simulated with the disease outbreak starting a quarter of a year later (i.e., 13 
weeks) and randomly assigning four disease start times34 across the fifteen-year model timeframe as 
well as randomly assigning the length of the disease outbreak to between 10 and 52 weeks. The 
results in Tables 18 and 19 show that temporal changes to disease outbreaks had only a minor 
impact on financial and pro-poor outcomes.  
As illustrated in Tables 18 and 19, randomly assigning the timing and length of the disease outbreak 
had the largest change from the baseline, hence, this was selected as an alternative baseline for ex-
ante testing of the project’s institutional scenarios and technical upgrading activities. The complete 
financial and pro-poor results of this scenario testing are found in Appendix D, Tables D5 and D6. In 
terms of technical activities, the only change was a minor improvement in the rank order of A3: AHW 
which is related to the short- and medium-term increased severity of the disease outbreak in this 
alternative scenario. When testing institutional scenarios, S2(PGs) improved its ranking on financial 
impact compared to S1(individuals), and S1(individuals) had more pig producers in highly profitable 
systems than S2(PGs) in the long-term. These improvements in S1(individuals) were related to the 
increased risks to pig producers from randomising disease outbreaks. These risks result in larger 
profits for farmers in the Hybrid FF system. However, in S2(PGs) with a smaller market for premium 
products, PG hybrid WF farmers, were unable to fully take advantage of post-disease price rises and 
are outperformed by non-PG local breed FF farmers. As a result, there are less pig producers in highly 
profitable systems in S2(PGs) than S1(individuals). 
 
34 This was achieved by randomly assigning a disease start time within four portions on the fifteen-year model 
timeframe. 
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Table 18: Comparison of changes to timing and length of disease outbreaks on aggregate profits of 
all pig producers in model baseline 
Scenario Short-term Medium-term Long-term 






Baseline: Disease 842,965  1,866,956  3,043,266  
Baseline + 13-week delay  793,013 -6 1,836,010 -2 3,020,267 -1 
Baseline + 26-week delay 791,820 -6 1,866,547 0 2,998,024 -1 
Baseline + 39-week delay 791,912 -6 1,875,050 0 3,010,675 -1 
Baseline + random assignment 852,195 +1 1,782,994 -4 3,132,999 3 
Note: a Percentage change from the baseline. 
Source: Pork VC model simulation 
Table 19: Comparison of changes to timing and length of disease outbreaks on number of pig 
producers in highly profitable systems in model baseline 
Scenario Short-term Medium-term Long-term 






Baseline: Disease 379  441  464  
Baseline + 13-week delay  376 -1 425 -4 491 6 
Baseline + 26-week delay 378 0 429 -3 498 8 
Baseline + 39-week delay 375 -1 432 -2 514 11 
Baseline + random assignment 362 -4 372 -16 484 4 
Note: a Percentage change from the baseline. 
Source: Pork VC model simulation 
5.7.1.3 Temporal delays to technical upgrading activities 
The baseline model assumed no delays occurred in the implementation of the project’s technical 
activities to the target population. However, implementation setbacks in development projects are 
common, often resulting from delays in contracting, procurement, hiring of staff, and natural 
disasters (Ashan & Gunawan, 2010). To investigate the effect of project delays, the A5: Combination 
scenario was simulated with a one-year delay to each of the four technical activities as well as to the 
formation of the PGs and POs. As highlighted in Tables 20 and 21, delays to A2: Training and the 
formation of PGs and POs have the highest negative impacts for the project. Delaying training by a 
year reduces the financial impact in S2(PGs).A5 and S3(POs).A5 by between 5% to 10%. In S2(PGs) 
and S3(POs), training on high quality pig production by the TRRILD project builds up the knowledge of 
PG/PO members, which is further increased as they interact with one-another. When the initial stock 
of knowledge is lower (i.e., through delayed training events by the project) the effect of peer-to-peer 
learning is decreased for the model’s lifetime, leading to higher disease burdens and lower 
confidence to upgrade to more profitable systems. When training is delayed in S2(PGs).A5 and 
S3(POs).A5, the combination of technical activities results in a negative short-term impact in terms of 
the number of pig producers in highly profitable systems. 
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Table 20: Results of implementation delays of technical upgrading activities on aggregate profits of all pig producers 
Scenario Short-term Medium-term Long-term 










of A5 (%) 






Baseline 842,965   1,866,956   3,043,266   
Scenario 1: Individual producers          
S1.A5: Combinationc 1,382,303 +64 +100 3,214,879 +72 +100 5,441,792 +79 +100 
S1.A5: Microcredit delay 1,304,901 +55 +94 3,110,210 +67 +97 5,319,503 +75 +98 
S1.A5: Training delay 1,328,246 +58 +96 3,043,649 +63 +95 5,105,735 +68 +94 
S1.A5: AHW delay 1,328,450 +58 +96 3,073,897 +65 +96 5,221,731 +72 +96 
S1.A5: AI Delay 1,365,600 +62 +99 3,195,151 +71 +99 5,422,364 +78 +100 
Scenario 2: Producer groups          
S2.A5: Combination 1,022,314 +21 +100 3,199,340 +71 +100 7,063,532 +132 +100 
S2.A5: Microcredit delay 1,013,077 +20 +99 3,184,677 +71 +100 7,042,612 +131 +100 
S2.A5: Training delay 955,084 +13 +93 2,895,031 +55 +90 6,435,701 +111 +91 
S2.A5: AHW delay 961,868 +14 +94 3,169,358 +70 +99 7,050,572 +132 +100 
S2.A5: AI Delay 1,007,438 +20 +99 3,164,684 +70 +99 7,007,462 +130 +99 
S2.A5: PG delay 956,536 +13 +94 3,054,271 +64 +95 6,827,084 +124 +97 
Scenario 3: Producer organisations          
S3.A5: Combination 1,026,296 +21 +100 4,033,651 +116 +100 11,205,559 +268 +100 
S3.A5: Microcredit delay 1,017,040 +21 +99 4,021,298 +115 +100 11,110,442 +265 +99 
S3.A5: Training delay 958,729 +14 +93 3,737,865 100 +93 10,614,487 249 +95 
S3.A5: AHW delay 949,594 +13 +93 3,984,025 113 +99 11,209,927 268 +100 
S3.A5: AI Delay 1,011,375 +20 +99 3,996,411 114 +99 11,151,500 266 +100 
S3.A5: PO Delay 957,207 +14 +93 3,627,232 94 +90 10,381,056 241 +93 
Note: a Percentage change from the baseline. b Column represents the proportion of the change from the baseline value of A.5: Combination captured by the various technical 
activity combinations. For example, 60% indicates that this combination captures 60% of the impacts of implementing all technical activities with no delays. c Combination refers to 
A1 + A2 + A3 + A4, where A1 is microcredit capped at $150K. 




Table 21: Results of implementation delays of technical upgrading activities on number of pig producers in highly profitable systems 
Scenario Short-term Medium-term Long-term 










of A5 (%) 






Baseline 379   441   464   
Scenario 1: Individual producers          
S1.A5: Combinationc 480 +26 +100 639 +45 +100 710 +53 +100 
S1.A5: Microcredit delay 472 +25 +98 631 +43 +99 703 +51 +99 
S1.A5: Training delay 461 +22 +96 606 +37 +95 674 +45 +95 
S1.A5: AHW delay 470 +24 +98 623 +41 +98 679 +46 +96 
S1.A5: AI Delay 479 +27 +100 639 +45 +100 710 +53 +100 
Scenario 2: Producer groups          
S2.A5: Combination 397 +5 +100 542 23 +100 704 +52 +100 
S2.A5: Microcredit delay 396 +5 +100 541 23 +100 703 +52 +100 
S2.A5: Training delay 372 -2 +94 504 14 +93 676 +46 +96 
S2.A5: AHW delay 398 +5 +100 544 23 +100 705 +52 +100 
S2.A5: AI Delay 394 +4 +99 539 22 +99 702 +51 +100 
S2.A5: PG Delay 356 -6 +90 526 19 +97 698 +50 +99 
Scenario 3: Producer organisations          
S3.A5: Combination 399 +5 +100 684 +55 +100 877 +89 +100 
S3.A5: Microcredit delay 398 +5 +100 682 +55 +100 878 +89 +100 
S3.A5: Training delay 373 -2 +93 659 +49 +96 879 +89 +100 
S3.A5: AHW delay 397 +5 +100 686 +56 +100 878 +89 +100 
S3.A5: AI Delay 396 +4 +99 681 +54 +100 878 +89 +100 
S3.A5: PO Delay 356 -6% +89 639 +45 +93 879 +89 +100 
Note: a Percentage change from the baseline. b Column represents the proportion of the change from the baseline value of A.5: Combination captured by the various technical 
activity combinations. For example, 60% indicates that this combination captures 60% of the impacts of implementing all technical activities with no delays. c Combination refers to 
A1 + A2 + A3 + A4, where A1 is microcredit capped at $150K. 




Delays in the formation of PGs and POs also bring ongoing reduced financial impacts in S2.A5 and 
S3.A5 in the range of 5% to 10%; however, the impacts to the number of producers in highly 
profitable systems is largely overcome by the end of the model run.  
5.7.1.4 Alternative PG and PO arrangements 
The literature suggests that different forms of institutional arrangements impact the financial 
performance of collective action (Chaddad & Cook, 2004). To understand the impact of alternative 
forms of collective action, institutional upgrading scenarios were simulated with the following 
alternative institutional arrangements: (i) no savings –  PGs and POs are unable to collect fees (or 
withhold premiums) from members for savings and investment in shared assets and services; (ii) 50% 
less savings – PGs prioritise rebates for members over savings, resulting in 50% less savings; iii) 50% 
more savings – PGs and POs prioritise savings over member rebates, resulting in 50% more savings; 
iv) no rebates – PGs and POs do not pay rebates proportional to patronage in order to maximise their 
saving and investment capacity. The results of these alterative arrangements are presented in Table 
22 and show that institutional arrangements had an impact on the financial position of PG and PO 
members, particularly in the long-term. 
In the short term, these altered institutional arrangements had little effect on the financial position 
of PG and PO members. This is explained by the support of the project to cover technical and 
management costs for the PGs and POs over the first three years of their lifetime. However, medium- 
and long-term results strongly point to the importance of institutional arrangements that encourage 
collective savings and rebates proportional to patronage as a mechanism to increase the financial 
position of its members. Without arrangements that encourage collective savings allowing 
investments in value-adding assets and technical services, member profits fell by 14% for PGs and 
49% for POs. The large reduction in PO member profits shows the critical nature of institutional 
arrangements when investments in value-adding assets are required, such as the slaughterhouse. 
PGs and POs were also less inclusive when collective savings were reduced by 50%; the number of 
members in the highly profitable hybrid FF system fell by 31% in S3(POs) and 15% in S2(PGs) relative 
to the standard model run and total membership fell by 19 producers in S3(POs) and 15 producers in 
S2(PGs). The ability to deliver rebates to members was also important in encouraging investments in 
individual farms, which in turn brought further cashflow and investment to the PGs and POs. 
Institutions that provided a financial rebate to members outperformed those that only pay market 
rates for fatteners in order to maximise collective savings. The overall financial position of PGs was 
reduced by 1.5% (S2) and 15% (S3) relative to the standard model run when rebates were held back 
entirely from members. Between the extremes of no savings (full rebate payment) and no rebates 
(full savings) the model showed that in POs, where investments in value-adding assets are required, 
erring on the side of saving (i.e., 50% more savings) was the more profitable option.   
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Table 22: Financial position of PG and PO members under alternative institutional arrangements 
Scenario Short-term Medium-term Long-term 






Scenario 2: Producer Groups 








S2.A5: PGs 50% less savings 464,583 +0 2,145,230 -0.1 5,453,094 -0.2 
S2.A5: PGs 50% more savings 463,342 +0 2,141,207 -1 5,451,744 -0.2 
S2.A5: PGs no rebates 463,342 -0.3 2,123,087 -1.0 5,380,764 -1.5 
S2.A5: PGs no savings 464,643 +0 2,074,945 -3.2 4,704,143 -14 
Scenario 3: Producer Organisations 








S3.A5: POs 50% less savings 513,197 -0.3 2,889,062 -7.7 9,397,306 -5.5 
S3.A5: POs 50% more savings 507,197 -1.6 3,250,668 +3.9 10,160,539 +2.1 
S3.A5: POs no rebates 501,551 -2.7 3,170,966 +1 8,479,973 -15 
S3.A5: POs no savings 512,571 -0.6 2,235,547 -29 5,105,785 -49 
Note: a Percentage change from the standard model. 
Source: Pork VC model simulation 
5.7.1.5 Changes in responsiveness of pig producers to market signals 
Upgrading between farming systems and changes in production capacity in the model were driven by 
profitability and the time taken for producers to determine market signals on price. These decisions 
were governed by graphical functions embedded in the model that were developed through 
interactions with SGMB and RG members. Because these graphical functions were based on 
perceptions of behaviour rather than publicly available or survey data (such as sale weight of live 
pigs, feed prices, etc.) SA was performed by increasing or decreasing pig producers’ responsiveness 
to market signals by 25%35 compared with the original model. The full results of this alternative 
scenario are found in Appendix B: Tables B.7, B.8, B.9, and B.10. 
The alternative scenario in which producers are more responsive to market signals brought increased 
volatility in the transition of pig producers between farming systems. This is illustrated in Figure 41, 
that shows the number of highly profitable pig producers oscillated significantly in this alternative 
scenario compared to the standard model. This is because higher numbers of producers initially 
upgraded but then a substantial portion failed and exited as prices fell and disease outbreaks 
occurred in the target area. Comparing baselines, the overall financial benefits of the rapid upgrading 
in pig systems outweighed the costs of a higher portion dropping out, shown by the 34% increase in 
the aggregate profits of pig producers when they are more responsive to market signals. In this 
alternative scenario there was only one minor change in the rank order of institutional scenarios: in 
the medium term, S2(PGs) outperformed S1(individuals) on financial impact (+78% change from 
baseline for S2.A5 compared with +72% for S1.A5). S2(PGs) and S3(POs) also showed larger financial 
 
35 To model this, the time taken to adjust to market signals was reduced by 25% and the effect of change, i.e., 
the increase in production or number of producers upgrading, was increased by 25% for a scenario of 
increasing responsiveness. For a scenario of decreasing producer responsiveness, time was increased by 25% 
and the effect of change was decreased by 25%.   
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gains compared to S1(individuals) than in the baseline model. This can be explained by the increased 
pace at which producers within PGs/POs transitioned to the most profitable system, hybrid FF, as 
well as the dropout rates, which were lower for PG and PO members. For example, when the 
responsiveness of producers to market signals is increased, in S3(POs) there were 568 producers in 
the PG hybrid FF system in the mid-point of the model compared with 447 in the baseline model 
simulation. Furthermore, in this alternative scenario, in S1(individuals) the number of hybrid FF 
producers reached 445 with a dropout rate of 20% per annum; by contrast, the dropout rate of 
hybrid FF producers in S3(POs) in the alternative scenario was 1.3%.  
 
Figure 41: Comparison of number of pig producers in highly profitable systems in standard model 
and increased responsiveness alternative scenario 
Source: Pork VC model simulation  
In terms of the rank order of technical upgrading activities, increasing responsiveness to markets 
signals had one main consequence: the relative impact of microcredit across both outcome 
indicators dropped one or two priority levels. In the baseline model simulation, microcredit 
encouraged faster upgrading because it lowered the entry costs of engagement in higher value pig 
enterprises. As a result, when producers naturally respond faster and at a higher magnitude to 
perceived profitability, the effect of microcredit is reduced. Volatility was also responsible for the 
diminished effect of microcredit because increasing the number of failed upgrades reduced the 
available loan capital, lessening the systematic impact of microcredit. For example, in the standard 
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simulation, in S1(individuals).A1 the available loan credit is US$133,000 by the end of fifteen years; 
however, this falls to US$82,300 in S1(individuals).A1 in this alternative scenario.  
Reducing the rate of producer responsiveness to market signals did not alter the results of the model 
in terms of the rank order of the financial impact of the three scenarios. From the standpoint of the 
number of producers in highly profitable systems the rank order was slightly changed in that S2(PGs) 
and S3(POs) had greater impacts on producer numbers than S1(individuals) in the short-term. This is 
owing to the 640 producers that enter the PG and PO, out of which 109 upgraded to the hybrid FF 
system after five years. Regarding technical upgrading activities, decreasing the responsiveness rate 
increased the impacts of microcredit, which moved up the priority ranking in all scenarios and 
timelines by at least one place. This is understandable when considering the results of the increased 
responsiveness scenario, as essentially the opposite reaction is in effect, namely, the ability of 
microcredit to improve the system is higher when starting from a base of lower responsiveness.  
5.7.1.6 African swine fever outbreak 
The presence of African swine fever (ASF) in the TRRILD project’s target region was considered a high 
likelihood given the ASF outbreak across Southeast Asia and Myanmar in 2019 (FAO, 2020). At the 
time of developing the model, a small ASF outbreak was present in northern Myanmar and yet to 
impact the target villages. As a result, an ex-ante ASF scenario was simulated in the model, using 
parameters provided by livestock specialists within the RG, to determine the potential impacts on the 
TRRILD target villages and possible changes to the rank order of institutional scenarios and technical 
upgrading activities. In the ASF scenario, the training and AHW activities were merged into a 
comprehensive biosecurity intervention (A2). This modelled the training of pig producers in 
biosecurity practices by the TRRILD project team and the coordination and implementation of 
biosecurity measures by village AHWs and pig producers. The model assumed biosecurity practises 
were adopted as per the VietGAHP36 2016 guidelines (Nguyen et al., 2019) and FAO criteria (2010), 
with full implementation reducing pig losses from ASF by up to 80%. These biosecurity interventions 
ensured: 
I. Swill feed does not contain pork and is boiled for 30 minutes prior to feeding. 
II. Perimeter double fencing is established for pig sties and minimum contact occurs between 
pigs. 
 
36 The 2016 VietGAHP guidelines were adapted by the TRRILD project for pig production trainings and as 
minimum quality standards for PG/PO members.  
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III. Equipment is cleaned and disinfected at least three times per week. All incoming vehicles 
and pigs are washed and disinfected outside of the perimeter fence.  
IV. Entry to pig farms is controlled. Vehicles and personnel, including AHWs, are disinfected on 
entering and leaving farms. Footbaths are installed at the entrance and exit of farms. Pig-
loading and off-loading is done outside perimeter fences. All replacement breeding stock 
comes from trusted sources. 
V. All dead animals, effluent, and discarded pig parts are burned and buried away from 
perimeter fences. 
VI. Animals showing signs of illness are isolated immediately and the AHW and LBVD office 
informed.  
VII. Mites are controlled through cutting back any vegetation from around pig houses.  
The RG provided the additional model parameters for the ASF scenario based on their estimates of a 
worst-case ASF scenario in the target villages. The costs of biosecurity measures are estimated as a 
one-off cost of US$34 per WF Unit and US$34 per Sow per FF Unit, and an ongoing cost of US$0.66 
(MMK1,000) per grower. The ongoing costs are similar to Ouma et al.’s (2018) estimation of 2625 
Uganda Shillings (equivalent to MMK942). In this simulation, the ASF outbreak caused a four-fold 
increase in mortality (60%) and panic selling (20%) of fatteners per week compared with the baseline 
disease scenario. The ASF outbreak began after three years of project implementation (week 156) 
and lasted for six months with the government imposing a strict importation ban. Consumer demand 
for local and premium pork dropped by 70% during this period. Taking into consideration the fear 
associated with ASF, producers are 25% more responsive to market signals during the ASF outbreak. 
The regular disease outbreaks that were part of the standard model run continued in the ASF 
scenario with a second ASF outbreak occurring seven years after the first outbreak (i.e., at week 560).    
As shown in Tables 23 and 24 ASF outbreaks could have a large impact in the target area without any 
project interventions. In comparison with data from the standard model baseline, two years 
following the first ASF outbreak (i.e., in the short-term) the target community lost 52% of their 
earnings from pig farming. These losses were slowly reclaimed by pig producers, but aggregate 
profits were still 29% lower than the baseline model prior to the second ASF outbreak. The number 
of highly profitable pig farmers also fell by 63% post-outbreak and did not fully recover (-25%) before 
the next outbreak occurred or by the end of the model (-41%). Correspondingly, the total number of 
pig farmers fell to 680 by the end of the ASF outbreak scenario compared with 1,161 in the baseline  
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model. Other pork VC actors (slaughterhouses, brokers, and employees) lost around a third of their 
income as a result of ASF.  
Table 23: Results of ASF alternative scenarios on aggregate profits of all pig producers 
Scenario Short-term Medium-term Long-term 
 US$ Change 
(%)a 
Rankb US$ Change 
(%) 
Rank US$ Change 
(%) 
Rank 
Baseline: Disease 842,295   1,866,956   3,043,266   
Baseline: ASF outbreak 401,177 -52  1,325,393 -29  1,862,715 -39  
Scenario One: Individual 
Producers and ASF 
         
S1.A1: Microcredit $150K 573,486 +43 3 1,150,238 -13 3 1,458,516 -22 3 
S1.A1.2: Microcredit $300K 672,217 +68 (4)c 999,860 -25 (4) 1,251,237 -33 (4) 
S1.A2: Biosecurity 976,952 +144 1 2,163,755 +61 1 3,143,634 +56 1 
S1.A4: AI 463,054 +15 2 1,356,512 +2 2 1,936,144 +4 2 
S1.A5: Combinationd 1,198,247 +199 1 2,503,514 +89 3 3,770,806 +102 3 
Scenario Two: Producer 
groups and ASF 
         
S2.A1: Microcredit $150K 295,378 -26 2 1,535,276 +16 2 2,224,667 +19 2 
S2.A1.2: Microcredit $300K 360,194 -10 (2) 1,752,904 +32 (2) 2,759,177 +48 (2) 
S2.A2: Biosecurity 565,780 +41 1 2,241,898 +69 1 4,664,053 +150 1 
S2.A4: AI 248,049 -38 3 1,363,685 +3 3 2,145,941 +15 3 
S2.A5: Combination 738,431 +84 3 2,044,762 +114 2 6,299,043 +238 2 
Scenario Three: Producer 
organisations and ASF 
         
S3.A1: Microcredit $150K 309,509 -23 2 2,000,210 +51 1 3,199,039 +72 2 
S3.A1.2: Microcredit $300K 375,956 -6 (2) 2,267,309 +71 (2) 3,484,176 +87 (2) 
S3.A2: Biosecurity 568,575 +42 1 3,009,714 +127 1 8,558,098 +359 1 
S3.A4: AI 250,426 -38 3 1,743,761 +32 3 2,813,527 +51 3 
S3.A5: Combination 745,336 +86 2 3,716,863 +180 1 10,174,486 +446 1 
Note: a Percentage change from the baseline. b Rank for the combined activities compares S1, S2, and S3.            
c Value in parentheses denotes that ranking of the sub activity A1.2. d Combination refers to A1 + A2 + A3 + A4, 
where A1 is microcredit capped at $150K.    
Source: Pork VC model simulation 
In the ASF alternative scenario, there were no substantial changes to the rank order of intervention 
scenarios for the project’s impacts on aggregate profits of all pig producers. In terms of differences 
from the baseline model, the combination of the project’s interventions had a more robust impact 
when there was an ASF outbreak. This was particularly evident in S2(PG) and S3(POs), in which the 
financial impacts of the project during an ASF outbreak were 80% (S2) and 67% (S3) higher than the 
baseline model run, compared with 30% for S1(individuals). This adds further support to earlier 
findings that PGs and POs can act as a safety net by helping small-scale producers maintain pig stocks 
to take advantage of price rebounds post-disease. When there is an ASF outbreak, collective action 
enabled the number of producers in highly profitable systems in S2(PGs) and S3(POs) to remain 
higher than in S1.A5. This was a change from the baseline model run where S1(individuals) 
outperformed S2(PGs) across all timelines and S3(POs) in the short-term.  
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Table 24: Results of ASF alternative scenarios on the number of pig producers in highly profitable 
systems  
Scenario Short-term Medium-term Long-term 
 Number Change 
(%)a 
Rankb Number Change 
(%) 
Rank Number Change 
(%) 
Rank 
Baseline: Disease 379   441   464   
Baseline: ASF outbreak 138 -63  330 -25  274 -41  
Scenario One: Individual Producers 
and ASF 
         
S1.A1: Microcredit $150K 74 -46 3 79 -76 3 51 -81 3 
S1.A1.2: Microcredit $300K 11 -92 (4)c 67 -80 (4) 44 -81 (4) 
S1.A2: Biosecurity 244 +76 1 338 +2 1 251 -8 1 
S1.A4: AI 143 +3 2 146 -56 2 109 -60 2 
S1.A5: Combinationd 227 +64 3 374 +13 2 276 +1 3 
Scenario Two: Producer groups and 
ASF 
         
S2.A1: Microcredit $150K 70 -50 2 277 -16 2 140 -49 3 
S2.A1.2: Microcredit $300K 69 -69 (4) 255 -23 (4) 196 -28 (2) 
S2.A2: Biosecurity 210 +51 1 283 -14 1 400 +46 1 
S2.A4: AI 71 -58 3 263 -20 3 166 -39 2 
S1.A5: Combination 249 +80 2 370 +12 3 495 +81 2 
Scenario Three: Producer 
organisations and ASF 
         
S3.A1: Microcredit $150K 70 -50 3 391 +18 2 261 -5 2 
S3.A1.2: Microcredit $300K 69 -50 (4) 384 +16 (3) 252 -8 (3) 
S3.A2: Biosecurity 211 +52 1 442 +34 1 593 +117 1 
S3.A4: AI 71 -48 2 372 +13 3 243 -11 4 
S3.A5: Combination 250 +80 1 504 +53 1 671 +145 1 
Note: a Percentage change from the baseline. b Rank for the combined activities compares S1, S2, and S3.            
c Value in parentheses denotes that ranking of the sub activity A1.2. d Combination refers to A1 + A2 + A3 + A4, 
where A1 is microcredit capped at $150K.    
Source: Pork VC model simulation 
Implementing biosecurity protocols had a considerably stronger impact than other technical 
activities regardless of the scenario or time horizon. In the ASF outbreak scenario, a singular focus on 
providing microcredit to individual pig farmers resulted in long-term negative impacts. In 
S1(individuals).A1 increasing access to microcredit encouraged more pig producers to upgrade to 
higher profit but higher risk systems. When ASF outbreaks occurred, these producers were forced to 
abandon pig farming as a livelihood and default on loans given their high debt levels. After the first 
ASF outbreak, available loan capital plummeted from US$150,000 to US$15,997, and thus 
kneecapped further recovery. The greater the stock of microcredit the larger the negative impacts, as 
more pig producers were encouraged to upgrade and, subsequently, became susceptible to farm 
failure.  
In S2(PGs).A1 and S3(POs).A1, microcredit delivered negative short-term but positive medium- and 
long-term financial benefits. However, it had associated negative consequences on the number of 
farmers in highly profitable systems. Microcredit in S2(PGs).A1 and S3(POs).A1 enabled farmers to 
upgrade to the highly profitable hybrid FF systems, though ASF and other disease outbreaks meant 
they regularly failed and consequently returned to WF systems. Even when biosecurity, microcredit, 
and AI were jointly implemented (i.e., A5), ASF still brought noticeable disruption to PGs and POs. In 
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S2(PGs).A5, 13% of PG members left the PG for a year or more after ASF occurred, with the number 
reducing to 7% of PO members in S3(POs).A5. If biosecurity protocols were not implemented by 
PG/PO members and premiums for high-quality fatteners were not forthcoming, these dropout rates 
further increased to 46% (S2) and 40% (S3) for hybrid FF farmers and 20% for hybrid WF (S2 and S3), 
which would seriously compromise PG and PO sustainability.  
The ASF scenario contained a static outbreak start time and fixed length. To understand the impacts 
of temporal variations to an ASF outbreak, the ASF scenario was re-simulated with the outbreak 
starting one year earlier, one year later, and two years later, randomly assigning the ASF start times 
as well as randomly assigning the length of the outbreak to between 10 and 52 weeks. In general, 
altering the timing and length of the ASF outbreak brought slightly stronger negative financial and 
pro-poor impacts to pig producers, as illustrated in Tables 25 and 26. The scenario with a two-year 
delay had the largest shift and was selected as an alternative ASF scenario to understand temporal 
impacts on the project’s institutional and technical upgrading activities. The results comparing the 
ASF outbreak and delaying the outbreak by two years on the rank order of upgrading interventions 
are found in Appendix D, Tables D.11 and D.12. These results reinforce the key findings of the ASF 
scenario: biosecurity activities have a strongly positive impact that is magnified when combined with 
other technical interventions. However, delaying the start time of the ASF outbreak brought some 
changes to the rank order of institutional scenarios. In the short-term, S2(PGs) outperformed S3(POs) 
in financial and pro-poor outcomes. This is because the ASF outbreak occurs at year five (i.e., when 
the short-term values are extracted from the model) and therefore investments in additional 
biosecurity measures for PO members have not been realised yet. The delay in the ASF outbreak 
allows higher numbers of pig producers to successfully pay back upgrading loans in S1(individual).A1 
and leads to improved performance for microcredit. In S2(PGs).A1 and S3(POs).A1, microcredit 
encourages PG and PO members to continually upgrade from WF to FF systems and hence they are 
susceptible to ASF shocks and as such microcredit’s rank order drops in these two institutional 
scenarios.  
Table 25: Comparison of changing ASF outbreak timing and length on aggregate profits of all pig 
producers 
Scenario Short-term Medium-term Long-term 






Baseline: Disease 842,965  1,866,956  3,043,266  
Baseline: ASF outbreak 401,177 -52 1,325,393 -29 1,862,715 -39 
Baseline: - 52 weeks 298,446 -65 992,571 -47 1,630,635 -46 
Baseline: + 52 weeks 678,346 -20 1,223,025 -34 1,791,792 -41 
Baseline: + 104 week 842,965 0 1,203,111 -36 1,575,269 -48 
Baseline: + random assignment 323,953 -62 970,912 -48 1,592,240 -48 
Note: a Percentage change from the baseline. 
Source: Pork VC model simulation 
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Table 26: Comparison of changing ASF outbreak timing and length on number of pig producers in 
highly profitable systems 
Scenario Short-term Medium-term Long-term 






Baseline: Disease  379  441  464  
Baseline: ASF outbreak 138 -64 330 -25 274 -43 
Baseline: - 52 weeks 110 -71 110 -75 233 -52 
Baseline: + 52 weeks 347 -8 294 -33 187 -63 
Baseline: + 104 week 379 0 105 -76 112 -80 
Baseline: + random assignment 99 -74 99 -78 239 -51 
Note: a Percentage change from the baseline. 
Source: Pork VC model simulation 
5.7.1.7 Alternative microcredit products 
The lending parameters of the TRRILD project’s partner MFI are derived from both internal company 
rules and external regulations governed by the Government of Myanmar’s (GoM) microfinance law. 
While interest rate terms are capped at 2.46% per month by the GoM, the lending term of six to 24 
months is applied at the discretion of the MFI. RG and SGMB participants reported that the partner 
MFI’s loan officers routinely offer short loan cycles to new clients to establish credit histories before 
lengthening the loan term in subsequent loan cycles. The model was simulated with a range of loan 
conditions within the bounds of the partner MFI’s and the GoM’s rules and regulations to determine 
the extent of their financial and pro-poor impacts on the system.  
As shown in Tables 27 and 28 extending the terms for loans provided greater financial and pro-poor 
impact across all scenarios and timelines. While longer loan terms for amortised loans resulted in 
higher total interest payments, this was offset by increasing the medium-term profitability of higher-
risk enterprises, which encouraged more producers to upgrade and as such increased the overall 
profits in the system. From the worst- (six-months) to best-case (24 months) scenario for loan terms, 
system profits doubled. Interestingly, the shortest loan term of six-months performed worse in pro-
poor impact than the baseline of no microcredit in S1(individuals) and S2(PGs). In these scenarios, 
the higher interest/longer loan terms of informal moneylenders proved superior to the lower 
interest/shorter loan term from the partner MFI in enabling farmers to upgrade to the local FF 
system. This is because production cycles of local breed fatteners (one production cycle per year) 
exceeded the MFI’s six-month loan term.       
Findings from the baseline model simulation showed prolonged periods of negative cashflow and 
profitability when pig producers take on microcredit loans to upgrade to more profitable pig 
enterprises. This was most visible in the early stages of S2(PGs) and S3(POs) because all PG and PO 
members accessed microcredit loans to upgrade to high-quality systems at one time. 
 
 157 
Table 27: Comparison of the aggregate profits of all pig producers under different microcredit loan 
terms 
Scenario Short-term Medium-term Long-term 






Baseline 842,965  1,866,956  3,043,266  
Scenario 1: Individual producers 













Scenario 1.A5: 12 months (standard) 1,382,303 +64 3,214,879 +72 5,441,792 +79 
Scenario 1.A5: 24 months 1,344,872 +60 3,628,301 +94 6,851,573 +125 
Scenario 2: Producer Groups 













Scenario 2.A5: 12 months (standard) 1,022,314 +21 3,199,340 +71 7,063,532 +132 
Scenario 2.A5: 24 months 1,018,533 +21 3,801,911 +104 9,028,524 +197 
Scenario 3: Producer Organisations 













Scenario 3.A5: 12 months (standard) 1,026,598 +21 4,033,651 +116 11,205,559 +268 
Scenario 3.A5: 24 months 1,023,598 +21 4,983,556 +167 13,260,683 +336 
Note: a Percentage change from the baseline. 
Source: Pork VC model simulation 
Table 28: Comparison of the number of producers in highly profitable systems under different 
microcredit loan terms 
Scenario Short-term Medium-term Long-term 






Baseline 379  441  464  
Scenario 1: Individual producers       
Scenario 1.5: 6 months 352 -7 352 -20 352 -24 
Scenario 1.5: 12 months (standard) 480 +26 639 +45 710 +53 
Scenario 1.5: 24 months 692 +82 972 +120 1,037 +123 
Scenario 2: Producer groups       
Scenario 2.5: 6 months 343 -10 378 -14 449 -3 
Scenario 2.5: 12 months (standard) 397 +5 542 +23 704 +52 
Scenario 2.5: 24 months 483 +5 732 +66 848 +83 
Scenario 3: Producer Organisations       
Scenario 3.5: 6 months 343 -10 399 -9 882 +90 
Scenario 3.5: 12 months (standard) 399 +27 684 +55 874 +89 
Scenario 3.5: 24 months 484 +5 794 +80 877 +88 
Note: a Percentage change from the baseline. 
Source: Pork VC model simulation 
However, the same negative cashflows occurred throughout S1(individuals) and in later stages of 
S2(PGs) and S3(POs) but are masked due to the aggregate nature of the model’s data. To test the 
effect of loan terms and interest payment schedules on profitability and cashflows, a simple model of 
an individual hybrid FF producer was constructed in Stella Architect using static parameters derived 
from averages across the first three years of the pork VC SD model. In the individual model, the 
hybrid FF producer purchases two breeding sows and constructs improved shelter using a loan from 
the partner MFI. As per the baseline model, 50% of piglets are sold and the rest raised as fatteners 
for market. The TRRILD partner MFI had three possible loan products available: (i) amortised; (ii) 
balloon; and (iii) deferred payment loan. The amortised loan product consisted of equal payments 
across the lifetime of the loan period. The balloon loan on offer required regular interest payments 
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on the outstanding principal which is paid at the end of the loan period. In the deferred payment 
loan both principal and accrued interest are paid at the end of the loan period. These loans can be 
applied to fund assets (in this case the initial establishment of the hybrid FF unit) or for working 
capital (i.e., a production loan to fund ongoing costs, such as feed, vaccinations, maintenance, etc.). 
The loan terms were six to 24 months for asset loans and four to 18 months for working capital loans. 
Different types of loan products have been shown to impact liquidity and overall profitability of farm 
enterprises (Finnemore et al., 2010). To test this, the three loan products37 were introduced to the 
individual hybrid FF model through an asset loan of US$1,279 for 24 months to purchase two high-
quality sows and related equipment and two back-to-back working capital loans38 of US$1,333 for 18 
months.  
The three microcredit products had different impacts on hybrid FF farm profitability as shown in 
Figure 42. Reflecting findings from the baseline model, the amortised loan resulted in liquidity stress 
for the individual hybrid FF pig producer. This stress lasted for 67 weeks, with the pig producer 
requiring US$1,315 of additional capital to cover loan repayments and ongoing costs. If these periods 
of negative cashflow can be managed, amortised loans offered pig farmers the greatest profit after 
three years of US$2,349. In comparison, the balloon loan reduced periods of negative cashflow to 
around five weeks during the first year of operation, though cash requirements were still significant 
with a peak of US$368. The deferred payment loan was able to fully insulate pig producers from 
liquidity stress, showing a minimum available balance of US$250. Both the balloon and deferred loan 
lowered the profitability of the farm enterprise to US$1,410 and US$1,429 which was 40% less than 
the amortised loan.   
Further options were simulated in the individual hybrid FF model to ascertain their ability to limit 
liquidity stress. Selling a higher rate of piglets brought revenue sooner into the business at the cost of 
lower and delayed profits. With an amortised loan, increasing the piglet selling rate to 80% relieved 
liquidity stress by around 50% (US$714 of additional capital was still required) but dampened short-
term profits by 3% after three years (US$2,445). For the balloon loan, increasing piglet sales to 80% 
fully alleviated liquidity stress but with a subsequent 5% drop in profits. The other option modelled 
was to take out a higher amount for the working capital loan. If the working capital loan amount is 
increased to the maximum rate of US$2,000, it worsened the liquidity stress for amortised loans but 
fully alleviated negative cashflows for balloon loan recipients. However, the larger balloon loan 
amounts impinge on profits, reducing three-year income to US$944, a drop of 38%.  
 
37 Parameters for three loan products is based on the TRRILD partner MFI’s lending practices.  
38 Maximum working capital amount is US$2,000 for the first cycle of the loan as per MFI rules.  
 159 
Altering the duration of loan terms also changed the liquidity stress of individual FF pig producers. 
When loan terms for asset and working capital were reduced to 52 weeks, cashflow problems are 
greatly magnified. Deficits peaked at US$2,177 for amortised loans, US$1,230 for balloon loans, and 
US$1,227 for the deferred loan. Altering the piglet selling rate to 80% does not alter the liquidity 
stress with such a short loan term, regardless of loan type.  
 
Figure 42: Aggregate profits of an individual hybrid FF producer in the first three years of 
operations 
Source: Individual hybrid FF model simulation 
5.7.2 Parameter sensitivity analysis 
A multi-variate parameter SA was performed to understand whether conclusions from the model 
were valid when assumptions were altered over a plausible range of uncertainty (Sterman, 2010, 
p.883). The first step in the process was undertaken by SGMB, RG, and PAC members who selected 
exogenous model parameters that were both highly uncertain and had a strong likelihood of 
influencing the model’s results (Sterman, 2010, p.884). SGMB, RG, and PAC members then helped 
determined the plausible range of these values. In this set of SA tests, a triangular distribution was 
selected for parameters where RG and SGMB could recall historical minimum and maximum values 
which were used for the lower and upper bounds, with the value used in scenario testing remaining 
as the mean. Triangular distributions are recommended for use within SA of SD models by Ford 
(2010) and are of particular value when the mean and upper and lower limits are known but there is 
data scarcity on the shape of the distribution (Thomopoulos, 2017). When historical data indicated 
equally likely values, a uniform distribution was used with the upper and lower values decided by 
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SGMB, RG, and PAC (Green, 2018). Uniform distributions are commonly used within SA of agri-food 
SD models (see Dizyee et al., 2017 and Ouma et al., 2018). For parameters without real-world 
equivalency, such as price elasticity for demand, ±50% from the original value were used as bounds 
for the uniform distribution. As illustrated in Table 29, bounds for parameter SA were weighted 
towards a worst-case scenario given the desire to “bullet proof” project upgrading strategies against 
potential negative events and to counter-act the tendency for SGMB, RG, and PAC participants to be 
overly optimistic with critical model variables (Ford, 2010; Sterman, 2010). For example, when KIIs 
reported a 35% premium for high-quality pork cuts for the Yangon market, a lower bound of 10% and 
an upper bound of 40% were selected to weight towards worst-case scenarios.  
Table 29: Parameters for the multi-variate sensitivity analysis 
Parameter  Base Value Unit Ranges of Uncertainty 
Death rate 0.15 Proportion Triangular (0.05, 0.3) 
Panic selling rate 0.05 Proportion Triangular (0.025, 0.3) 
Length of disease outbreak 26 Weeks Triangular (10, 52) 
Consumer change in pork demand due to disease -0.3 Proportion Triangular (-0.1, -0.6) 
Change in pork demand during Chinese New Year 0.2 Proportion Triangular (0.1,0.5) 
Sensitivity of Myeik price to inventory coverage   -0.1 n.a Uniform (-0.05, -0.15) 
Sensitivity of Mawlymine price to inventory coverage  -0.05 n.a Uniform (-0.025, -0.075) 
Price elasticity of demand -0.5 n.a Uniform (-0.25, -0.75) 
Money lender interest rate 0.05 Percentage/month Triangular (0.04, 0.075) 
Time to fatten hybrid pigs 19.3 Weeks Triangular (17.4, 20) 
Slaughterhouse production costs 8.82 US$/pig Uniform (6.15, 11.0)a 
Premium for high-quality wholesale pork in Myeik 10 Percent Uniform (1, 15) 
Premium for high-quality pork cuts in Myeik 15 Percent Uniform (5, 20) 
Premium for high-quality pork cuts in Yangon 35 Percent Uniform (10, 40) 
Note: a For the PO slaughterhouse’s production costs a uniform distribution was used with ± of 25% as the 
maximum and minimum variables for key input costs exogenous to the model. 
Source: Pork VC model simulation  
In total, 14 parameters were selected for multi-variate SA performed through Monte Carlo 
simulations in Stella Architect, using a Latin hypercube sampling (LHS) methodology. The LHS 
technique has been shown as an efficient method for testing SD models (Ford & Flynn, 2005). When 
compared to random sampling or stratified sampling, LHS was found as the most efficient design for 
models with large numbers of uncertain variables (McKay et al., 1979), reducing the required sample 
size by a factor of ten (Reilly et al., 1987). The SD literature has proposed different sample sizes for 
the LHS methodology; however, there is no widely acknowledged method for determining the 
sample size required for LHS (Matala, 2008). In a study using SD modelling to investigate policy 
options for a regional electric system Ford (1990) found a sample of 40 simulations (with 150 
uncertain variables) produced similar uncertainty intervals as doubling the LHS sample to 80 
simulations. Following on from this study, Ford (2010) suggests a pragmatic solution to ascertaining 
the correct sample size for LHS is to double the sample size during SA to check whether uncertainty 
intervals are altered. McKay (1988) suggested the sample for LHS should be twice the size as the 
number of uncertain variables, while Manache and Melching (2007) found that 4/3 times the number 
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of uncertain input variable was sufficient to identify sensitive parameters. In a recent study, Kwakkel 
and Pryut (2015) used a 1000 runs in their LHS within a SD model to determine uncertainties related 
to the availability of minerals crucial for economic development of nations. Following this recent 
example and Ford’s (2015) suggestion, this research selected a sample size of 1000 for LHS and 
halved (i.e., 500 runs) and doubled (i.e., 2000 runs) the sample size to check for changes in values of 
indicator means, coefficient of variation and ultimately, the rank order of institutional and technical 
upgrading scenarios.  
Analysis of the results of the multi-variate SA included calculations of mean, quartiles, minimum and 
maximum values, standard deviation, confidence intervals, coefficients of variation, and plotting the 
histograms of the distributions. The multi-variate SA undertaken through a Monte Carlo simulation 
produced results for the two outcome indicators consistent with a normal distribution, with some 
minor skewness. The histograms and box plots for the two outcome indicators for S1(individuals, 
S2(PGs), and S3(POs) are found in Appendix E.  
The results of the multi-variate SA support the model’s findings regarding financial and pro-poor 
impacts of the institutional scenarios and technical upgrading activities. The results for the 1000 run 
multi-variate SA are presented in Tables 30, 31, 32, and 33. The multi-variate SA reduced the mean 
baseline values for the two outcome indicators by around 10%, which is expected given the 
weighting in the probability distributions towards worst-case scenarios. As shown in Table 30, the SA 
ranking of the three scenarios on the aggregate profits of all pig producers did not change. However, 
the weighting towards worst-case scenarios in SA brought a small delay to the impacts of PG and PO 
investments in transitioning producers to highly profitable systems. As Table 31 shows, when 
uncertainty is factored in, S1(individuals).A5 had the broadest pro-poor impact in the short- and 
medium-term, with S3(POs).A5 eventually delivering the highest impacts in the long-term. The co-
efficient of variation (CV) included in Tables 30 and 31 reveals an acceptable level of variation for the 
institutional scenarios and show that the upgrading interventions reduce risk relative to the baseline. 
This is also reflected in the strengthening of the project’s impacts (in terms of % change from the 
baseline value) across all three institutional scenarios. S1(individuals).A5 had larger gains in the SA 
compared to S2(PGs).A5 and S3(POs).A5 though these were not sufficient to disrupt the rank order of 
institutional scenarios. While the CVs of S1(individual).A5 are the lowest, S2(PGs).A5 and S3(POs).A5 
have similar CVs, indicating that greater investments in producer institutions that can invest in value-
adding assets bring greater pro-poor and financial impacts at similar risk levels to more modest 
investments in producer groups that provide transactional services. 
The results of the multi-variate SA further strengthen the case for prioritising the technical activities 
of A1: Microcredit and A3: AHWs. As illustrated in Table 32 and Table 33, any changes in the rank 
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order of upgrading activities across both indicators were a result of improving impacts of A1: 
Microcredit and A3: AHWs compared with A2: Training and A4: AI. The results of the SA also 
confirmed the importance of multiple intertwined activities. As shown in Tables 32 and 33, in S2(PGs) 
and S3(POs), the negative impacts of implementing individual technical activities were more 
significant in SA; however, the combination of technical activities produced stronger results. For 
example, in S2(PGs) adding percentage effects from isolated activities in the short-term showed a 
combined change of -29% from the baseline in terms of producer profits but the effect reverses to a 
+25% change when activities are implemented simultaneously in S2.A5. 
The findings of the SA remained consistent when undertaking LHS with sample sizes of 500 and 2000 
runs as shown in Tables B.13 to B.18 found in Appendix F. The mean values of SA differed by less 
than 1.2% across the SA runs of 500, 1000, and 2000 simulations. The slight change in means resulted 
in a two minor rank order shifts (see Tables F5 and F6); however, these did not signal any changes to 









Table 30: Multi-variate sensitivity analysis: Comparison of the aggregate profits of all pig producers across institutional scenarios  
Scenario Short-term Medium-term Long-term 




95% CI [LL, UL] 
SA 
Rank 




95% CI [LL, UL] 
SA 
Rank 




95% CI [LL, UL] 
SA 
Rank 
Baseline 842,965  768,254 
(19%) 
[758,978, 771,531] 
 1,866,956  1,684,115 
(20%) 
[1,663,177, 1,705,053] 




S1.A5: Combination 1,382,303 1 1,365,197 
(8%) 
[1,358,770, 1,371,624] 
1 3,214,879 2 3,218,349 
(11%) 
[3,195,992, 3,240,707] 




S2.A5: Combination 1,022,314 3 959,624 
(14%) 
[951,376, 967,871] 
3 3,199,340 3 3,093,090 
(16%) 
[3,062,508, 3,123,672] 




S3.A5: Combination 1,026,296 2 967,945 
(14%) 
[959,672, 976,217] 
2 4,033,651 1 3,596,168 
(18%) 
[3,555,200, 3,637,136] 




Note: ST denotes results from scenario testing. SA provides the mean value from sensitivity analysis. Coefficients of variation (CV) are provided in brackets. LL represents the lower 
limit and UL represents the upper limit of the 95% confidence interval (CI).    








Table 31: Multi-variate sensitivity analysis: Comparison of the number of pig producers in highly profitable systems across institutional scenarios 
Scenario Short-term Medium-term Long-term 
 ST 
Number 
ST Rank SA Number 
(CV) 





ST Rank SA Number 
(CV) 





ST Rank SA Number 
(CV) 
95% CI [LL, UL] 
SA Rank 












S1.A5: Combination 480 1 485 
(8%) 
[482, 487] 
1 639 2 639 
(11%) 
[635, 644] 




S2.A5: Combination 397 3 373 
(10%) 
[370, 375] 
3 542 3 508 
(16%) 
[503, 513] 




S3.A5: Combination 399 2 374 
(11%) 
[372, 377] 









Note: ST denotes results from scenario testing. SA provides the mean value from sensitivity analysis. Coefficients of variation (CV) are provided in brackets. LL represents the lower 
limit and UL represents the upper limit of the 95% confidence interval (CI). c indicates rankings that have improved in the SA compared with the baseline model run. d indicates 
rankings that have worsened in the SA compared with the baseline model run. 







Table 32: Multi-variate sensitivity analysis: Comparison of the aggregate profits of all pig producers across technical upgrading activities  
Scenario Short-term Medium-term Long-term 
 ST US$ ST 
Rank 
SA US$ SA 
Rank 
ST US$ ST 
Rank 
SA US$ SA 
Rank 
ST US$ ST 
Rank 
SA US$ ST 
Rank 
Baseline 842,965  768,254  1,866,956  1,684,115  3,043,266  2,702,188  
Scenario 1: Individual producers             
S1.A1: Microcredit $150K 1,087,576 1 1,050,763 1 2,380,011 1 2,287,546 1 3,940,949 1 3,707,147 1 
S1.A1.2: Microcredit $300K 1,261,361 (1)a 1,243,903 (1) 2,877,423 (1) 2,792,792 (1) 4,897,681 (1) 4,638,498 (1) 
S1.A2: Training 945,149 3 865,292 3 2,089,817 3 1,923,978 3 3,452,985 2 3,122,299 3d 
S1.A3: AHWs 975,574 2 924,813 2 2,139,809 2 2,053,378 2 3,420,022 3 3,283,421 2c 
S1.A4: AI 919,824 4 841,039 4 2,027,026 4 1,874,430 4 3,353,877 4 3,024,807 4 
S1.A5: Combination 1,382,303  1,365,197  3,214,879  3,218,349  5,441,792  5,411,166  
Scenario 2: Producer groups             
S2.A1: Microcredit $150K 830,903 1 756,258 1 2,171,795 2 2,046,108 1c 4,021,996 3 3,744,576 2c 
S2.A1.2: Microcredit $300K 917,148 (1) 858,844 (1) 2,475,852 (1) 2,379,672 (1) 4,692,074 (1) 4,500,663 (1) 
S2.A2: Training 800,067 3 697,972 3 2,141,964 3 1,953,724 3 4,062,055 2 3,681,166 3d 
S2.A3: AHWs 819,634 2 728,279 2 2,210,552 1 2,025,130 2d 4,103,582 1 3,792,198 1 
S2.A4: AI 769,025 4 671,354 4 2,044,762 4 1,857,094 4 3,812,834 4 3,018,444 4 
S2.A5: Combination 1,022,314  959,624  3,199,340  3,093,090  7,063,532  6,636,282  
Scenario 3: Producer organisations             
S3.A1: Microcredit $150K 835,051 1 764,251 1 2,754,206 2 2,404,078 2 6,835,205 4 5,502,402 3c 
S3.A1.2: Microcredit $300K 921,469 (1) 866,263 (1) 3,145,440 (1) 2,781,791 (1) 7,730,822 (2) 6,363,430 (2) 
S3.A2: Training 804,249 3 705,498 3 2,754,454 3 2,319,272 3 7,153,488 2 5,557,582 2 
S3.A3: AHWs 823,966 2 736,393 2 2,955,368 1 2,484,295 1 8,166,828 1 6,373,854 1 
S3.A4: AI 773,044 4 679,591 4 2,658,302 4 2,204,966 4 6,890,234 3 5,267,707 4d 
S3.A5: Combination 1,026,296  967,945  4,033,651  3,596,168  11,205,559  9,467,633  
Note: ST denotes results from scenario testing. SA provides the mean value from sensitivity analysis. Coefficients of variation (CV) are provided in brackets. LL represents the lower 
limit and UL represents the upper limit of the 95% confidence interval (CI). a value in parentheses denotes that ranking of the sub activity A1.2. ). c indicates rankings that have 
improved in the SA compared with the baseline model run. d indicates rankings that have worsened in the SA compared with the baseline model run. 




Table 33: Multi-variate sensitivity analysis: Comparison of the number of pig producers in highly profitable systems across technical upgrading activities 
Scenario Short-term Medium-term Long-term 
 ST Number ST 
Rank 






SA Number SA 
Rank 
ST Number ST 
Rank 
SA Number ST 
Rank 
Baseline: 379  340  441  396  464  388  
Scenario 1: Individual producers             
S1.A1: Microcredit $150K 420 1 408 1 539 1 498 1 550 1 491 1 
S1.A1.2: Microcredit $300K 477 (1)a 465 (1) 635 (1) 590 (1) 636 (1) 561 (1) 
S1.A2: Training 399 2 374 3d 495 2 445 3d 522 2 437 3d 
S1.A3: AHWs 389 3 388 2c 457 3 453 2c 507 3 469 2c 
S1.A4: AI 380 4 344 4 449 4 405 4 483 4 400 4 
S1.A5: Combination 480  485  639  639  710  652  
Scenario 2: Producer groups             
S2.A1: Microcredit $150K 343 2 309 1c 394 2 361 2 453 2 406 2 
S2.A1.2: Microcredit $300K 363 (1) 336 (1) 435 (1) 410 (1) 512 (1) 466 (1) 
S2.A2: Training 344 1 280 4d 398 1 363 1 474 1 413 1 
S2.A3: AHWs 343 2 298 2 378 4 350 3c 449 4 402 3c 
S2.A4: AI 343 2 298 2 389 3 349 4d 451 3 386 4d 
S2.A5: Combination 397  373  549  508  712  629  
Scenario 3: Producer organisations             
S3.A1: Microcredit $150K 343 1 311 1c 534 4 448 1c 699 4 537 3c 
S3.A1.2: Microcredit $300K 363 (1) 338 (1) 575 (1) 499 (1) 853 (2) 599 (2) 
S3.A2: Training 343 1 284 3d 550 2 447 2 751 2 565 2 
S3.A3: AHWs 343 1 299 2d 556 1 446 3d 882 1 644 1 
S3.A4: AI 343 1 284 4d 540 3 436 4 722 3 530 4d 
S3.A5: Combination 399  374  684  590  877  765  
Note: ST denotes results from scenario testing. SA provides the mean value from sensitivity analysis. Coefficients of variation (CV) are provided in brackets. LL represents the lower 
limit and UL represents the upper limit of the 95% confidence interval (CI). a value in parentheses denotes that ranking of the sub activity A1.2. ). c indicates rankings that have 
improved in the SA compared with the baseline model run. d indicates rankings that have worsened in the SA compared with the baseline model run. 




This chapter draws on the results of the research to present the recommended pro-poor upgrading 
interventions for the TRRILD project and discusses the effectiveness of SGMB tools. Section 6.1 
outlines the concentrated pro-poor upgrading interventions selected for their multiplying effects and 
appropriateness for the TRRILD project’s timeframe, resource constraints, and operating context. 
This is followed by an overview of the TRRILD project’s early upgrading efforts in the pork VC in 
Section 6.2, highlighting short-term outcomes as they relate to the model’s recommendations. 
Section 6.3 concludes the discussion chapter by exploring the effectiveness of system thinking and 
SGMB tools for engaging stakeholders in VC analysis. Specifically, Section 6.3.1 outline factors 
influencing the effectiveness of SGMB tools, Section 6.3.2 explores how SGMB participant 
understanding of the target VCs evolved, and Section 6.3.3 identifies critical lessons learned through 
the process of using SGMB within a pro-poor development project.     
6.1 Recommendations for pro-poor upgrading strategies for the TRRILD 
project 
The purpose of constructing a quantitative SD model for the pork VC was to guide decision-making in 
the TRRILD project to improve outcomes for VC stakeholders. Results from the model were analysed, 
simplified, and presented to project partners and stakeholders together to generate a series of 
recommendations for pro-poor upgrading interventions for the TRRILD project to focus on. The 
presentation of upgrading recommendations fulfilled a variety of objectives: the action research call 
for practical knowledge (Reason & Bradbury, 2008); the goal of SD models to improve decision-
making (Sterman, 2001); and the need for ex-ante evaluations as proposed by advocates for pro-poor 
VC approaches (Riisgard et al., 2010).  
Recommendations for upgrading the pork VC were presented to, and accepted by, TRRILD PAC 
members in August 2019. This allowed for a three-year implementation period before the project’s 
completion date in October 2022. Following the acceptance of recommendations, the Researcher 
continued to update the model structure, revise parameters, and rerun simulations to assist real 
time decision-making when contextual conditions changed, and to address specific queries posed by 
PAC members. This section outlines the collective body of recommendations from the pork VC 
chain’s ex-ante impact evaluations that were shared with PAC members up until September 2020. 
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6.1.1 Focus on producer institutions 
Simulation results showed that the TRRILD project should focus on collective action rather than 
broadly targeting individual producers. This would entail establishing pig PGs that operate at a 
transactional level before upgrading to PO status and extending their services by investing in value-
adding assets to capture a greater portion of the price paid by consumers. Although the project’s 
short-term financial impacts are highest when targeting the entire population of pig producers, the 
model clearly demonstrates that investments in the institutional capacity of PGs and POs have 
medium- and long-term advantages in raising incomes and broadening the pro-poor impact of the 
project. The institutional arrangements of collective action are critical. PGs provide improved 
outcomes for members when they retain earnings for investment in collective services. To achieve 
PO status, they further need to adopt institutional arrangements that encourage investment and 
discourage side selling. This can include the provision of regular rebates to members, tradable 
delivery rights, and the issuing of class B shares (Chaddad & Cook, 2004). At the early stage of 
establishment, PGs can engage in collective buying of inputs and selling of fatteners to reduce 
transaction costs and improve financial returns to members. The model shows that PG savings are 
critical at this initial stage of formation. It is suggested that, in lieu of membership fees (which may 
act as a membership disincentive), the PG should rather retain 20%39 of price margins for capacity 
investments. This modest amount would help create a pattern for PG members (who are unused to 
collective action) and could be then increased as determined by the PG’s future investment 
requirements.  
The model’s results show that the highest gains for the target villages come from transitioning PGs 
into POs that can functionally upgrade by investing in a safe and hygienic slaughterhouse that allows 
them to meet the quality standards demanded by high-end restaurants and supermarkets. It is 
recommended that the PGs be constituted with institutional arrangements that support a successful 
transition to POs. This transition would likely follow a path starting with bulk purchase and 
distribution of inputs, then adding collective marketing of high-quality products to premium buyers, 
and – lastly – investing in value-adding assets and inclusive business models (IBMs) (Esnard, 2021). 
Even at the early stages of formation, these constitutions should support: (i) governance 
arrangements that ensure that control resides with patron members; (ii) different types of shares to 
raise equity capital from members and non-members; (iii) access to debt capital to help finance 
investments in value-adding assets; (iv) the development of secondary market mechanisms such as 
tradable delivery rights for high-quality fatteners; and (v) proportionality between investment, 
 
39 If PGs negotiate a 5% discount for bulk purchasing of commercial pig feed, then a 4% discount is passed onto 
members with the PG retaining 1% for future investment. In a similar pattern, if PG bulk selling of fatteners or 
piglets incurs a 0.125 US$/kg price increase above market rates, the PG would retain 0.025 US$/kg.  
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patronage, and financial benefits to reduce conflict and encourage members to invest in and 
patronise their PO (Chaddad & Cook, 2004; Esnard, 2021; Moore & Noe, 1995).  
While only the establishment of a safe and hygienic slaughterhouse was modelled, POs can also 
induce functional upgrading by supplying inputs or services to other VC actors. One suggested option 
is for POs to invest in the establishment of an input supply shop for commercial pig feed, equipment, 
and medicines. As the model demonstrated, procurement of quality commercial pig feed is a 
substantial production cost (around 50% for WF and 80% for FF farmers) and may be prone to supply 
chain disruptions as it is sourced from Yangon. The project should train POs to manufacture quality 
pig feed from locally available ingredients and help them to finance these enterprises40 using a mix of 
equity, debt, and grant capital. Initial work by the Researcher and the TRRILD project’s technical 
officer showed that using local ingredients can reduce feed costs by 20-30% compared with 
commercial brands while maintaining similar feed conversion ratios and fat content in pork products. 
Tanintharyi is home to one of Myanmar’s largest marine fishing industries (Department of Fisheries, 
2018) with 19 fish processing plants (Mar, 2017) that produce significant volumes of by-products that 
could be utilised in local feed rations. The other two main ingredients of local pig feed, broken rice 
and rice bran, are also abundantly available at village and township levels owing to the prominence 
of rice farming in the region.  
6.1.2 High-quality hybrid fatteners 
It is recommended that PGs concentrate on selling high-quality hybrid fatteners. The model shows 
that hybrid pig farming is three to four times more profitable than raising local pig breeds. National 
data from LVBD (2018), reinforced by feedback at SGMB and RG workshops, point to a shift in 
consumer preferences towards leaner pork produced by hybrid fatteners. Following patterns in other 
nations, the demand for higher quality pork is expected to trend upwards as per capita incomes rise 
(Huynh et al., 2007; Reardon et al., 2012). The model’s results show that farmers can be protected 
from the higher risks involved in hybrid pig farming through a combination of the project’s 
interventions (biosecurity, microcredit, training, and AHWs) and the establishment of PGs and POs. 
Functional PGs and POs can reduce compliance and unit transaction costs enabling sustained access 
to these risk-lowering activities and premium markets (Markelova et al., 2009).  
Investments in hybrid pig farming by PG members make them susceptible to hold-up problems given 
the oligopsony power of slaughterhouses in Myeik and Palaw. Increasing the production of hybrid 
fatteners for the local wholesale market does not protect PG members from collusion between local 
slaughterhouses to lower farmgate prices, nor does it remove competition from quality hybrid pigs 
 
40 These enterprises would require financing to construct a retail outlet and storage facilities, purchase mixing 
equipment, along with working capital to allow the bulk purchasing of ingredients and storage bags.  
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sold from Mawlymine. Investing in high-quality fatteners for the premium market in Myeik and 
Yangon would enable PGs to differentiate their products from those sold in Mawlymine and other 
regional pig producers and help overcome these challenges. This differentiation would rest on PGs 
enforcing GAHP and biosecurity protocols that improve food safety, and shorter travel times that 
cause less animal stress. Before a PO makes a large investment in a hygienic, safe slaughterhouse to 
meet standards for the Yangon premium market, it should engage a local slaughterhouse to butcher 
high-quality fatteners for sale to local restaurants, hotels, and supermarkets. It is recommended that, 
together with PG representatives, the project organises a series of meetings with the restaurant 
association in Myeik to understand the quality standards required and to canvass orders for high-
quality wholesale pork cuts from interested customers. Initial KIIs in Myeik found quality conscious 
restaurants were willing to pay premiums of 10% to 15% over the wholesale price for daily deliveries 
of a higher-quality product which would supplement the current practise of purchasing frozen pork 
from Thailand or other countries. Once order numbers are understood, the PGs can engage with a 
reputable slaughterhouse to make regular deliveries of high-quality pork cuts to restaurants. The 
project will need to introduce a tagging system to safeguard against opportunistic behaviour and to 
help assure quality by promoting traceability.  
To access premium markets, PGs need to differentiate their products, not only by appearance (i.e., 
fat content of meat) and taste, but also by credence attributes relating to food safety, 
environmental, and ethical standards in production. The TRRILD project should work with capable 
PGs and interested downstream retail partners to develop a set of minimum quality standards (MQS) 
that define a “high-quality” fattener as per buyer standards and expectations. PGs could work with 
members and AHWs to clearly explain the standards, to train members, and to monitor farm 
adherence to the MQS and award tags to sows, piglets, and fatteners accordingly. This provides a 
helpful first step towards the later development of a participatory guarantee scheme in which other 
stakeholders (i.e., buyers, consumers, slaughterhouses) are involved in the development, training, 
and monitoring of product standards (Nelson et al., 2016). Once introduced to the PGs, a tradeable 
delivery right system (see Section 2.3.3.2) would also be tied to the tagging of high-quality fatteners 
to help PGs monitor the quality of the animals and assure the buyer that they comply with the MQS.  
There is a risk of individual farm failure and PG collapse if PG members are unable to recoup 
investments in commercial feed, hygienic farm operations, and quality hybrid breeding sows through 
price premiums. This risk increases if the project provides microcredit lending for upgrading without 
sufficient biosecurity protocols or a comprehensive AHW network in place. In S2(PGs), the model 
showed that PGs remain functional even when members are paid the Mawlymine price for their live 
pigs which is lower than the premium price generated in the model. However, in the model, if 
slaughterhouses offered live pig prices which are discounted from the Mawlymine prices by 10 to 
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15%, members dropped out of the PG or became inactive and started side selling their fatteners 
because the PG no longer provided price or service incentives to continue membership. This suggests 
that in the early stages of developing a relationship with slaughterhouses, when premiums for high-
quality fatteners may not be forthcoming, PGs will remain a viable option if they market their 
members’ fatteners as a substitute for Mawlymine imports.  
The model’s results indicate that the local unhygienic slaughterhouses are currently highly profitable. 
Well-established slaughterhouses may therefore resist partnering with PGs for a high-quality 
product. While the TRRILD project should still canvass existing slaughterhouses for partnerships, 
external support may be necessary to attract a suitable business partner. This could include training 
in safe, hygienic slaughtering and butchering of premium cuts along with equipment grants to 
encourage slaughterhouses to adopt new practices. If slaughterhouses remain resistant to partnering 
with PGs to establish a premium product, the project should consider supporting a PO through debt 
or grant capital to establish their own upgraded slaughterhouse as per S3(PO). This would be 
dependent on progressing initially positive discussions with the local government on increasing 
slaughterhouse license tenure beyond a 12-month period. The model showed that a PO could repay 
a loan large enough to finance a hygienic slaughterhouse if the loan was amortised at standard MFI 
rates over a period of 24 months. The TRRILD project should investigate this further and develop a 
business case to attract strategic partners, such as premium wholesalers and supermarkets in Yangon 
who have an incentive to strengthen their supply chain amidst challenges importing frozen premium 
products and the threat of domestic supply shortages following an outbreak of ASF. Prioritised pig 
PGs will have to adhere to a common production plan in order to meet the quantity, quality, and 
consistency requirements of a large premium buyer, like City Mart in Yangon. This plan would need 
to that ensure there are sufficient high-quality FF hybrid farms to supply piglets of MQS to WF hybrid 
PG members.  
Establishing a slaughterhouse for high-quality hybrid fatteners through a PO has the greatest pro-
poor impact. S3(POs) creates a new highly profitable pig enterprise, the hybrid WF system, which is 
three times more profitable than S2(PGs) in the long-term. When small-scale producers can capture 
value added from both farm production and processing segments in the chain, producing a smaller 
number of fatteners (maximum of six per year for a hybrid WF system) is more profitable than the 
larger and more intensive local breed FF system (which typically includes two sows, and produces 10 
fatteners, and 10 piglets per year). When considering horizontal impacts in the VC (Bolwig et al., 
2010), the hybrid WF system is highly favourable because it requires less household labour (which is 
typically provided by women), less technical know-how, lower start-up capital, and a smaller 
resource base (i.e., time, labour, and land) which make this farming enterprise more accessible and 
less risky for the poorest members of the village. Moreover, the hybrid WF system reduces the 
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environmental impacts of pig farming (e.g., pig waste, smell, noise pollution, and environmental 
degradation through roaming). The establishment of a slaughterhouse also delivers significantly 
higher off-farm employment opportunities than when PGs remain at the transactional level or the 
project focuses on individual farmers.  
6.1.3 Technical upgrading activities 
Model results further indicate that the project should implement microcredit, training, and AHWs 
activities alongside investments in biosecurity protocols to have the greatest medium and long-term 
impacts on target villages. As shown in the model, and through PAC discussions, AI does not bring 
substantial impacts to target communities and should not be a focus until the technology is more 
widespread in Myanmar and POs have the capacity to manage an AI unit.  
Given the likelihood and considerable damage to the pork VC from an ASF outbreak, biosecurity 
practises should be mainstreamed across the other technical upgrading activities. Loans for pig farm 
upgrades and grants of in-kind support should be made to PG members provisional on investing in 
additional biosecurity measures, such as footbaths and parameter fencing, and production loans 
should also cover disinfectants and other related costs. Additionally, loans should be provided only 
after pig producers are trained on biosecurity and AHWs are established at the community level and 
are able to monitor and enforce compliance to biosecurity protocols. The adherence to biosecurity 
guidelines should also be included in the PGs’ MQS and other collective selling activities.   
The establishment of an AHW network is a priority intervention that needs to occur before PG 
members upgrade their farm systems to the higher risk hybrid WF or FF systems. The target region 
has a history of disease outbreaks, poor farmer knowledge on disease and biosecurity protocols, and 
extremely low vaccination coverage. As PGs invest in higher quality and more costly inputs, such as 
sows, piglets, and commercial feed, the potential negative impacts from a disease outbreak increase 
and the importance of AHWs and GAHP (captured in an MQS) for PG members becomes more 
important. The model shows that a well-functioning AHW network has impacts beyond pig survival 
rates; it also prevents loan defaults and keeps credit in the system for further upgrading loans, while 
helping PGs and POs consistently meet supply agreements for premium products. The TRRILD project 
will also need to provide start-up kits to equip AHWs as vaccinations and equipment are not 
consistently available on the local market. As the project exits, PGs and POs would need to have 
strong connections in place with the LBVD and the private sector to enable consistent supply of the 
necessary equipment and vaccines.  
Microcredit loans are another priority project activity as they have the greatest impact on helping 
producers upgrade their farming systems. However, there are risks because of liquidity stress that 
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will need to be managed. The project should make a minimum of US$150,000 available for upgrading 
and production loans for pig producers after a competent AHW network is in place. Given the 
production cycle of pig farming and high entry and production costs, small-scale farmers are likely to 
experience periods of negative cashflow in the first three years after upgrading with the partner 
MFI’s current loan products and lending practices. Wealthier PG members can draw upon their 
household savings or take on smaller upgrading loans (i.e., if they are upgrading to produce a high-
quality fattener from an existing hybrid farm) to manage this liquidity problem. The model showed 
there are viable pro-poor options within the policies available to the partner MFI to ease the liquidity 
stress over the first three years of hybrid pig farming for farmers with less resources. Extending loan 
terms to 18 months for production loans and 24 months for asset loans along with either a balloon 
loan, with payments tailored to the production cycle, or a deferred payment loan allows poorer 
farmers to engage in hybrid FF farming with lower capital reserves. Insisting on first-time borrowers 
taking small loan sizes and short repayment terms to improve credit worthiness will have a 
detrimental effect, echoing the findings of Pellegrina (2011). With these specific loan conditions, 
many PG members will be forced to engage with informal money lenders to fill their credit gaps 
which will then negatively impact on their ability to meet interest and principal payments from the 
MFI – especially if there is a disease outbreak. Thus, current risk reducing practices employed by the 
MFI could have the opposite effect by enhancing producer susceptibility to exiting pig farming and 
defaulting on their loans.    
The focus on high-quality fatteners will require PGs to invest in high-quality breeding sows and boars 
to maintain genetic integrity. Achieving genetic integrity through AI is considered too risky for the 
TRRILD project. It is suggested that small breeding sow and boar units are established within 
prioritised PGs to ensure consistent quality of fatteners for the premium pork market and to achieve 
cost reductions. The TRRILD project can initially assist prioritised PGs to procure high-quality boars 
and breeding sows from Yangon which can then be granted to a qualified PG member. The costs of 
the sow or boar unit can be repaid by this PG member by providing PGs with the equivalent number 
of piglets over a set period. This will help inject start-up capital into the PG to cover initial expenses. 
The remaining piglets from the breeder unit can then be sold to PG members for fattening and 
breeding purposes. Breeding sows and their offspring will need to be tagged to certify the quality and 
parentage. This type of system would help ensure that PGs begin operations with quality genetic 
stocks while also lowering the entry costs for PGs to start hybrid pig production. Another pro-poor 
advantage to this system is that smaller sized loans are required as breeder and boar unit PG 
members would not have to pay an upfront cost to purchase the initial sows and boars. The reduced 
loan size, together with initially higher piglet sales will help these breeder farms maintain positive 
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cashflow. As per FAO guidelines (2009), AHWs will need to work closely with PGs to ensure they keep 
a register of parentage to prevent inbreeding through successive pig production cycles.  
The model’s findings support feedback from KIIs and FGDs that past technical training events have 
motivated pig producers to upgrade their farming system but did not fully mitigate risks from disease 
and cashflow stress. Intensive hybrid pig farming practices differ from the free-roaming system that 
most PG members follow with their local breeds. Repeated training and exposure to successful PGs 
will be required to increase the technical knowledge of farmers on hybrid production. Findings from 
the model’s sensitivity analysis show that the impacts of trainings are sensitive to project delays and 
as such trainings should move ahead concurrently with establishing PGs and an AHW network. To 
prepare PG members to successfully meet supply and quality standards for premium markets, the 
TRRILD project will need to train PGs in the agreed MQS. Special attention in training will need to be 
given to standardising feeding protocols amongst PG members and across PGs to enable them to 
attain bulk purchasing discounts and produce a consistently high-quality fattener. In S2 and S3, PGs 
and PO investments in a technical officer help ensure standards are maintained and new PG 
members are educated, and peer-to-peer learning strengthens technical knowledge in the system. 
The introduction of a delivery right for high-quality fatteners tied to a tagging system would also 
provide further incentives for PG members to meet rising pig standards along with the prevention of 
side selling.       
The TRRILD project’s MFI partner has a mandate to extend credit beyond PG members. Early 
information from the MFI’s database showed loans were being made to non-PG member pig 
producers within and outside the 32 target villages. Results from S1 (individual) showed that MFI 
lending to individuals for local and hybrid breeds, particularly the FF system, would deliver overall 
positive financial and pro-poor results and could help offset any broker and slaughterhouse financial 
losses from a focus on PGs and POs. However, the alternative ASF scenario highlighted negative 
impacts that stem from high dropout rates based on the lending of microcredit without ensuring that 
biosecurity protocols are in place. Given the likelihood of an ASF outbreak during the project’s 
lifetime, the model’s results indicate that the MFI should restrict microcredit loans to only PG 
members and non-members that have invested in biosecurity infrastructure and practices. If the MFI 
were to concentrate any additional lending to pig producers outside of PGs but in the same villages, 
this would further strengthen the ability of PGs to survive disease outbreaks given the high chance of 
disease passing between pigs in the same villages.  
6.2 Implementation of pro-poor upgrading activities 
The focus of this research was to undertake an ex-ante impact evaluation of the pork VC to provide 
pro-poor upgrading recommendations for the TRRILD project. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to 
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provide a detailed description of the implementation of these recommendations and project 
outcomes. This is because the action research portion of this study ended in December 2020, while 
the project’s activities were to continue until October 2022.41  Additionally, while this study resided 
in the action research paradigm, restrictions due to the COVID-19 pandemic prevented the 
Researcher from scheduled travel to Myanmar after January 2020 to help guide the implementation 
of upgrading activities. This section will, however, provide a brief update on the TRRILD project’s 
initial upgrading efforts in the pork VC until December 2020, highlighting short-term outcomes as 
they relate to the model’s recommendations.  
Out of the original 30 PGs constituted42 by the TRRILD project, 20 PGs were active and focusing on 
the pork VC. PGs had an average of 34 members, with women comprising 75% of members and 58% 
of directors. These 20 PGs were all considered “functional,” meaning they had a formal constitution 
that allowed the PG to introduce investor-friendly institutional arrangements, well-defined strategic 
objectives, elected directors, and evidence of sound financial practices and regular meetings. A 
considerable transition from local breed to hybrid pig systems had taken place in the PGs, providing 
evidence that the project’s technical activities were effective in supporting pig farmers to upgrade 
their enterprises. As shown in Table 34, there was a 669% increase in hybrid pigs and 152% increase 
in local pig numbers held by PG members in the span of one year, along with an extra 118 pig 
producers joining the pig PGs. This level of PG membership is slightly higher than the 640 members 
used within the SD model.   
Table 34: Status of pig PGs in TRRILD project 
 September 2019 September 2020 
Number of pig PG members 592 710 
Number of local breed pigs 507 1,276 
Number of hybrid pigs 161 1,238 
Source: TRRILD project Year Three Annual Report (WV New Zealand, 2021) 
From the 20 pig PGs, 14 had been prioritised for project investments to achieve a systematic 
production plan to supply 1,000 kgs of premium pork every week. The target figure of 1000 kgs was 
taken as the project’s production goal following conversations with a premium buyer in Yangon who 
indicated this was their minimum order volume. This equated to a minimum of 14 hybrid FF farms 
(each with three breeding sows) solely producing piglets for 124 WF farmers who would raise three 
fatteners twice a year.  
The strength of the pig PGs was evidenced by their ability to collectively purchase key inputs. Out of 
the 14 prioritised pig PGs, seven had started purchasing commercial pig feed in bulk from retailers, 
 
41 The TRRILD project’s impact evaluation was scheduled for the first half of 2022. 
42 The TRRILD project targeted 32 villages but two dropped out during the constitution process.  
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dividing the feed and bagging it into smaller portions for selling to both members and non-members. 
These PGs were transacting 10,300 kgs of commercial feed every month and receiving a 3.5% bulk 
purchasing discount. With the additional benefit of direct delivery to the village, this bulk order 
discount is close to the 5% estimate used in the SD model. Discount margins were partially passed on 
to members as the PG retained a small portion of the savings (20%) to cover costs and build its 
capital base, with non-members paying a slightly higher rate for feed. By the end of September 2020, 
prioritised PGs had invested US$51,883 of member capital in purchasing commercial pig feed. Ten 
PGs were also collectively purchasing high-quality piglets from PGs that had established breeding 
sow units with support from the project, further reducing transaction costs. These piglet purchases 
were transacted through verbal agreements covering timing, price, and volume. 
To ensure the genetic integrity of prioritised PG hybrid fatteners and a consistent quality standard 
across PG members, the project established four hybrid demonstration farms: two boar units (two 
boars per unit), and two sow breeding units (three sows per unit). These farms were operated by 
individual members contracted by their PGs, and the costs of the boar/sow returned to the PG either 
through regular cash instalments or the equivalent value of piglets, allowing the PG to build up its 
working capital. Biosecurity guidelines were built into contracts with the demonstration farmers, 
ensuring their farms were suitable examples for training and exposure visits by PG members. 
Although quality breeding sows and boars were ordered in September 2019, procurement delays 
meant they did not arrive in Myeik and Palaw until December 2019, producing the first offspring April 
2020, which were weaned in June 2020. Within a year of their introduction, 17 additional PG 
members had established FF enterprises with offspring from the demonstration farm, initially 
focusing solely on piglet production. A further 103 PG members had mated the high-quality hybrid 
boars from demonstration farms with existing sows (following quality and health checks by TRRILD 
project staff) to produce a total of 707 piglets that met minimum quality standards (MQS) set by the 
project’s technical officer. These high-quality piglets were either sold on to other WF PG members or 
retained by FF PG members for fattening or replacement of breeding sows. Unfortunately, the 
introduction of an ear-tagging system to register high-quality sows, fatteners, and piglets did not 
occur in 2021 because of procurement delays and travel restrictions which meant that scheduled 
training for AHW on tagging did not take place. Following the success of these farms, five additional 
PGs were in the process of establishing high-quality boar (2) and breeder (3) units; however, these 
PGs had decided to collectively own and operate these subsequent units.    
The project provided basic swine management training to around 550 farmers each year. This is 
lower than the estimate of 650 farmers used in the model and reflects the impact of COVID-19 travel 
restrictions on staff mobility. A training manual on hybrid pig production was developed by TRRILD 
technical staff in conjunction with LBVD staff, covering systematic pig production, disease 
 177 
prevention, and biosecurity measures. Pre- and post-training tests showed that the proportion of 
farmers with a sound knowledge of swine management increased from 17% to 71% after training. 
However, 15% of PG members did not show any knowledge gains and was linked to their 
unfamiliarity with classroom learning techniques and low literacy levels. As a result, the project 
shifted its training methods to emphasize exposure visits, practical training (at demonstration unit 
sites) and the provision of training-of-trainers to AHWs, who would then work closely with small 
groups of PG members.   
The project successfully established AHWs based in each of the 20 PG locations, having an immediate 
impact in lowering pig mortality among PG members during multiple disease outbreaks that occurred 
in 2019 and 2020. These village-based AHWs were trained by the TRRILD technical specialist and 
LBVD officials (both members of the RG) on improved feeding practices, pig house design, sanitation, 
animal health care (including practical training on vaccinations), and disease prevention. When the 
perceived risk of an ASF outbreak in the target villages increased, AHWs were provided with 
refresher training on biosecurity after which they actively supported PG members to comply with 
biosecurity guidelines while also distributing project-subsidised disinfectants. Although there was no 
outbreak of ASF in the target villages, there were significant outbreaks of Staphylococcus in Palaw as 
well as PCV2 (Porcine Circovirus Type 2) across both Myeik and Palaw. AHWs were able to deliver 
vaccinations to 934 pigs to help prevent Staphylococcus as well as to 1,262 pigs to guard against 
PCV2. Out of the 710 PG members, only two members’ pigs were infected with PCV2, evidence of the 
impacts of the project’s investments in AHWs, training, biosecurity practices, and high-quality 
breeds. There were indications that AHWs would continue in their roles past the project’s 
completion in 2022. Pig farmers were routinely connecting with AHWs for assistance and 
vaccinations, with AHWs charging between US$0.33 to US$0.66 per call-out or injection for PG 
members as a bulk discount and US$1 to US$1.6 for non-PG members. AHWs in Myeik were able to 
access vaccines with the project’s support through local markets or contacts within the LBVD. 
However, the project was still required to subsidise vaccines for AHWs based in Palaw due to the 
absence of a local supply from either the LBVD or an input supplier.    
Microfinance loans for pig enterprises were made to 81 members across 13 PGs as of September 
2020. The PG loan portfolio for the pig VC totalled US$72,866 representing 26.4% of all microfinance 
loans made to PG members. This was the largest loan category, over twice the amount of the next 
two highest loan types (rice production: US$32,866 and rubber production: US$32,166), signalling 
the priority placed on investments into the pork chain compared with other livelihood options.43 The 
 
43 Most paddy farmers in target villages take the maximum loan amount available from the MADB to finance 
seasonal inputs. TRRILD project staff did not report that any other MFIs had extended their operations to cover 
the target villages.  
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average loan amount was US$899. Out of the total number of loans, 6% were for less than US$300, 
60% were for between US$300 and US$1000, and 34% of loans were for over US$1,333 (equivalent 
to MMK2,000,000, a common loan category). The high value of loans and large increases in hybrid 
pig numbers strongly indicate that PG members were using microcredit for upgrading to both hybrid 
WF and FF systems. Out of the two products on offer by the partner MFI, PG members had 
prioritised the balloon (63%) over the amortized (27%) loan. However, the MFI had not yet approved 
the use of the deferred interest loan in this target area. This had deterred some PGs, such as Ma Yin, 
from taking out microfinance loans to facilitate upgrades. Given the large increase in hybrid pig 
numbers, PG members were clearly also relying on capital beyond the partner MFI for upgrades to 
their pig farms, such as household savings, informal money lenders, or the Village Savings and Loan 
Associations (VSLAs) established by the project. The partner MFI’s low portfolio-at-risk rate (less than 
0.1%), even in the middle of COVID-19 restrictions, suggests that loans were primarily being made to 
pig farmers with either significant cash reserves or multiple streams of income.  
The live pig price in Myeik and Palaw oscillated sharply in 2019 and 2020 due following multiple 
shocks to the pork VC system. Monthly live pig prices collected by TRRILD staff are shown in Figure 43 
and show significantly larger price movements in 2019 and 2020 compared with the last decade (cf. 
Figures 15 and 16 developed by SGMB and RG participants). Heavy monsoon rains in June and July of 
2019 restricted the transportation of live pigs from outside the region into Myeik and Palaw. The 
supply of pork in Myeik and Palaw was further compromised by the Myanmar government’s import 
restrictions on live pigs and pork products from ASF affected countries (Wai, 2019), and the local 
government strictly enforcing an importation ban on live pigs due to an ASF outbreak in northern 
Myanmar. As a result, live pig prices were steady at 2.5 US$/kg for the second half of 2019, before 
reaching to 2.71 US$/kg in the first quarter of 2021, a record high in Myeik and Palaw. The pace and 
magnitude of this upwards price movement resembled price shifts in the SD model’s alternative 
scenario: disease and importation ban (see Section 5.7.1.1 and Figure 40). COVID-19 restrictions 
were strictly enforced in Myanmar in June of 2020. This included domestic and international travel 
bans, restrictions on local travel and gatherings, and the closure of restaurants and hotels in Myeik.  
The outbreaks of PVC2 and Staphylococcus, and the threat of ASF, further dampened the demand for 
pork, resulting in plummeting pork prices in July through November 2020. Live pig prices in Myeik 
and Palaw between August 2020 and November 2020 fell below the cost of production, reaching 
lows of 1.58 US$/kg. Many of the COVID-19 travel and hospitality restrictions were eased in 
November and December 2020, and this immediately resulted in live pig prices climbing to 2.08 
US$/kg. When these disease, importation ban, and demand changes were populated into S3(POs), 
the pork VC model was able to retrospectively produce a similar pattern of live pig price changes, as 
shown in Figure 43. 
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Figure 43: Comparison of actual and predicted slaughterhouse prices of live pigs in Myeik, January 
2019 to December 2020 
Source: TRRILD project staff and Pork VC model simulation  
The large and frequent oscillations in live pig prices made collective selling between PGs and the local 
slaughterhouses difficult to arrange. Given procurement delays and biological production time lags, 
the first high-quality PG hybrid fatteners (produced from imported boars) started to reach their 
optimal selling weight (80 to 96kgs) around April/May 2020. However, the high farm-gate prices at 
this time meant that PG members were reluctant to consider a long-term supply contract with a 
single slaughterhouse. The volume of high-quality hybrid fatteners was also too low to garner high 
interest from the largest slaughterhouses who had concerns about consistency of supply. Most PG 
high-quality fatteners reached their optimal selling weight after COVID-19 restrictions were enforced 
in June and July 2020 and this reversed the situation: low demand and sharply falling prices meant 
there was little motivation for the larger slaughterhouses to discuss a formal agreement with PGs or 
to pay a premium for a high-quality product. Towards the end of 2020, five of the PGs collectively 
sold 69 hybrid fatteners (the total value of transaction was US$14,680) to one of the smaller 
slaughterhouses for 0.2 US$/kg (equivalent to a 7% premium) above the market rate. This new 
entrant into the slaughterhouse business held one of the smaller licences (three live pigs/day 
allowance) and appeared motivated to engage with the PG because of the lower transaction costs 
and higher quality of PG members’ pigs.  
Once PGs began investing in high-quality hybrid fatteners, the TRRILD project organised a series of 
meetings with the Myeik restaurant association to reintroduce the PGs and explain their intention to 
produce higher-quality, hygienic pork products. Following this meeting, orders were canvassed and 
collected from eleven restaurants. The three priority cuts given by restaurants were shoulder, three-
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layer, and ribs, with enough demand for an initial order of seven high-quality hybrid fatteners per 
week. Prices indicated by restaurants were 10 to 15% above the wholesale price, similar to the 10% 
premium used in the SD model for the Myeik high-quality wholesale market. The project’s original 
plan was to partner with a slaughterhouse in Myeik to fulfil these local orders. This would allow PGs 
time to firmly entrench a production and quality control system, essential before entering the 
Yangon premium market and investing in an upgraded slaughtering facility. The project also 
investigated providing butchering training, and small capital grants to a slaughterhouse to improve 
safety and hygiene in the chain (e.g., fly screens, cool chain equipment, and vacuum packing 
equipment). Unfortunately, restaurant orders fell by 70% to 100% owing to COVID-19 restrictions 
and this activity was placed on hold by the TRRILD project until the situation stabilised.   
PG members who made substantial investments in their pig enterprises (such as commercial feed, 
biosecurity, hybrid breeds, hygienic shelter, etc.) were faced with a series of external shocks in their 
first year of upgrading. Two of these shocks, multiple disease outbreaks and an importation ban, was 
included in the SD model, though the demand shock following COVID-19 restrictions was not 
modelled explicitly. The model’s alternative scenario for an ASF outbreak, however, did closely 
resemble the multiple shocks experienced in 2020 (see Section 5.7.1.6), as it included a 70% drop in 
consumer demand coinciding with a high pig mortality rate and import restrictions. Only a small 
number of PG members reacted to these shocks by selling under-weight fatteners for low prices, i.e., 
panic selling. The model’s prediction that live pig prices would sharply rebound following disease and 
demand shocks helped TRRILD staff to understand and explain the likely upward trend in prices to PG 
members. This encouraged most PG members to hold on to their fatteners until the live pig price 
increased in November and December 2020, resulting in small but positive profits. The TRRILD 
project’s MFI partner also tailored its loan products to help farmers manage negative cashflow during 
this time. This included rescheduling loan repayments, grace periods (principal and interest) of up to 
three months, removal of fees for withdrawing savings, and the introduction of a group recovery 
loan product.  
Some initial steps in upgrading PGs to POs were taken in 2020 but these were ultimately hampered 
by the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic. Based on a capacity assessment of PGs, two of the 14 pig 
PGs were prioritised for upgrading to PO status with the other 12 PGs remaining at the transactional 
level. The upgrading process involved the development of enterprise business plans to support value 
adding strategies. One of these PGs, Ma Yin, was able to finalise a business plan by the end of 
October 2020. Ma Yin PG’s business plan aimed to: (i) expand its existing input supply shop44 by 
increasing the volume of feed and range of inputs and (ii) invest in feed-mixing machinery and 
 
44 The input supply shop was selling 2,500 kgs of commercial pig feed every month, equivalent to monthly sales 
of US$1,388.  
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working capital to produce high-quality pig feed from local ingredients. This PG was able to raise 
US$2,040 of capital from its members and requested a grant of US$2,240 to finance the balance of 
the proposed investment. LU’s other TRRILD-associated PhD student worked with the PG’s directors 
to develop a unique shareholding structure that would give all members a financial interest in the PG 
(Esnard, 2021). The PG would issue 321 shares valued at US$13.33 per share (equivalent to MMK 
20,000 per share) to raise US$4,280 – enough equity capital to finance the investment. PG members 
would purchase 153 shares (for a total of US$2,040) and the project would provide a grant to 
purchase 168 shares (for a total of US$2,240). The grant-funded shares would be distributed equally 
to PG members. The shares were to be tradeable between members, with larger investors who held 
more shares benefiting from a larger price discount on inputs purchased from the PO. For example, 
PG members with 4-6 shares would receive a 2% price discount, shareholders with 7-9 shares a 5% 
discount, and shareholders with ten or more shares a 6% discount. This design aimed to encourage 
larger patrons to hold a larger number of shares as this helps to align the benefits of patronage (price 
discounts) with the benefits of investment (dividends and capital gains), so reducing the potential for 
conflict between investors and patrons that tends to discourage members from investing in and 
patronising their organisation. This structure exploited the PG’s investor-friendly constitution to also 
allow investment in the scheme by non-PG members. However, by the end of 2020, the PG had yet 
to move forward with this proposal, given their concerns over the demand for local pig feed due to 
the recent instability of live pig prices. 
The application of SGMB and SD modelling to analyse agri-food value chains, evaluate interventions, 
and guide project and policy decisions is relatively new. The potential of SD was highlighted by Rich 
et al. (2011) and applied within pig value chains in Vietnam (Rich et al., 2018). GMB was also used by 
Lie et al. (2018) to develop a quantitative SD model and evaluate potential policy interventions for 
the dairy value chain in Nicaragua. While more recently, SGMB was conceptualised to analyse urban 
food value chains in New Zealand (Rich et al., 2018) and applied to evaluate potential interventions in 
horticulture value chains in India (Cooper et al., 2021). This research extended these previous studies 
by developing the first pig SD model that evaluates both financial products and collective action 
among farmers as possible interventions to upgrade an inefficient agri-food value chain. While these 
interventions were evaluated ex-ante, the SD model proved remarkably accurate in predicting live 
pig price movements in Southern Myanmar and recommending interventions that were readily 
adopted by small-scale pig producers. This research also extended previous GMB and SGMB activities 
as it was embedded in a development project. The flexible and participatory nature of SGMB tools 
supported the wide engagement of stakeholders in the pig industry and strengthened the uptake of 
the model’s recommendations.  
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6.3 The effectiveness of spatial group model building tools 
Spatial group model building (SGMB) is an emerging participatory modelling practice that builds upon 
group model building (GMB) to incorporate spatial and temporal dimensions, both highly influential 
factors that underpin agri-food VCs (Rich et al., 2018; Rich et al., 2021). Even though early 
practitioners emphasised the importance of including clients in the process of building SD models 
(Forrester, 1961), GMB emerged as a unique, documented process in the 1990s of jointly 
constructing SD models with stakeholders (Richardson & Anderson, 1995; Vennix, 1996,). In GMB, 
stakeholders work together to conceptualize common problems and reach a consensus which 
improves team building and ownership of the solutions (Vennix, 1996). Thus, GMB sits within the 
wider genre of participatory research which aims to co-generate knowledge through including 
community members in obtaining data, conducting analysis, and interpreting and owning the results 
(Pain & Francis, 2003). Positioned within the TRRILD project and the action research paradigm, the 
SGMB process added a further dimension to participatory research in that it aimed to increase local 
participation and ownership in a development intervention, in which “local” refers to agri-food VC 
stakeholders, with a focus on small-scale producers. While interpretations on the role and 
effectiveness of participatory tools in development projects are diverse (e.g., Chambers, 1995, 2005; 
Cook & Kothari, 2001; Mosse, 2004), in this research SGMB was used as both a “means” to 
development and an “end” in itself (Oakley, 1991). In this regard, the effectiveness of SGMB is linked 
to its ability to increase the impact of the project, by selecting high payoff, pro-poor upgrading 
interventions, as well as its ability to empower participants to upgrade their enterprises in the agri-
food VC.     
This section adds to the body of literature that critically reflects on GMB methods (see Rouwette at 
al., 2002 and Scott et al., 2015 for a meta-analysis of the effectiveness of GMB) but extends this 
further by focusing on the effectiveness of an emerging tool, SGMB, in an applied setting. This 
section will outline factors that influenced the effectiveness of SGMB tools for engaging stakeholders 
in VC analysis, while highlighting critical lessons learnt from a first-time application of SGMB to 
develop quantitative agri-food VC models in emerging economies. Next, this section will highlight 
how SGMB participant understanding of the VCs evolved through the SGMB process. Finally, this 
section will provide recommendations for future SGMB processes within development initiatives.  
6.3.1 Factors influencing the effectiveness of spatial group model building 
Layerstack follows in the footsteps of a rich history of easy-to-understand and tactile participatory 
rural appraisal (PRA) tools that encourage community stakeholders to share and discuss rich 
contextual information (Narayanasamy, 2009). The Layerstack exercise conducted in the initial SGMB 
workshop proved an effective tactile tool for engaging a diverse set of stakeholders around temporal 
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and spatial evolution in the VC. A participatory GIS tool, Layerstack, consists of an A2-sized map of 
the target area over which plastic acetates representing different characteristics of the VC are 
placed, as shown in Figures 45 and 46. A detailed description of the Layerstack tool is covered by Rich 
et al. (2018) and Rich et al.45 (2021), while its application to this research is found in Section 3.3.2.3 
and Section 4.1. The Layerstack exercise enabled spatial and temporal features of pork and paddy 
VCs to surface at the beginning of group learning and problem framing, helping to focus and 
maximise the subsequent model building process. For example, the Layerstack exercise of the pork 
VC showed that geographic areas with a high concentration of local breed pig producers overlapped 
(layer 1) with the decreasing quality of goods and services away from urban centres (layer two), and 
this constituted 90% of the project’s target villages (base map). Participants were initially hesitant to 
draw on the acetates, but their reluctance soon eased after the MBT demonstrated the impermanent 
nature of the materials, such as the stickers, whiteboard markers, and post-it notes. The plastic 
acetates meant it was quick and easy for participants to move stickers, rub out markers, and redraw 
behaviour modes as the conversation evolved and the group’s consensus changed. This made it 
simpler for participants to disagree with and challenge one another, and more difficult for the 
participants holding markers to operate as information gatekeepers. When participants monopolised 
materials and the subsequent recording of information on the acetates, the facilitator could politely 
request them to hand over the markers/stickers to other stakeholders to encourage wider 
participation or to update recorded information as the group’s consensus evolved. 
 
Figure 44: The Layerstack toolkit  
Source: K.M. Rich 
One factor restricting the level of engagement in Layerstack was the size of the group, which was 15 
in the workshop in Myeik and 16 in Palaw. As shown in Figure 45, this number was too large for all 
members to physically gather around the Layerstack and see what was occurring, to use the 
materials to record information, and easily converse with one another. In both workshops, around 
 
45 This paper is co-authored by the Researcher.  
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ten participants formed a circle around the map with the remaining members moving in and out of 
this circle as their attention oscillated, suggesting a maximum of ten participants for future 
Layerstack exercises. The limited physical space around Layerstack also contributed to a few 
downstream VC actors excusing themselves from the process when layers not relating to their node 
were being discussed.  
 
Figure 45: Layerstack exercise during SGMB workshop one in Palaw 
Source: Researcher 
Layerstack’s effectiveness as a tool relied heavily on the facilitation skills of the model building team 
(MBT). Prior to the first workshop, a mock Layerstack exercise was conducted with MBT members 
taking turns as the Layerstack facilitator while also role-playing as VC actors. The MBT had distinct 
roles during the Layerstack exercise: a Lead Facilitator, a Timekeeper (who also ensured a ready stock 
of consumables), a Notetaker (who took pictures of the different layers and recorded discussion 
points), a Process Coach, and the last member who acted as a “people’s champion.” This last role 
involved physically coming alongside and listening to less vocal participants, interceding for them in 
the discussion when their opinions were not considered by the wider group, helping with translations 
between Burmese and Karen, and assisting when literacy ability hindered participation.  
While the mock sessions helped MBT members understand the mechanics of the Layerstack tool, 
there were still facilitation challenges which needed to be addressed by the Process Coach. Firstly, 
the Lead Facilitator’s natural inclination was to “hold the marker” and undertake the drawing/placing 
of stickers themself. The Lead Facilitator was also more likely to encourage the overtly confident and 
assertive members of the group to take on information recording roles, rather than sharing 
responsibility for drawing and placing materials amongst all participants and drawing quieter 
members into the discussion. Secondly, there was a proclivity for the MBT to passively engage with 
responses to their questions and not to probe and follow up with “Why?”, “When?”, “Can you 
explain?”, or “Do you all agree, or is there a different opinion?” question prompts. While challenges 
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were present the MBT clearly grew in confidence through the exercises, helped by a debrief after and 
between Myeik and Palaw Layerstack exercises46 and guidance by the Process Coach during the 
exercise.  
Beyond Layerstack, other physical tactile tools were used within the SGMB workshops to increase the 
quality of engagements with participants. This included the use of coloured cards for the hopes-and-
fears script, the water-in-a-glass script for introducing SD terminology, cause-and-consequence 
mapping on whiteboards, and the physical drawing of CLDs and basic SD concept models on large 
sheets of paper. During the workshop, any proposed changes to models, questions, or additional 
information from participants were written on cards/post-it-notes and physically placed on the paper 
or drawn in with markers. This meant SGMB and RG participants did not have to use the MBT as 
conduits as they would if SD-specific software packages or Microsoft Word or PowerPoint were used 
to present CLDs, concept models, etc. The reliance on paper materials, however, meant a large 
amount of time was dedicated to workshop preparation. For each SGMB workshop up to five CLDs 
had to be drawn out on large sections of paper (2 metres by 1. 5 metre) as illustrated in Figure 46.  
 
Figure 46: Preparing a concept module for presentation at an SGMB workshop 
Source: Researcher 
One benefit of this hands-on approach was that the MBT increased their familiarity with the models 
as they transposed materials and were quick to identify any structural or translation errors. All 
workshop material was written in the Burmese language with English translations written in pencil in 
a smaller font to help assist the English-speaking Researcher to engage in sessions. Once prepared, 
MBT members used the large paper materials to practice explaining the content to each other which 
was also another opportunity to pinpoint any information gaps. A physical chart of critical 
 
46 A series of prompt questions were developed to help with facilitation.  
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information gaps was kept by the MBT, and this was updated by SGMB and RG participants at the 
end of each workshop as shown in Figure 47.  
 
Figure 47: MBT members discuss information gaps with the RG 
Note: Three MBT members at the front of the RG workshop share materials from the SGMB workshop, 
including a record of information gaps. 
Source: Researcher 
The plus, minus, interesting (PMI) exercise proved a useful physical tool to guide MBT reflections and 
to identify lessons learned for the strengthening of future SGMB and RG workshops. The PMI tool has 
three reflection categories: (i) Plus, the positive elements of the workshop; (ii) Minus, the negative 
elements of the workshop; and (iii) Interesting, points that are neither positive or negative but are 
observations or points of interest (Sharma & Priyamvada, 2017). After each workshop, the 
Researcher led the MBT through the PMI tool by drawing the three columns on the whiteboard (Plus, 
Minus, Interesting), preceded by a general discussion on the MBT’s overall impression on the 
effectiveness of the workshop as suggested by Hovmand (2014). As the last to be discussed, the 
“Interesting” category invariably collected the recommended changes to upcoming workshops. The 
majority of the MBT were surprisingly open and self-critical during the PMI exercises, perhaps 
associated with experiences working for an INGO in which PMI is extensively used with project design 
and implementation workshops. The full details from the PMI reflection exercises are found in Table 
G1 in Appendix G. One example of how discussions using the PMI tool resulted in critical changes is 
the designation of workshop roles to MBT members. In the first workshops, critical reflections 
centred on the roles and responsibility of the MBT: the Lead Facilitator tended to “teach” rather than 
“facilitate and prompt,” leaving the Assistant Facilitator largely underutilised. This resulted in the 
inability to follow agenda times, which led to workshops running overtime. As a result, the MBT 
decided that the Researcher should co-lead workshop facilitation with the Lead Facilitator, and the 
three remaining MBT members, with less technical backgrounds but more community facilitation 
experience, should facilitate small group work. In this way, the Researcher’s role merged the 
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facilitator, process coach, team leader, and modeler functions. The merging of Researcher roles was 
also reported within Helene Lie’s research that used a GMB process to build a SD model of the dairy 
VC in Nicaragua (Lie et al., 2017) and is common in participatory processes (Voinov & Bousquet, 
2010). As Table G1 illustrates, by the later workshops, the MBT had become more confident in their 
roles, agendas were being completed on time, and discussions were richer as facilitation improved.  
Further aiding the effectiveness of the process was the physical layout of workshops, which were 
arranged to enhance group interactions and participation. As shown in Figure 48, chairs were set out 
in a C-shape, with a central whiteboard behind the frontal space where the facilitators stood. The C-
shape meant that all participants could see one another and the MBT were able to walk easily 
around the room and support participants with comprehension or translation issues and could pass 
materials developed by participants to the Assistant Facilitator. Walls were kept clear to minimise 
distractions but also to allow easy access to workshop materials that were placed on the walls as 
shown in Figure 49. The workshop room also had enough space so that participants could 
comfortably work in small groups and MBT members could navigate the room during these exercises 
(Hovmand, 2004, p.70). The MBT quickly learnt that room set-up and preparation required at least 90 
minutes, and prior preparation of physical materials (coloured cards, stickers, tape, etc.) greatly 
helped workshops to run on time. The meeting spaces in both locations were booked for the entire 
day, as many participants lingered to continue in discussions with the MBT and each other. 
 





Figure 49: Set-up of SGMB workshop four in Palaw 
Source: Researcher  
Reported by Vennix (1996) as the most important element for effective GMB facilitation, the attitude 
of MBT members heavily impacted the effectiveness of the SGMB process. Roles for the MBT 
members were assigned by the partner INGO to project staff prior to the Researcher arriving in 
Myanmar. The interim TRRILD Project Manager at the time appointed himself the Lead Facilitator 
based on project hierarchy and his technical experience which included roles as a university lecturer 
and township agricultural technical officer in Central Myanmar. The Lead Facilitator had a propensity 
to practise a teacher-centred approach to workshop facilitation. This “chalk and talk” phenomena 
(Hardman et al., 2016, p.99) is well documented in the Myanmar education system: teachers are the 
central source of knowledge, and students are expected to passively receive information from their 
teacher through rote learning (Oo, 2015). This approach does not naturally align with the attitude 
and skills that make a strong GMB facilitator. As Vennix (1996) notes, a good facilitator is someone 
who has a helping attitude, which is characterised by neutrality with respect to the content of the 
discussion, asking questions to further inquire about the problem, promoting curiosity and inquiry, 
and facilitating reflection and learning rather than teaching.  
Despite training and coaching, the lack of facilitation experience manifested itself in noticeable ways: 
(i) the Lead Facilitator often spoke more than participants; (ii) the Lead Facilitator disproportionately 
engaged the more powerful participants; (iii) the Lead Facilitator was hesitant to probe further once 
someone had shared their opinion, particularly if they were an expert or more powerful person; and 
(iv) the Lead Facilitator, along with other MBT members, struggled to constructively engage in 
arguments between participants. It became increasingly clear that the Lead Facilitator perceived 
himself as a teacher and expert. Vennix (1996, p. 141) cautions against having a facilitator who is a 
subject matter expert as this can impede the GMB process. However, changing roles within the MBT 
would have been difficult because of the sensitivity around the hierarchy within the project team.  
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Considering this, the Researcher took on the role of co-lead Facilitator and sought to coach the Lead 
Facilitator during the workshop process. Detailed agendas were also used to guide the MBT, along 
with question prompts to help promote appreciative inquiry. The Lead Facilitator and other MBT 
members were also reassured that robust discussions between participants were a key part of the 
process and as facilitators they should actively engage when participants disagreed with one another 
rather than avoiding confrontation, which would inevitably result in the more powerful participants 
dominating the discussions. While the Lead Facilitator improved their facilitation skills, workshop 
outcomes were impacted by their attitude and consequently a decision to replace the Lead 
Facilitator by another team member earlier on would likely have improved SGMB outcomes. In SGMB 
four, another MBT member, with strong community facilitation background but limited technical 
knowledge took over the Lead Facilitator role due to illness and this helped improve the quality of 
workshop discussions from that point forwards. In fact, all the other MBT members outside of the 
original Lead Facilitator had strong community development backgrounds with between three to 15 
years of experience facilitating workshops in the target area. This greatly helped the development of 
concept models in SGMB two, three, and four which were drafted through small group work led by 
these individuals.  
Managing the power dynamics between participants was another factor in determining the 
effectiveness of SGMB sessions. The development literature suggests that participatory processes 
can be biased towards community members who already wield power (Guijt & Shah, 1998), prove 
exclusionary to the poor and marginalised (Kapoor, 2002), and mask invisible problems and power 
imbalances (Mosse, 1994). The negative influence of power differentials between participants on 
GMB outcomes is also well documented in the SD literature (Van Nistelrooij et al., 2012; Vennix, 
1996). While research into the effectiveness of GMB has been almost exclusively conducted in 
countries with low power-distance cultures, an initial comparison across multiple country contexts 
showed GMB had comparable effects on communication, insight, learning, and consensus despite 
differences in power-distance (Lansu et al., 2016). While it was impossible to fully mitigate the 
influences of power imbalances, several methods were weaved into SGMB exercises to lessen their 
impact. Group sessions were divided into two separate entities: SGMB workshops with VC actors, 
and RG workshops with technical experts. This separation was undertaken to facilitate more open 
discussion among VC actors. Myanmar’s history of authoritarian government and teacher-centred 
education system has led to a reluctance of those with less power, i.e., community members, to 
speak openly in front of the powerful (Steinberg, 2013), which could have resulted in “group-speak” 
in the SGMB sessions (Hovmand, 2014). This group-speak was evident in the first SGMB workshop in 
Palaw where two local government technical officers attended and the tendency to defer to them as 
the source of “technical knowledge’” by the other participants was strongly apparent. To prevent this 
 190 
from effecting the quality of future workshops, these two technical officers were “promoted” to the 
RG, which greatly fostered the wider participation of community members in subsequent workshops.  
Within SGMB workshops, there were still obvious power differentials – male, older, and wealthier 
participants spoke more often, and their opinions were less challenged by others, particularly in 
plenary discussions. To help overcome this and following the example of Lie et al. (2016), the MBT 
chose small group work as the preferred method for developing model structure, with groups of five 
to eight participants as the norm (see Figure 50). Participation levels greatly increased in small group 
work as it enabled experienced facilitators to draw in the less vocal participants. In the early plenary 
discussions, it was observed that paddy farmers and pig producers were less inclined to speak out 
and voice different opinions to the more powerful downstream VC actors, who typically spoke first 
when the floor was opened for discussion.  
 
Figure 50: Small group work to develop concept models 
Source: Researcher 
To help overcome this, prior to plenary discussions, individuals were asked to write on cards and 
then turns were taken to read out their cards to the group, after which a plenary discussion was 
facilitated. The Notetaker also recorded who provided specific feedback, and this was further helped 
by colour coding the participant’s name tags according to their role in the VC, i.e., farmers had a 
green background, wholesalers had a yellow background, etc. It was also observed early on that, 
while female participants were hesitant to speak out in plenary, they frequently initiated side 
discussions with each other. To help bring their opinions to the fore, the Assistant 
Facilitator/Translator and Notetaker (both female) would sit among or near to the female group47 
and either encourage them to speak or help summarise their discussion to present to the group. 
 
47  Female participants from the target villages sat together in all workshops. 
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During individual writing exercises, these two MBT members would also help participants who 
struggled with language and literacy barriers (they both spoke Karen) to write their opinions on cards 
and engage in the discussions.  
One of the key factors in building the effectiveness of the SGMB and RG workshops was the training 
of the MBT. Two days of initial training were provided to the MBT by the Expert Modeller, including 
practise sessions of key SGMB tools: hopes-and-fears script, introducing SD terminology through the 
water bottle example, Layerstack, cause-and-consequence mapping, and concept model building. 
The first RG workshop served as both an introduction to key technical partners and a quasi-practise 
session for the MBT. Prior to each workshop, the MBT developed a detailed agenda and practised 
upcoming facilitation techniques. Of particular value in skill-building was the routine of having MBT 
members explain cause-and-consequence maps, CLDs, and concept models to one another prior to 
the workshop (see Figure 51). This also helped identify any misunderstandings among the MBT 
members and increased the MBT’s confidence to facilitate, which was particularly needed for RG 
workshops that were attended by senior government officials. This technique was also adopted 
during SGMB and RG workshops with participants routinely volunteering to explain updated versions 
of the concept models in plenary. This helped the MBT to pinpoint specific areas of the model where 
there were disagreements, as participants were often more willing to correct or questions from “one 
of their own” rather than the Researcher or the Lead Facilitator.  
 
Figure 51: MBT members practise explaining CLDs prior to transposing them to paper 
Source: Researcher 
Reaching decisions in SGMB and RG workshops through consensus while allowing robust discussions 
among participants, also proved an important factor for SGMB effectiveness. Decision-making 
through group discussion and consensus is the common approach for GMB processes as they have 
been shown to deliver more effective outcomes (Vennix, 1996). Kapoor notes that participatory 
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methods are built on Habermas’s notion of an “ideal speech situation,” where “discussion is 
inclusive…coercion free…and open” (2002, p.105). However, in day-to-day activities and formal 
events, poorer and marginalised community members are often excluded from discussion spaces or 
their opinions dismissed (Kapoor, 2002; Mosse, 1994). Several approaches were taken to mitigate 
power imbalances within SGMB and RG workshops while still encouraging open discussions that 
could expand the mental models of participants. As noted earlier, participants were encouraged to 
write down their responses to questions prior to sharing to avoid the group-speak phenomenon. 
Building on this, those who were typically excluded were invited to share their viewpoints early on in 
plenary discussions. Meanwhile, the MBT made a concerted effort to draw upon these viewpoints 
during group discussions especially when more vocal or powerful members of the group voiced a 
differing opinion. For critical decisions (i.e., problem prioritisation, and selecting intervention 
scenarios and indicators for results) a voting technique was used after options were sought from 
plenary discussions. In this technique, participants were given three stickers and allowed to place a 
maximum of two stickers on their preferred options represented by coloured cards on the wall. 
Participants voted in groups of two or three, as shown in Figure 52 and vote tallies were then shared 
with everyone for confirmation and discussion.  
 
Figure 52: Voting during the SGMB workshop in Myeik 
Source: Researcher 
After the initial introductory session, subsequent RG workshops were held following the SGMB 
workshops, allowing the RG to validate and recommend changes to model structure and parameters. 
RG members validated around 90% of the structure and parameters originating in the SGMB 
workshops, with the 10% of suggested changes usually focusing on meso-level information or 
technical data for interventions, i.e., number of pigs slaughtered per day in Myeik, or the impact of 
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AHWs on pig mortality. Even when differences in parameter values occurred it was seldom more 
than a 10% numerical shift. When the changes proposed by the RG were fed back to SGMB 
participants, there were only a few times when the updated values were not accepted. The main 
difference between SGMB and RG members was their perspective on the optimal level of model 
simplicity. SGMB members desired a simple, easy-to-understand model, while in contrast, RG 
members often expressed the model was oversimplified and further technical data should be 
included. The MBT strove to keep the model as simple as possible (Sterman, 2000); however, 
complexity invariably began to increase when the qualitative concept model was quantified using 
Stella Architect.  
Conflict management skills were also needed to promote effective decision-making in the SGMB and 
RG workshops. During SGMB workshops one and two, there were notable disagreements between 
farmers and downstream processors (represented by slaughterhouse owners and brokers in the pork 
chain, and millers in the rice chain). This resulted in heated exchanges centring on the reasons 
behind low farm-gate prices – farmers accused processors of collusion to reduce prices while 
processors blamed the poor quality of products and logistical constraints. Initially, MBT members 
were uncomfortable with this type of intra-group conflict and tried to quickly change the subject or 
passively let the dominant party lead the argument. It took some convincing for MBT members to 
accept that cognitive conflict in GMB processes generally increases the quality of decisions (Vennix, 
1996, p.156) and was a normal part of the process. The Researcher and MBT discussed this at length 
between workshops and time was spent training the MBT in basic conflict management techniques, 
such as diagnostic and action alternative interventions (Vennix, 1996). By the third and fourth SGMB 
sessions, conflicts about who was to blame for problems in the VC had noticeably lessened; instead, 
participants focused their discussions on the structure of CLDs and concept models. During the 
fourth SGMB workshop, participants started to reference the specific structure and relationships 
within the system as the cause of problems rather than pointing to individual personality traits or 
behaviours. Underpinning this shift was the informal social exchanges between participants before 
and after workshops and during food and beverage breaks. Early in the process, VC actors did not mix 
socially, but by the end of the fifth workshop, strong relationships had developed between 
individuals from the various VC nodes. MBT members commented that many of these relationships 
had evolved into business transactions, i.e., slaughterhouse owners discussing their quality standards 
with participants which later helped PGs make sales to these businesses. This trust among between 
SGMB participants was supported by the results of the pre- and post-SGMB questionnaire (see 
Section 6.4). However, this enhanced trust did not extend to VC actors that did not attend the SGMB 
workshops.   
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Factors relating to physical tools and facilitation methods discussed above helped foster the 
commitment of SGMB participants to the model’s upgrading recommendations. In the SGMB 
workshop, there were seven paddy farmers and nine pig producers from the target communities, 
from which two paddy farmers and two pig producers become leaders48 in their respective producer 
groups. In Year Three of the TRRILD project (i.e., following the conclusion of the SGMB workshops 
and decisions on the upgrading recommendations), a PG prioritisation exercise was conducted. PGs 
were ranked by their level of collective action, strategy development, capacity of directors, and the 
capacity of members to support the chosen strategy. Accordingly, the strongest four PGs were 
selected for support from the TRRILD project to upgrade into Producer Organisations (POs). This 
support was to include equity capital for investments in value adding assets and prioritising POs for 
loans from the MFI partner. Following their prioritisation, it was discovered that all four of these PGs 
(pork VC: Ma Yin and Payi Taung, and paddy VC: Pyin Gyi and Kwe Kue) were led by former SGMB 
participants and had moved ahead with the model recommendations at a rapid pace compared with 
other PGs. This included these PGs placing bulk orders for high-quality fertiliser and commercial pig 
feed, establishing hybrid breeding units and boar units, entering into a supply contract with a rice 
miller, and investing in value-adding assets without support from the TRRILD project (such as 
tractors, harvesters, and a pig feed shop). TRRILD project staff commented that the increased 
understanding on VC dynamics brought into these groups by former SGMB participants, now PG 
directors, was a key factor in the group’s success.   
In addition to individual ownership, local government buy-in for upgrading recommendations was 
critical to the success of the TRRILD project, given the government’s role in approving project designs 
and yearly workplans, authorising travel for international staff, selecting the villages that receive 
government assistance, and deciding on local policies. The key Regional and Township technical staff 
for agriculture and livestock departments joined as RG members and requested a number of follow-
up meetings with the MBT to discuss how they could better support project implementation. This 
manifested itself in helping the project team procure high-quality paddy seed from a government 
seed farm, indicating willingness to grant a five-year license for a high-quality slaughterhouse 
constructed with project support, and ensuring project target villages received AHW and seed 
multiplication training.  
A necessary complement to a discussion of the effectiveness of SGMB tools is an acknowledgement 
of caveats. Though engagement in workshops and ownership of model recommendations were high, 
there was also evidence of fatigue among SGMB and RG participants during the model building 
process. Participants were made aware of the required commitment levels at the beginning of 
 
48 Each of these SGMB members was from a different village, so there were four PGs with directors who 
participated in the SGMB process.   
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workshop one. However, even while energy levels within workshops were consistent, the number of 
participants decreased from an average of 13 attending workshops one to four and 10 attending 
workshop five as shown in Table A6 in Appendix A. Dropouts are common in participatory research; 
participants have many other responsibilities and their interests in the project and willingness to 
participate can change over time (Cornwall & Jewkes, 1995). Nevertheless, there were contributing 
factors to lower participation levels in later stages: paddy harvesting was taking place at the time of 
SGMB workshop five in Palaw, and monsoon rains made travel to SGMB workshop five in Myeik 
difficult. The hopes-and-fears exercise at the beginning of workshop one provided an opportunity to 
address any concerns participants had regarding their commitment early in the process. Farmers 
from the target villages noted that the project was already one year into implementation and they 
had not seen any change in their villages; and other participants requested to know workshop times 
well in advance to ensure they could attend. To address these concerns, documents covering the 
project’s purpose, timeline, and key activities were shared with participants, along with a timeline of 
the SGMB workshops (see Figure 53).  
 
Figure 53: Document provided to participants outlining SGMB process 
Source: Researcher 
RG members also shared some misconceptions about the location of the project and how they could 
be involved. However, once the scope of the project was better understood (i.e., working across the 
entire VC rather than providing handouts to individual community members) government technical 
officers invited their department directors to attend subsequent RG meetings with them. The first 
four SGMB and RG workshops took place over a seven-week period and this length of engagement 
appeared appropriate to maintain participation levels. A much longer gap occurred between 
workshop four and five which was five months for the pork VC model and 11 months for the paddy 
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VC model. This length of time was likely too long as it took some effort to reengage participants in 
both the processes and to reorientate them to the concept models and the scenarios developed for 
testing.   
6.3.2 Analysis of spatial group model building participants’ understanding of the 
pork value chain 
Studies have demonstrated the ability of GMB to increase participant understanding of a problem, 
commitment to a course of action, and to bring about changes in behaviour (Rouwette, et al. 2002; 
Rouwette, et al. 2011; Scott et al. 2016). To add exploratory insights to the wider body of GMB 
knowledge, a written pre- and post-SGMB questionnaire was developed by the Researcher to 
investigate the effectiveness of SGMB in transforming participant understanding of the VC. While 
Scott et al. (2016) and Rouwette et al. (2002) warn against the methodological problems of using 
self-reporting to measure the effectiveness of the GMB process, pre- and post-questionnaires remain 
a valuable and widely used tool for evaluating GMB (Lansu, et al. 2016; Rouwette et al., 2011, Vennix, 
et al., 1993).  
The full pre- and post-SGMB questionnaire, including Myanmar translations, is found in Appendix H, 
Table H1. The first part (Part A) of the questionnaire focused on participant understanding of the VC, 
specifically around connections with other actors, value addition, marketing, and ability to upgrade. 
The second part (Part B) of the questionnaire centred on relationships between VC actors, to gauge 
levels of trust, collective action, and coordination. The last section (Part C) sought to understand the 
effectiveness of the SGMB workshops in engaging participants in VC analysis and upgrading. A total 
of 33 questions were included, out of which 29 used a five-point Likert scale: five points for “strongly 
agree,” four points for “agree,” three points for “neutral,” two points for “disagree,” and one point 
for “strongly disagree.” The use of five-point Likert scales is commonplace in social science and GMB 
research for measuring changes in attitudes and behaviours (Joshi et al., 2015; Lansu et. al, 2016). 
The remaining four questions were open-ended and collected data on trust and connections 
between VC actors, and perceptions of critical challenges.   
In total, there were 28 respondents to the first questionnaire and 16 respondents to the follow-up, of 
which there were 15 overlapping participants. The lower respondent numbers compared to 
attendees in SGMB one is because of the omission of the two technical officers who were transferred 
to the RG. The reduced number of respondents in SGMB five reflects the lower attendance owing to 
the time lag between the workshops. The overall results from the pre- and post-SGMB 
questionnaires are found in Tables H2 and H3 in Appendix H. The data from the 29 questions with 
Likert responses were analysed through SPSS using a paired sample t-test to determine changes in 
the mean value of responses between the pre- and post-SGMB questionnaires. Tables 35 and 36 
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present the pre-SGMB and post-SGMB mean values, mean differences, t-scores, and significance 
levels for the 15 paired sample questionnaires. Table 37 shows the mean values for the post-SGMB 
questionnaire related to participant perspectives on the SGMB workshop and their ownership of 
upgrading recommendations.   
The results in Tables 35 and 36 show nine questions in which the mean response changed 
significantly between SGMB one and five (Question six with P < 0.01, Questions 13, 16, and 18 with P 
< 0.05, and Questions one, ten, 12, 23 and 28 with P <0.10). The overarching trend for Part A 
questions which centred on participant self-reported knowledge of the VC shows a decline in mean 
between the first and last SGMB workshop. Participants were less confident that they knew all the 
key people in the VC, understood the types of relationships between VC actors, knew the 
characteristics that resulted in increased prices for their products, and understood all the potential 
markets. In Part B, levels of trust in other VC actors decreased between SGMB one and SGMB five. 
Participants were less trusting that VC actors were always fair and honest and could be depended 
upon for help when they faced a problem in their businesses.  
It is worth noting that these results contrast with the Researcher’s initial hypothesis that SGMB 
participants’ self-reported knowledge of the VC and trust in other VC members would increase 
during their involvement in the SGMB workshops. Instead, the results suggest that the SGMB process 
expanded the mental models of the participants to the extent that they became more aware of the 
complexity of the system and thus their confidence in the depth of their understanding of the VC 
decreased. This is supported in part by the findings of Rouwette et al. (2011, p.18) who noted that 
when GMB participants develop a model showing multiple interlinkages between problem elements, 
they may understand the problem is even more complex than they earlier thought. Rouwette et al. 
(2011) rationalised this as the reasons why perceived behavioural control scores (i.e., participant 
perceptions of “the ease of implementing options”) remained neutral following GMB sessions. 
However, in this research there is evidence that the wider knowledge gained of a complex system 
(i.e., the VC) had a positive impact on the SGMB participant willingness to upgrade their enterprises. 
From SGMB workshop one until the final SGMB workshop, participant knowledge on how to improve 
their products to earn additional income increased (Question 16) as did their perception that 
improving their business was within their own ability. i.e., behavioural control (Question 18). This is 
further supported by the example of SGMB participants taking leadership positions in the strongest 




Table 35: Results from paired sample t-tests of pre- and post-spatial group model building questionnaire, Part A: Value chain  
Questions Pre-test Post-test Paired Differences 
 M N M N M t Sig. 
1. I know all the key people in the VC. 4.07 15 3.60 15 .467 1.825* .089 
3. There are opportunities to increase my income from paddy/pork. 4.27 15 4.13 15 .133 .807 .433 
4. I understand how different people in the VC add value to the product. 3.80 15 3.93 15 -.133 -.487 .634 
5. I understand the differences in profit people in the VC make from the value they 
add to the product. 
4.07 15 3.93 15 .133 .564 .582 
6. I understand all the types of relationships (friend, contract, cash-buyer, etc.) 
between the different actors in the VC. 
3.80 15 2.87 15 .933 3.761*** .002 
7. I understand that men and women have different roles in the VC. 4.14 14 4.00 14 .143 .806 .435 
9. I know the quality characteristics of products that earn a higher price. 4.00 15 4.07 15 -.067 -.292 .774 
10. I know the volume of products that earn a higher price. 3.80 15 3.40 15 .400 1.871* .082 
11. I know at what times of year the prices for products are higher. 4.00 15 3.93 15 .067 .323 .751 
12. I know what type of products are demanded by consumers. 4.07 15 3.73 15 .333 1.784* .096 
13. I have a good understanding of all the potential markets for my products. 3.93 15 3.33 15 .600 2.806** .014 
14. I have a good understanding of how the VC effects (positive and negative) the 
livelihoods of poorer communities. 
4.13 15 4.00 15 .133 .695 .499 
15. The VC does little harm to the natural environment.  3.27 15 3.40 15 -.133 -.354 .728 
16. I understand how I can improve my products to earn extra income. 4.00 15 4.33 15 -.333 -2.646** .019 
17. I am interested in using new practices in my business. 4.53 15 4.47 15 .067 .367 .719 
18. Making improvements to my paddy/pork business is beyond my ability. 3.60 15 3.07 15 .533 2.779** .015 
19. I have a good understanding of the key challenges to earning more income from 
the VC. 
4.13 15 3.93 15 .200 1.146 .271 
Note: M refers to the Mean of paired responses, N refers to the Number of paired responses, t refers to the t score, and sig. refers to the level of significance. * indicates P < 0.1, ** 
indicates P < 0.05, and *** indicates P < 0.01.  





Table 36: Results from paired sample t-tests of pre- and post-spatial group model building questionnaire, Part B: Relationships 
Questions Pre-test Post-test Paired Differences 
 M N M N M t Sig. 
21. My suppliers/buyers always provide me with the information I require for my 
business. 
3.79 14 3.79 14 .000 .000 1.000 
22. All members of the VC are always fair and honest in their negotiations with me. 3.43 14 3.43 14 .000 .000 1.000 
23. There are specific members of the VC which are always fair and honest in their 
negotiations with me. 
3.86 14 3.64 14 .214 1.883* .082 
24. Members of the VC may use opportunities to hurt me financially. 3.21 14 2.71 14 .500 1.165 .265 
25. I only trust specific members of the VC to give me a fair price for my goods or 
services. 
3.64 14 3.86 14 -.214 -.563 .583 
26. There are more benefits for me when I work closely with all members of the VC. 3.96 14 4.14 14 -.286 -.939 .365 
27. There are more benefits for me when I work closely with specific members of 
the VC. 
3.86 14 3.86 14 .000 .000 1.000 
28. I can depend upon my relationships with specific VC members when I have a 
problem with my business. 
4.00 14 3.64 14 .357 2.110* .055 
Note: M refers to the Mean of paired responses, N refers to the Number of paired responses, t refers to the t score, and sig. refers to the level of significance. * indicates P < 0.1.  
Source: SPSS paired sample t-test 
 
Table 37: Results from post-spatial group model building questionnaire, Part C: Effectiveness of SGMB 
Questions Post-test 
 M N 
29. The model that we developed together accurately represents the complex and dynamic processes in the 
value chain. 
4.00 15 
31. The model helps me understand how I can make more income from the value chain. 4.13 15 
32. Following my participation in the workshops, I have used what I have learnt to improve my business. 3.53 15 
33. I have shared with many of my friends/family/business partners what I have learnt from the workshops. 3.67 15 
Note: M refers to the Mean of paired responses and N refers to the Number of paired responses 
Source: Participant spatial group model building questionnaires 
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SGMB participants’ strengthened relationships with specific VC actors and expanded knowledge of 
feedback loops in the VC were evident in responses to the four open-ended questions. After SGMB 
workshop five, participants listed an expanded set of the key actors in the VC (Question two). For the 
pork VC, participant contacts now extended to include pig feed shops, medicine shops, veterinarians, 
and the LBVD. Meanwhile in the paddy chain, quality seed producers and the township agricultural 
officer were identified as key actors in the chain. These additional nodes in the VC, while largely 
absent in pre-SGMB responses, were now listed in post-SGMB questionnaires as members of the VC 
that were fair and honest (Question 23) and as members of the VC with whom participants worked 
closely (Question 27). Interestingly, while there was a fair amount of antagonism towards 
slaughterhouse owners in initial workshops, producers in the pork chain also included 
slaughterhouse owners and buyers as trusted entities in the post-questionnaire. In Question 20, 
participants were asked to list the key challenges to earning more income from the VC. The majority 
of responses elicited prior to the SGMB process were surface-level problems, that were easily 
observable to participants and centred around the actions of other identifiable entities. However, 
following SGMB workshop five, the challenges identified were either root causes within problem 
feedback loops or problems that participants had more agency to overcome. For example, in the 
pork SGMB workshop’s pre-questionnaire, participant responses centred on the unstable prices of 
live pigs or unfair relationships with brokers, but in the post-questionnaire they prioritised disease 
outbreaks, and the quality of hybrid breeding sows and boars as the main challenges. A similar 
phenomenon was reflected in the paddy VC, where pre-questionnaire responses centred around 
poor quality roading and labour shortages, two problems largely beyond the control of participants 
to overcome. In contrast, in the post-questionnaire responses, participants noted access to capital 
for investments in labour-saving technologies, such as harvesters and tractors, and access to quality 
seeds that ensures timely harvesting as the key challenges to overcome. Both challenges were 
identified in cause-and-effect exercises and concept models as leverage points in the system.    
Responses in Part C of the questionnaire, as shown in Table 37, indicated the SGMB workshops were 
an effective tool for engaging participants in VC analysis and upgrading. From the 14 respondents, 12 
people reported that they “agreed,” and one person stated they “strongly agreed” that the model 
accurately represented the complex and dynamic processes in the VC. Additionally, 13 participants 
reported that they “agreed” and one participant that they “strongly agreed” that the model helped 
them to understand how to increase their income from the VC. Most participants noted that the 
opportunity to collaborate and form relationships with other stakeholders in the workshop was the 
most important outcome of the SGMB process. This was closely followed by the gaining of 
knowledge. The effectiveness of SGMB in increasing knowledge (Questions 29, 30, and 31) was 
higher than its ability to encourage participants to share and use the knowledge (Questions 32 and 
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33). This is unsurprising given that the workshop preceded the rollout of the TRRILD project’s 
technical activities and the noted lag between learning and behaviour change. Nevertheless, 71% of 
participants reported they had used what they learnt in the SGMB workshops to improve their 
business and 86% of participants stated they had shared learning from the workshop with friends, 
family, or business partners.  
6.3.3 Lessons learned from applying systems thinking and tools within a pro-poor 
development project 
The original nature of the research encourages reflection on the methods employed, analysing 
challenges, and critical success factors of developing pro-poor VC upgrading recommendations using 
SGMB tools. To the Researcher’s knowledge, this is the first-time research applying systems thinking 
and participatory model building tools has been undertaken in Myanmar. In addition, previous 
applications of GMB and SGMB in VC analysis have provided general policy recommendations; 
however, this research embedded SGMB in a development intervention with the express purpose of 
selecting pro-poor upgrading activities. In this section, several macro-level themes are described, 
acting as lessons learned and discussion points to help guide future applications of SGMB within 
development interventions.  
6.3.3.1 Model purpose 
An early, shared understanding as to the purpose of a quantitative SD model is critical to ensure the 
resultant model supports project decision-making. The SD literature encourages stakeholders to see 
SD models as useful decision support tools, rather than precise forecasting instruments (Sterman, 
2000, Vennix, 1999). This tension in purpose was present in the project to some degree. A section of 
project stakeholders understood the model as a helpful tool to make more informed, and hence 
better, decisions, while others desired a model that would make precise predictions. For project 
stakeholders on the latter end of the spectrum (i.e., models are precision forecasting instruments), 
the model should be as close as possible a representation of the target VCs. This view naturally leads 
to an increasingly complex quantitative model, one that will bear less and less resemblance to the 
original CLDs and concept models developed with SGMB stakeholders. This search for realism 
lengthens the time for developing a “finished” model (i.e., a model that is thorough enough to 
provide upgrading recommendations), as the model’s boundary and structure grow to accommodate 
complexity. For the stakeholders who envisioned the model as a decision-support tool, the aim is for 
a simpler, even a parsimonious, model that provides insights into critical feedback loops and 
relationship that drive system behaviour. An understanding around the specific elements that drive 
system behaviour leads to simplification through restricting the model’s boundary and core 
structure. For example, when 20% of the structure in a system can be shown to drive 90% of the 
behaviour, a decision around whether to model the remaining 80% of the structure should be 
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explored. Agreement among stakeholders on model purpose, boundaries, and structure can 
ultimately lead to a simpler and more pliable model that requires fewer resources to develop and is 
easier to understand by the wider set of stakeholders, especially those intimately involved in bringing 
about the model’s recommendations, i.e., VC actors and the TRRILD project team. A simpler model 
would also enhance the ability of an expanded group of stakeholders (i.e., project team members, 
donors, RG and SGMB participants) to use and iteratively update the model, particularly if the model 
were hosted online or built through open-access software, such as Insight Maker 
(https://insightmaker.com/).  
The purpose of the SD model in determining the strategic direction of a development project should 
also be clear to direct the timing of the modelling process. One question that needs addressing early 
in the project is: Are the model’s recommendations going to help determine the overall scope and 
direction of the project, or rather, will the model assist the project team to allocate resources within 
a set of pre-determined options? The TRRILD project’s design document, budget, and workplan were 
approved in August 2017 with the project officially starting in September of the same year. The 
modelling process, however, did not begin until January 2019 with the pork VC’s upgrading 
recommendation approved in August 2019, almost two years into the project’s five-year timeframe. 
As a result, the problems identified and the model’s boundary, as well as the scenarios run for the ex-
ante impact evaluation were strongly influenced by the project’s existing framework and activities. 
The timing of the modelling process constrained the ability to explore other options for project 
interventions, such as changes to the slaughterhouse policy, or strengthening the LBVD’s service 
delivery. Bringing SD modelling earlier into the design process could have elicited a more sustainable 
and impactful development intervention. Once target VCs and geographic location have been 
decided upon an SGMB process could help define the project’s strategy, including the element of the 
market system to focus on (supporting functions, rules, or the core supply and demand functions), 
how resources should be allocated to different project partners, and even the type of partners 
required for an effective project consortium.        
6.3.3.2 A mixed methods approach 
In a data scarce environment, such as Myanmar, future SGMB processes could employ a mixed 
methods approach to strengthen the reliability and validity of the model and its recommendations. 
Participatory model building is a time-consuming process, requiring dedicated resources, 
commitment by stakeholders, as well as technical expertise in model building (Lie, 2017). The SGMB 
tools used in this research identified spatial and temporal dynamics, and leverage points in the VC 
system that would not have surfaced if the project had solely relied on traditional VCA methods, such 
as surveys, FGDs, and KIIs (Rich et al., 2018). Moreover, as Lie (2017) noted, using participatory 
methods to construct an SD VC model promotes team learning, consensus decision-making, and 
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commitment to the model’s recommendations. Triangulation in this research was built using the RG 
and supplementary KIIs and FGDs.49 Secondary data covering the target population area was limited, 
consisting only of the TRRILD project’s baseline survey (Snoxell & Lyne, 2018), two rapid VC 
assessment (Rich, 2018; ACCESS Advisory, 2019), and a household economic assessment (WV 
Myanmar, 2018). Even though a diverse set of stakeholders were involved in the SGMB process, 
there is a risk that the views expressed, or the data obtained in workshops did not adequately 
represent the target population. Conducting a survey of key VC actors once the initial concept model 
had been developed could have helped address knowledge gaps identified in the SGMB process. In 
this research, several small surveys undertaken by the TRRILD project were drawn upon to 
supplement data from the SGMB and RG workshops, including a survey of PG members and a survey 
of restaurants and hotels regarding their demand for high-quality pork cuts. Another potential option 
to overcome data scarcity and reduce the resources involved in participatory model building is to 
start with an existing, validated model structure and use a smaller number of workshops and surveys 
to contextualise it (Vennix, 1996). This would enhance the scalability of SGMB and GMB processes, 
shifting limited project or donor resources towards nuanced model enhancement and context 
specific scenario testing.  
A challenge of using SD models for VC analysis is the reliance on aggregated data (Lie, 2017) which 
can treat smallholder farmers as a homogenous group. This research attempted to overcome this 
challenge by using model arrays that captured six different pig enterprises. One advantage of using 
additional survey data is to further understand the diversity of small-scale pig farmers, enhancing the 
ability of the model to consider the horizontal impacts of VC upgrading scenarios (Riisgard et al., 
2010). For example, additional information around the asset base, gender, additional livelihood 
sources, and demographics of pig producers would help to further understand the project’s impacts 
on the wellbeing of targeted household and any multiplier effects from the interventions. This could 
include socio-economic measures such as expenditure on education, health, or nutrition.  Any use of 
mixed methods approaches will likely add to the cost and time of conducting an SGMB process and 
would therefore need to consider resource constraints and align to the purpose of the model.   
6.3.3.3 Training of the model building team 
The effectiveness of any GMB process relies on skilled facilitation by the MBT (Vennix, 1996). Strong 
facilitation skills aid in developing a robust model that includes critical structure and feedback loops 
but also ensures ownership of the model’s results, leading to behaviour changes within participants. 
Much thought needs to be given to whom should be on the MBT, what their roles are, and the type 
of training they require. Rather than selecting the roles of MBT members before training, roles 
 
49 Including the KIIs and FGDs undertaken within a traditional VCA of the target area by an external agency 
(ACCESS Advisory, 2019).  
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should be assigned after an assessment of team member capacity following the training and mock 
exercises. In the research, two days of training was provided to the team before the first RG 
workshop; however, the MBT still struggled to fully fulfil their roles and responsibilities until after the 
second SGMB workshop. While these challenges could have been lessened by a better allocation of 
roles to team members, it also suggests further practise exercises were warranted. This could include 
practise sessions on difficult-to-grasp exercises and further workshop run-throughs with mock 
participants. Ideally, the MBT should be confident in facilitating SGMB exercises before the first RG 
workshops, especially when key project partners, like local government officials, are members of the 
RG.  
The scope of training provided to the MBT should be determined by the role the SD model plays in 
the development project. In the TRRILD project, the Researcher was primarily responsible for 
developing the SD model and the ex-ante impact evaluation. This meant the Researcher led the MBT, 
co-facilitated the workshops, constructed the quantitative SD model, and presented ex-ante 
recommendations to the PAC over a two-year period (i.e., field research and analysis-of-results stage 
of a PhD degree). However, if the SD modelling is included in the design phase and iterative 
modelling is a priority throughout the project, then dedicated project staff would need to be 
equipped to lead the process throughout the project’s lifetime. This would entail more detailed 
training and then ongoing coaching and mentoring by an expert modeller and budget support for a 
full-time modeller to be integrated into the project team. While the modelling process was iterative 
to a degree, after a certain point the lead modeller’s focus (as a PhD student) turned to the writing 
up and dissemination of the results.  
Further integration of the lead SD modeller into the project team is also recommended where time, 
budget, and logistics allow. This would see the SD modeller being based in the project site for 
extended periods of time, providing easier access to target communities, key stakeholders, and 
project decisionmakers. If resources are restricted, deeper integration should happen at the front 
end of the project as this allows the lead modeller to better understand the phenomena under study 
and to help select the makeup of the MBT and the composition of SGMB and RG participants. In this 
research, deeper integration was partially achieved through the background of the Researcher, who 
had previously worked in Myanmar for the partner INGO, including time in the project’s target area. 
The connection between the Researcher and the project location was also made stronger through 
having two TRRILD project staff join as participants of the RG. The ease of communication with these 
project staff through email and video chat meant that they evolved into gatekeepers for the RG, 
which was especially valuable in seeking additional technical data during the process of converting 
the qualitative concept model into a quantitative SD model which took place in New Zealand.  
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6.3.3.4 Selection of spatial group model building and reference group participants 
Ideally the selection of SGMB and RG participants should take place once the MBT has a solid 
understanding of the SGMB process and the broad issues and actors involved in the VC. In this 
research, the selection of the SGMB and RG participants happened prior to the Researcher’s arrival in 
Myanmar given the logistics of organising and inviting remote producers to the workshops. As the 
model-building workshops progressed, it became evident that additional stakeholder perspectives 
would have delivered more insightful workshop discussions. This meant several people were later 
added to the RG workshop (e.g., heads of the township’s livestock and agricultural departments), and 
KIIs outside of the workshops were conducted with paddy and pork retailers, paddy mill owners, and 
input supply shop owners. In retrospect, it would have been helpful for owners of the two large 
paddy mills and representatives from the Myeik restaurant association to have joined SGMB 
workshops as these actors eventually served as the project’s critical partners for upgrading the VCs. 
In the end, the MBT had multiple meetings with the two largest paddy mill owners, resulting in the 
introduction of a supply contract for a high-quality paddy variety between one mill owner and a PG. 
For the pork VC, the Researcher conducted several meetings with individual restaurant owners to 
understand their quality and demand requirements and was able to video call into a restaurant 
association meeting with 26 restaurant owners to canvas orders for high-quality pork cuts.  
When the purpose of GMB is to support decision-making in a development project, key project 
decision makers need to be involved in the model-building process to build trust in the model’s 
recommendations. The overall governance of the TRRILD project was provided by the PAC, which 
consisted of the representatives from the four project partners. Only one member of the PAC 
participated in the SGMB and RG workshops, and this was limited to the first round of SGMB and RG 
workshops. As a result, the Researcher represented the model’s recommendations to the PAC 
through formal and informal mechanisms. Formal presentations were given of the preliminary results 
after the field research phase (March 2019) and then of the final recommendations after SGMB five 
(July 2019 and January 2020). Informal updates were given to PAC members at various stages. For 
example, the MFI partner asked for help in developing loan products for pork and paddy producers 
based on the model’s results, and the TRRILD project’s Chief of Party (CoP) requested a cost-benefit 
analysis of the introduction of AHWs in the target villages. While these showed the value and 
confidence that were placed in the model, ownership of the model’s recommendations would have 
been strengthened by having PAC members, particularly the project CoP, more fully involved in the 
process. Implementation challenges in the project would have benefited from a deeper knowledge of 
the model’s results by project decision-makers, including delays in providing loans to PGs for 
investing in value-adding assets, and a reluctance to extend credit lines to pig producers to help 
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manage liquidity stress during the fluctuations in live pig prices extending from COVID-19 restrictions 





This research used systems thinking and participatory SGMB methods to develop a SD model of the 
pork VC in Myeik and Palaw townships in the Tanintharyi region of Myanmar. The quantitative SD 
model was used to conduct an ex-ante impact evaluation of potential pro-poor upgrading strategies 
for implementation within the TRRILD project. The ex-ante scenario testing quantified the impacts 
and trade-offs of upgrading strategies among pork VCs actors, with a focus on small-scale farmers. 
Analysing the results of the scenario testing generated a series of pro-poor upgrading 
recommendations for the TRRILD project.  
This chapter summarises the main findings of the SGMB process and the ex-ante impact evaluation in 
Section 7.1, with the key recommendations made to the TRRILD project covered in Section 7.2. The 
research’s contribution to theory and methods is highlighted in Section 7.3, followed by a summary 
of policy implications in Section 7.4. Challenges to the research are outlined in Section 7.5, and 
Section 7.6 concludes the chapter with recommendations for future research. 
7.1 Summary of main findings 
The SGMB process highlighted the constraints and importance of small-scale pig production as a 
livelihood strategy in the target villages of the TRRILD project. For farmers with access to arable 
farmland, pig production helped diversify household incomes, lowering vulnerability to shocks. For 
the resource poor, pigs were a form of savings used to alleviate temporary cashflow problems and to 
finance inputs for subsistence crops and non-farm enterprises. Small-scale pig farmers were broadly 
categorised into two production systems: the smaller and less costly WF system, and the larger and 
more intensive FF system. Local breed pigs were predominantly farmed by small-scale farmers, even 
though slaughterhouses increasingly sought hybrid pigs to meet rising consumer demand for leaner 
pork and premium cuts. A government licensing system for pig slaughtering allowed slaughterhouses 
to assume the role of “lead” actors in the VC. These slaughterhouses operated at low food safety 
standards and had little incentive to invest in hygienic, food-safe facilities. The majority of hybrid pigs 
sent to local slaughterhouses were imported from outside the region, while retailers seeking 
premium pork cuts relied on frozen imports to meet quality standards. Small-scale pig producers in 
the project’s target villages faced significant barriers as they sought to increase production capacity 
or upgrade their enterprises from WF to FF systems and from local breeds to hybrid pigs. These 
obstacles included large price oscillations, high transaction costs, limited horizontal and vertical 
coordination, frequent disease outbreaks, and liquidity problems. 
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An SD model was developed to conduct an ex-ante impact evaluation of pro-poor upgrading 
strategies proposed for the pork VC. The quantitative SD model comprised seven modules that 
captured critical sub-sectors and feedback loops identified by SGMB and RG participants, including 
new innovations to model collective action and the provision of credit. Stakeholders selected three 
institutional scenarios for testing and comparison: S1 (focusing on individual pig producers), S2 
(establishing pig PGs), and S3 (transitioning PGs to POs). In conjunction with the institutional 
scenarios, five technical upgrading activities were tested: microcredit, technical training on hybrid pig 
production, AHWs, AI, and jointly implementing all four technical activities.  
A baseline model spanning fifteen years was simulated to allow comparisons against a benchmark of 
no project interventions. In the baseline model, the price of live pigs rose steadily although 
significant outbreaks of swine disease caused substantive price fluctuations. These large price spikes 
induced small-scale producers to either increase production capacity or to upgrade to higher value – 
but riskier – pig enterprises. When live pig prices fell sharply due to the subsequent oversupply of 
fatteners, small-scale producers became over-indebted and dropped out of pig farming. The 
potential four-fold increase in profits provided a strong incentive for farmers to upgrade from local to 
hybrid breeds as well as from WF to FF systems. However, the anticipation of higher profits was 
offset by the larger risks inherent within these systems. Hybrid FF farming systems experienced 
longer and deeper periods of negative cashflow owing to higher pig mortality rates, the fluctuating 
live pig price, and the substantial loan payments to informal moneylenders. Pig farmers upgraded 
steadily from local breed WF to local breed FF farming systems, with a third of upgraded FF farmers, 
though, dropping out and returning to WF systems. Importantly, small-scale pig producers were still 
unable to upgrade in large numbers to the highly profitable hybrid FF system because they could not 
access affordable loans to finance breeding sows and appropriate housing and the high risks due to 
price fluctuations and disease outbreaks.  
The model established a clear rank order of individual technical activities: (1) AHWs, (2) microcredit, 
(3) technical training, and (4) AI. The establishment of village-based AHWs generated the largest 
financial gains for farmers because lower pig mortality rates protected poorer farmers from negative 
cashflow and loan defaults. Maintaining higher pig stocks during disease outbreaks meant farmers 
could rapidly scale-up production and take advantage of favourable post-disease prices, generating a 
strong positive flow-on effect to farm profitability and allowing further farm investments. The ability 
of PGs (S2) and POs (S3) to retain earnings allowed almost universal coverage of AHW services for 
members, while less than a quarter of pigs were covered in S1 (individuals). Formal microcredit loans 
had the greatest impact on the number of pig producers upgrading to highly profitable systems, with 
some risks for poorer farmers. Microcredit doubled the proportion of farmers who dropped out of FF 
systems because it exacerbated the consequences of negative cashflow. The technical training of pig 
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producers delivered around two-thirds the impacts of microcredit and AHW. Training alone did not 
encourage upgrading but did help to increase the profitability of current pig enterprises. AI exerted 
minimal system impacts and involved high risks.  
Combining technical activities resulted in a healthy interaction effect, delivering two to three times 
higher aggregate profits for pig producers than the highest single activity. This combined impact was 
particularly important in S2 (PGs) and S3 (POs) where individual activities had a short-term negative 
impact but, significantly, a well-sequenced combination of upgrading activities ensured short-term 
positive pro-poor and financial outcomes. Individual technical activities were unable to fully 
overcome liquidity problems faced by PG and PO members; however, combining these activities 
protected members from negative cashflows, and prevented PGs and POs from nascent collapse 
when member profits, PG rebates, and PG services were low. The risk-lowering ability of PGs and POs 
encouraged members to rapidly transition from moderately profitable WF to highly profitable FF 
systems, activating reinforcing feedback investment loops. 
Investing in the institutional arrangements of collective action delivered delayed, but more 
substantial, pro-poor and financial impacts. While S1 (individuals) had the highest short-term 
financial benefit, these gains quickly plateaued. In contrast, establishing PGs (S2) that provide 
transaction services delivered close to twice the long-term economic benefits of focusing on 
individual farmers (S1). Meanwhile, transitioning PGs to POs (S3) that can finance value-adding assets 
grew aggregate incomes by three times that of S1 (individuals) and twice that of S2 (PGs), while also 
bringing 24% more pig producers into highly profitable systems. Project investments in POs, and to a 
lesser extent PGs, created a pathway for poorer pig producers with lower capital and risk tolerance 
to engage in a moderately profitable farming system (hybrid WF) and then transition to a highly 
profitable system (hybrid FF). Institutional arrangements that encouraged both retained earnings and 
rebates for members increased the financial position of members and the inclusiveness of the 
PG/PO. Increasing the proportion of retained earnings for investment in value-adding assets enabled 
a more inclusive PO while also generating higher profits for members.   
The model identified two areas of concern regarding producer liquidity. In S1 (individuals), 
established hybrid FF farmers faced periods of negative cashflow soon after the project exits. PG and 
PO members in S2 and S3 likewise experienced significant liquidity problems when they took on 
microcredit loans to upgrade farms to hybrid FF or WF systems. Increasing the length of loan terms 
combined with either a balloon or deferred payment schedule and selling a higher portion of piglets 
enabled producers to maintain positive cashflows, albeit with overall reductions in farm profits.  
Each institutional scenario had a different impact on downstream actors in the pork VC. S1 
(individuals) magnified the current system leading to profit increases for brokers and 
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slaughterhouses. Cumulative profits for brokers and slaughterhouses fell slightly in S2 (PGs) and S3 
(POs), while all three scenarios substantially increased off-farm employment. The increases in off-
farm wages in S2 (PGs) and S3 (POs) largely offset losses experienced by brokers and slaughterhouses 
in the system. The model suggested that a safe, hygienic slaughterhouse capable of producing 
premium pork cuts is a sound investment for a strategic partner, while also revealing that, once 
established, a PO could finance this asset with debt capital borrowed at market rates.   
Sensitivity analysis conducted with alternative scenarios and stochastic parameters strengthened the 
model’s original findings: the greatest pro-poor and financial gains result from well-sequenced 
investments in AHWs, microcredit, and training alongside the establishment of PGs that transition to 
POs. An alternative scenario that modelled an emerging ASF threat showed that project impacts are 
sustainable when biosecurity practices are interwoven into the combination of technical activities. 
However, providing microcredit loans prior to risk-lowering technical activities could cause sustained 
negative impacts in target villages. 
7.2 Contribution to the TRRILD project 
The research provided the TRRILD project with technical advice while concurrently strengthening the 
understanding and ownership of interventions by project beneficiaries and staff alike. Analysing the 
findings of the ex-ante impact evaluation led to focused and prioritised pro-poor upgrading 
recommendations for the project’s pork VC. The recommended interventions were then shared with 
TRRILD stakeholders for discussion and research informed decision-making in the project. All the 
study’s recommendations were adopted by the TRRILD PAC and guided project implementation 
through the research period.  
The research recommended that the TRRILD project should focus on collective action rather than 
broadly targeting individual producers. The project should initially establish pig PGs that operate at a 
transactional level and later upgrade to PO status by investing in value-adding assets for forward and 
backward integration in the VC. The research indicated that significant project resources should be 
allocated to create investor-friendly institutional arrangements as these encourage more inclusive 
and profitable PGs and POs. PGs need to retain earnings to maintain collective services because 
these improve financial outcomes for members. To upgrade PGs to POs, institutional arrangements 
that encourage investment and discourage side-selling need to be adopted. The institutional 
arrangements should allow (i) control to reside with patron members; (ii) different types of shares to 
raise equity capital from members and non-members; (iii) proportionality between investment and 
patronage; and (iv) secondary markets for equity shares. Considering their pro-poor and economic 
benefits, the research encouraged the TRRILD project to work closely with prioritised POs to develop 
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enterprise business plans that would appeal to equity investors, including smallholder patrons and 
strategic partners, and formal lenders as partners in a well-structured IBM. 
High-quality hybrid fattener production was also recommended by the research. A well-sequenced 
combination of technical activities initiated by the project and sustained by functional PGs and POs, 
helps to protect small-scale producers from high levels of risk inherent in hybrid pig farming. The 
burgeoning premium pork market should be targeted, first in Myeik and later Yangon, to overcome 
hold-up problems and collusion between slaughterhouses. To differentiate their products, PGs would 
need to develop a set of achievable food safety, environmental, and ethical minimum quality 
standards (MQS) that participating members must satisfy in their farming operations. As a first-step, 
PGs and project staff could partner with interested retailers in Myeik and a reputable slaughterhouse 
to make regular deliveries of high-quality pork cuts. Small breeding sow and boar units established by 
the project within prioritised PGs would help lower costs and maintain the genetic integrity of 
fatteners and continued access to premium markets. A common production plan based on piglets 
and sows from breeding units that meet the MQS would be required to satisfy a contract to supply a 
consistent quantity of high-quality fatteners. Introducing a tagging system would also help safeguard 
against opportunistic behaviour by PG members and the slaughterhouse, while assuring quality by 
promoting traceability. Creating a tradeable delivery right based on MQS and tied to the tagging 
system would further assist PGs to monitor quality and fulfil supply contracts.   
The research showed that slaughterhouses may resist partnering with PGs and as a result the project 
should provide incentives to attract a reputable business partner. Incentives could include training 
and equipment grants to encourage partnerships with an existing slaughterhouse, but if this fails, 
then the project should consider supporting a PO through a mixture of equity, grant, and debt capital 
to establish their own upgraded slaughterhouse. Establishing a partnership with a slaughterhouse 
creates a less resource intensive, but profitable, pig system – the hybrid WF – widening the 
membership and profitability of POs which in turn leads to wider, deeper, and more sustainable 
project impacts.    
The project was recommended to jointly implement AHWs, microcredit, and technical training 
activities alongside investments in biosecurity protocols. The sequencing of interventions is shown as 
critical by the research. A well-trained and equipped AHW network should be established first, and 
technical training completed before formal microcredit loans are made available for farm upgrades. 
The research advised that the partner MFI make a minimum of US$150,000 available for asset and 
seasonal loans, while lengthening loan terms and offering balloon and deferred repayment schedules 
as these conditions help poorer village households to benefit from PG membership by upgrading to 
hybrid pig farming. Given the increased risk of an ASF outbreak, the research suggested that the MFI 
 212 
restrict microcredit loans only to those PG members and non-members who have invested in 
biosecurity infrastructure and practices.  
The SGMB process changed the mental models of participants, fostered ownership of interventions, 
and strengthened project implementation. Participants’ understanding of the VC widened, trust with 
known VC actors grew, and confidence to upgrade increased, leading to improved short-term project 
outcomes. It is noteworthy that all four POs prioritised for upgrading had a former SGMB participant 
as a director, while RG members had used their own resources to support pig vaccination campaigns 
and the procurement of high-quality inputs. Project staff were able to reference the model to make 
critical decisions on how to support the pig industry through price and disease shocks, including 
shifting project budget to support biosecurity practices and debt relief.   
7.3 Contributions to theory and methodology 
In an advancement over a traditional VCA, systems thinking and SGMB tools show how critical 
feedback loops and causal relationships in the VC system work to prevent small-scale farmers from 
upgrading. Participatory SGMB tools quickly bring to the surface the contextual temporal and spatial 
dynamics affecting the VC. Moving beyond a qualitative analysis, the SGMB process and SD modelling 
tools quantify these causal relationships in the system, allowing for an ex-ante evaluation of 
intervention impacts across a wide range of VC actors. This evaluation enables trade-off analysis and 
the selection of strategies that have positive and sustainable benefits for small-scale farmers. Trade-
off analysis also helps identify coordination issues and actors potentially resistant to upgrading, 
narrowing solutions to those that have a higher chance of success. The ability to conduct quantitative 
trade-off analysis across different actors and time horizons can also help decision-makers to 
rationalise investments in upgrading activities that have longer pay-off times or initially lower 
beneficiary numbers, such as establishing PGs that transition to POs.       
Diverse barriers prevent small-scale farmers from engaging in high VCs (Trienekens, 2011), making 
entry points or catalytic activities difficult to determine. An SGMB informed SD model helps distil the 
complex nature of agri-food VCs by identifying “root” system problems, thus improving the targeting 
of upgrading interventions. The research highlights that a well-sequenced, multipronged approach is 
required to deliver sustainable and far-reaching benefits to small-scale farmers. Microcredit catalyses 
small-scale producers to “step up” into higher value systems, while AHWs and training in GAHPs are 
important risk-lowering mechanisms allowing small-scale producers to “hold on” during the 
inevitable shocks. In markets with price volatility, the ability to “hold on” permits small-scale 
producers to enjoy favourable prices, leading to further investments. The research also demonstrates 
the value of collective action as part of a multipronged approach. PGs that transition to POs help 
sustain and multiply the short injections of technical assistance from development projects and 
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enable a larger number of poorer small-scale farmers to both “step up” and “hold on”. Importantly in 
VCs where there is possible collusion or domination by a lead actor, such as a slaughterhouse, POs 
and PGs improve negotiation capacity because of their ability to meet quality requirements of 
premium buyers as well as increasing the potential for forward and backward integration, a 
“stepping out” into value-adding activities.  
The research proposes that institutional arrangements are critical to the success of collective action, 
particularly in contexts such as Myanmar where financial services are weak resulting in limited access 
to term loans of modest size, leading to a “missing middle” (Milder, 2008). Investor-friendly 
institutional arrangements assist PGs to transition into POs that can finance value adding assets and 
engage in IBMs while encouraging member patronage. Importantly, the research demonstrates that 
shifting project resources to “soft” activities (like constituting PGs with appropriate institutional and 
governance arrangements) are critical to ensuring that “hard” activities (like capital or asset grants) 
have pro-poor multipliers. These multipliers stem from inclusion (grant capital gives even the poorest 
members a meaningful financial interest in their PO), equity (members can realise capital gains on 
their patronage-based shareholding), employment (creating off-farm jobs), and higher incomes 
(through value-added products).  
The research widens the corpus of GMB theory by documenting a first-time application of SGMB to 
upgrading small-scale farmers within an agri-food VC project. Unlike earlier studies that stopped at 
policy recommendations (Lie et al., 2018), this research was guided by action research principles and 
embedded in a development intervention, such that the SD model’s findings helped determine the 
project’s pro-poor upgrading strategies. The SGMB processes described in this research therefore 
provide a roadmap for future pro-poor applications to follow. This roadmap includes examples of 
process timelines, workshop agendas, team compositions, SGMB exercises and scripts, and VC 
modules, along with lessons learned from reflections on the process.  These insights can be applied 
to future initiatives using SGMB and systems thinking to upgrade agri-food VCs and to other 
community-based research topics in which spatial dynamics are important considerations within 
messy problems.  
Importantly, the research adds several innovative modules and methods to the body of SD model 
structure. First, the research showcases endogenized product pricing for small-scale producers by 
linking the farmgate price and the aggregate system price. These connections allow both higher-level 
(regional) and lower-level (village) system changes to inform pricing. Second, the research presents a 
credit module for simulating the impacts of different financing options for small-scale farmers in the 
VC. The credit module includes functionality to alter the stock of credit available, prioritise different 
loan products, and adjust loan conditions. Finally, the research extends the collective action structure 
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of McRoberts et al. (2013) to create PG and PO modules. These modules shed light on the financial 
and pro-poor performance of different PG and PO institutional structures and their impacts on the 
wider VC system. The PG module includes functionality around membership, retained earnings to 
finance PG transactional services, and rebates for members. The PO module’s additional structure 
captures the ability to invest in a value-adding assets. The credit, PG, and PO modules are considered 
beta versions and further refinement is anticipated as these modules are absorbed into future SD VC 
modelling processes.  
7.4 Policy implications 
Several contextual and wider policy implications arise from the research’s findings that development 
agencies should consider a multipronged approach when working to upgrade small-scale farmers. 
Complex constraints and diversity amongst farmers require intertwined and reinforcing, as opposed 
to siloed, intervention strategies. This research shows that a well-sequenced combination of 
technical training, horizontal and vertical coordination mechanisms, disease prevention, and micro 
and meso-credit delivers the highest pro-poor and financial outcomes for small-scale pig producers. 
While some farmers can successfully upgrade their enterprises with the assistance of one or two 
activities, poorer farmers require more layered support. There is pressure for development projects 
to cover large target populations, and this often limits the range of technical support available to 
farmers. However, the research suggests that by narrowing their investments to broadly supporting a 
smaller number of committed small-scale farmers within a PG or PO, development agencies will 
achieve greater inclusion and financial outcomes. POs that adopt institutional arrangements which 
encourage compliance with supply contracts and investment in value-adding assets can attract 
strategic business partners and successfully enter premium markets. These POs can remain inclusive 
of poorer members when grant capital contributed by donors to finance value-adding assets is 
treated as equity capital invested by members, with each member receiving an equal number of 
shares or through the provision of tradeable delivery rights.  
The research also indicates that the provision of affordable and appropriate credit is critical for small-
scale farmers in Myanmar to upgrade their agri-food enterprises. MFIs and other financial 
institutions need to develop loan products to address smallholder liquidity problems. This includes 
products that allow small-scale farmers to finance seasonal inputs that result in products that meet 
the quality and food safety requirements of premium markets, along with meso-sized loans to 
finance lumpy, value-adding assets. Finance for durable assets needs to have longer repayment 
periods than those currently offered by MFIs (two years) and optional repayment schedules 
(deferred, graduated, or balloon) that align well with anticipated cash inflows. Importantly, these 
meso-sized loans should be available to well-structured groups, such as POs, without requiring each 
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member to accept liability for “their” share of the PO’s loan. Assets purchased by the PO can be 
liquidated by its directors to repay outstanding loans in the event of a default. Members therefore 
risk losing their equity capital in the event of a default and should not be expected to assume the 
lender’s risk in their personal capacity. Development projects could include instruments, such as 
tradable class B shares and equity capital injections, to help leverage additional financial resources 
from the private sector that facilitate IBMs. Findings from the research also suggests that the risks for 
MFIs of lending to poorer small-scale producers reduce when these clients are provided with 
targeted loan products and supported with technical activities, such as training, access to AHWs, and 
biosecurity guidelines through membership in functional PGs and POs. 
Testing intervention strategies in a virtual modelling environment is a cost-effective method for 
development agencies to trial different upgrading solutions with little risk of harm from 
experimentation with non-traditional approaches. SD models improve decision-making, leading to a 
better allocation of scare development resources and an increased ability to target interventions to 
vulnerable or marginalised groups. This technique is particularly applicable to complex, 
interconnected environments, like agri-food VCs, in which interventions may create winners at the 
expense of losers and result in unintended negative consequences that manifest well after the 
action.  
Additionally important, development partners should understand the rationale for using VC SD 
models early in the project process. Within an already designed project, SD modelling guides the 
implementation of pre-selected upgrading activities and the allocation of resources. In contrast, 
embedding SD modelling from a project’s inception enables policy makers to test a wider set of 
upgrading approaches, helping to set the project’s strategic direction and design. This latter 
approach requires more flexibility on behalf of donor agencies and, as such, it fits well within those 
agencies that apply adaptive aid management principles. For modelling insights to fully saturate 
these decision spaces, key project decision-makers need to recognise that they are also stakeholders 
in the modelling process and further engage within RG or SGMB workshops.  
7.5 Challenges and limitations to the research 
Several practical constraints limited the effectiveness of the research’s participatory SD modelling 
methods in determining pro-poor upgrading strategies. First, the timing of the SGMB process meant 
that the scope of research (and model) was, to a large extent, bounded by the TRRILD project’s 
existing design documents. This limited opportunities for the research to investigate a wider set of 
pro-poor policy options for upgrading the pork VC. Second, although a total of twelve weeks was 
spent in Myanmar across three field trips, lengthier or more frequent trips would have assisted data 
gathering and analysis. Field timeframes were selected to accommodate project workplans, resulting 
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in the qualitative SGMB processes being undertaken in Myanmar, with quantitative SD model 
building largely completed remotely from New Zealand. This inhibited the co-creation of the 
quantitative SD model with SGMB and RG participants, lessening their ability to learn directly from 
interactions with a quantitative model. The time spent training and completing mock-up workshops 
with the model-building team could, in hindsight, have been lengthened, leading to improved 
workshop facilitation that further garnered stakeholder engagement. Additionally, not having the VC 
retail segment involved early in the SGMB process stunted the development of the model’s 
downstream structure, and possibly slowed the creation of partnerships with strategic business 
partners. Third, due to COVID-19, restrictions were placed on domestic and international travel in 
Myanmar from March 2020. This restricted in-person interactions with the TRRILD team, SGMB and 
RG participants, and target communities that were planned for the iterative modelling process. While 
on-line discussions enabled further model iterations, the reduction in workshops and KIIs limited 
dialectic interactions that would have led to subsequent model refinement and improved decision-
making. Lastly, the participatory phase of this research involved cross-cultural interactions. As a 
result, the Researcher’s worldview and language skills shaped his interactions with participants in 
workshops, KIIs, and FGDs, thus influencing how data was collected and interpreted.   
As noted in other VC research using SD approaches (Lie, 2017), one challenge of using SD models is 
the reliance on aggregated data. While aggregation helps to model system behaviour and understand 
macro- and meso-level patterns, it can result in small-scale farmers being treated as a homogenous 
group. Other agricultural simulation models, such as agent-based modelling, enable further 
heterogeneity at the farm-level (Berger, 2001), though they are constrained by their inability to 
interact with system-level evolutions and employ less-intuitive and more complicated computer 
programming tools than SD applications. The research sought to overcome this challenge and infuse 
pro-poor methods into the model through categorising small-scale farmers by production system and 
introducing limited heterogeneity through arrays in the SD modelling software, Stella Architect. 
These categorisations were based on a rapid VC assessment and SGMB and RG information and 
therefore did not fully capture the diverse range of small-scale farmers in the target villages. 
Important contextual information relating to gender, ethnicity, household assets, and alternative 
livelihood strategies of pig producers was therefore likely excluded from the research. A deeper 
understanding of household savings and wealth would have helped advance the credit and 
investment portions of the SD model. However, gathering this information through survey 
instruments and building more complicated models to accommodate the additional data would have 
added significant cost and time, impacting other areas of the research.  
The sensitivity analysis reported in this thesis was conducted to determine whether plausible 
uncertainty altered the model’s pro-poor upgrading recommendations. Alongside a range of 
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alternative contextual scenarios, 14 parameters were treated as stochastic variables. More detailed 
methods to determine model sensitivity could have been employed had resources and time allowed. 
For example, Chapman and Darby (2016) select a larger range of unreliable parameters and test the 
general sensitivity of each parameter by running multiple simulations with a uniform distribution 
over a ± 50% error range. The sub-set of parameters that exhibit general sensitivity (i.e., they 
significantly alter model behaviour and/or the results of scenario testing) could then be further 
explored individually or through various combinations to understand the key drivers behind changes 
in model behaviour or scenario results.  
7.6 Recommendations for future research 
This research provided an initial application of SGMB to upgrade pro-poor VCs within an international 
development project. The SGMB process documented within this research can be applied to other 
agri-food VCs in different contexts to generate further insights into the effectiveness of participatory 
modelling tools to engage stakeholders in VCA and upgrading. Future research could take a more 
longitudinal approach, documenting how the SD model and its findings evolve over time and how the 
modelling process changes mental models of participants and the direction of upgrading 
interventions from original intentions. As well as further resources, this practice would also require 
integrating adaptive management techniques into the development intervention and flexibility on 
behalf of the donor and implementing partners.  
It was beyond the scope of the research to analyse and compare observable outcomes of the project 
and VC system behaviour against model predictions. Future research could likewise document the 
medium- and long-term outcomes of upgrading interventions and VC behaviours within a 
development intervention and compare them to the ex-ante model findings. Such research covering 
the ex-post evaluation of SD models could help determine the extent that structure, parameters, and 
modules accurately reflect system behaviour across different contexts. This information would help 
build confidence in the use of SD modelling tools for VCA and upgrading, while also creating a 
knowledge bank of basic model structure that can form the building blocks of future initiatives.  
Because participatory model-building processes are resource heavy, donors and practitioners alike 
should ask questions about value for money, short-cut methodologies, and ability to scale. The 
applicability of template approaches will gain currency for future research as the knowledge bank of 
VC SD models grows. This research would include understanding the scale of model adaption needed 
between different countries (e.g., transferring the pork VC SD model in this research to Timor-Leste), 
and different VCs (e.g., transferring the credit module developed in this research to a model of the 
paddy VC). Additionally important is an investigation into scaling up or scaling down of models in 
order to understand the level of system aggregation in VC models which provide the most effective 
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insights. Finally, future research could also examine how the most important system insights can be 
captured by more parsimonious models and whether these simpler models further enhance 
stakeholder learning and ownership.   
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Spatial group model building agendas and timeline 
Table A1: SGMB workshop one agenda 
Length 
(mins) 
Public Agenda Team Agenda 
Pre-workshop 
 Arrival and registration - Prepare room: walls free from distraction, water and snacks on 
desks, books and pens on desks, desks in C shape, and Layerstack 
ready 
- Register participants and supply with name tags (colour of tag 
representing participant’s role in the VC) 
10 Research information 
sharing and consent 
gathering 
- Distribute research information and consent forms 
- Explain and clarify purpose of research and conditions of consent 
- Request signatures and collect consent forms 
75 Baseline survey - Explain purpose of baseline survey and anonymity 
- Facilitator reads aloud questions and clarifies understanding 
- Assistant Facilitators assist individual participants who struggle to 
understand questions or language 
Workshop 
15 1. Formal welcome and 
introductions 
- General welcome and introduction of Model Building Team (MBT) 
- Participants stand and introduce themselves 
5 2. Overview of the 
TRRILD project and 
SGMB workshops 
- Overview of the TRRILD project, covering timeline, key outcomes, 
and relationship to SGMB workshops 
- Overview of SGMB process, including five workshops, timing, and 
expected level of participation 
- Distribute one-page information sheet on TRRILD project and SGMB 
process (in Myanmar language) 
5 3. Overview of workshop - Explain key sessions and how long will be spent on them 
- Explain lunch details and location of bathrooms 
30 4. Hope and fears - Each participant writes hopes and fears for the model building 
process on two coloured cards 
- Participants come to front of group and briefly explain hopes and 
fears 
- Hopes and fears cards are stuck on whiteboard and collated into 
similar groups by Facilitator  
- Facilitator summarises common themes and addresses any concerns 
20 5. Introduction of SD 
concepts and 
terminology 
- Introduce terminology of stocks, flows, and converters with examples 
from agriculture 
- Highlight terminology with coke-in-bottle example, show coke as 
stock and add converters to change flow rate 
- Draw behaviour over time graph of water in bottle 
- Ask for examples of stocks, flows, and converters in the VC, and draw 
on whiteboard  
Lunch 
90 6. Layerstack exercise to 
map VC system 
- Introduce Layerstack, showing maps, acetates, markers, and stickers 
- Briefly show Layerstack from SGMB training as an example 
- Allow 15 minutes for each layer, this includes time for Facilitator to 
summarise key information before moving on to the next layer 
- Ensure there is discussion and active participation, noting down any 
disagreements  
45 7. VC problem 
prioritisation 





Public Agenda Team Agenda 
- Participants individually write down one key problem on coloured 
cards and then present to group, answering any questions from 
plenary 
- Problem cards placed on whiteboard 
- Facilitator compiles problem cards into common themes and asks if 
any problems are missing 
- Assistant Facilitator writes additional problems on cards and places 
on whiteboard 
- Participants are given three stickers and vote for top problems by 
placing stickers (maximum two per card) on problem cards 
- Facilitator counts voting and presents top three problems to the 
group, while confirming nature of problem 
10 8. Wrap-up - Summarise workshop and thank participants 
- Remind participants of the next workshop 
Planned length: 10.00 to 15.00 (30 mins for lunch) 
Actual length: 10.15 to 16.10 (Myeik); 10.00 to 16.00 (Palaw) 
Source: Researcher 
Table A2: SGMB workshop two agenda 
Length 
(mins) 
Public Agenda Team Agenda 
Pre-workshop 
 Arrival and registration - Prepare room: walls free from distraction, water and snacks on 
desks, books and pens on desks, desks in C shape, and Layerstack 
ready 
- Register participants and distribute name tags 
Workshop 
10 1. Formal welcome and 
overview of the day 
- General welcome, including recap on previous workshop and agenda 
for current workshop 
 
15 2. Review of SD 
concepts and 
terminology 
- Review of stocks, flows, and converters 
- Elicit example of stocks from VC and facilitate group to draw a simple 
stock and flow diagram on whiteboard 
95 3. Cause-and- 
consequence mapping 
of priority problems 
- Review prioritised VC problems in plenary and break into small 
groups 
- Groups develop reference modes for problems and draw behaviour 
over time graphs in centre of whiteboard 
- Individuals within small groups write causes and consequences of 
problems on coloured cards 
- Individual participants place “cause” cards on left side of reference 
mode. Facilitator sorts causes into common themes and adds further 
‘causes’ and draws in relationships by asking the prompt question, 
“What causes this?” (repeat for consequences on right side of 
reference mode, but using the key question, “Then what happens?”) 
- Facilitator draws in relationships linking problem consequences to 
problem causes, documenting polarity of relationships and key 
feedback loops 
- Each small group presents map to plenary 
- Facilitator leads plenary discussion for each map and makes updates 
based on group consensus 
- Facilitator summarises final version of cause-and-consequence maps 
and reference modes 
Lunch 
10 4. Decide on modules 
for development 
- Facilitator summarises common issues and themes that emerged 




Public Agenda Team Agenda 
- Discussion in plenary on which modules should be included in the 
model to ensure common themes and issues are accounted for 
60 5. Develop preliminary 
concept modules 
- Present preliminary Production and Finance Casual Loop Diagrams 
(CLDs) on paper sheets that were prepared earlier and discuss in 
plenary, highlighting key stocks, flows, and converters 
- Update CLDs through post-it notes, and markers based on plenary 
discussions 
10 6. Wrap-up - Summarise workshop and thank participants 
- Remind participants of the next workshop 
Planned length: 10.00 to 13.50 (30 mins for lunch) 
Actual length: 10.15 to 14.30 (Myeik); 10.00 to 15.00 (Palaw) 
Source: Researcher 
Table A3: SGMB workshop three agenda 
Length 
(mins) 
Public Agenda Team Agenda 
Pre-workshop 
 Arrival and registration - Prepare room: walls free from distraction, water and snacks on 
desks, books and pens on desks, desks in C shape, and Layerstack 
ready 
- Register participants and distribute name tags 
Workshop 
10 1. Formal welcome and 
overview of the day 
- General welcome, including recap on previous workshop and agenda 
for current workshop 
15 2. Present basic SD 
model  
- Introduce simple production and system pricing and marketing 
modules in Stella Architect 
- Demonstrate how SD models can produce graphs which resemble 
reference mode behaviour and how these are altered with changes to 
model variables 
- Explain that the next step to building a functional SD model of the VC 
is to develop CLDs of the modules using SD structure 
95 3. Development of CLD 
for modules 
- Divide participants into small groups in order to develop CLDs for 
remaining modules on large paper sheets 
- CLDs use SD concepts, such as stocks, flows, and converters using 
stocks. CLDs include polarity of relationships and if consensus among 
participants, parameters to define relationships 
- Each group presents CLD to plenary 
- Presenter facilitates discussion and updates CLDs, using post-it notes 
to record structural changes and markers for changes to causal 
relationships and polarity 
Lunch 
60 4. Review CLD for all 
modules and add data 
- Facilitator presents each CLD to plenary and highlights key structure 
and relationships 
- Discussions in plenary to agree on key variables, including basic 
behaviour and parameters for graphical functions 
10 5. Wrap-up - Summarise workshop and thank participants 
- Remind participants of the next workshop 
Planned length: 10.00 to 13.40 (30 mins for lunch) 
Actual length: 10.10 to 14.20 (Myeik) 10.00 to 14.00 (Palaw) 
Source: Researcher  
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Table A4: SGMB workshop four agenda 
Length 
(mins) 
Public Agenda Team Agenda 
Pre-workshop 
 Arrival and registration - Prepare room: walls free from distraction, water and snacks on 
desks, books and pens on desks, desks in C shape, and Layerstack 
ready 
- Register participants and distribute name tags 
Workshop 
10 1. Formal welcome and 
overview of the day 
- General welcome, including recap on previous workshop and agenda 
for current workshop 
 
75 2. Present combined 
modules and validate  
- Present the modules on large sheets of paper and explain 
connections between the modules 
- Explain that taken as whole they represent the concept model of the 
VC and highlight the key feedback loops which generate behaviour of 
the system  
- Request volunteer from among participants to explain the concept 
model, including connections between and key feedback loops 
- Gather feedback on concept model in plenary, with any final changes 
added to the model through coloured cards and markers 
60 3. Validate model data 
and fill in data gaps 
- In plenary present data sheets for model variables in two columns 
(one column for SGMB participants and one column for RG 
participants) 
- Review model data, focusing on variables with no data or variables 
with large discrepancies between SGMB and RG data 
Lunch 
20 4. Selection of 
interventions for 
scenario testing stage 
- Explain that the concept model will be converted into an SD model 
with Stella Architect and show basic SD model example used in SGMB 
Two 
-  Explain that participants need to help decide the potential project 
interventions for the scenario testing stage 
- Participants individually write two project interventions on coloured 
cards and one-by-one shares with group 
- Facilitator sorts cards under similar themes on whiteboard and 
summarises and clarifies meaning 
- Three voting stickers are distributed to each participant to vote on 
top three interventions (maximum two voting stickers per card) 
20 5. Selection of indicators 
to analyse results 
- Explain that participants need to help decide on indicators to 
measure the impacts of the interventions  
- Participants individually write two indicators on coloured cards and 
one-by-one shares with group 
- Facilitator sorts cards under similar themes on whiteboard and 
summarises and clarifies meaning 
- Three voting stickers are distributed to each participant to vote on 
top three interventions (maximum two voting stickers per card) 
20 6. Wrap-up - Summarise workshop process and thank participants 
- Update participants on the next steps which will take place in New 
Zealand: finalising the SD model, undertaking scenario testing, and 
analysing results 
- Update participants on the purpose and likely timing of SGMB Five 
- Present workshop certificates and take final group photo 
Planned length: 10.00 to 14.00 (30 mins for lunch) 




Table A5: SGMB workshop five agenda 
Length 
(mins) 
Public Agenda Team Agenda 
Pre-workshop 
 Arrival and registration - Prepare room: walls free from distraction, water and snacks on 
desks, books and pens on desks, desks in C shape, and Layerstack 
ready 
- Register participants and distribute name tags 
Workshop 
20 1. Formal welcome and 
overview of the day 
- General welcome 
- Recap on workshop process and the summarise the process to 
complete the quantitative SD model, undertake scenario testing, and 
analyse results  
- Share workshop agenda 
40 2. Present updated 
concept model  
- Present the updated concept model (drawn on paper prior to 
workshop), highlighting each of the modules and key feedback loops 
- Discussion in plenary with any feedback recorded on coloured cards 
and placed on model 
90 3. Present results of 
scenario testing 
- Present the updated SD model using Stella Architect 
- Point out the corresponding structure from the concept model which 
is now embedded in the SD model 
- Show how scenario testing changes the results of the SD model 
- Through simple power point slides present results of each scenario, 
pausing afterwards to collect any feedback or answer questions 
- Write feedback on whiteboard 
Lunch 
20 4. Present parameters 
for sensitivity analysis 
- Explain that the SD model uses data provided from SGMB and RG 
workshops and other secondary sources 
- Explain that some variables in the model have a wide range and/or 
have a significant impact on the model’s results 
- Present these variables and facilitate discussion and agreement on 
the low and high points of the range 
40 5. Follow-up VC survey  - Remind participants of the baseline knowledge survey from SGMB 
One and reaffirm anonymity 
- Explain that this is a follow-up questionnaire covering the same 
questions but also containing a section on the SGMB process 
- Facilitator reads questions aloud and clarifies understanding 
- Assistant facilitators assist participants who struggle to understand 
and help with translation as necessary  
20 6. Wrap-up - Summarise workshop process and thank participants 
- Update participants on the next steps: project to decide on 
interventions and timeline for starting of activities 
Planned length: 10.00 to 14.20 (30 mins for lunch) 
Actual length: 10.30 to 15.00 (Myeik) 10.00 to 14.30 (Palaw) 
Post-workshop 
60 Focus Group Discussion 
with select participants 
- Follow-up questions with workshop participants (four producers and 







Table A6: Timeline of the model building process 
Date Activity Participants Objectives 
7/01/2019 – 
11/01/2019 
SGMB training Researcher and 
Expert Modeler  
1. Familiarise Researcher with SGMB 
tools and observe SGMB workshops 
21/01/2019 – 
23/01/2019 
Training workshop for 
Myanmar MBT team 
MBT: 6 1. SGMB team members understand 
basic SD concepts 
2. SGMB team members understand 
their roles and workshop purposes 
3. Practise facilitation of SGMB tools, 
such as Layerstack and casual loop 
diagrams 
24/01/2019 RG workshop 1 MBT: 6 
RG: 8   
1. Introduce TRRILD project and 
research 
2. Participants understand SD, SGMB, 
and RG principles and commit to 
workshops 









1. Introduce TRRILD project and SGMB 
process 
2. Survey of participants’ VC 
knowledge and behaviours 
3. Introduce basic SD concepts and 
terminology 
4. Map out VC spatial dynamics using 
Layerstack 





SGMB workshop 2 MBT:5 
Myeik: 15 
Palaw: 14 
1. Develop reference modes 
2. Complete cause-and-consequence 
mapping 
3. Select modules for model structure 
4. Present and refine CLDs 
06/02/2019 RG workshop 2 MBT: 5 
RG: 10 
1. Review and revise module structure 





SGMB workshop 3 MBT: 5 
Myeik: 15 
Palaw: 13 
1. Review and revise module structure 
2. Parameterise modules 
20/02/2019 RG workshop 3 MBT: 5 
RG: 10 
1. Review and revise model structure 





SGMB workshop 4 MBT: 5 
Myeik: 12 
Palaw: 12 
1. Validate and parameterise concept 
model 
2. Elicit and prioritise indicators and 
interventions for scenario testing 
01/03/2019 RG workshop 4 MBT: 5 
RG: 8  
1. Validate and parameterise model 
2. Elicit and prioritise indicators and 
interventions for scenario testing 
04/2019 – 
08/2019 
Model finalisation and 
scenario testing for pork VC 
Researcher and 
Expert Modeler 
1. Finalise pork SD model 
2. Undertake scenario testing and 
analyse results 
3. Develop recommendations on 
upgrading 
08/08/2019 Combined SGMB and RG 
workshop 5 for pork VC 
MBT: 4 
SGMB: 10 
RG: 4  
1. Validate final pork SD model 
2. Discussion of results and priority 
interventions 
3. Follow-up survey and FGD on SGMB 
participants’ VC knowledge and 
behaviours  
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08/2019 Discussion of pig model  
results with TRRILD partners 





1. Present model results and 
recommendations for pork upgrading 





SGMB and RG (Rice) 
workshop 5 




1. Validate final rice SD model 
2. Discussion of rice results and 
priority interventions 
3. Follow-up survey and FGD on SGMB 
participants’ VC knowledge and 
behaviours 
01/2020 Monitoring of pork VC 
interventions 
Researcher 1. Monitor implementation of pork 




Remote follow-up with RG 
and TRRILD staff 
Researcher 1. Review and revise model 
2. Provide recommendations based on 
revisions 
Note: The table also provides the dates for the SGMB workshops for the rice VC as these workshops are 




Pork value chain system dynamics model  
This appendix provides a snap-shot of the modules within the Stella Architect-developed pork VC SD 
















































Figure B1: System pricing and marketing module developed in Stella Architect 
Source: Pork VC SD model developed by the Researcher 
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Figure B2: System pricing and marketing module (off-farm employment) developed in Stella Architect 
Source: Pork VC SD model developed by the Researcher 
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Figure B3: Pig production module developed in Stella Architect 
Source: Pork VC SD model developed by the Researcher 
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Figure B4: Farmer finance module developed in Stella Architect 




Figure B5: Credit and investment modules developed in Stella Architect 
Source: Pork VC model developed by the Researcher 
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Figure B6: Knowledge module developed in Stella Architect 
Source: Pork VC model developed by the Researcher 
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Figure B7: Collective action module (PG portion) developed in Stella Architect 
Source: Pork VC model developed by the Researcher 
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Figure B8: Collective action module (PO portion) developed in Stella Architect 






Figure B9: Collective action module (PO portion): Demand and slaughterhouse capacity structure developed in Stella Architect 
Source: Pork VC model developed by the Researcher 
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Figure B10: Animal Health Worker scenario structure developed in Stella Architect 
Source: Pork VC model developed by the Researcher 
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Figure B11: Artificial Insemination scenario structure developed in Stella Architect 



















Table C1: Baseline data for system pricing and marketing module 
Structure Baseline Unit Source 
Stocks 







Pigs in production in Myeik 5460 Pigs SGMB 
Inventory of live pigs ready for 
slaughtering in Myeik 
1400 Pigs SGMB 
Myeik production capacity 210 Pigs/week SGMB and RG 
Expected price of Mawlymine live pigs 5100 Kyats/viss SGMB 
Price difference between Myeik and 
Mawlymine 
0 Kyats/viss b 
Myeik slaughterhouse total live pig 
demand 
700 Pigs/week SGMB 
Slaughterhouse profit margin 0 Unitless  
Cumulative Myeik slaughterhouse profits 
(USD) 
0 US$  
Expected slaughterhouse price of live pigs 
from Myeik 
5000 Kyats/viss SGMB 
Myeik slaughterhouse profit margin 0 Unitless  
Number of weeks worked in off-farm 
activities  
0 Weeks  
Aggregate profits for brokers in target 
villages (USD) 
0 US$  
Individual brokers aggregate profits 0 US$  
Flows    






Breeding Myeik pigs Myiek_production_capacity*(1+"Seasonal_production_effects_-_fatteners") Pigs/week  
Fattening Myeik pigs (Pigs_in_production_in_Myeik/Time_to_fatten_in_Myeik)+(Pigs_in_production_in_Myeik*P
anic_selling) 
Pigs/week  








Structure Baseline Unit Source 
Selling to other sources Mawlymine_live_pigs_available_for_export-Importing_live_pigs_from_Mawlymine Pigs/week  
Importing live pigs from Mawlymine (Order_fulfillment_rate_Mawlymine*Order_rate_from_Mawlymine) Pigs/week  
Purchasing for slaughter in Myeik Total_orders_for_live_pigs_in_Myeik*Order_fufillment_rate Pigs/week  





Change in price difference Expected_price_of_Mawlymine_live_pigs-Slaughterhouse_price_of_live_pigs_from_Myeik Kyats/viss/we
ek 
 









Change in slaughterhouse profit margin (Myeik_slaughterhouse_revenue/Myeik_slaughterhouse_costs)-
Slaughterhouse_profit_margin 
Unitless  
Change in slaughterhouse profits Myeik_slaughterhouse_profits/1500 US$/week  
Change in weeks worked "Number_of_people_employed_in_off-farm_activities" Weeks  




Change in individual broker profits Change_in_broker_profits/Number_of_brokers US$/week/br
oker 
 
Variables    








Length of disease outbreak 26 Weeks SGMB 
Disease outbreak death rate 0.15 Proportion  SGMB and RG 
Time between disease outbreaks 208 Weeks SGMB and RG 
Disease start time 72 Week  








Panic selling rate 0.05 Proportion   
Panic selling length 10 Weeks SGMB 
Supply decrease from Chinese New Year -0.2 Unitless SGMB 






Importation ban IF "Disease_scenario_on_/_off" = 1 THEN STEP(-1, Disease_start_time+4)-STEP(-1, 
Disease_start_time+4+Length_of_importation_ban)  




Length of importation ban 26 Weeks RG 
Growth in Mawlymine pig supply 0.06 Proportion RG 
Time to fatten in Myeik 26 Weeks SGMB 
Order rate from Mawlymine (Total_orders_for_live_pigs_in_Myeik*Effect_of_price_difference_on_ordering_from_Mawl
ymine) 
Pigs/week  
Order fulfilment rate Mawlymine GRAPH(Mawlymine_maximum_order_processing_rate/Order_rate_from_Mawlymine) 
(0.000, 0.000), (0.200, 0.100), (0.400, 0.300), (0.600, 0.500), (0.800, 0.700), (1.000, 0.900), 
(1.200, 1.000), (1.400, 1.000), (1.600, 1.000), (1.800, 1.000), (2.000, 1.000) 
Unitless  
Mawlymine maximum order processing 
rate 
Mawlymine_live_pigs_available_for_export/Mawlymine_order_fulfillment_time Pigs/week Sterman (2010) 
Mawlymine order fulfilment time 1 Week SGMB and RG 
Mawlymine inventory coverage Mawlymine_live_pigs_available_for_export/Order_rate_from_Mawlymine Pigs Sterman (2010) 
Perceived coverage Mawlymine SMTH1(Mawlymine_inventory_coverage, Time_to_perceive_Mawlymine_inventory) Unitless Sterman (2010) 
Time to perceive Mawlymine inventory 1 Week SGMB 
Desired inventory Mawlymine 1 Unitless  
Inventory ratio Mawlymine Perceived_coverage_Mawlymine/Desired_inventory_Mawlymine Unitless Sterman (2010) 
Sensitivity of Mawlymine price to 
inventory coverage 
-0.05 Unitless  
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Structure Baseline Unit Source 
Effect of inventory on Mawlymine price Inventory_ratio_Mawlymine^Sensitivity_of_Mawlymine_price_to_inventory_coverage Unitless Sterman (2010) 
Price of live pigs from Mawlymine Initial_price_live_pigs_Mawlymine*Effect_of_inventory_on_Mawlymine_price Kyats/viss Sterman (2010) 
Initial price of live pigs from Mawlymine 5100 Kyats/viss SGMB 
Indicated price Mawlymine MAX(Price_of_live_pigs_from_Mawlymine, Production_costs_Mawlymine) Kyats/viss Sterman (2010) 
Production costs Mawlymine 4800 Kyats/viss RG 
Time to adjust to Mawlymine pig price 1 Week SGMB 




(-1000, 1.000), (-800, 1.000), (-600, 0.977), (-400, 0.950), (-200, 0.900), (0, 0.800), (200, 
0.653), (400, 0.528), (600, 0.400), (800, 0.300), (1000, 0.200) 
Unitless SGMB 
Total orders for live pigs in Myeik SMTH1((Myeik_slaughterhouse_total_live_pig_demand), 4) Pigs/week  
Order fulfilment rate Order_fulfilment_rate = 
GRAPH(Maximum_order_processing_rate/Total_orders_for_live_pigs_in_Myeik) 
(0.000, 0.000), (0.200, 0.100), (0.400, 0.300), (0.600, 0.500), (0.800, 0.700), (1.000, 0.900), 
(1.200, 1.000), (1.400, 1.000), (1.600, 1.000), (1.800, 1.000), (2.000, 1.000) 
Unitless  
Mawlymine order fulfilment time 1 Week  
Maximum order processing rate Inventory_of_live_pigs_ready_for_slaughtering_in_Myeik/Order_fulfilment_time Pigs/week Sterman (2010) 
Inventory coverage Inventory_of_live_pigs_ready_for_slaughtering_in_Myeik/Total_orders_for_live_pigs_in_M
yeik 
Unitless Sterman (2010) 
Perceived inventory coverage SMTH1(Inventory_coverage, Time_to_perceive_inventory) Unitless Sterman (2010) 
Time to perceive inventory 1 Weeks SGMB 
Desired inventory 2 Weeks  
Inventory ratio Perceived_inventory_coverage/Desired_inventory Unitless  
Effect of inventory coverage on price Inventory_ratio^Sensitivity_of_price_to_inventory_coverage Unitless Sterman (2010) 





Kyats/viss Sterman (2010) 
Effect of costs on price 1+Sensitvity_of_price_to_costs*((Production_costs/Expected_slaughterhouse_price_of_live
_pigs_from_Myeik)-1) 
Unitless Sterman (2010) 
Sensitivity of price to costs 0.25 Unitless  
Production costs 4500 Kyats/viss SGMB 
Indicated price MAX(Slaughterhouse_price_of_live_pigs_from_Myeik, Production_costs) Kyats/viss Sterman (2010) 
Price adjustment time 26 Weeks  
Expected profit margin SMTH1((Slaughterhouse_price_of_live_pigs_from_Myeik/Production_costs), 
Time_to_adjust_to_profit) 
Unitless  
Time to adjust to profit 26 Weeks  
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Structure Baseline Unit Source 
Indicated capacity utilisation = GRAPH(Expected_profit_margin) 
(-1.000, 0.000), (-0.800, 0.000), (-0.600, 0.000), (-0.400, 0.000), (-0.200, 0.000), (0.000, 
0.100), (0.200, 0.200), (0.400, 0.300), (0.600, 0.400), (0.800, 0.500), (1.000, 0.550), (1.200, 
0.600), (1.400, 0.650), (1.600, 0.700), (1.800, 0.750), (2.000, 0.800), (2.200, 0.850), (2.400, 
0.900), (2.600, 1.000), (2.800, 1.000), (3.000, 1.000) 
Unitless SGMB 
Desired production capacity Indicated_capacity_utilisation*Myeik_total_production_capacity Pigs/week  
Myeik total production capacity 700 Pigs/week RG 
Time to change pig production capacity 26 Weeks  





Slaughterhouse production costs 14,230 Kyats/pig SGMB and RG 
Conversion ratio 0.833 Proportion SGMB 
Average live pig weight 55 Viss SGMB 
Price conversion wholesale pork to 
carcass 
0.8575 Proportion  
Government fixed pork price ceiling Pork_wholesale_price*(1+Price_increase) Kyats/viss RG 
Price increase STEP(0.07, 256)+STEP(0.07, 612) Kyats/viss RG 
Pork wholesale price 8500 Kyats/viss SGMB and RG 




Unitless Sterman (2010) 
Demand schedule EXP(Demand_intercept)*Government_fixed_pork_price_ceiling^Price_elasticity_of_demand Unitless Sterman (2010) 
Price elasticity of demand -0.5 Unitless  






Demand increase from Chinese New Year 0.2 Proportion RG 
Change in demand due to population and 
income growth 
0.06/52 Proportion SGMB and RG 
Consumer lag 4 Weeks SGMB and RG 
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Structure Baseline Unit Source 
Consumer reduction in demand due to 
disease 
-0.3 Proportion SGMB and RG 












Effect of slaughterhouse profits on 
maximum price 
 GRAPH(SMTH1(Slaughterhouse_profit_margin, Time_to_adjust_price)) 
(0.9000, 0.900), (0.9500, 0.950), (1.0000, 1.000), (1.0500, 1.000), (1.1000, 1.000), (1.1500, 
1.000), (1.2000, 1.000), (1.2500, 1.050), (1.3000, 1.100), (1.3500, 1.150), (1.4000, 1.200) 
Unitless  
Time to adjust price 4 Weeks  
Myeik slaughterhouse profits Myeik_slaughterhouse_revenue-Myeik_slaughterhouse_costs Kyats/viss  
Myeik slaughterhouse revenues ((Purchasing_for_slaughter_in_Myeik)*Average_live_pig_weight*Conversion_ratio*standar
d_wholesale_price) 
Kyats  










Number of pigs/week/labourer 23.3  RG 










Number of feed shop workers Number_of_feed_shops*3  RG 






Structure Baseline Unit Source 
Income generated by off-farm 
employment 
"Number_of_weeks_worked_in_off-farm_activities"*5*(7500/1500) US$ RG 
Average feed sales/shop 3,000,000 Week RG 



















Broker unit costs 7500 Kyats/pig RG 
Broker revenue  Broker_purchase_costs*(1+Broker_markup) Kyats/pig RG 
Broker profits Broker_revenue-Broker_costs Kyats  
Total pigs through brokers SUM(Panic_selling_growers)+SUM(Broker_purchasing_for_slaughter)+SUM(Culling_of_bree
ding_stock)+SUM(Panic_selling_breeding_stock) 
Pigs  
Number of brokers SMTH1(Total_pigs_through_brokers/"Max_pigs/broker",  104) Brokers  
Max pigs/broker 10 Pigs/week RG 
Weight reduction 0.02 Percent RG 






Note: a Repeats until end of model run time. b Blank source denotes data or equations which were developed by the Researcher.  
Source: Pork VC model 
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Table C2: Baseline data for pig production module 








Piglets 0 Piglets  
Growers 1 Growers  
Breeding stock Pig_producers_in_each_farming_system Sows  
Inventory of live pigs in TRRILD project 
area 
0 Fatteners  
Purchased piglets 0 Piglets  
Breeding stock adjustment Breeding_stock_gap Unitless  
Pig producers in each farming system Local FF: 192 
Local WF 768 
Hybrid FF: 160 
Hybrid WF: 160 
Pig producers PG survey 
Former pig producers 0 Pig producers  
Number of pig producers who drop out 0 Pig producers  
Cumulative number of fatteners sold 0 Fatteners  
Flows    
Purchasing piglets (Pig_producers_in_each_farming_system*Effect_of_profit_on_purchasing_piglets*(1+"Seas
onal_production_effect_-_piglets"))/Length_of_piglet_production_cycle 
Piglets/ week  






Aborting Gestation*Abortion_rate Foetuses / 
week 
 
Being born Gestation/Gestation_delay Piglets/ week  
Piglets dying Piglets*Piglet_death_rate Piglets/ week  
Growing (Piglets*(1-Piglet_selling_rate))/Time_to_grow Piglets/ week  
Selling piglets (Piglets*Piglet_selling_rate)/Time_to_grow Piglets/ week  
Selecting for breeding stock IF Disease_outbreak > 0 THEN 0 ELSE (Growers/2)*Indicated_breeding_stock_change_rate Gilts/ week  
Growers dying Grower_death_rate*Growers Growers/ 
week 
 




Structure Baseline  Unit Source 
Fattening pigs (Growers-(Selecting_for_breeding_stock))/Time_to_fatten Growers/ 
week 
 
Slaughtering for premium cuts PG Hybrid: "Order_for_high-quality_premium_cuts"*FF_to_WF_ratio Fatteners / 
week 
 
Slaughtering for high-quality wholesale PG Hybrid: "Demand_for_high-quality_wholesale"*FF_to_WF_ratio Fatteners/ 
week 
 




Panic selling breeding stock Breeding_stock*Panic_selling Sows/ week  
Culling of breeding stock (Breeding_stock/Average_breeding_time) Sows/ week SGMB 
Breeding stock dying Breeding_stock*Death_rate_breeding_stock Sows/ week  
Sows entering breeding stock Entering_pig_system[FarrowtoFinish] Sows/ week  
Change in breeding stock adjustment (Breeding_stock_gap-Breeding_stock_adjustment)/Gap_adjustment_time Unitless  








Individual local WF: 
"Re-entering_pig_farming"[Individual_local,WeantoFinish]+"Re-
entering_pig_farming"[Individual_local,FarrowtoFinish] 
Individual hybrid FF:  
(Changing_pig_system[Individual_hybrid,WeantoFinish]+Changing_pig_system[Individual_lo
cal,FarrowtoFinish])+Changing_pig_system[PG_hybrid,FarrowtoFinish] 












Structure Baseline  Unit Source 
entering_pig_farming"[Individual_hybrid,WeantoFinish]/"Time_to_make_a_decision_re-
entering") 
PG hybrid FF: 
Joining_PG[PG_hybrid,FarrowtoFinish]+Changing_farming_system[PG_hybrid,WeantoFinish] 


















Individual hybrid FF:  0 





PG hybrid FF: 0 














Structure Baseline  Unit Source 
Taking_hiatus_from_PG[PG_hybrid] 
Leaving PG Individual Local FF: 0 
Individual local WF: 0 
Individual hybrid FF: 
Taking_hiatus_from_PG[PG_hybrid,FarrowtoFinish] 
Individual hybrid WF: 
Taking_hiatus_from_PG[PG_hybrid,WeantoFinish] 
PG hybrid FF: 
"Re-engaging_in_PG"[PG_hybrid,FarrowtoFinish] 




























PG hybrid FF:  









PG hybrid WF:  























PG hybrid FF:  
(Former_pig_producers[PG_hybrid,WeantoFinish]*"Effect_of_profitability_re-
entering_pig_farming"[PG_hybrid,WeantoFinish])/"Time_to_make_a_decision_re-entering" 







Inflow of pig producers who drop out Leaving_pig_farming Producers / 
week 
 
Variables    
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Structure Baseline  Unit Source 
Annual profits of all pig producers IF TIME < 1 THEN 0 ELSE "Cumulative_profits_of_individual_pig_producers_(USD)"/((TIME-
208)/52) 
US$/year  
Number of highly profitable pig producers IF Annual_profits_of_pig_producers > 153 THEN Pig_producers_in_each_farming_system 
ELSE 0 
Producers  
Number of litters/year Local: 1 
Hybrid: 2 
Litters/ year SGMB and RG 
Seasonal production effects - FF PULSE(Normal_season_production_rate, 0, 52) 
+PULSE(High_season_production_rate, 4, 52) 
+PULSE(High_season_production_rate, 8, 52) 
+PULSE(Normal_season_production_rate, 12, 52) 
+PULSE(Normal_season_production_rate, 16, 52) 
+PULSE(Normal_season_production_rate, 20, 52) 
+PULSE(Normal_season_production_rate, 24, 52) 
+PULSE(Normal_season_production_rate, 28, 52) 
+PULSE(Normal_season_production_rate, 32, 52) 
+PULSE(Normal_season_production_rate, 36, 52) 
+PULSE(Normal_season_production_rate, 40, 52) 
+PULSE(Normal_season_production_rate, 44, 52) 
+PULSE(Normal_season_production_rate, 48, 52) 
Unitless SGMB 
Number of piglets Local: 8 
Hybrid: 12 
Piglets/ litter RG 
Local breed disease resilience  0.3 Proportion  RG 


















Gestation delay 114/7 weeks RG 
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Structure Baseline  Unit Source 













Time to grow 6.42 Weeks RG 
Piglet selling rate IF Disease_outbreak > 0 THEN 0.1 ELSE 0.5 Proportion SGMB 













Time to fatten Local: 36.4 
Hybrid: 19.3 
Weeks RG 
Slaughterhouse demand Inventory_of_live_pigs_in_TRRILD_project_area Fatteners/ 
week 
 
Average breeding time 104 Weeks SGMB 













Structure Baseline  Unit Source 
ase_outbreak*(1-
Coverage_of_Good_Animal_Husbandry_Practises[Individual_hybrid,FarrowtoFinish])) 
Breeding stock gap (Desired_breeding_stock+Culling_of_breeding_stock)-Breeding_stock Sows (Hamza & Rich, 
2015) 
Indicated breeding stock change rate IF Growers = 0 THEN 0 ELSE MAX((Breeding_stock_adjustment/Growers), 0) Unitless (Hamza & Rich, 
2015) 
Gap adjustment time Local: 52 
Hybrid: 26 
Weeks SGMB and RG 




Pig_producers_in_each_farming_system*Maximum_sows_per_farm Sows  
Maximum sows/farm 3 Sows RG 
Effect of short-term profits on change in 
breeding stock 
= GRAPH("Short-term_perceived_expected_profit_margin") 
(-1.000, 0.000), (-0.800, 0.000), (-0.600, 0.000), (-0.400, 0.000), (-0.200, 0.000), (0.000, 
0.100), (0.200, 0.200), (0.400, 0.300), (0.600, 0.400), (0.800, 0.500), (1.000, 0.550), (1.200, 
0.600), (1.400, 0.650), (1.600, 0.700), (1.800, 0.750), (2.000, 0.800), (2.200, 0.850), (2.400, 
0.900), (2.600, 0.950), (2.800, 1.000), (3.000, 1.000) 
Unitless  
Normal season production rate -0.04 Proportion RG 
High season production rate 0.2 Proportion RG 
Seasonal production effect - WF PULSE(Normal_season_production_rate, 0, 52) 
+PULSE(Normal_season_production_rate, 4, 52) 
+PULSE(Normal_season_production_rate, 8, 52) 
+PULSE(Normal_season_production_rate, 12, 52) 
+PULSE(Normal_season_production_rate, 16, 52) 
+PULSE(Normal_season_production_rate, 20, 52) 
+PULSE(Normal_season_production_rate, 24, 52) 
+PULSE(Normal_season_production_rate, 28, 52) 
+PULSE(High_season_production_rate, 32, 52) 
+PULSE(High_season_production_rate, 36, 52) 
+PULSE(High_season_production_rate, 40, 52) 
+PULSE(Normal_season_production_rate, 44, 52) 
+PULSE(Normal_season_production_rate, 48, 52) 
Unitless  
Length of piglet production cycle Local: 52 
Hybrid: 26 
Weeks SGMB and RG 
Effect of profit on purchasing piglets = GRAPH("Short-term_perceived_expected_profit_margin") Unitless SGMB 
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Structure Baseline  Unit Source 
(0.000, 0.000), (0.100, 0.000), (0.200, 0.000), (0.300, 0.000), (0.400, 0.000), (0.500, 0.000), 
(0.600, 0.000), (0.700, 0.100), (0.800, 0.500), (0.900, 0.800), (1.000, 1.000), (1.100, 1.200), 
(1.200, 1.400), (1.300, 1.600), (1.400, 1.800), (1.500, 2.000), (1.600, 2.200), (1.700, 2.400), 
(1.800, 2.600), (1.900, 2.800), (2.000, 3.000) 
Time to make a decision 26 Weeks SGMB 
Time to make a decision re-entering 52 Weeks SGMB 
Effect of medium-term profitability on 
changing pig systems 
= GRAPH((expected_profitability_of_pig_systems*Confidence_to_upgrade)) 
(-1.000, 0.000), (-0.850, 0.000), (-0.700, 0.000), (-0.550, 0.000), (-0.400, 0.000), (-0.250, 
0.000), (-0.100, 0.000), (0.050, 0.000), (0.200, 0.177), (0.350, 0.351), (0.500, 0.494), (0.650, 
0.600), (0.800, 0.700), (0.950, 0.800), (1.100, 0.887), (1.250, 0.894), (1.400, 0.900), (1.550, 
0.900), (1.700, 0.900), (1.850, 0.900), (2.000, 0.900) 
Unitless  
Confidence to upgrade IF Effect_of_knowledge_on_upgrading_decision < 1 THEN 1 ELSE 
Effect_of_knowledge_on_upgrading_decision 
Unitless  
Note: a Blank source denotes data or equations which were developed by the Researcher.  
Source: Pork VC model 
Table C3: Baseline data for farmer finance module 
Structure Baseline  Unit  Source 
Stocks 






Savings for financing production costs 0 Kyats/week  
Cumulative profits of individual pig 
producers (USD) 
0 US$  
Cumulative profits of all pig producers 
(USD) 
0 US$  
Feed quality 1 Unitless  
Flows    
Change in profits Pig_farmer_profits Kyats/week  
Saving profits for production IF Change_in_profits < 0 THEN Change_in_profits ELSE 
Change_in_profits*MIN((Savings_rate+Compulsary_savings_from_MFI), 0.8) 
Kyats/week  
Financing Savings_for_financing_production_costs Kyats/week  
Change in producer profits "Weekly_profits_for_indiviudal_producers_(USD)" US$/week  
Change in all producers’ profits (SUM(Pig_farmer_profits))/Exchange_rate US$/week  
Change in feed investment (Desired_feed_quality-Feed_quality)/Time_to_change_feed Unitless  
Variables     
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Structure Baseline  Unit  Source 
Profit margin IF Total_farm_costs > 0 THEN Total_farm_revenue/Total_farm_costs ELSE 1 Unitless  
Short-term expected profit margin Profit_margin Unitless  





Time to adjust to short-term profits Local: 52 
Hybrid: 26 
Weeks SGMB 
Short-term profit margin without 
upgrading costs 
IF TIME > 52 THEN Total_farm_revenue/(Total_farm_costs-Upgrading_loan_repayments) 
ELSE 1 
Unitless  
Short-term perceived profit margin 




Savings rate = GRAPH(Profit_margin) 
(0.000, 0.800), (0.250, 0.800), (0.500, 0.800), (0.750, 0.800), (1.000, 0.775), (1.250, 0.750), 
(1.500, 0.700), (1.750, 0.650), (2.000, 0.600), (2.250, 0.550), (2.500, 0.525), (2.750, 0.500), 
(3.000, 0.500), (3.250, 0.500), (3.500, 0.500), (3.750, 0.500), (4.000, 0.500), (4.250, 0.500), 
(4.500, 0.500), (4.750, 0.500), (5.000, 0.500) 
Proportion SGMB 
Compulsory savings from MFI 0.05*Proportion_of_productive_loans_from_MFI Proportion RG 







Piglet revenue Selling_piglets*(Piglet_cost-Piglet_marketing_costs) Kyats/week  










Fattener live weight Local: 35 
Individual hybrid: 55 
PG hybrid: 55 
Viss SGMB 
Culled sow price "Farm-gate_price_of_live_pigs_in_target_villages"*0.85 Kyats/viss SGMB 
Panic selling live weight Fattener_live_weight*0.4 Kyats/viss SGMB 
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Structure Baseline  Unit  Source 















Broker mark-up 0.025*Effect_of_transaction_costs Percentage SGMB and RG 
Effect of transaction costs = GRAPH(Total_number_of_pigs_available_per_week) 
(0.00, 1.400), (2.00, 1.260), (4.00, 1.155), (6.00, 1.072), (8.00, 0.996), (10.00, 0.936), (12.00, 
0.883), (14.00, 0.830), (16.00, 0.792), (18.00, 0.777), (20.00, 0.777) 
Unitless  
Total number of pigs available per week (Inventory_of_live_pigs_in_TRRILD_project_area[Individual]+Culling_of_breeding_stock[Indi
vidual]+Culling_of_breeding_stock[Individual])/Number_of_villages 
Pigs/week  
Number of villages 32 Villages RG 
Pig quality score IF Effect_of_knowledge_on_pig_quality < 1 THEN 1 ELSE 
Effect_of_knowledge_on_pig_quality 
Unitless RG 
Collective transport costs (5000/Fattener_live_weight[PG]) Kyats/viss SGMB 
Proportion of loan repayments in costs (Upgrading_loan_repayments+Loan_costs_for_productive_cycle)/Total_farm_costs Proportion  
Debt pressure = GRAPH(Proportion_of_loan_repayments_in_costs) 
(0.0000, 1.000), (0.0500, 0.995), (0.1000, 0.990), (0.1500, 0.985), (0.2000, 0.980), (0.2500, 
0.975), (0.3000, 0.970), (0.3500, 0.965), (0.4000, 0.960), (0.4500, 0.955), (0.5000, 0.950) 
Unitless  
Effect of feed on pig quality Feed_quality Unitless  
Total farm costs Loan_costs_for_production_cycle+Farm_production_costs+Upgrading_loan_repayments Kyats/week  
Desired feed quality  = GRAPH("Short-term_perceived_expected_profit_margin") 
(0.000, 0.8500), (0.100, 0.8500), (0.200, 0.8500), (0.300, 0.8500), (0.400, 0.8500), (0.500, 
0.8500), (0.600, 0.8500), (0.700, 0.8500), (0.800, 0.9000), (0.900, 0.9500), (1.000, 1.0000), 
(1.100, 1.0330), (1.200, 1.0660), (1.300, 1.1000), (1.400, 1.1330), (1.500, 1.1660), (1.600, 
1.2000), (1.700, 1.2330), (1.800, 1.2660), (1.900, 1.3000), (2.000, 1.3000) 
  
Time to change feed 4 Weeks SGMB 




Structure Baseline  Unit  Source 
Production loan capital required (Farm_production_costs-(HISTORY(Savings_for_financing_production_costs, TIME)- 
(HISTORY(Savings_for_financing_production_costs, TIME-1))))*Production_cycle_length 
Kyats/week  
Production cycle length Local: 42.82 
Hybrid: 25.72 
Weeks SGMB and RG 
Average production loan size IF Pig_producers_in_each_farming_system = 0 THEN 0 ELSE 
SMTH1(((Production_loan_capital_required)/Pig_producers_in_each_farming_system), 52) 
Kyats/week  
Farm production costs Piglet_purchase_costs+Feed_costs+Other_variable_costs+Breeding_costs Kyats/week  











Boar servicing costs Local: 30,000 
Hybrid: 45,000 
Kyats/ service SGMB and RG 




Kyats/ service  
Other variable costs (Watering+Veterinary_services+Shelter_maintenance)*(Growers+Breeding_stock)+Costs_of
_AHW_services+"Costs_of_bio-security_and_hygiene_measures" 
Kyats/week  
Shelter maintenance Individual local FF: 46.7  
Individual local WF: 27.5 
Hybrid FF: 144.3  
Hybrid WF: 51.8  
PG Hybrid FF: 144.3 
PG Hybrid WF: 51.8 
Kyats/ week/ 
pig 
SGMB and RG 
Veterinary services Individual local FF: 20 
Individual local WF: 11.7 
Hybrid FF: 30 
Hybrid WF: 19.8 
Kyats/ week / 
pig 
SGMB and RG 
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Structure Baseline  Unit  Source 
Watering Local: 27.5 
Hybrid: 51.5 
PG: 51.5 
Kyats/ week / 
pig 
SGMB and RG 
Costs of AHW services ("AHW_costs/grower"*Growers*Proportion_of_pigs_covered_by_AHW)/Time_to_fatten Kyats/week SGMB and RG 
AHW costs/grower 4,000 Kyats RG 
Costs of bio-security and hygiene 
measures 
(1000*Growers*"Application_of_bio-security_and_hygiene_measures")/Time_to_fatten Kyats/week RG 
Piglet purchase costs Purchased_piglets*Piglet_cost Kyats/week  
Piglet cost Local: Slaughterhouse_price_of_live_pigs_from_Myeik*0.65*14 
Hybrid: Slaughterhouse_price_of_live_pigs_from_Myeik*18.75 
Kyats/week SGMB and RG 
Feed costs Piglet_feed_costs+Grower_feed_costs+Sow_feed_costs Kyats/week  
Piglet feed costs "Feed_costs/piglet"*Piglets Kyats/week  
Feed costs/piglet Local: 260.1 
Hybrid: 706 
PG: 706*(1-PG_discount_for_bulk_ordering) 
Kyats/week SGMB and RG 
Grower feed costs Growers*"Feed_costs/grower" Kyats/week  
Feed costs/grower Individual local FF: 700 
Individual local WF: 500 
Individual hybrid FF: Effect_of_feed_quality_on_costs[Individual_hybrid,FarrowtoFinish] 
Individual hybrid WF: 
Effect_of_feed_quality_on_costs[Individual_hybrid,WeantoFinish]*0.65 
PG hybrid FF:  
Effect_of_feed_quality_on_costs[Individual_hybrid,FarrowtoFinish] 
PG Hybrid WF: 
(Effect_of_feed_quality_on_costs[PG_hybrid,WeantoFinish]*(1-
PG_discount_for_bulk_ordering))*0.65 
Kyats/week SGMB and RG 
Sow feed costs Breeding_stock*"Feed_costs/sow" Kyats/week SGMB and RG 
Feed costs/sow Local: 1,212 
Hybrid: 9678 
PG: 9678*(1-PG_discount_for_bulk_ordering) 
Kyats/week SGMB and RG 
PG discount for bulk ordering 0.05 Percentage RG 
Effect of feed quality on costs =GRAPH(Feed_quality) 
(0.8500, 5000.0), (0.9000, 5500.0), (0.9500, 6000.0), (1.0000, 6500.0), (1.0500, 7000.0), 
(1.1000, 7500.0), (1.1500, 8000.0), (1.2000, 8500.0), (1.2500, 9000.0), (1.3000, 9500.0) 
Unitless RG 
Note: a Blank source denotes data or equations which were developed by the Researcher.  
Source: Pork VC model 
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 Table C4: Baseline data for farm investment and credit modules 
Structure Baseline Unit Source 
Stocks 






Loan capital in use by pig farmers 0 Kyats  
Upgrading loan capital requirements  0 Kyats  
Number of farmers with investment loans 0 Farmers  
Flows    
Injecting loan capital Repaying_loan Kyats/week  




Repaying loan DELAY(Providing_loans, MFI_loan_term) Kyats/week  
Defaulting on production loan SUM(Default_productive_loan_from_MFI) Kyats/week  
Defaulting on upgrading loan SUM(Default_investment_loan_from_MFI) Kyats/week  
Farmers taking investment loan Entering_pig_system*"Farm_set-up_costs" Kyats/week  
Paying off investment loans DELAY(Farmers_taking_investment_loan, Investment_loan_term)   
Taking loan Entering_pig_system Farmers  
Paying off loan DELAY(Taking_loan, "Investment_loan_term_(PG)") Farmers  
Variables    
Initial capital injection (kyat) "Initial_capital_injection_(USD)"*1500 Kyats  
Initial capital injection (USD) A1: 150000 
A1a: 300000 
US$  
Medium-term expected profitability of 
pig systems 
(Expected_revenue_with_investment-
Expected_cost_with_investment)/Expected_revenue_with_investment ELSE 0 
Kyats/week  
Effect of profitability on new entrants 
leaving pig farming 
= GRAPH("Medium-term_expected_profitability_of_pig_systems") 
(-1.000, 1.000), (-0.800, 0.700), (-0.600, 0.500), (-0.400, 0.300), (-0.200, 0.100), (0.000, 
0.000), (0.200, 0.000), (0.400, 0.000), (0.600, 0.000), (0.800, 0.000), (1.000, 0.000) 
Unitless SGMB and RG 





Default investment loan size IF Upgrading_loan_capital_requirements = 0 OR 




Default investment loan from MFI Proportion_of_investment_loans_covered_by_MFI*Default_investment_loan_size Kyats  
Default production loan size Average_production_loan_size*(Leaving_pig_farming) Kyats  
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Structure Baseline Unit Source 
Default productive loan from MFI Proportion_of_productive_loans_from_MFI*Default_production_loan_size[PG_hybrid,Farro
wtoFinish] 
Kyats  
Expected revenue with investment SMTH1(Total_farm_revenue/Pig_producers_in_each_farming_system, 
Time_to_adjust_to_revenue_and_costs) 
Kyats/week  




Time to adjust to revenue and costs 52 Weeks  
Loan costs for upgrading -PMT(Upgrading_interest_rate, Investment_loan_term, "Farm_set-up_costs", 0) Kyats/week  
Farm set-up costs Shelter+Equipment+Purchase_breeding_sow Kyats  
Shelter Local FF: 120000 
Local WF: 0 
Hybrid FF: 1125000 
Hybrid WF: 50000 
Kyats SGMB and RG 
Equipment Local FF: 10000 
Local WF: 0 
Hybrid FF: 50000 
Hybrid WF: 5,000 
Kyats SGMB and RG 
Purchase breeding sow Piglet_cost*4 Kyats SGMB and RG 
Upgrading loan repayments -PMT(Upgrading_interest_rate,Investment_loan_term, 
Upgrading_loan_capital_requirements, 0) 
Kyats/week  
Money lender interest rate (0.05*12)/52 Interest/ 
week 
SGMB and RG 
MFI interest rate (0.0246*12)/52 Interest/ 
week 
RG 





Proportion of investment loans covered 
by MFI 
IF Capital_requirements_for_farm_investments = 0 OR 
Capital_requirements_for_farm_investments < Available_loan_capital_from_formal_lenders 
















Money lender loan term 52 Weeks SGMB 
MFI loan term 66 Weeks RG 

















Note: a  Blank source denotes data or equations which were developed by the Researcher.  
Source: Pork VC model 
Table C5: Baseline data for knowledge module 
Structure Baseline Units Source 
Stock 






Flows    
Gaining knowledge  Learning_rate Per week  
Forgetting  Farmer_technical_knowledge*(Forgetting_rate/52) Per week  
Variables     
Initial knowledge level 0.1 Unitless  




Unitless Sterman (2000) 
Learning rate - upgrading -0.05 Unitless RG 




Structure Baseline Units Source 
Effect of knowledge on pig quality (Farmer_technical_knowledge/Initial_knowledge_level)^(LN(1-"Learning_rate_-
_quality")/LN(2)) 
Unitless Sterman (2000) 
Application of bio-security and hygiene 
measures 
IF Effect_of_knowledge_on_upgrading_decision < 1 THEN 1 ELSE 
Effect_of_knowledge_on_upgrading_decision 
Unitless  
Effects of bio-security and hygiene 
measures on animal health 
"Application_of_bio-security_and_hygiene_measures"*0.2 Unitless  
Learning rate - quality -0.02 Unitless RG 






Unitless Lie et al. (2018) 
Time to absorb 1 Week  
Knowledge absorption rate 0.5 Proportion RG 
Maximum knowledge available 1 Unitless  
Knowledge gap Maximum_knowledge_available-Farmer_technical_knowledge Unitless Lie et al. (2018) 
Percentage of farmers acquiring 






Percentage of farmers trained by LVBD 




Number of farmers/training Total_number_of_pig_farmers*Percentage_of_farmers_trained_by_LVBD_and_civil_society Farmers/ 
training 
RG 
Number of trainings/year 1 Trainings/ 
year 
RG 
Percentage of farmers acquiring 







Number of farmers/project training 25 Farmers RG 
Number of project trainings/year 26 Trainings/ 
year 
RG 
Weeks of training from project 156 Weeks RG 
Percentage of farmers acquiring 






Structure Baseline Units Source 
of_active_PG_members)*"Farmer_training_intervention_on_/_off"),Weeks_of_training_fro
m_PG) 
Number of PG trainings/year 26 Trainings RG 
Weeks of training from PG 1000 Weeks  
Number of farmers/PG training 10 Farmers RG 
Percentage of PG members acquiring 
knowledge from training 
Percentage_of_farmers_acquiring_knowledge_from_project_training+Percentage_of_farme
rs_acquiring_knowledge_from_PG_training 
PG members  




SGMB and RG 
Number of contacts with technically 
competent farmers 










Proportion of farmers educated by peers IF Number_of_farmers = 0 THEN 0 ELSE 
(Number_of_contacts_with_technically_competent_farmers*Proportion_of_contacts_result
ing_in_education)/Number_of_farmers 
Proportion  Reinker and 
Gralla, 2018 
Proportion of contacts resulting in 
education  
0.5 Proportion SGMB 
Note: a Blank source denotes data or equations which were developed by the Researcher.  
Source: Pork VC model 
Table C6: Baseline data for collective action module (PG portion) 
Structure  Baseline  Units Source 
Stocks 






Non-active PG members 0 Farmers  
PG cashflow 0 Kyats  
PG savings 0 Kyats  
PG rebates 0 Kyats  
Myeik demand for high-quality wholesale 
pork 
0.01 Proportion SGMB and RG 
Flows    
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Changing farming system PG WF: 







Leaving pig farming (PG) Leaving_pig_farming[PG_hybrid] Farmers/ 
week 
 















Kyats/ week  
PG costs PG_payment_to_members_for_pigs[PG_hybrid,FarrowtoFinish]+PG_payment_to_members
_for_pigs[PG_hybrid,WeantoFinish]+PG_operating_costs 
Kyats/ week  
Allocating rebates to PG members PG_payment_to_members_for_pigs[PG_hybrid,FarrowtoFinish]+PG_payment_to_members
_for_pigs[PG_hybrid,WeantoFinish]+PG_operating_costs 
Kyats/ week  
Paying rebates to PG members PG_rebates Kyats/ week  
Saving IF Maximum_flexible_cash > 0 AND PG_savings < Maximum_PG_savings THEN 
(PG_cashflow/DT-
PG_costs)*(MIN((PG_savings_rate+Effect_of_slaughterhouse_profits_on_savings), 1)) ELSE 
0 
Kyats/ week  
Investing in AHWs IF Gap_in_AHW_coverage > 0 THEN Gap_in_AHW_coverage*Cost_of_AHW ELSE 0 Kyats  
Investing in AI IF Gap_in_AI_capacity > 0 THEN Gap_in_AI_capacity*Cost_of_unit_investment_in_AI ELSE 0 Kyats  
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Structure  Baseline  Units Source 
Cashflow shortfall IF PG_cashflow < 0 THEN PG_savings ELSE 0 Kyats  




Change in demand for high-quality 




Variables    
Initial number of PG members 640 Pig producers RG 
PG forming STEP((Initial_number_of_PG_members/Time_to_form_PG*"PG_intervention_on_/_off"),1) 





Time to form PG 52 weeks RG 
Initial WF to FF ration 1/6 Proportion RG 
Time to recruit new members 26 Weeks RG 
Effect of PG capacity deficit on recruiting = GRAPH(Gap_between_production_capacity_and_supply_from_PG) 
(0.00, 0.0), (5.00, 10.0), (10.00, 20.0), (15.00, 30.0), (20.00, 40.0), (25.00, 50.0), (30.00, 60.0), 





Effect of profits on taking hiatus from PG = GRAPH(PG_member_profitability_versus_individual_farmers) 
(0.000, 1.000), (0.200, 0.700), (0.400, 0.400), (0.600, 0.200), (0.800, 0.100), (1.000, 0.000), 
(1.200, 0.000), (1.400, 0.000), (1.600, 0.000), (1.800, 0.000), (2.000, 0.000) 
Unitless  





Time to make PG decision 26 Weeks  
Effect of profit on re-joining PG = GRAPH(PG_member_profitability_versus_individual_farmers) 
(1.000, 0.100), (1.100, 0.200), (1.200, 0.400), (1.300, 0.700), (1.400, 1.000), (1.500, 1.000), 
(1.600, 1.000), (1.700, 1.000), (1.800, 1.000), (1.900, 1.000), (2.000, 1.000) 
Unitless SGMB 
Premium for high-quality fattener 0.05 Proportion RG 
PG high-quality fattener price Farmgate_price_of_live_pigs_in_target_villages*(1+"Premium_for_high-quality_fattener") Kyats/viss RG 




PG member rebate PG hybrid FF:  
IF Paying_rebates_to_PG_members >0 THEN 
FF_to_WF_ratio*Paying_rebates_to_PG_members ELSE 0 
PG hybrid WF: 
Kyats/week  
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Structure  Baseline  Units Source 
IF Paying_rebates_to_PG_members >0 THEN (1-
FF_to_WF_ratio)*Paying_rebates_to_PG_members ELSE 0 
PG payment to members for pigs PG  hybrid FF 














Desired balance  PG_costs*Desired_time_coverage Kyats McRoberts 
(2013) 
Desired time coverage 4 Weeks RG 
Maximum flexible cash PG_cashflow-Desired_balance Kyats McRoberts 
(2013) 
PG savings rate 0.1 Proportion  
Maximum PG savings 75000000 Kyats  
PG operating costs AHW_costs+Management_costs+Technical_support_costs Kyats  
AHW costs Cost_of_AHW_refresher_training*Number_of_AHWs Kyats/week  
Management costs SMTH1(((Volume_of_fatteners_through_PG)/100*(300000*DT)), 52) Kyats/week RG 
Technical support costs SMTH1(((Volume_of_fatteners_through_PG/200)*(200000*DT)), 52) Kyats/week RG 




Cost of AHW refresher training 10000/52 Kyats/week RG 
Increase in demand for high-quality pork 
in Myeik 
0.02/52 Proportion / 
week 
RG 
Note: a Blank source denotes data or equations which were developed by the Researcher. b The term “PG” is used in the table, but the same module structure is also used for the 
Scenario 3 (POs).  
Source: Pork VC model 
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Table C7: Baseline data for collective action module (PO structure) 
Structure Baseline Units Source 
Stocks    
PO slaughterhouse cashflow 0 Kyats a 








PO investment total 0 Kyats  
Strategic partner profits 0 Kyats  
Myeik demand for high-quality pork cuts 0.005 Proportion RG 
Yangon demand for high-quality pork cuts 625 Viss/week RG 





PO slaughterhouse production capacity PO_slaughterhouse_capacity Fatteners/ 
week 
 
Slaughterhouse experience level 0 Unitless  
Flows    
Paying dividend IF Slaughterhouse_maximum_flexible_cash > 0 THEN (PO_slaughterhouse_cashflow/DT)-
Slaughterhouse_costs ELSE 0 




Kyats/ week  
Slaughterhouse costs Butchering_and_packaging_costs+Marketing_costs+PO_slaughterhouse_production_costs+
Pig_purchasing_costs+Transport_costs 
Kyats/ week  













Structure Baseline Units Source 




PO investing in slaughterhouse Investing_in_PO_capacity Kyats/week  
Strategic partner change in profits Dividend_payment_to_strategic_partner*DT Kyats/week  
Change in demand for high-quality 






Change in demand for high-quality pork 




Change in demand for high-quality pork 




















Gaining experience Number_of_carcasses Unitless  
Variables    
Effect of slaughterhouse profits on 
savings 
= GRAPH(IF Gap_between_production_capacity_and_supply_from_PG > 0 THEN 0 ELSE 
"Medium-term_slaughterhouse_profit_margin") 
(0.000, 0.000), (0.100, 0.000), (0.200, 0.000), (0.300, 0.000), (0.400, 0.000), (0.500, 0.000), 
(0.600, 0.000), (0.700, 0.000), (0.800, 0.000), (0.900, 0.000), (1.000, 0.000), (1.100, 0.100), 
(1.200, 0.200), (1.300, 0.400), (1.400, 0.500), (1.500, 0.600), (1.600, 0.700), (1.700, 0.800), 
(1.800, 0.800), (1.900, 0.800), (2.000, 0.800) 
Unitless  
Effect of slaughterhouse profits on 
capacity investment  
= GRAPH(IF Gap_between_production_capacity_and_supply_from_PG > 0 THEN 0 ELSE 
"Medium-term_slaughterhouse_profit_margin") 
(0.000, 0.000), (0.100, 0.000), (0.200, 0.000), (0.300, 0.000), (0.400, 0.000), (0.500, 0.000), 
(0.600, 0.000), (0.700, 0.000), (0.800, 0.000), (0.900, 0.000), (1.000, 0.000), (1.100, 0.100), 
(1.200, 0.400), (1.300, 0.800), (1.400, 1.000), (1.500, 1.000), (1.600, 1.000), (1.700, 1.000), 
(1.800, 1.000), (1.900, 1.000), (2.000, 1.000) 
Unitless  
Dividend payment to PO members Paying_dividend*Slaughterhouse_profit_split Kyats  
Dividend payment to strategic partner (1-Slaughterhouse_profit_split)*Paying_dividend Kyats  
Slaughterhouse maximum flexible cash PO_slaughterhouse_cashflow-Slaughterhouse_desired_balance Kyats McRoberts 
(2013) 
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Structure Baseline Units Source 
Slaughterhouse desired balance Slaughterhouse_costs*Slaughterhouse_desired_coverage_time Kyats McRoberts 
(2013) 
Slaughterhouse desired coverage time 4 Weeks RG 





Kyats/ week  
PO slaughterhouse production costs (Labour+Electricity+Rent+Licence_fee)*Number_of_carcasses*Effect_of_experience_on_pr
oduction_costs 
Kyats/ week RG 
Labour 1000 Kyats/ carcass RG 
Electricity 23 Kyats/ carcass RG 
Rent 500 Kyats/ carcass RG 
Licence fee 13000 Kyats/ carcass RG 







Marketing costs "Marketing_costs/viss"*(Myeik_premium_pork_sales+Yangon_premium_pork_cuts_sales) Kyats/week  
Marketing costs/viss 100 Kyats/viss RG 
Butchering and packaging costs "Butchering_and_packaging_costs/viss"*(Myeik_premium_pork_sales+Yangon_premium_p
ork_cuts_sales) 
Kyats/week  




Myeik transport costs/viss 50 Kyats/viss RG 
Yangon transport costs/viss 300 Kyats/viss RG 
Yangon premium 0.35 Proportion RG 
Revenue from high-quality pork cuts in 
Yangon 
"Yangon_pork_products_price/viss"*Yangon_premium_pork_cuts_sales Kyats/week  
Yangon pork cuts price/viss Government_fixed_pork_price_ceiling*(1+Yangon_premium) Kyats/viss RG 




Structure Baseline Units Source 














Carcass weight Fattener_live_weight[PG_hybrid,FarrowtoFinish]*Conversion_ratio Viss  







Proportion of carcass for premium cuts 
(Myeik) 
0.3 Proportion RG 
Myeik premium pork sales Number_of_carcasses_allocated_to_Myeik_premium_cuts*Carcass_weight*"Proportion_of
_carcass_for_premium_cuts_(Myeik)" 
Viss/week  
Revenue from high-quality pork cuts in 
Myeik 
Myeik_premium_pork_sales*"Myeik_pork_cuts_price/viss" Kyats/week  
Myeik pork cuts price/viss Government_fixed_pork_price_ceiling*(1+Myeik_premium) Kyats/viss  
Myeik premium 0.15 Proportion RG 
Myeik premium for wholesale high-
quality market  
0.1 Proportion RG 
Revenue from high-quality wholesale 






Standard wholesale price Government_fixed_pork_price_ceiling*Price_conversion_wholesale_pork_to_carcass Kyats RG 






Medium-term slaughterhouse profit 
margin 
SMTH1(PO_slaughterhousee_profit_margin, Time_to_adjust_to_slaughterhouse_profits) Unitless  






Unit cost of slaughterhouse capacity 715*1500 Kyats/ 
fattener 
RG 
Capacity acquisition delay 12 Weeks RG 
Time to depreciate 30*52 Weeks RG 
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Structure Baseline Units Source 
Strategic partner investment Initial_investment_requirement Kyats  
Minimum slaughterhouse capacity 35 Fatteners/ 
week 
RG 
Initial investment requirement  Minimum_slaughterhouse_capacity*Unit_cost_of_slaughterhouse_capacity Kyats  






Slaughterhouse profit split  IF TIME < (Slaughterhouse_start_time+52) THEN 0 ELSE 
PO_investment_total/(Initial_investment_requirement+PO_investment_total) 
Proportion  
Initial production level 5000 Carcasses  
Effect of experience levels on production 
costs 
IF Slaughterhouse_experence_level > 1000 THEN 
(Slaughterhouse_experence_level/Initial_production_level)^(LN(1-"Learning_curve_effect_-
_production_costs")/LN(2)) ELSE 1 
Proportion  
Learning curve effect – production costs 0.02 Unitless  
PO slaughterhouse short-term expected 
profit margin 
SMTH1(PO_slaughterhousee_profit_margin, Time_to_adjust_to_Slaughterhouse_profit) Unitless  
Indicated slaughterhouse capacity 
utilisation  
= GRAPH("PO_slaughterhouse_short-term_expected_profit_margin") 
(0.000, 0.000), (0.100, 0.000), (0.200, 0.000), (0.300, 0.000), (0.400, 0.000), (0.500, 0.000), 
(0.600, 0.000), (0.700, 0.300), (0.800, 0.500), (0.900, 0.700), (1.000, 0.800), (1.100, 0.900), 
(1.200, 0.950), (1.300, 0.975), (1.400, 1.000), (1.500, 1.000), (1.600, 1.000), (1.700, 1.000), 
(1.800, 1.000), (1.900, 1.000), (2.000, 1.000) 
Unitless RG 





Time to change slaughterhouse 
production capacity  
1 Week  
Gap between production capacity and 
supply from PG 
PO_slaughterhouse_production_capacity-(SMTH1(Volume_of_fatteners_through_PG, 52)) Fatteners/ 
week 
 
PO slaughterhouse profit margin Slaughterhouse_revenue/Slaughterhouse_costs Unitless  




Fatteners ordered for high-quality pork 
cuts 








Structure Baseline Units Source 
High-quality wholesale pork order from 
slaughterhouse 
IF "Wholesale_requirement_for_high-quality_fatteners" < 
(PO_slaughterhouse_production_capacity-"Fatteners_ordered_for_high-quality_pork_cuts") 












Proportion of carcass for premium cuts 
(Yangon) 
0.3 Proportion RG 











Order adjustment time 4 Weeks  










Increase in Yangon Demand 0.06/52 Growth/ 
week 
 
Note: a Blank source denotes data or equations which were developed by the Researcher.  
Source: Pork VC model 
Table C8: Model data for AHW scenario 
Structure Data Units Source 
Stocks    
Supply line of AHW Capacity 0 AHWs a 
Number of AHWs 4 AHWs SGMB 
AHW knowledge 0.1 Unitless  
Flows    
Recruiting new AHWs IF TIME = 1 THEN (Initial_number_of_AHWs_recruited_by_project-Number_of_AHWs)/DT 
ELSE (Investing_in_AHWs/Cost_of_AHW) 
AHWs/ week RG 
Adding new AHWs DELAY(Recruiting_new_AHWs, Time_to_train_AHW) AHWs/ week  
AHWs exiting Number_of_AHWs*AHW_dropout_rate AHW/ week  
AHWs gaining knowledge AHW_learning_rate Unitless  
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Structure Data Units Source 
AHWs forgetting  AHW_knowledge*(AHW_forgetting_rate/52) Unitless  
Variables    
Number of AHWs/project training IF Number_of_AHWs > 32 THEN 32 ELSE Number_of_AHWs AHWs/ 
training 
RG 
Weeks of AHW training from project/PG S1: 156 
S2 and S3: 752 
Weeks  
Percentage of AHWs acquiring knowledge 







Number of AHW project trainings/year 4 Trainings/ 
year 
RG 
Percentage of AHWs trained by LVBD and 
civil society 
0.05 Proportion / 
year 
RG 
AHW learning rate ((Percentage_of_AHWs_acquiring_knowledge_from_trainings)*AHW_knowledge_gap*AHW
_kowledge_absorption_rate)/AHW_time_to_absorb 
Unitless Lie et al (2018) 
AHW time to absorb  1 Weeks  
AHW knowledge absorption rate 0.5 Proportion  
AHW knowledge gap AHW_maximum_knowledge_available-AHW_knowledge Unitless  
AHW maximum knowledge available  1 Unitless  
AHW forgetting rate 0.05 Proportion  
Time to train AHW 12 Weeks RG 
Gap in AHW coverage SMTH1((Total_number_of_pigs_in_system/Capacity_of_each_AHW)-
(Number_of_AHWs+Supply_line_of_AHW_capacity), 52) ELSE 0 
AHWs  
AHW dropout rate 0.1/52 AHWs/ week RG 





Capacity of each AHW 140 Pigs RG 
Reduction in disease effects 0.6 Proportion RG 
Effectiveness of AHW Proportion_of_pigs_covered_by_AHW*AHW_knowledge Proportion  
Costs of AHW 15,000 Kyats/ AHW RG 
Effect of AHWs on reducing mortality Effectiveness_of_AHWs*Reduction_in_disease_effects Proportion  
Note: a Blank source denotes data or equations which were developed by the Researcher.  
Source: Pork VC model 
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Table C9: Model data for AI scenario 
Structure Data Units Source 
Stocks    
Supply line of AI capacity 0 Inseminations
/week 
a 
AI capacity  0 Inseminations
/week 
 
AI subsidy required by project 0 US$  
Flows    





Increasing Ai capacity DELAY(Initiating_new_AI_capacity, Time_to_establish_AI_centre) Inseminations
/week 
 
Declining AI capacity AI_capacity/Depreciation_of_AI_centre Inseminations
/week 
 
Requiring AI subsidy  (Project_subsidy_for_AI*Fertilisation_events_covered_by_AI)/1500 US$/week  
Variables     
AI centre capacity 20 Inseminations
/ week 
 
Cost of unit investment in AI 112500 Kyats RG 
Time to establish AI centre 26 Weeks RG 
Number of AI workers AI_capacity/20 Workers RG 
Depreciation of AI centre 30*52 Weeks RG 





Proportion of fertilisation events covered 
by AI centre 
MIN((AI_capacity/"Total_number_of_fertilisation_events/week"), 1) Proportion  





Transport fees Fertilisation_events_covered_by_AI*3000 Kyats RG 
Labour charges AI_capacity/20*(15000*7) Kyats/week RG 
AI veterinary services (AI_capacity/20)*(6000/52) Kyats/week RG 
Boar Feed ((AI_capacity/20)*720000)/52 Kyats/week RG 
Boar replacement costs ((500000/20)*AI_capacity)/156 Kyats/week RG 
AI maintenance  (67500/52) Kyats/week  
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Structure Data Units Source 
Total costs for AI Boar_feed+Labour_charges+AI_veterinary_services+AI_maintenance+Transport_fees+Boar_
replacement_costs 
Kyats  





Project subsidy for AI Break_even_fee_for_Hyrbid_AI_services-AI_costs Kyats  
Note: a Blank source denotes data or equations which were developed by the Researcher.  



















Table D1: Comparison of aggregate profits of all pig producers between standard model baseline (disease) and no disease alternative scenario  
Scenario Short-term Medium-term Long-term 
 Disease 
US$ 








Rank No disease 
US$ 
Rank 
Baseline 842,965  916,551  1,866,956  2,085,929  3,043,266  3,481,062  
Scenario 1: Individual Producers             
S1.A1: Microcredit $150K 

























S1.A2: Training 945,149 3 1,015,575 2c 2,089,817 3 2,318,872 2c 3,452,985 2 3,869,751 2 
S1.A3: AHWs 975,574 2 985,362 4d 2,139,809 2 2,228,807 4d 3,420,022 3 3,685,918 4d 
S1.A4: AI 919,824 4 988,827 3c 2,027,026 4 2,253,035 3c 3,353,877 4 3,751,547 3c 
S1.A5: Combination 1,382,303 1 1,404,149 1 3,214,879 2 3,290,741 3 5,441,792 3 5,754,571 3 
Scenario 2: Producer Groups             
S2.A1: Microcredit $150K 

























S2.A2: Training 800,067 3 917,502 2c 2,141,964 3 2,534,206 2c 4,062,055 2 4,741,968 2 
S2.A3: AHWs 819,634 2 899,542 3d 2,210,552 1 2,452,196 3d 4,103,582 1 4,536,085 3d 
S2.A4: AI 769,025 4 885,542 4 2,044,762 4 2,408,630 4 3,812,834 4 4,432,642 4 
S2.A5: Combination 1,022,314 3 1,097.108 3 3,199,340 3 3,495,536 2c 7,063,532 2 7,730,747 2 
Scenario 3: Producer Organisations             
S3.A1: Microcredit $150K 

























S3.A2: Training 804,249 3 921,685 2c 2,754,454 3 3,266,382 3 7,153,488 2 8,745,170 2 
S3.A3: AHWs 823,966 2 903,711 3d 2,955,368 1 3,269,390 2d 8,166,828 1 9,079,268 1 
S3.A4: AI 773,044 4 889,609 4 2,658,302 4 3,155,488 4 6,890,234 3 8,615,219 4d 
S3.A5: Combination 1,026,296 2 1,100,818 2 4,033,651 1 4,418,050 1 11,205,559 1 12,049,246 1 
Note: a Rank for S1.A5, S2.A5, and S3.A5: Combination refers to the ranking of the three (S1, S2, and S3) institutional scenarios. b Value in parentheses denotes that ranking of the 
sub activity A1.2. c indicates rankings that have improved in the alternative scenario compared with the standard model run. d indicates rankings that have worsened in the 
alternative scenario compared with the standard model run. 





Table D2: Comparison of number of pig producers in highly profitable systems between standard model baseline (disease) and no disease alternative scenario 
Scenario Short-term Medium-term Long-term 
 Disease 
Number 








Rank No disease 
Number 
Rank 
Baseline 379  353  441  401  464  489  
Scenario 1: Individual Producers             
S1.A1: Microcredit $150K 

























S1.A2: Training 399 2 370 2 495 2 448 2 522 2 565 2 
S1.A3: AHWs 389 3 366 3 457 3 427 3 507 3 522 3 
S1.A4: AI 380 4 353 4 449 4 401 4 483 4 489 4 
S1.A5: Combination 480 1 449 1 639 2 622 2 710 3 799 2c 
Scenario 2: Producer Groups             
S2.A1: Microcredit $150K 

























S2.A2: Training 344 1 321 1 398 1 391 1 474 1 532 1 
S2.A3: AHWs 343 2 320 3d 378 4 371 4 449 4 507 2c 
S2.A4: AI 343 2 321 4 389 3 376 3 451 3 502 4 
S2.A5: Combination 397 2 370 3d 549 3 554 3 712 2 768 3d 
Scenario 3: Producer Organisations             
S3.A1: Microcredit $150K 

























S3.A2: Training 343 1 321 1 550 2 567 1c 751 2 914 2 
S3.A3: AHWs 343 1 320 4d 556 1 567 1 882 1 915 1 
S3.A4: AI 343 1 321 1 540 3 561 4 722 3 911 3 
S3.A5: Combination 399 1 394 2c 684 1 691 1 877 1 899 1 
Note: a Rank for S1.A5, S2.A5, and S3.A5: Combination refers to the ranking of the three (S1, S2, and S3) institutional scenarios. b Value in parentheses denotes that ranking of the 
sub activity A1.2. c indicates rankings that have improved in the alternative scenario compared with the standard model run. d indicates rankings that have worsened in the 
alternative scenario compared with the standard model run. 




Table D3: Comparison of aggregate profits of all pig producers between standard model baseline (disease) and disease and import ban alternative scenario 




















Baseline 842,965  911,040  1,866,956  2,089,426  3,043,266  3,624,170  
Scenario 1: Individual Producers             
S1.A1: Microcredit $150K 

























S1.A2: Training 945,149 3 1,021,180 3 2,089,817 3 2,346,787 3 3,452,985 2 4,165,739 3d 
S1.A3: AHWs 975,574 2 1,092,817 2 2,139,809 2 2,507,445 2 3,420,022 3 4,373,948 2c 
S1.A4: AI 919,824 4 989,420 4 2,027,026 4 2,256,803 4 3,353,877 4 4,005,632 4 
S1.A5: Combination 1,382,303 1 1,497,763 1 3,214,879 2 3,821,433 3d 5,441,792 3 7,123,553 3 
Scenario 2: Producer Groups             
S2.A1: Microcredit $150K 

























S2.A2: Training 800,067 3 878,554 3 2,141,964 3 2,527,423 3 4,062,055 2 5,260,434 2 
S2.A3: AHWs 819,634 2 926,013 1c 2,210,552 1 2,720,259 1 4,103,582 1 5,919,426 1 
S2.A4: AI 769,025 4 848,061 4 2,044,762 4 2,366,537 4 3,812,834 4 4,837,803 4 
S2.A5: Combination 1,022,314 3 1,146,668 3 3,199,340 3 3,943,578 2c 7,063,532 2 9,734,560 2 
Scenario 3: Producer Organisations             
S3.A1: Microcredit $150K 

























S3.A2: Training 804,249 3 885,840 3 2,754,454 3 3,075,180 2c 7,153,488 2 8,099,521 2 
S3.A3: AHWs 823,966 2 932,227 1c 2,955,368 1 3,365,975 1 8,166,828 1 9,398,295 1 
S3.A4: AI 773,044 4 852,667 4 2,658,302 4 2,932,816 4 6,890,234 3 7,711,214 4d 
S3.A5: Combination 1,026,296 2 1,152,521 2 4,033,651 1 4,512,945 1 11,205,559 1 12,699,075 1 
Note: a Rank for S1.A5, S2.A5, and S3.A5: Combination refers to the ranking of the three (S1, S2, and S3) institutional scenarios. b Value in parentheses denotes that ranking of the 
sub activity A1.2. c indicates rankings that have improved in the alternative scenario compared with the standard model run. d indicates rankings that have worsened in the 
alternative scenario compared with the standard model run. 
Source: Pork VC model simulation  
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Table D4: Comparison of number of pig producers in highly profitable systems between standard model baseline (disease) and disease and import ban 
alternative scenario 




















Baseline 379  375  441  443  464  521  
Scenario 1: Individual Producers             
S1.A1: Microcredit $150K 

























S1.A2: Training 399 2 395 2 495 2 504 2 522 2 606 2 
S1.A3: AHWs 389 3 392 3 457 3 491 3 507 3 599 3 
S1.A4: AI 380 4 375 4 449 4 456 4 483 4 547 4 
S1.A5: Combination 480 1 508 1 639 2 704 1c 710 3 842 2c 
Scenario 2: Producer Groups             
S2.A1: Microcredit $150K 

























S2.A2: Training 344 1 343 2d 398 1 424 2d 474 1 600 2d 
S2.A3: AHWs 343 2 344 1c 378 4 444 1c 449 4 665 1c 
S2.A4: AI 343 2 339 4 389 3 411 4 451 3 566 3c 
S2.A5: Combination 397 3 394 2c 549 3 608 3 712 2 831 3d 
Scenario 3: Producer Organisations             
S3.A1: Microcredit $150K 

























S3.A2: Training 343 1 340 2 550 2 562 2 751 2 824 2 
S3.A3: AHWs 343 1 343 1c 556 1 586 1 882 1 847 1 
S3.A4: AI 343 1 339 3 540 3 556 3 722 3 804 3 
S3.A5: Combination 399 2 394 2 684 1 702 2d 877 1 899 1 
Note: a Rank for S1.A5, S2.A5, and S3.A5: Combination refers to the ranking of the three (S1, S2, and S3) institutional scenarios. b Value in parentheses denotes that ranking of the 
sub activity A1.2. c indicates rankings that have improved in the alternative scenario compared with the standard model run. d indicates rankings that have worsened in the 
alternative scenario compared with the standard model run. 
Source: Pork VC model simulation  
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Table D5: Comparison of aggregate profits of all pig producers between standard model baseline (disease) and disease with random outbreaks alternative 
scenario 















Baseline 842,965  852,195  1,866,956  1,782,994  3,043,266  3,132,999  
Scenario 1: Individual producers             
S1.A1: Microcredit $150K 1,087,576 1 1,109,973 1 2,380,011 1 2,288,328 1 3,940,949 1 3,983,260 1 
S1.A1.2: Microcredit $300K 1,261,361 (1)b 1,306,491 (1) 2,877,423 (1) 2,762,843 (1) 4,897,681 (1) 4,892,440 (1) 
S1.A2: Training 945,149 3 952,911 3 2,089,817 3 2,007,043 3 3,452,985 2 3,528,256 2 
S1.A3: AHWs 975,574 2 974,939 2 2,139,809 2 2,083,314 2 3,420,022 3 3,517,354 3 
S1.A4: AI 919,824 4 927,105 4 2,027,026 4 1,947,769 4 3,353,877 4 3,439,331 4 
S1.A5: Combination 1,382,303 1 1,391,133 1 3,214,879 2 3,129,359 3d 5,441,792 3 5,543,415 3 
Scenario 2: Producer groups             
S2.A1: Microcredit $150K 830,903 1 850,807 1 2,171,795 2 2,123,141 2 4,021,996 3 4,136,818 3 
S2.A1.2: Microcredit $300K 917,148 (1) 948,617 (1) 2,475,852 (1) 2,397,766 (1) 4,692,074 (1) 4,820,992 (1) 
S2.A2: Training 800,067 3 817,835 3 2,141,964 3 2,095,628 3 4,062,055 2 4,218,095 2 
S2.A3: AHWs 819,634 2 833,417 2 2,210,552 1 2,182,154 1 4,103,582 1 4,226,675 1 
S2.A4: AI 769,025 4 785,818 4 2,044,762 4 1,995,047 4 3,812,834 4 3,962,532 4 
S2.A5: Combination 1,022,314 3 1,036,060 3 3,199,340 3 3,237,616 2c 7,063,532 2 7,199,273 2 
Scenario 3: Producer organisations             
S3.A1: Microcredit $150K 835,051 1 854,967 1 2,754,206 2 2,664,583 2 6,835,205 4 7,074,474 4 
S3.A1.2: Microcredit $300K 921,469 (1) 952,276 (1) 3,145,440 (1) 3,019,440 (1) 7,730,822 (2) 8,003,267 (2) 
S3.A2: Training 804,249 3 821,992 3 2,754,454 3 2,658,014 3 7,153,488 2 7,412,300 2 
S3.A3: AHWs 823,966 2 837,589 2 2,955,368 1 2,943,097 1 8,166,828 1 8,389,438 1 
S3.A4: AI 773,044 4 789,881 4 2,658,302 4 2,579,189 4 6,890,234 3 7,252,798 3 
S3.A5: Combination 1,026,296 2 1,039,818 2 4,033,651 1 3,995,128 1 11,205,559 1 11,418,916 1 
Note: a Rank for S1.A5, S2.A5, and S3.A5: Combination refers to the ranking of the three (S1, S2, and S3) institutional scenarios. b Value in parentheses denotes that ranking of the 
sub activity A1.2. c indicates rankings that have improved in the alternative scenario compared with the standard model run. d indicates rankings that have worsened in the 
alternative scenario compared with the standard model run. 




Table D6: Comparison of number of pig producers in highly profitable systems producers between standard model baseline (disease) and disease with random 
outbreaks alternative scenario 

















Baseline 379  362  441  372  464  484  
Scenario 1: Individual producers             
S1.A1: Microcredit $150K 420 1 402 1 539 1 406 1 550 1 590 1 
S1.A1.2: Microcredit $300K 477 (1)b 455 (1) 635 (1) 471 (1) 636 (1) 704 (1) 
S1.A2: Training 399 2 383 2 495 2 397 3d 522 2 548 2 
S1.A3: AHWs 389 3 378 3 457 3 422 2c 507 3 536 3 
S1.A4: AI 380 4 362 4 449 4 370 4 483 4 493 4 
S1.A5: Combination 480 1 465 1 639 2 567 2 710 3 763 2c 
Scenario 2: Producer groups             
S2.A1: Microcredit $150K 343 2 332 1c 394 2 365 2 453 2 495 4d 
S2.A1.2: Microcredit $300K 363 (1) 347 (1) 435 (1) 399 (1) 512 (1) 564 (1) 
S2.A2: Training 344 1 332 1 398 1 375 1 474 1 531 1 
S2.A3: AHWs 343 2 331 2 378 4 363 4 449 4 504 3c 
S2.A4: AI 343 2 332 1c 389 3 364 3 451 3 508 2c 
S2.A5: Combination 399 3 383 3 549 3 525 3 712 2 750 3d 
Scenario 3: Producer organisations             
S3.A1: Microcredit $150K 343 1 332 1 534 4 448 4 699 4 778 4 
S3.A1.2: Microcredit $300K 363 (1) 349 (1) 575 (1) 484 (2d) 853 (2) 894 (2) 
S3.A2: Training 343 1 332 1 550 2 472 2 751 2 807 2 
S3.A3: AHWs 343 1 332 1 556 1 524 1 882 1 905 1 
S3.A4: AI 343 1 332 1 540 3 458 3 722 3 797 3 
S3.A5: Combination 399 2 385 2 684 1 654 1 877 1 897 1 
Note: a Rank for S1.A5, S2.A5, and S3.A5: Combination refers to the ranking of the three (S1, S2, and S3) institutional scenarios. b Value in parentheses denotes that ranking of the 
sub activity A1.2. c indicates rankings that have improved in the alternative scenario compared with the standard model run. d indicates rankings that have worsened in the 
alternative scenario compared with the standard model run. 
Source: Pork VC model simulation  
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Table D7: Comparisons of aggregate profits of all pig Producers between standard model and increased responsiveness of producers alternative scenario 


























Baseline 842,965  967,396  1,866,956  2,262,879  3,043,266  4,088,431  
Scenario 1: Individual Producers             
S1.A1: Microcredit $150K 

























S1.A2: Training 945,149 3 1,056,005 3 2,089,817 3 2,637,265 2c 3,452,985 2 4,870,883 2 
S1.A3: AHWs 975,574 2 1,125,296 2 2,139,809 2 2,628,087 3d 3,420,022 3 4,642,841 3 
S1.A4: AI 919,824 4 1,050,922 4 2,027,026 4 2,526,261 4 3,353,877 4 4,597,437 4 
S1.A5: Combination 1,382,303 1 1,525,388 1 3,214,879 2 3,872,171 3d 5,441,792 3 7,041,153 3 
Scenario 2: Producer Groups             
S2.A1: Microcredit $150K 

























S2.A2: Training 800,067 3 810,311 3 2,141,964 3 2,607,154 2c 4,062,055 2 5,730,216 2 
S2.A3: AHWs 819,634 2 838,843 1c 2,210,552 1 2,628,380 1 4,103,582 1 5,782,979 1 
S2.A4: AI 769,025 4 789,625 4 2,044,762 4 2,473,802 4 3,812,834 4 5,357,445 3c 
S2.A5: Combination 1,022,314 3 1,054,453 3 3,199,340 3 4,043,304 2c 7,063,532 2 9,734,560 2 
Scenario 3: Producer Organisations             
S3.A1: Microcredit $150K 

























S3.A2: Training 804,249 3 820,716 3 2,754,454 3 3,534,568 2c 7,153,488 2 10,241,990 2 
S3.A3: AHWs 823,966 2 843,614 1c 2,955,368 1 3,717,568 1 8,166,828 1 11,739,481 1 
S3.A4: AI 773,044 4 796,877 4 2,658,302 4 3,384,639 4 6,890,234 3 10,097,423 3 
S3.A5: Combination 1,026,296 2 1,060,053 2 4,033,651 1 5,385,378 1 11,205,559 1 15,715,394 1 
Note: a Rank for S1.A5, S2.A5, and S3.A5: Combination refers to the ranking of the three (S1, S2, and S3) institutional scenarios. b Value in parentheses denotes that ranking of the 
sub activity A1.2. c indicates rankings that have improved in the alternative scenario compared with the standard model run. d indicates rankings that have worsened in the 
alternative scenario compared with the standard model run. 
Source: Pork VC model simulation  
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Table D8: Comparisons of number of pig producers in highly profitable systems between standard model and increased responsiveness of producers 
alternative scenario 























Baseline 379  469  441  642  464  544  
Scenario 1: Individual Producers             
S1.A1: Microcredit $150K 

























S1.A2: Training 399 2 522 2 495 2 731 1c 522 2 615 2 
S1.A3: AHWs 389 3 490 3 457 3 690 3 507 3 710 1c 
S1.A4: AI 380 4 482 4 449 4 665 4 483 4 562 4 
S1.A5: Combination 480 1 640 1 639 2 887 2 710 3 847 2c 
Scenario 2: Producer Groups             
S2.A1: Microcredit $150K 

























S2.A2: Training 344 1 431 1 398 1 570 1 474 1 625 2d 
S2.A3: AHWs 343 2 416 4d 378 4 533 3c 449 4 638 1c 
S2.A4: AI 343 2 428 2 389 3 557 2c 451 3 580 3c 
S2.A5: Combination 397 2 502 3d 549 3 746 3 712 2 816 3d 
Scenario 3: Producer Organisations             
S3.A1: Microcredit $150K 

























S3.A2: Training 343 1 426 1 550 2 764 2 751 2 859 2 
S3.A3: AHWs 343 1 418 3d 556 1 770 1 882 1 876 1 
S3.A4: AI 343 1 425 2d 540 3 767 3 722 3 858 3 
S3.A5: Combination 399 2 504 2c 684 1 929 1 877 1 853 1 
Note: a Rank for S1.A5, S2.A5, and S3.A5: Combination refers to the ranking of the three (S1, S2, and S3) institutional scenarios. b Value in parentheses denotes that ranking of the 
sub activity A1.2. c indicates rankings that have improved in the alternative scenario compared with the standard model run. d indicates rankings that have worsened in the 
alternative scenario compared with the standard model run. 
Source: Pork VC model simulation  
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Table D9: Comparisons of aggregate profits of all pig Producers between standard model and decreased responsiveness of producers alternative scenario 


























Baseline 842,965  668,146  1,866,956  1,452,233  3,043,266  2,307,633  
Scenario 1: Individual Producers             
S1.A1: Microcredit $150K 

























S1.A2: Training 945,149 3 749,994 3 2,089,817 3 1,625,183 3 3,452,985 2 2,550,035 2 
S1.A3: AHWs 975,574 2 776,666 2 2,139,809 2 1,665,183 2 3,420,022 3 2,582,775 3 
S1.A4: AI 919,824 4 719,588 4 2,027,026 4 1,566,683 4 3,353,877 4 2,502,142 4 
S1.A5: Combination 1,382,303 1 1,196,188 1 3,214,879 2 2,552,802 2 5,441,792 3 3,975,661 3 
Scenario 2: Producer Groups             
S2.A1: Microcredit $150K 

























S2.A2: Training 800,067 3 617,434 3 2,141,964 3 1,671,833 3 4,062,055 2 2,870,973 3d 
S2.A3: AHWs 819,634 2 635,695 2 2,210,552 1 1,714,423 2d 4,103,582 1 2,946,162 2d 
S2.A4: AI 769,025 4 584,941 4 2,044,762 4 1,563,507 4 3,812,834 4 2,691,128 4 
S2.A5: Combination 1,022,314 3 855,035 3 3,199,340 3 2,354,848 3 7,063,532 2 4,436,988 2 
Scenario 3: Producer Organisations             
S3.A1: Microcredit $150K 

























S3.A2: Training 804,249 3 625,163 3 2,754,454 3 1,984,498 3 7,153,488 2 4,113,148 3d 
S3.A3: AHWs 823,966 2 638,972 2 2,955,368 1 2,092,213 2d 8,166,828 1 4,675,666 1 
S3.A4: AI 773,044 4 592,134 4 2,658,302 4 1,869,192 4 6,890,234 3 3,770,819 4d 
S3.A5: Combination 1,026,296 2 858,246 2 4,033,651 1 2,783,239 1 11,205,559 1 6,862,214 1 
Note: a Rank for S1.A5, S2.A5, and S3.A5: Combination refers to the ranking of the three (S1, S2, and S3) institutional scenarios. b Value in parentheses denotes that ranking of the 
sub activity A1.2. c indicates rankings that have improved in the alternative scenario compared with the standard model run. d indicates rankings that have worsened in the 
alternative scenario compared with the standard model run. 






Table D10: Comparisons of number of pig producers in highly profitable systems between standard model and decreased responsiveness of producers 
alternative scenario 























Baseline 379  352  441  352  464  352  
Scenario 1: Individual Producers             
S1.A1: Microcredit $150K 

























S1.A2: Training 399 2 352 2 495 2 353 2 522 2 361 2 
S1.A3: AHWs 389 3 352 2c 457 3 352 3 507 3 353 4d 
S1.A4: AI 380 4 352 2c 449 4 352 3c 483 4 354 3c 
S1.A5: Combination 480 1 273 3d 639 2 415 2 710 2 454 2 
Scenario 2: Producer Groups             
S2.A1: Microcredit $150K 

























S2.A2: Training 344 1 173 3d 398 1 278 2d 474 1 290 2d 
S2.A3: AHWs 343 2 278 1c 378 4 278 2c 449 4 282 3c 
S2.A4: AI 343 2 173 3d 389 3 278 2c 451 3 283 4d 
S2.A5: Combination 397 2 279 2 549 3 329 3 704 3 407 3 
Scenario 3: Producer Organisations             
S3.A1: Microcredit $150K 

























S3.A2: Training 343 1 173 3 550 2 316 3d 751 2 425 2 
S3.A3: AHWs 343 1 278 1 556 1 329 1 882 1 476 1 
S3.A4: AI 343 1 173 3 540 3 309 4d 722 3 397 4d 
S3.A5: Combination 399 2 280 1c 684 1 425 1 877 1 631 1 
Note: a Rank for S1.A5, S2.A5, and S3.A5: Combination refers to the ranking of the three (S1, S2, and S3) institutional scenarios. b Value in parentheses denotes that ranking of the 
sub activity A1.2. c indicates rankings that have improved in the alternative scenario compared with the standard model run. d indicates rankings that have worsened in the 
alternative scenario compared with the standard model run. 
Source: Pork VC model simulation  
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Table D11: Comparison of aggregate profits of all pig producers in ASF outbreak and ASF outbreak with two-year delay alternative scenarios 


























Baseline 401,177  842,965  1,325,393  1,203,111  1,862,715  1,575,269  
Scenario 1: Individual producers             
S1.A1: Microcredit $150K 573,486 3 1,122,532 1c 1,150,238 3 1,513,807 2c 1,458,516 3 1,883,131 2c 
S1.A1.2: Microcredit $300K 672,217 (4)b 845,630 (4) 999,860 (4) 1,203,111 (4) 1,251,237 (4) 1,578,896 (4) 
S1.A2: Biosecurity 976,952 1 1,098,584 2d 2,163,755 1 1,927,932 1 3,143,634 1 2,852,429 1 
S1.A4: AI 463,054 2 922,472 3 1,356,512 2 1,313,007 3d 1,936,144 2 1,724,060 3d 
S1.A5: Combination 1,198,247 1 1,416,822 1 2,503,514 3 1,984,487 3 3,770,806 3 2,781,030  
Scenario 2: Producer groups             
S2.A1: Microcredit $150K 295,378 2 822,611 2 1,535,276 2 1,412,896 2 2,224,667 2 1,917,063 2 
S2.A1.2: Microcredit $300K 360,194 (2) 910,240 (1) 1,752,904 (2) 1,172,844 (2) 2,759,177 (2) 1,492,302 (4d) 
S2.A2: Training 565,780 1 889,178 1 2,241,898 1 2,001,555 1 4,664,053 1 3,312,393 1 
S2.A4: Biosecurity 248,049 3 760,922 3 1,363,685 3 1,250,932 3 2,145,941 3 1,704,329 3 
S2.A5: Combination 738,431 3 1,013,462 2c 2,044,762 2 2,603,639 2 6,299,043 2 4,525,530 2 
Scenario 3: Producer organisations             
S3.A1: Microcredit $150K 309,509 2 791,326 2 2,000,210 2 1,270,684 3d 3,199,039 2 1,967,736 3d 
S3.A1.2: Microcredit $300K 375,956 (2) 891,257 (1) 2,267,309 (2) 1,258,965 (3) 3,484,176 (2) 1,551,461 (4) 
S3.A2: Biosecurity 568,575 1 866,111 1 3,009,714 1 2,504,485 1 8,558,098 1 6,756,886 1 
S3.A4: AI 250,426 3 729,767 3 1,743,761 3 1,357,976 2c 2,813,527 3 2,149,627 2c 
S3.A5: Combination 745,336 2 993,834 3d 3,716,863 1 3,070,999 1 10,174,486 1 8,329,249 1 
Note: a Rank for S1.A5, S2.A5, and S3.A5: Combination refers to the ranking of the three (S1, S2, and S3) institutional scenarios. b Value in parentheses denotes that ranking of the 
sub activity A1.2. c indicates rankings that have improved in the alternative scenario compared with the standard model run. d indicates rankings that have worsened in the 
alternative scenario compared with the standard model run. 





Table D12: Comparison of number of pig producers in highly profitable systems in ASF outbreak and ASF outbreak with two-year delay alternative scenarios 


























Baseline 138  379  441  105  464  112  
Scenario 1: Individual producers             
S1.A1: Microcredit $150K 74 3 352 1c 79 3 123 2c 51 3 38 3 
S1.A1.2: Microcredit $300K 11 (4)b 352 1c 67 (4) 105 (4) 44 (4) 113 (2c) 
S1.A2: Biosecurity 244 1 352 1 338 1 295 1 251 1 222 1 
S1.A4: AI 143 2 352 1c 146 2 111 3d 109 2 112 2 
S1.A5: Combination 227 3 365 3 374 2 272 3d 276 3 181 3 
Scenario 2: Producer groups             
S2.A1: Microcredit $150K 70 2 343 2 277 2 187 2 140 3 5 2c 
S2.A1.2: Microcredit $300K 69 (4) 361 (1) 255 (4) 57 (4) 196 (2) 7 (2) 
S2.A2: Training 210 1 352 1 283 1 268 1 400 1 201 1 
S2.A4: Biosecurity 71 3 343 2c 263 3 170 3 166 2 2 3d 
S2.A5: Combination 249 2 394 1c 370 3 366 2c 495 2 206 2 
Scenario 3: Producer organisations             
S3.A1: Microcredit $150K 70 3 343 1c 391 2 57 3d 261 2 14 2 
S3.A1.2: Microcredit $300K 69 (4) 348 (4) 384 (3) 57 (3) 252 (3) 9 (3) 
S3.A2: Biosecurity 211 1 343 1 442 1 380 1 593 1 461 1 
S3.A4: AI 71 2 343 1c 372 3 193 2c 243 3 13 3 
S3.A5: Combination 250 1 378 2d 504 1 446 1 671 1 520 1 
Note: a Rank for S1.A5, S2.A5, and S3.A5: Combination refers to the ranking of the three (S1, S2, and S3) institutional scenarios. b Value in parentheses denotes that ranking of the 
sub activity A1.2. c indicates rankings that have improved in the alternative scenario compared with the standard model run. d indicates rankings that have worsened in the 
alternative scenario compared with the standard model run. 




Histograms and box plots for results of multi-variate sensitivity 
analysis 
E.1 Histograms for aggregate profits of all pig producers 
 
Figure E1: Frequency distribution for S1(individual).A5: short-term aggregate profits of all pig 
producers 




Figure E2: Frequency distribution for S2(PGs).A5: short-term aggregate profits of all pig producers 
Source: Pork VC model simulation 
 
 
Figure E3: Frequency distribution for S3(POs).A5: short-term aggregate profits of all pig producers 
Source: Pork VC model simulation 
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Figure E4: Frequency distribution for S1(individual).A5: medium-term aggregate profits of all pig 
producers 
Source: Pork VC model simulation 
 
 
Figure E5: Frequency distribution for S2(PGs).A5: medium-term aggregate profits of all pig 
producers 
Source: Pork VC model simulation 
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Figure E6: Frequency distribution for S3(POs).A5: medium-term aggregate profits of all pig 
producers 
Source: Pork VC model simulation 
 
 
Figure E7: Frequency distribution for S1(individual).A5: long-term aggregate profits of all pig 
producers 
Source: Pork VC model simulation 
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Figure E8: Frequency distribution for S2(PGs).A5: long-term aggregate profits of all pig producers 
Source: Pork VC model simulation 
 
 
Figure E9: Frequency distribution for S3(POs).A5: long-term aggregate profits of all pig producers 
Source: Pork VC model simulation 
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E.2 Histograms for number of pig producers in highly profitable systems 
 
Figure E10: Frequency distribution for S1(individual).A5: short-term number of pig producers in 
highly profitable systems 
Source: Pork VC model simulation 
 
 
Figure E11: Frequency distribution for S2(PGs).A5: short-term number of pig producers in highly 
profitable systems 
Source: Pork VC model simulation 
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Figure E12: Frequency distribution for S3(P0s).A5: short-term number of pig producers in highly 
profitable systems 
Source: Pork VC model simulation 
 
 
Figure E13: Frequency distribution for S1(individual).A5: medium-term number of pig producers in 
highly profitable systems 
Source: Pork VC model simulation 
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Figure E14: Frequency distribution for S2(PGs).A5: medium-term number of pig producers in highly 
profitable systems 
Source: Pork VC model simulation 
 
 
Figure E15: Frequency distribution for S3(POs).A5: medium-term number of pig producers in highly 
profitable systems 
Source: Pork VC model simulation 
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Figure E16: Frequency distribution for S1(individual).A5: long-term number of pig producers in 
highly profitable systems 
Source: Pork VC model simulation 
 
 
Figure E17: Frequency distribution for S2(PGs).A5: long-term number of pig producers in highly 
profitable systems 
Source: Pork VC model simulation 
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Figure E18: Frequency distribution for S3(POs).A5: long-term number of pig producers in highly 
profitable systems 
Source: Pork VC model simulation 
E.3 Box plots for aggregate profits for all pig producers 
 
 
Figure E19: Box plot for short-term aggregate profits of all pig producers  
Source Pork VC model simulation  
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Figure E20: Box plot for medium-term aggregate profits of all pig producers 
Source: Pork VC model simulation  
 
 
Figure E21: Box plots for long-term aggregate profits of all pig producers 
Source: Pork VC model simulation 
 
 




Figure E22: Box plot for short-term number of pig producers in highly profitable systems 
Source: Pork VC model simulation  
 
 
Figure E23: Box plot  for medium-term numbers of pig producers in highly profitable systems 





Figure E24: Box plot for long-term numbers of pig producers in highly profitable systems 
Source: Pork VC model simulation 
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Appendix F 
Results from multi-variate sensitivity analysis with alternative 














































Table F1: Comparison of alternative sample sizes on multi-variate sensitivity analysis: aggregate profits of all pig producers in scenario one 
Scenario Short-term Medium-term Long-term 































































Scenario 1: Individual 
producers 
         


































































































































































Note: SA denotes results from sensitivity analysis with different sample sizes for LHS. SA: 1000 is the standard sensitivity analysis testing that used 1000 sample runs. SA: 500 
shows the results with 500 sample runs, and SA: 2000 shows results with 2000 sample runs. The % change figure represents the percentage change in the mean between SA:1000 
and SA:500/SA:2000. The coefficients of variation (CV) are provided in brackets below. a Value in parentheses denotes that ranking of the sub activity A1.2 




Table F2: Comparison of alternative sample sizes on multi-variate sensitivity analysis: aggregate profits of all pig producers in scenario two 
Scenario Short-term Medium-term Long-term 































































Scenario 2: Producer Groups          


































































































































































Note: SA denotes results from sensitivity analysis with different sample sizes for LHS. SA: 1000 is the standard sensitivity analysis testing that used 1000 sample runs. SA: 500 
shows the results with 500 sample runs, and SA: 2000 shows results with 2000 sample runs. The % change figure represents the percentage change in the mean between SA:1000 
and SA:500/SA:2000. The coefficients of variation (CV) are provided in brackets below. a Value in parentheses denotes that ranking of the sub activity A1.2 





Table F3: Comparison of alternative sample sizes on multi-variate sensitivity analysis: aggregate profits of all pig producers in scenario three 
Scenario Short-term Medium-term Long-term 































































Scenario 3: Producer 
Organisations 
         


































































































































































Note: SA denotes results from sensitivity analysis with different sample sizes for LHS. SA: 1000 is the standard sensitivity analysis testing that used 1000 sample runs. SA: 500 
shows the results with 500 sample runs, and SA: 2000 shows results with 2000 sample runs. The % change figure represents the percentage change in the mean between SA:1000 
and SA:500/SA:2000. The coefficients of variation (CV) are provided in brackets below. a Value in parentheses denotes that ranking of the sub activity A1.2 
Source: Pork VC model simulation 
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Table F4: Comparison of alternative sample sizes on multi-variate sensitivity analysis: number of pig producers in highly profitable systems in scenario one 
Scenario Short-term Medium-term Long-term 































































Scenario 1: Individual 
Producers 
         


































































































































































Note: SA denotes results from sensitivity analysis with different sample sizes for LHS. SA: 1000 is the standard sensitivity analysis testing that used 1000 sample runs. SA: 500 
shows the results with 500 sample runs, and SA: 2000 shows results with 2000 sample runs. The % change figure represents the percentage change in the mean between SA:1000 
and SA:500/SA:2000. The coefficients of variation (CV) are provided in brackets below. a Value in parentheses denotes that ranking of the sub activity A1.2 
Source: Pork VC model simulation 
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Table F5: Comparison of alternative sample sizes on multi-variate sensitivity analysis: number of pig producers in highly profitable systems in scenario two 
Scenario Short-term Medium-term Long-term 































































Scenario 2: Producer Groups          


































































































































































Note: SA denotes results from sensitivity analysis with different sample sizes for LHS. SA: 1000 is the standard sensitivity analysis testing that used 1000 sample runs. SA: 500 
shows the results with 500 sample runs, and SA: 2000 shows results with 2000 sample runs. The % change figure represents the percentage change in the mean between SA:1000 
and SA:500/SA:2000. The coefficients of variation (CV) are provided in brackets below. a Value in parentheses denotes that ranking of the sub activity A1.2. b indicates rankings that 
have improved in SA: 500 and SA: 2000 compared with SS: 1000. c indicates rankings that have worsened in SA: 500 and SA: 2000 compared with SS: 1000.  
Source: Pork VC model simulation 
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Table F6: Comparison of alternative sample sizes on multi-variate sensitivity analysis: number of pig producers in highly profitable systems in scenario three 
Scenario Short-term Medium-term Long-term 































































Scenario 3: Producer 
Organisations 
         


































































































































































Note: SA denotes results from sensitivity analysis with different sample sizes for LHS. SA: 1000 is the standard sensitivity analysis testing that used 1000 sample runs. SA: 500 
shows the results with 500 sample runs, and SA: 2000 shows results with 2000 sample runs. The % change figure represents the percentage change in the mean between SA:1000 
and SA:500/SA:2000. The coefficients of variation (CV) are provided in brackets below. a Value in parentheses denotes that ranking of the sub activity A1.2. b indicates rankings that 
have improved in SA: 500 and SA: 2000 compared with SS: 1000. c indicates rankings that have worsened in SA: 500 and SA: 2000 compared with SS: 1000.  
Source: Pork VC model simulation 
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Appendix G 





















Table G1: Results of Plus, Minus, Interesting reflection exercises 
Plus (+) Minus (-) Interesting (?) 
SGMB 1: Myeik   
- People are very open and talkative 
- Right people attended, including those who are 
important and busy 
- Could refer to agenda on wall to keep workshop on 
time 
- Facilitators were able to remain in roles better than in 
practise workshop 
 
- Questionnaire was 45 minutes, which was overly long 
- Group of 15 were too large for Layerstack and some did 
not pay attention to layers which did not relate to their 
part in the VC 
- One member tried to dominate the conversation by 
talking over others and taking a long time to present 
their opinion 
- Front of workshop was crowded with three facilitators 
- Not all participants could see the water level in the 
water-in-a-bottle script 
- Could use coloured water or coke so that people can 
see better during stock and flow example 
- Should have more space at front of workshop so 
facilitators can move easily 
- Can try having different coloured name tags for VC 
actors to help distinguish them 
- Questionnaire translation needs to be reviewed for 
simplicity 
- Researcher to take on co-facilitation role 
 
SGMB 1: Palaw   
- Kept to the agenda and followed the allocated time 
- Facilitators improved in their roles 
- Participants understood the tools very quickly and we 
received more information from Layerstack than in 
Myeik 
- Palaw NGO staff were very helpful in setting out room 
and calling participants so they arrived on time 
- Pre-workshop preparation was rushed as there was a 
misunderstanding on who would complete setting up 
tasks 
- The Palaw Rice Technical Officer talked more than 
other participants and dominated the first few layers of 
Layerstack exercises 
- Difficult to ask follow-up questions during Layerstack of 
other workshop participants 
- Time constraints because of government regulations 
means we do not have time to prepare in Palaw and 
have lengthy follow-up conversations 
 
- Participants needed help in writing, especially Karen 
ethnicity, can ask Palaw NGO staff for assistance 
- Request Palaw Rice Technical Officer to move to 
Reference Group 
- Request Palaw NGO staff to set up workshop and 
manage lunch booking so we can spend longer 
informally engaging with participant’s post-workshop 
 
SGMB 2: Myeik   
- Good preparation, nothing missing 
- Completed agenda and kept to time 
- Open discussion and able to control disagreements 
between participants 
- Facilitators turned their back on participants when 
writing on board 
- Need to summarise more often 
- After lunch four participants left as they had urgent 
business 
- Cause-and-consequence exercise was difficult and 
messy on whiteboard 
- Some participants are embarrassed to discuss in front 
of foreigners 
- Hard to read participants written words. Need to keep 
clarifying meaning with them.  
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Plus (+) Minus (-) Interesting (?) 
- Running out of time because of the need to translate 
from English-Myanmar-English  
 
SGMB 2: Palaw   
- Facilitators stuck to their role 
- Participants are open, honest, and friendly and willing 
to provide more information 
- No funnelling of information through the technical 
officer 
- Some participants copy other people’s ideas when 
writing on cards 
- Split facilitation in small groups between MBT 
members 
 
SGMB 3: Myeik   
- Participants are freer to discuss in small groups 
- Excellent one-on-one discussions with downstream VC 
actors during breaks and before/after workshops 
- MBT followed their roles, and collected all the 
information we needed 
- Friendly, open, discussion and people listened rather 
than talking over one another 
- People who were absent are the ones who expected 
handouts from the project 
- Helping people to write their answers on paper means 
they are more likely to contribute during plenary 
discussion 
- Some people get tired of writing on cards 
- Ran overtime for lunch, but because participants 
wanted to keep discussing the VC 
- Fewer participants means better discussions, we 
should do more small-group work 
- We need to ask more prompt questions along with 
“Did you understand everything?”, “What is missing 
from this diagram?” 
- We need to summarise the discussions and ask, “Is this 
correct, did I capture everything?” 
SGMB 3: Palaw   
- Finished on time 
- Completed every agenda item 
- Increasingly active participants and good discussions 
- Participants enjoyed explaining their concept models to 
each other 
- New Lead Facilitator did an excellent job 
- A new participant joined to substitute a participant that 
could not attend 
- MBT distracted by outside phone calls 
- Some items rushed so that we could finish on time 
- The lead Facilitator was unwell, so another MBT 
stepped in to fill their role 
SGMB 4: Myeik   
- Followed our roles 
- New Lead Facilitator was very active and able to 
communicate well with participants 
- Concept model was completed  
- Almost all participants attended 
- Slightly over time for workshop - Some differences in information between SGMB and 
RG and Lincoln University Producer Group research team 
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Plus (+) Minus (-) Interesting (?) 
SGMB 4: Palaw   
- Concept model and information completed - Some participants are restless with reviewing 
information as nothing new for them 
- Not easy to keep inviting participants as they are busy, 
so attendance is declining  
 
SGMB 5: Myeik   
- Almost all SGMB participants attended 
- Agree with the model recommendations 
- More discussions between participants on how they 
can work together to improve the VC 
 
- Presentation of results by PowerPoint meant that it 
was difficult to understand for some participants 
- Results presentation too lengthy 
- Long gap between workshop four and five, some 
participants had to be reminded about the concept 
model 
- Present results in simpler format 
SGMB 5: Palaw   
- Participants engaged better with simple presentation 
of key model results and recommendations 
- Some participants unable to attend because it was rice 
harvesting seasons 
- Technical Officer did not attend as they had relocated 
overseas 
- Participants want project to start now, expressed 
concern at all the consultation but no project activities 
yet 
 









Spatial group model building questionnaire and results 
 Table H1: Spatial group model building questionnaire 
Spatial Group Model Building Questionnaire 
က႑ေပါင္း စံး ပါဝငသည္း   (ဆန္စပါ စ္ က  ္ ပ႑းရ  ထ တ္က ုန္) လ ပငန္း ရွငအဖ ြဲ႕ နမူနာပံး စံ တ္ည္႑းဆာက္း ခင္း  
႑းမ ခခန္း လႊးာ 
Background Information 
႑းနာကခံ (က္ ယ္႑းရ ရာဇဝင္) အခ ကအ လက္ 
Name:   
အမည ္ 
Date of birth:  
ေ မမြးသကၠရာဇ္ 
Today’s date:  




လူမ   ြး 
Primary occupation:  
အလုပ္အက ုင္ 
Years spent working in primary occupation:  
လက္ရ ဆန္စပ္ ြး  ုက    ြးေ ရြး လုပ္ငန္ ြးတြင္ လုပ္္ ိုင္ြဲ ဲ့သည္ ဲ့     ေ အရအတြက္ 
Highest education level attained: 





Part A: Value Chain 
အပ္ င္း (က) တ္န္ ္ု  း မင္း   ထ တ္က ုန္လုပငန္း  က င္း ဆက္ 
Q.1) I know all the key people in the paddy/pork value chain.  
ေ မြးမြန္ ြး-၁) ြန္  ိုြး ျမင္ ဲ့ ဆန္စပ္ ြး  ုက    ြးေ ရြး ထြ္ုိုန္ လုပ္ငန္ ြးတြင္ ပ္ ဝင္ေ ေနသာ အဓ ကလူ အာြးလံ  ုြးက ု
တက    ု ္ပ္္ သ ပ္ သည္။   
 
Please tick your response: ေ က ြးဇူြး ျပ္ ၍ သင္၏ေအ ျဖက ု (ေ ရ ြးၿပ္ ြး) အမ န္ ျြ ္ေ ပ္ြးပ္ ။ 
Strongly agree 
(ေ ကာင္ ြးေ ကာင္ ြးသ ပ္ သည္) 
Agree 




(မသ ပ္ ) 
Strongly 
disagree 
(လံ  ုြးဝ 
မသ ပ္ ) 
 
 
Q.2) Please list the roles of key people in the paddy/pork value chain you know. 
ေ မြးမြန္ ြး-၂) ြန္ ို  ြး ျမင္ ဲ့ ဆန္စပ္ ြး  ုက    ြးေ ရြး ထြ္ုိုန္လိုပ္ငန္ ြး တကင္ ြးဆက္ကြ င္  သငသ ေ သာ အဓ ကလူမ ာြး၏ 




Q.3) There are opportunities to increase my income from paddy/pork. 
ေ မြးမြန္ ြး-၃) ဆန္စပ္ ြး  ုက    ြးေ ရြး ထြ္ုိုန္လိုပ္ငန္ ြး ျဖင္ ဲ့ ကတ    ္ုပ္္၏ ဝင္ေ မငြု  ြးြကလ ာဖု  ႔ 
အမြင္ ဲ့အလမ္ ြးမ ာြး ရ  ပ္ သည္။  
 
Please tick your response: ေ က ြးဇူြး ျပ္ ၍ သင္၏ေအ ျဖက ု (ေ ရ ြးၿပ္ ြး) အမ န္ ျြ ္ေ ပ္ြးပ္ ။ 
Strongly agree  
(အတလန္ ရ  ပ္ သည္) 
Agree 




(မရ  ပ္ ) 
Strongly 
disagree 
(လံ  ုြးဝ မရ  ပ္ ) 
 
 
Q.4) I understand how different people in the paddy/pork value chain add value to the product. 
ေ မြးမြန္ ြး-၄) ဆန္စပ္ ြး  ုက    ြးေ ရြး ထြ္ုိုန္လိုပ္ငန္ ြးေ တြမ ာ လုပ္ငန္ ြးက႑မြူသူေ တြဟာ  ထုြ္ိုန္ေ တြ 
ြန္  ိုြးြကလ ာေ အာင္  (ေ   ြးပ္ ုေရအာင္) မညသ ို႔လုပ္္ေ ဆာငၾကသည္ ို တက    ု ္ပ္္ သ ပ္ သည္။  
 
Please tick your response: ေ က ြးဇူြး ျပ္ ၍ သင္၏ေအ ျဖက ု (ေ ရ ြးၿပ္ ြး) အမ န္ ျြ ္ေ ပ္ြးပ္ ။ 
Strongly agree 
(ေ ကာင္ ြးေ ကာင္ ြးသ ပ္ သည္) 
Agree 




(မသ ပ္ ) 
Strongly 
disagree 
(လံ  ုြးဝ 
မသ ပ္ ) 
 
Q.5) I understand the differences in profit people in the paddy/pork value chain make from the value they 
add to the product 
ေ မြးမြန္ ြး-၅) ဆန္စပ္ ြး  ုက    ြးေ ရြး ထြ္ုိုန္လိုပ္ငန္ ြး လုပ္သူမ ာြးသည္ သူြ ု႔၏ ထြ္ုိုန္ ြန္  ိုြးြက္ေ အာင္ 
(ေ   ြးပ္ ုေရအာင္) လုပ္္ာတြင္ အက   ြးအျမြ္ အနည္ ြးအမ ာြး မြူည ြာေ တြရ  ၾကြာက ု တက  န္ ပု္သ ပ္ သည္။ 
 
Please tick your response: ေ က ြးဇူြး ျပ္ ၍ သင္၏ေအ ျဖက ု (ေ ရ ြးၿပ္ ြး) အမ န္ ျြ ္ေ ပ္ြးပ္ ။ 
Strongly agree 
(ေ ကာင္ ြးေ ကာင္ ြးသ ပ္ သည္) 
Agree 









(လံ  ုြးဝ 
မသ ပ္ ) 
 
Q.6) I understand all the types of relationships (friend, contract, cash-buyer, etc.) between the different 
actors in the paddy/pork value chain. 
ေ မြးမြန္ ြး-၆) ဆန္စပ္ ြး  ုက    ြးေ ရြး ထြ္ုိုန္ လုပ္ငန္ ြးေ တြမ ာ လုပ္ငန္ ြးက႑ မြူသူေ တြအၾကာြး 
(မ ြ္ေ တဆသူငယ္္ င္ ြး ျဖ သူ၊  ာြ  ပ္္ ျဖင္ ဲ့လုပ္သူ၊ ေ မငလကင ္ ြးေ ပ္ြးဝယ္သ ူ  သျဖင္ ဲ့) 
ပ္ြသကဆ က္  မ ယ္္ရ ပံ္ ု ံဘယ္လ  ိုရ  သည္ ို သ ပ္ သည္။ 
 
Please tick your response: ေ က ြးဇူြး ျပ္ ၍ သင္၏ေအ ျဖက ု (ေ ရ ြးၿပ္ ြး) အမ န္ ျြ ္ေ ပ္ြးပ္ ။ 
Strongly agree 
(ေ ကာင္ ြးေ ကာင္ ြးသ ပ္ သည္) 
Agree 




(မသ ပ္ ) 
Strongly 
disagree 
(လံ  ုြးဝ 
မသ ပ္ ) 
 
 
Q.7) I understand that men and women have different roles in the paddy/pork value chain. 
ေ မြးမြန္ ြး-၇) ဆန္စပ္ ြး  ုက    ြးေ ရြး ထြ္ုိုန္လိုပ္ငန္ ြး လုပ္္ေ နၾကသည္ ဲ့  အမ   ြးသာြး   င္ ဲ့ အမ   ြးသမ ြးေ တြအၾကာြး 
မြူည ြြဲဲ့ အလုပ္ြာဝန္ေ္႑တြ ရ  ေ နၾကသည္ ို သ ပ္ သည္။  
 
Please tick your response: ေ က ြးဇူြး ျပ္ ၍ သင္၏ေအ ျဖက ု (ေ ရ ြးၿပ္ ြး) အမ န္ ျြ ္ေ ပ္ြးပ္ ။ 
Strongly agree 
(ေ ကာင္ ြးေ ကာင္ ြးသ ပ္ သည္) 
Agree 




(မသ ပ္ ) 
Strongly 
disagree 
(လံ  ုြးဝ 
မသ ပ္ ) 
 
 
Q.8) Please list the main roles women and men have in paddy/pork production. 
ေ မြးမြန္ ြး-၈) ေ က ြးဇူြး ျပ္ ၍ ဆန္စပ္ ြး  ုက    ြးေ ရြး ထြ္ုိုန္လိုပ္ငန္ ြးအတြင္ ြးရ  အမ   ြးသာြး   င္ ဲ့ အမ   ြးသမ ြးမ ာြး၏ 
အဓ က အြန္ ြးက႑က ု ေ ဖာ ္ ျေပ္ပ္ြးပ္ ။  
 
Women’s roles 
အမ   ြးသမ ြးမ ာြး၏ အြန္ ြးက႑ 
Men’s roles 






Q.9) I know the quality characteristics of paddy/pork products that earn a higher price.  
ေ မြးမြန္ ြး-၉) ေ   ြးေ ကာင္ ြးပ္ ုရသည္ ဲ့ ဆန္စပ္ ြး  ုက    ြးေ ရြး ထြ္ုိုန္္ ာြး၏ အရေညအတသြး လကၡဏာက ု တက     ္ုပ္္ 
သ ပ္ သည္။ 
 
Please tick your response: ေ က ြးဇူြး ျပ္ ၍ သင္၏ေအ ျဖက ု (ေ ရ ြးၿပ္ ြး) အမ န္ ျြ ္ေ ပ္ြးပ္ ။ 
Strongly agree 
(ေ ကာင္ ြးေ ကာင္ ြးသ ပ္ သည္) 
Agree 




(မသ ပ္ ) 
Strongly 
disagree 
(လံ  ုြးဝ 




Q.10) I know the volume of paddy/pork products that earn a higher price. 
ေ မြးမြန္ ြး-၁၀) ေ   ြးေ ကာင္ ြးပ္ ုရသည္ ဲ့ ဆန္စပ္ ြး  ုက    ြးေ ရြး ထြ္ုိုန္္ ာြး၏ ေအရာင္ ြးအဝယ္လ ိုပ္္ေ နသည္ ဲ့ 
ပ္မာဏက ု တက    ု ္ပ္္ သ ပ္ သည္။ 
 
Please tick your response: ေ က ြးဇူြး ျပ္ ၍ သင္၏ေအ ျဖက ု (ေ ရ ြးၿပ္ ြး) အမ န္ ျြ ္ေ ပ္ြးပ္ ။ 
Strongly agree 
(ေ ကာင္ ြးေ ကာင္ ြးသ ပ္ သည္) 
Agree 




(မသ ပ္ ) 
Strongly 
disagree 
(လံ  ုြးဝ 
မသ ပ္ ) 
 
Q.11) I know at what times of year the prices for paddy/pork products are higher. 
ေ မြးမြန္ ြး-၁၁) ဘယ္အ ြ  န္ ဘယ္္ာသ ဘယ္္ာေလတြမ ာ ဆန္စပ္ ြး  ုက    ြးေ ရြး ထြ္ုိုန္ေ တြ ပ္ ု၍ ေ   ြးႀက ြးြြသည္ 
(ပ္ ု၍ ေ   ြးေ ကာင္ ြးြြသည္)က ု တက    ္ ပ္ု္ သ ပ္ သည္။ 
 
Please tick your response: ေ က ြးဇူြး ျပ္ ၍ သင္၏ေအ ျဖက ု (ေ ရ ြးၿပ္ ြး) အမ န္ ျြ ္ေ ပ္ြးပ္ ။ 
Strongly agree 
(ေ ကာင္ ြးေ ကာင္ ြးသ ပ္ သည္) 
Agree 




(မသ ပ္ ) 
Strongly 
disagree 
(လံ  ုြးဝ 
မသ ပ္ ) 
 
Q.12) I know what type of paddy/pork products are demanded by consumers. 
ေ မြးမြန္ ြး-၁၂) မညသည္ ဲ့ ဆန္စပ္ ြး  ုက    ြးေ ရြး ထြ္ုိုန္္   ြးအမ   ြးအ ာြးက ု ဝယ္သ ူေ တြ လ ုြ င္ေ နၾကသလြဲဆ ုြာ 
တက    ု ္ပ္္ သ ပ္ သည္။  
 
Please tick your response: ေ က ြးဇူြး ျပ္ ၍ သင္၏ေအ ျဖက ု (ေ ရ ြးၿပ္ ြး) အမ န္ ျြ ္ေ ပ္ြးပ္ ။ 
Strongly agree 
(ေ ကာင္ ြးေ ကာင္ ြး 
သ ပ္ သည္။ 
Agree 




(မသ ပ္ ) 
Strongly 
disagree 
(လံ  ုြးဝ မသ ပ္ ) 
 
Q.13) I have a good understanding of the potential markets for my paddy/pork products. 
ေ မြးမြန္ ြး-၁၃) တက     ္ုပ္္၏ ဆန္စပ္ ြး  ုက    ြးေ ရြး ထြ္ုိုန္ ္ေ တြအတြက္ အလာြးအလာေ ကာင္ ြးသည္ ဲ့  
ေ   ြးတကေကအ  ျြေအနမ ာြးက ု တက    ု ္ပ္္ ေ ကာင္ ြးေ ကာင္ ြး သ ပ္ သည္။ 
 
Please tick your response: ေ က ြးဇူြး ျပ္ ၍ သင္၏ေအ ျဖက ု (ေ ရ ြးၿပ္ ြး) အမ န္ ျြ ္ေ ပ္ြးပ္ ။ 
Strongly agree 
(ေ ကာင္ ြးေ ကာင္ ြးသ ပ္ သည္) 
Agree 




(မသ ပ္ ) 
Strongly 
disagree 
(လံ  ုြးဝ 
မသ ပ္ ) 
 
Q.14 I have a good understanding of how the paddy/pork value chain effects (positive and negative) the 
livelihoods of poorer communities. 
ေ မြးမြန္ ြး-၁၄) ြန္  ိုြး ျမင္ ဲ့ ဆန္စပ္ ြး  ုက    ြးေ ရြး ထြ္ုိုန္ လုပ္ငန္ ြးသည္ ဆင္ ြးရြဲသာြးမ သာြး ုမ ာြး၏ 
( ာြးဝြ္ေ ေနရြး) လူေ နမ  ဘဝေအပ္ၚ မညသည္ ဲ့ ေ ကာင္ ြးက   ြး/ဆု  ြးက   ြးမ ာြး သက္ေ ရာက္ေ  သည္ ို  
တက    ု ္ပ္္ ေ ကာင္ ြးေ ကာင္ ြး သ ပ္ သည္။ 
 
Please tick your response: ေ က ြးဇူြး ျပ္ ၍ သင္၏ေအ ျဖက ု (ေ ရ ြးၿပ္ ြး) အမ န္ ျြ ္ေ ပ္ြးပ္ ။ 
Strongly agree 
(ေ ကာင္ ြးေ ကာင္ ြးသ ပ္ သည္) 
Agree 









(လံ  ုြးဝ 
မသ ပ္ ) 
 
Q.15) The paddy/pork value chain does little harm to the natural environment. (translated: “little” means 
“almost none”) 
ေ မြးမြန္ ြး-၁၅) ြန္  ိုြး ျမင္ ဲ့ ဆန္စပ္ ြး  ုက    ြးေ ရြး ထြ္ုိုန္လိုပ္ငန္ ြးသည္  သဘာဝပ္ြ္ဝန္ ြးက င္ ို ထ ြ ုက္ရ မရ  ပ္ ။ 
(ထ ြ ုက္ရ မရ  ေသလာက ပ္ြဲ။) 
 
Please tick your response: ေ က ြးဇူြး ျပ္ ၍ သင္၏ေအ ျဖက ု (ေ ရ ြးၿပ္ ြး) အမ န္ ျြ ္ေ ပ္ြးပ္ ။ 
Strongly agree  
(လံ  ုြးဝ 
မထ ြ ုေကသ လက ြဲ) 
Agree 




(ထ ြု  ကြ ယ္္) 
Strongly disagree 
(လံ  ုြးဝ 
ထ ြ ုကြ ယ္္) 
 
Q.16) I understand how I can improve my paddy/pork products to earn extra income. 
ေ မြးမြန္ ြး-၁၆) အပ္ ု ဝင္ေ မငြု  ြးလာေ  ရန္ တက    ္ ပ္ု္၏ ဆန္စပ္ ြး  ုက    ြးေ ရြး ထြ္ုိုန္္ ာြးက ု မညသ ို႔ 
ြ ုြးြက္ေ ကာင္ ြးမမန္လာေ အာင္ လုပ္္မည္ ို တက     ္ုပ္္ သ ပ္ သည္။ 
 
Please tick your response: ေ က ြးဇူြး ျပ္ ၍ သင္၏ေအ ျဖက ု (ေ ရ ြးၿပ္ ြး) အမ န္ ျြ ္ေ ပ္ြးပ္ ။ 
Strongly agree 
(ေ ကာင္ ြးေ ကာင္ ြးသ ပ္ သည္) 
Agree 




(မသ ပ္ ) 
Strongly 
disagree 
(လံ  ုြးဝ 
မသ ပ္ ) 
 
Q.17) I am interested in using new practices in my paddy/pork business. 
ေ မြးမြန္ ြး-၁၇) ဆန္စပ္ ြး  ုက    ြးေ ရြး လက္ေ တြ႔အသ ံု ြးြ နည္ ြးပ္ညာ လုပ္နည္ ြးလုပ္ဟန္ အသ ္ ာြး 
အသ ံ ုြး ျပ္ ျြင္ ြးက ု တက     ္ုပ္္   ြ္ဝငစာြးပ္ သည္။  
 
Please tick your response: ေ က ြးဇူြး ျပ္ ၍ သင္၏ေအ ျဖက ု (ေ ရ ြးၿပ္ ြး) အမ န္ ျြ ္ေ ပ္ြးပ္ ။ 
Strongly agree 
(ေ ကာင္ ြးေ ကာင္ ြးသ ပ္ သည္) 
Agree 




(မသ ပ္ ) 
Strongly 
disagree 
(လံ  ုြးဝ 
မသ ပ္ ) 
 
Q.18) Making improvements to my paddy/pork business is beyond my ability.  
ေ မြးမြန္ ြး-၁၈) တက    ္ ုပ္္၏ ဆန္စပ္ ြး  ုက    ြးေ ရြး လုပ္ငန္ ြးက ု ပ္ ုမ ုြ ုြးြက္ေ ကာင္ ြးမမန္လာေ အာင္ 
အဆင္ ဲ့ ျမ င္ ဲ့ြင္  ေ ဆာရငက္္ ျြင္ ြးမ ာြး  ( ျပ္ လုပ္  ို႔) တကမ     ု ္ပ္္ မြြ္    ုင ၊ လကလရ မ္ ြးမမ ပ္ ။ 
 
Please tick your response: ေ က ြးဇူြး ျပ္ ၍ သင္၏ေအ ျဖက ု (ေ ရ ြးၿပ္ ြး) အမ န္ ျြ ္ေ ပ္ြးပ္ ။ 
Strongly agree  
(လံ  ုြးဝ 
မြြ္    ုင ) 
Agree 




(ြြ္    ငုြယ္္) 
Strongly disagree 
(ေ ကာင္ ြးေ ကာင္ ြး 
ြြန ို ငြယ္္) 
 
Q.19) I have a good understanding of the key challenges to earning more income from the paddy/pork value 
chain. 
ေ မြးမြန္ ြး-၁၉) ြန္  ိုြး ျမင္ ဲ့ ဆန္စပ္ ြး  ုက    ြးေ ရြး ထြ္ုိုန္လိုပ္ငန္ ြး ျဖင္ ဲ့ မ သာြး ုဝင္ေ မင ပ္ ုြ ုြးလာေ အာငလိုပ္  ို႔  
အဓ က   န္ေ ြၚမ  မ ာြး၊ အြကအ ြြဲမ ာြး၊ အြာြးအဆ ြးမ ာြးက ု တက    ္ ုပ္္ ေ ကာင္ ြးမ ာ သ ပ္ သည္။ 
 




(ေ ကာင္ ြးေ ကာင္ ြးသ ပ္ သည္) 
Agree 




(မသ ပ္ ) 
Strongly 
disagree 
(လံ  ုြးဝ 
မသ ပ္ ) 
 
Q.20) Please list the key challenges to earning more income from the paddy/pork value chain. 
ေ မြးမြန္ ြး-၂၀) ဆန္စပ္ ြး  ုက    ြးေ ရြး ထြ္ုိုန္လိုပ္ငန္ ြး ျဖင္ ဲ့ မ သာြး ုဝင္ေ မင ပ္ ုြ ုြးလာေ အာငလိုပ္  ို႔  အဓ က 




















Part B: Relationships and Trust 
အပ္ ုင္ ြး(ြ) ေ ပ္ င္ ြးသင္ ြးဆကဆ ံေ ရြး   င္ ဲ့ ယ္ံုၾကည္ရ 
Q.21) My suppliers/buyers always provide me with the information I require for my business. 
ေ မြးမြန္ ြး-၂၁) ကတ   ္ ုပ္္၏   ြးမပ္ာြးေ ရြးလုပ္ငန္ ြးအတြက္ လ ုအပ္္ေ သာ သြင္ ြးအြ ကအ လက္ ာြး   င္ ဲ့ ပ္ြသကၿပ္ ြး 
ကတ   ္ ပ္ု္ ို ေ ရာင္ ြးေြ ပ္ြးေ နသူမ ာြး/ တကမ     ု ္ ုပ္ထံမ ဝယ္ယ ူေ နသူမ ာြးက တက    ု ္ပ္အာြး အၿမြဲလ ုလ ု  
သြင္ ြးေမ  ဝ ကူည ေ ပ္ြးၾကပ္ သည္။ 
 
Please tick your response: ေ က ြးဇူြး ျပ္ ၍ သင္၏ေအ ျဖက ု (ေ ရ ြးၿပ္ ြး) အမ န္ ျြ ္ေ ပ္ြးပ္ ။ 
Strongly agree 
(ေ ကာင္ ြးေ ကာင္ ြးေ ပ္ြးပ္ သည္) 
Agree 







(လံ  ုြးဝ 
ေမပ္ြးပ္ ) 
 
Q.22) All members of the value chain are always fair and honest in their negotiations with me. 
ေ မြးမြန္ ြး-၂၂) ဆန္စပ္ ြး  ုက    ြးေ ရြး ထြ္ုိုန္ လုပ္ငန္ ြးအတြင္ ြးရ   အစဖြဲ႕ဝင္ ာြးအာြးလံ  ုြးသည္ တက    ု ္ပ္္    င္ ဲ့ 
ည      င္ ြးလုပ္္ေ ဆာငာ္တြင္ (တက     ္ုေပ္အပ္ၚ) အၿမြဲြမ္ ြး မ  ြမ  ရ  ၾကပ္ သည္။   ုသာြးၾကပ္ သည္။  
 
Please tick your response: ေ က ြးဇူြး ျပ္ ၍ သင္၏ေအ ျဖက ု (ေ ရ ြးၿပ္ ြး) အမ န္ ျြ ္ေ ပ္ြးပ္ ။ 
Strongly agree 
(ေအြာ ္ မ  ြ 
  ုြးသာြးၾကပ္ သည္) 
Agree (မ  ြ 
  ုြးသာြးၾကပ္ သည္) 
Neutral  
(ၾကာြးေ န) 
Disagree (မမ  ြ 
မ  ုြးသာြးၾကပ္ ) 
Strongly disagree 
(လံ  ုြးဝ မမ  ြ 
မ  ုြးသာြးၾကပ္ ) 
 
Q.23) There are specific members of the value chain which are always fair and honest in their negotiations 
with me. 
ေ မြးမြန္ ြး-၂၃) တက     ္ုပ္္    င္ ဲ့ ည      င္ ြးြ ုင င္ လုပ္္ေ ဆာငာ္တြင္  (တက    ္ ေုပ္အပ္ၚ) အၿမြဲြမ္ ြး မ  ြမ  ၊ 
  ုြးသာြးမ  ရ  ၾကသည္ ဲ့ အစဖြဲ႕ဝင္ ာြး အထြူးသျဖင္ ဲ့ သြသြ္ရြ္ရြ္   ရ  ပ္ သည္။ 
 
Please tick your response: ေ က ြးဇူြး ျပ္ ၍ သင္၏ေအ ျဖက ု (ေ ရ ြးၿပ္ ြး) အမ န္ ျြ ္ေ ပ္ြးပ္ ။ 
Strongly agree 
(ေအြာ ္ 
သြသြ္ရြ္ရြ္ရ ပ္ သည္) 
Agree 




(မရ  ပ္ ) 
Strongly 
disagree 
(လံ  ုြးဝ မရ  ပ္ ) 
Please list these members: 






Q.24) Members of the value chain may use opportunities to hurt me financially.  
ေ မြးမြန္ ြး-၂၄) ြန္  ိုြးတကင္ ြးဆက္ကြ င ဝင္ေ သာ အစဖြဲ႕ဝင္ ာြးသည္  တက  န္ ပု္အာြး   ြးမပ္ာြးေ ရြးအရ ထ ြ ုက္ေ ေ အာင္ 
အမြင္ ဲ့အလမ္ ြးမ ာြး အက   ြးအျမြ္ ာြးက ု မြရာြးသျဖင္ ဲ့ ရယ္ူေ နၾကသည္။ 
 
Please tick your response: ေ က ြးဇူြး ျပ္ ၍ သင္၏ေအ ျဖက ု (ေ ရ ြးၿပ္ ြး) အမ န္ ျြ ္ေ ပ္ြးပ္ ။ 
Strongly agree  










Strongly disagree  
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Q.25) I only trust specific members of the value chain to give me a fair price for my goods or services. 
ေ မြးမြန္ ြး-၂၅) တက    ု ္ပ္္၏ ထြ္ုိုန္္ ာြးအတြက္ သင္ ဲ့ြင္ ဲ့မ  ေြသာ ေ   ြးြ ္ိုရရ  ဖ ု႔ လုပ္ငန္ ြးအတြင္ ြးရ  
သြသြ္ရြ္ရြ ္(လူနည္ ြး ု) အစဖြဲ႕ဝင္ေ တြက ုသာ တက    ု ္ပ္္ ယ္ံ ုၾကညလ ို႔ ရပ္ သည္။ 
 
Please tick your response: ေ က ြးဇူြး ျပ္ ၍ သင္၏ေအ ျဖက ု (ေ ရ ြးၿပ္ ြး) အမ န္ ျြ ္ေ ပ္ြးပ္ ။ 
Strongly agree (အတလန္ 
ယ္ံ ၾုကညလ ို႔ ရပ္ သည္) 
Agree 





(ယ္ံ ၾုကညလ ို႔ 
မရပ္ ) 
Strongly disagree  
(လံ  ုြးဝ ယ္ံ ုၾကညလ ို႔ 
မရပ္ ) 
 
Q.26) There are more benefits for me when I work closely with all members of the value chain. 
ေ မြးမြန္ ြး-၂၆) ြန္  ိုြး ျမင္ ဲ့ ဆန္စပ္ ြး  ုက    ြးေ ရြး ထြ္ုိုန္လိုပ္ငန္ ြးအတြင္ ြးရ  အစဖြဲ႕ဝင္ ာြး အာြးလံ  ုြး    င္ ဲ့ 
ရင္ ြးရင္ ြးန ြးန ြး အလုပ္လ ိုပ္သည္ ဲ့အြ  ကတ   ္ ပု္အ တြက္ အက   ြးအျမြ္ ပ္ ုမ ာြးပ္ သည္။ 
 
Please tick your response: ေ က ြးဇူြး ျပ္ ၍ သင္၏ေအ ျဖက ု (ေ ရ ြးၿပ္ ြး) အမ န္ ျြ ္ေ ပ္ြးပ္ ။ 
Strongly agree  
(အတလန္ မ န္ သည္) 
Agree  





Strongly disagree  
(လံ  ုြးဝ မဟုြ ) 
 
Q.27) There are more benefits for me when I work closely with specific members of the value chain. 
ေ မြးမြန္ ြး-၂၇) ြန္  ိုြး ျမင္ ဲ့ ဆန္စပ္ ြး  ုက    ြးေ ရြး ထြ္ုိုန္လိုပ္ငန္ ြးအတြင္ ြးရ  (တက     ္ုပ္္) အထူြး စြြဲ ျြာြး 
သြ္ရြထ ာြးြြဲဲ့ အစဖြဲ႕ဝင္ ာြး   င္ ဲ့ ရင္ ြးရင္ ြးန ြးန ြး အလုပ္လ ိုပ္သည္ ဲ့အြ  ကတ   ္ ပု္အ တြက္ အက   ြးအျမြ္ ပ္ ုမ ာြးပ္ သည္။ 
Please tick your response: ေ က ြးဇူြး ျပ္ ၍ သင္၏ေအ ျဖက ု (ေ ရ ြးၿပ္ ြး) အမ န္ ျြ ္ေ ပ္ြးပ္ ။ 
Strongly agree  
(အတလန္ မ န္ သည္) 
Agree  





Strongly disagree  
(လံ  ုြးဝ မဟုြ္ပ္ ) 
 
Please list the members of the value chain which you work closely with for increased benefits: 
အက   ြးအျမြြ ို  ြးလာဖ ု႔အတြက္  လုပ္ငန္ ြးမ ာ သင္    င္ ဲ့ န ြးကရပ္စာ အလုပ္လ ိုပ္္ေ ေနသာ အစဖြဲ႕ဝင္ ာြးက ု  





Q.28) I can depend upon my relationships with specific value chain members when I have a problem with 
my business. 
ေ မြးမြန္ ြး-၂၈) တက    ု ္ပ္္၏ အလုပ္္ရာ အြကအ ြြဲ  ျပႆ္နာႀကံ  ြြဲဲ့အြ   လုပ္ငန္ ြးအတြင္ ြးရ  သြသြ္ရြ္ရြ္ 
အစဖြဲ႕ဝင္ (အြ   ႕)နြဲ႔ တက    ု ္ပ္္၏ ဆကဆ ံေ ရြးေအပ္ၚ ယ္ံ ုၾကညစ ြ္ ၊ မ   ြ ု အာြးက ုြးလ ု႔ ရ   ငု သည္။ 
 
Please tick your response: ေ က ြးဇူြး ျပ္ ၍ သင္၏ေအ ျဖက ု (ေ ရ ြးၿပ္ ြး) အမ န္ ျြ ္ေ ပ္ြးပ္ ။ 
Strongly agree  
(အတလန္ မ န္ သည္) 
Agree  





Strongly disagree  




Part C: Effectiveness of SGMB 
အပ္ ုင္ ြး(ဂ) ကေ႑ပ္ င္ ြး ံ ုပ္ ဝငသည္ ဲ့ (ဆန္စပ္ ြး  ုက    ြးေ ရြး ထြ္ုိုန္) လုပ္ငန္ ြးရ ငအစဖြဲ႕ နမူနာပံ္  ံု 
ြည္ေ ဆာက္ ျြင္ ြး၏ အက   ြးသက္ေ ရာက္ရ 
Q.29) The model that we developed together accurately represents the complex and dynamic processes in 
the pork/paddy value chain: 
ေ မြးမြန္ ြး-၂၉) မ မ ြု  ႔ အြူြတက ေ ရြးဆ ြဲြြဲဲ့သည္ ဲ့ ဤ (ကေ႑ပ္ င္ ြး ံ  ုလုပ္ငန္ ြးရ င္ ာြး ပ္ ဝငသည္ ဲ့ 
ေ တြ႕ဆ ံေု တဆြးေ   မ  ြးစပ္ြဲ) ပံ္ ု ံမ   ြးသည္ ဆန္စပ္ ြး  ုက    ြးေ ရြး ထြ္ုိုန္လိုပ္ငန္ ြးအတြင္ ြး ရ  ပ္္ေ တထြးၿပ္ ြး 
အြ  န္    င္ ဲ့အမ  ေ  ျပ္ာင္ ြးလြဲ ျြင္ ြး  ျဖ စဥ္ ာြးက ု အြ အက (က ုယ္စာြး ျပ္ ) ေ ဖာ ္ ျေပ္ပ္ြးသည္။ 
  
Please tick your response: ေ က ြးဇူြး ျပ္ ၍ သင္၏ေအ ျဖက ု (ေ ရ ြးၿပ္ ြး) အမ န္ ျြ ္ေ ပ္ြးပ္ ရန္။ 
Strongly agree  
(အတလန္ မ န္ သည္) 
Agree  





Strongly disagree  
(လံ  ုြးဝ မဟုြ္ပ္ ) 
 
Q.30) What is the most important outcome for you from participating in these workshops? 
ေ မြးမြန္ ြး-၃၀) ေဤတဆြးေ   မ  ြးစပ္ြဲမ ာြးတြင္ ပ္ ဝင္ေ တဆြးေ   မ  ြး ျြင္ ြးမ ာြးမ သင္ ဲ့အတြက္ 
ေအရြးအၾက ြးဆံ  ုြး (ေအကာင္ ြးဆံ  ုြး)  အက   ြးရလဒ္ ္(ဘာလြဲ) ဘယ္အ ရာ ျဖ သလြဲ။ 
Please write your response: 




Q.31) The model helps me understand how I can make more income from the value chain:  
ေ မြးမြန္ ြး-၃၁) ဤ (ကေ႑ပ္ င္ ြး ံ  ုလုပ္ငန္ ြးရ င္ ာြး ပ္ ဝငသည္ ဲ့ ေ တြ႕ဆ ံေု တဆြးေ   မ  ြးစပ္ြဲ) ပံ္ ု ံမ   ြးသည္ 
ဆန္စပ္ ြး  ုက    ြးေ ရြး ထြ္ုိုန္ န္င္္ ြးဆက္ရ တက    ု ္ပ္္ ဘယ္လ  ို ဝင္ေ မငပ္ ုေရအာင္ လုပ္္    ုငသလြဲဆ ုြာက ု
သ ရ  နာြးလည္ေ အာင္ ကူည ေ ပ္ြးပ္ သည္။ 
 
Please tick your response: ေ က ြးဇူြး ျပ္ ၍ သင္၏ေအ ျဖက ု (ေ ရ ြးၿပ္ ြး) အမ န္ ျြ ္ေ ပ္ြးပ္ ရန္။ 
Strongly agree  
(အတလန္ မ န္ သည္) 
Agree  





Strongly disagree  
(လံ  ုြးဝ မဟုြ္ပ္ ) 
 
Q.32) Following my participation in the workshops, I have used what I have learnt to improve my business: 
ေ မြးမြန္ ြး-၃၂) ေ တြ႕ဆ ံေု တဆြးေ   မ  ြးစပ္ြဲမ ာြးတြင္ တက     ္ုပ္ ဝငြက္ေ ရာကၿပ္ ြးေ နာက္ 
တက    ္ ပ္ု္ေ လဲ့လာထာြးေ သာအရာမ ာြးက ု တက     ္ု ပ္ု္၏ လုပ္ငန္ ြး ြ ုြးြက္ ေ ကာင္ ြးမမန္  ို႔အတြက္ 
အသ ံ ုြးြ ၿပ္ ြးပ္ ၿပ္ ။ 
 
Please tick your response: ေ က ြးဇူြး ျပ္ ၍ သင္၏ေအ ျဖက ု (ေ ရ ြးၿပ္ ြး) အမ န္ ျြ ္ေ ပ္ြးပ္ ရန္။ 
Strongly agree  
(အတလန္ မ န္ သည္) 
Agree  





Strongly disagree  
(လံ  ုြးဝ မဟုြ္ပ္ ) 
 
Q.33) I have shared with many of my friends / family / business partners what I have learnt from the 
workshops: 
ေ မြးမြန္ ြး-၃၃) ေ တြ႕ဆံ ေု တဆြးေ   မ  ြးစပ္ြဲမ ာြးမ တက     ္ု ပ္ု္ေ လဲ့လာထာြးေ သာအရာမ ာြးက ု
တက    ု ္ပ္္၏ သူငယ္္ င္ ြးမ ြ္ေ တဆမ ာြး (သ ု႔မဟုြ္) တက     ္ုပ္္၏ မ သာြး ု (သ ု႔မဟုြ္) တက    ု ္ပ္္၏ 
လုပ္ငန္ ြး လက ြ ြဲေ ဖာ ္မ ာြး  ေအြာ ္မ ာြးမ ာြးအာြး  ျပ္န္လည္ ေ ဝင ၿပ္ ြးပ္ ၿပ္ ။ 
 
Please tick your response: ေ က ြးဇူြး ျပ္ ၍ သင္၏ေအ ျဖက ု (ေ ရ ြးၿပ္ ြး) အမ န္ ျြ ္ေ ပ္ြးပ္ ရန္။ 
Strongly agree  
(အတလန္ မ န္ သည္) 
Agree  





Strongly disagree  




Table H2: Results from pre-spatial group model building questionnaire 
Question M N S.E 
1. I know all the key people in the VC. 4.07 28 .114 
3. There are opportunities to increase my income from paddy/pork. 4.07 28 .114 
4. I understand how different people in the VC add value to the product. 3.82 28 .137 
5. I understand the differences in profit people in the VC make from the 
value they add to the product. 
3.96 28 .096 
6. I understand all the types of relationships (friend, contract, cash-
buyer, etc.) between the different actors in the VC. 
3.71 28 .161 
7. I understand that men and women have different roles in the VC. 4.00 28 .136 
9. I know the quality characteristics of products that earn a higher price. 4.14 28 .143 
10. I know the volume of products that earn a higher price. 3.93 28 .154 
11. I know at what times of year the prices for products are higher. 4.00 28 .154 
12. I know what type of products are demanded by consumers. 4.11 28 .119 
13. I have a good understanding of the potential markets for my 
products. 
3.82 28 .090 
14. I have a good understanding of how the VC effects (positive and 
negative) the livelihoods of poorer communities. 
4.07 28 .050 
15. The VC does little harm to the natural environment.  3.29 28 .198 
16. I understand how I can improve my products to earn extra income. 3.89 28 .079 
17. I am interested in using new practices in my business. 4.39 28 .094 
18. Making improvements to my paddy/pork business is beyond my 
ability. 
3.68 28 .193 
19. I have a good understanding of the key challenges to earning more 
income from the VC. 
4.11 28 .079 
21. My suppliers/buyers always provide me with the information I 
require for my business. 
3.75 28 .175 
22. All members of the VC are always fair and honest in their 
negotiations with me. 
3.61 28 .139 
23. There are specific members of the VC which are always fair and 
honest in their negotiations with me. 
3.89 28 .079 
24. Members of the VC may use opportunities to hurt me financially. 3.32 28 .171 
25. I only trust specific members of the VC to give me a fair price for my 
goods or services. 
3.79 28 .173 
26. There are more benefits for me when I work closely with all 
members of the VC. 
4.14 28 .160 
27. There are more benefits for me when I work closely with specific 
members of the VC. 
3.96 28 .131 
28. I can depend upon my relationships with specific VC members when 
I have a problem with my business. 
4.07 28 .102 
Note: M refers to the Mean, N refers to the Number of responses, and S.E refers to the Standard Error. 










Table H3: Results from post-spatial group model building questionnaire 
Question M N S.E 
1. I know all the key people in the VC. 3.62 16 .221 
3. There are opportunities to increase my income from paddy/pork. 4.13 16 .085 
4. I understand how different people in the VC add value to the product. 4.00 16 .129 
5. I understand the differences in profit people in the VC make from the 
value they add to the product. 
4.00 16 .158 
6. I understand all the types of relationships (friend, contract, cash-
buyer, etc.) between the different actors in the VC. 
2.81 16 .228 
7. I understand that men and women have different roles in the VC. 4.07 15 .067 
9. I know the quality characteristics of products that earn a higher price. 4.13 16 .085 
10. I know the volume of products that earn a higher price. 3.50 16 .204 
11. I know at what times of year the prices for products are higher. 4.00 16 .158 
12. I know what type of products are demanded by consumers. 3.81 16 .164 
13. I have a good understanding of the potential markets for my 
products. 
3.44 16 .241 
14. I have a good understanding of how the VC effects (positive and 
negative) the livelihoods of poorer communities. 
4.00 16 .129 
15. The VC does little harm to the natural environment.  3.31 16 .313 
16. I understand how I can improve my products to earn extra income. 4.31 16 .120 
17. I am interested in using new practices in my business. 4.50 16 .129 
18. Making improvements to my paddy/pork business is beyond my 
ability. 
2.94 16 .249 
19. I have a good understanding of the key challenges to earning more 
income from the VC. 
3.94 16 .143 
21. My suppliers/buyers always provide me with the information I 
require for my business. 
3.87 15 .165 
22. All members of the VC are always fair and honest in their 
negotiations with me. 
3.47 15 .215 
23. There are specific members of the VC which are always fair and 
honest in their negotiations with me. 
3.67 15 .126 
24. Members of the VC may use opportunities to hurt me financially. 2.67 15 .252 
25. I only trust specific members of the VC to give me a fair price for my 
goods or services. 
3.87 15 .165 
26. There are more benefits for me when I work closely with all 
members of the VC. 
4.20 15 .107 
27. There are more benefits for me when I work closely with specific 
members of the VC. 
3.93 15 .118 
28. I can depend upon my relationships with specific VC members when 
I have a problem with my business. 
3.67 15 .159 
29. The model that we developed together accurately represents the 
complex and dynamic processes in the value chain. 
4.00 15 .138 
31. The model helps me understand how I can make more income from 
the value chain. 
4.13 15 .091 
32. Following my participation in the workshops, I have used what I 
have learnt to improve my business. 
3.53 15 .215 
33. I have shared with many of my friends/family/business partners 
what I have learnt from the workshops. 
3.67 15 .211 
Note: M refers to the Mean, N refers to the Number of responses, and S.E refers to the Standard Error. 
Source: Participant SGMB questionnaires 
 
 
 
